

THE ONE
AND ITS RELATION TO INTELLECT
IN PLOTINUS

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JOHN BUSSANICH

THE ONE
AND ITS RELATION TO INTELLECT
IN PLOTINUS



THE ONE AND ITS RELATION TO INTELLECT IN PLOTINUS

A commentary on selected texts

BY

JOHN BUSSANICH



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Albuquerque, New Mexico
July, 1988

INTRODUCTION

The study of Plotinus is an irresistibly intriguing and tantalizingly difficult enterprise. Behind every sentence, every phrase we can sense a vigorous intelligence at work, one which is, at the same time, supremely certain of its direction and purpose, but which also strains for expression. As readers, we too sense the tension. Hardly a paragraph passes beneath the eye without recalling the adage that, uncannily, Plotinus encapsulates the full sweep of his thought on virtually every page of the *Enneads*. All too often, however, this assuredness crumbles, when we encounter an image or phrase that is quite familiar—but in contexts entirely different from the one at hand. The topography suddenly appears strange. Traditional philosophical terms and theories are pressed into unusual service. Then, just as suddenly, the light changes and all is familiar once again. Repeated experiences of this sort have a tendency to force us to look at what seems familiar from a slightly altered perspective. A more complete introjection of ourselves into Plotinus' many ways of thinking is what I have in mind here, a procedure which at times allows a vast network of hitherto unsuspected inter-connections to come into view. At which point we feel compelled to traverse the same terrain again.

The present study, then, is a detailed record, a travel diary if you will, of repeated forays into what—for all its abstruseness and difficulty—is justly considered by Plotinian scholars to be reasonably familiar and usually well-charted territory: Plotinus' doctrine of the One and its relation to the intelligible universe. The intrepid explorer could not have better guides than Armstrong, Bréhier, Szlezák, Rist, Atkinson, Hadot, Beierwaltes, Trouillard and the many others whose pathmarkers have proved indispensable along the way. The impetus for yet another study of this cluster of central metaphysical problems in the thought of Plotinus is the conviction that much remains unexplained and hence that there is a need to wrestle with the sorts of reading experiences alluded to earlier. Often, too, I have gone a different way from eminent scholars who make out cases which are illuminating and plausible. My goal throughout has been to offer interesting and fruitful observations on texts which all Plotinian scholars know very well indeed, but which will always be open to new interpretations.

But why a commentary, instead of a thematic study? Perhaps this question is less cogent now than it would have been thirty years ago before the appearance of several outstanding commentaries on individual treatises: Beierwaltes on III.7 (1967), Cilento on the *Großschrift* (1971), Bertier et al. on VI.6 (1980), and Atkinson on V.1 (1983). However, each of these excellent commentaries derives much of its *raison d'être* from its focus on an individual treatise. The present

commentary also seeks to follow the text, philologically and philosophically, as closely as possible, but it has been necessary to depart from the single treatise format: no one treatise contains all of Plotinus' complex speculation on the One and its relation to Intellect. On this most important aspect of Plotinian metaphysics a minutely careful examination of the detailed features of Plotinus' philosophical discourse, in all its twistings and turnings, can be, it seems to me, a valuable complement to the synthetic and thematic studies which dominate this area of Plotinian studies.

In this commentary on Plotinus' most important discussions of the One and Intellect, I aim at addressing all the relevant philological questions and philosophical issues. On the former, I agree with Merlan's remark "that the philological aspects of the philosophy of Plotinus are considerably more important than it would appear at the first glance" (1963) 77. While few scholars would dispute this point, the lack of a detailed exegetical commentary on the significant texts—with the exception of the pertinent sections of Atkinson's commentary—points to an important lacuna in Plotinian scholarship. With respect to the latter, I would argue that the analysis of the key metaphysical problems must be grounded in the sort of detailed exegesis conducted in a commentary. In fact, this assumption is presupposed in many of the best studies, for example Rist (1967). Usually, however, the sweep of most studies of Plotinian metaphysics is quite broad and many of the details have not been sufficiently explored.

Although a detailed introduction to Plotinus' metaphysics and mysticism is unnecessary, it will be useful to provide an inventory of the central facets of his doctrine of the One and of his noetic theory. This will be followed by a brief consideration of Plotinus' method of philosophizing and his way of writing and speaking. Finally, I will speak to the issue of the development of his thought.

The One and its Relation to Intellect

Plotinus views both the One and Intellect from a number of distinct perspectives, which can be articulated succinctly, though at the cost of some oversimplification. The One is represented both (i) as the transcendental absolute, beyond being and all predication and (ii) as omnipresent. These two "aspects" are often seen as products of the negative and positive conceptions of the One, respectively. Though it is possible to distinguish them, they must be examined in conjunction with each other and with respect to the three "phases" of the life of Intellect. Ignoring for the moment the evidence and arguments which support the claim that Intellect has three aspects or distinct modes of life, these can be identified as follows. (i) Plotinus presents the generation of Intellect by means of his theory of procession and reversion, which he conceives as two timeless movements, but which are distinguished in a variety of ways in the texts

discussed in the commentary. This theory of ontological derivation defines the One both as generative source and as object of intellection. For an adequate understanding of this first aspect of Intellect's life—as also in the case of the third—we must examine, in context, the different roles played by the negative and positive conceptions of the first principle: the doctrine of undiminished giving and the inner life of the One. (ii) Properly speaking, Intellect designates the static and eternal, self-intelligizing actuality which is the penultimate goal of all human aspiration. The reality of the intelligible universe—a one-many comprising the unity of subject, object and activity of thinking—is the direct result of the reversion to the One. Though it is often very difficult to distinguish the actualized Intellect from the first and third phases of intellectual life, of the three it is the one that is most self-referential and furthest removed, as it were, from direct contact with the One. In the texts discussed in the commentary, this aspect of Intellect is least prominent. (iii) The ultimate phase of Intellect's life is the most elusive of the three, for it seems to be an activity which, strictly speaking, transcends the intelligible universe. For lack of a better description, I refer to this phase as the “mystical return,” in which Intellect, or the ascended soul, transcends the structure of reality by means of its “non-intellectual” and erotic part and achieves union with the One. In order to be understood this hyper-noetic life especially requires a careful elucidation of both the positive and negative conceptions of the One.

These are the essential aspects of the relation of the One and Intellect which Plotinus discusses in the texts included in this study. However, it will be quite obvious to scholars that this bald list of aspects is highly schematized and that even the relatively uncontroversial parts of it—e.g. the relation between items (i) and (ii) in Intellect's life—are open to a variety of interpretations, not to mention the knotty philosophical difficulties which each aspect, of either the One or Intellect, involves. The purpose of this brief exposé is merely to point out the major fault-lines in Plotinus' metaphysics.

Plotinus' Philosophical Style

A primary justification for a detailed exegetical commentary on the texts which discuss these difficult problems is Plotinus' manner of philosophizing. Plotinian scholars are not unfamiliar with his way of thinking, mode of composition, oral teaching style, or his oblique references to the views of predecessors, but it will be useful to rehearse these features here as a reminder of how vigilant the reader of the *Enneads* must be.

In every encounter with a Plotinian text we must be sensitive to the context of the discussion, continually on the look-out for the views of anonymous interlocutors, and always willing to read between the lines. As Wallis judiciously puts it, “the *Enneads* are written in what is in effect a philosophical shorthand,

compared with which even Aristotle is often a model of prolixity” (1972) 43. Porphyry registers the same opinion, though he understates the matter: “in writing he is concise and full of thought. He puts things shortly and abounds more in ideas than in words” (*V. Pl.* 14.1-2). The texts discussed in the commentary provide abundant evidence of the truth of these judgments.

As a member of Plotinus’ circle who was present for the lectures which he later edited for publication, Porphyry was in an excellent position to assess his teacher’s manner of thinking and writing.

When Plotinus had written anything he could never bear to go over it twice; even to read it through was too much for him, as his eyesight did not serve him well for reading. In writing he did not form the letters with any regard to appearance or divide his syllables correctly, and he paid no attention to spelling. He was wholly concerned with thought; and, which surprised us all, he went on in this way right up to the end. He worked out his train of thought from beginning to end in his own mind, and then, when he wrote it down, since he had set it all in order in his mind, he wrote as continuously as if he was copying from a book. Even if he was talking to someone, engaged in continuous conversation, he kept to his train of thought. He could take his necessary part in the conversation to the full, and at the same time keep his mind fixed without a break on what he was considering. When the person he had been talking to was gone he did not go over what he had written, because his sight, as I have said, did not suffice for revision. He went straight on with what came next, keeping the connection, just as if there had been no interval of conversation between. (*V. Pl.* 8.1-20)

Plotinus may have possessed remarkable powers of concentration, as Porphyry suggests, but this does not alleviate the difficulties created by his frequent parenthetical remarks, use of elliptical expressions, or rebuttals of the views of other philosophers, views held by figures in the Greek philosophical tradition or those expressed by members of his circle or visitors to its meetings. Wallis specifies the difficulties which arise from the last practice: “Confusion can arise from Plotinus’ habit of launching into such a passage without any indication that it does not contain his own views; nor is it always easy to see exactly where his reply starts or how much of the interlocutor’s position he means to reject” (1972) 42. Being aware of this practice is important not so much in order to be able to identify the source of a position and its implications, which are under attack, but rather to determine how thinking out his counter-position affects Plotinus’ statement of his own doctrines in a particular context. We must also reckon with the fact that in his use of earlier commentators and philosophers Plotinus “did not just speak straight out of these books but took a distinctive personal line in his consideration, and brought the method (*voûς*) of Ammonius to bear on the investigation in hand” (*V. Pl.* 14.14-16).

Plotinus’ “distinctive personal line” is also apparent in his inconsistent use of terminology and his appropriation of terms for his own purposes, as, for example, from the *Chaldaean Oracles*; but this is also often the case in his use of

Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. His aversion to systematic analysis and the abundant use of image and metaphor are other expressions of his personal style which place great demands on the commentator. In large part these characteristics can be traced to Plotinus' intellectual and emotional intensity: Porphyry remarks that "he generally expresses himself in a tone of rapt inspiration, and states what he himself really feels about the matter and not what has been handed down by tradition" (*V. Pl.* 14.2-4). I take this and similar statements to mean that Plotinus' metaphysical doctrines are often rooted in his own experience, which in turn shapes his manner of expression. Schwyzer brilliantly articulates how the texture of Plotinus' discourse reflects his experience and his distinctive view of reality.

The judgement that Plotinus writes bad Greek . . . is only correct if one considers the rules of school grammars as alone authoritative. Plotinus writes an individualistic, but never deliberately obscure Greek. The serious difficulties for understanding do not lie in an unclear manner of expression, but in the abstractness of the thought. In spite of many freedoms, Plotinus' language conforms to the laws of Greek grammar, and is not at all the stammering utterance of a mystic. It is rather an ever renewed, intelligent struggle to express the inexpressible, in which all the stylistic resources of the Greek language are employed. These, however, never become an end in themselves, but are brought in only to clarify the processes of philosophical thought. Plotinus is convinced that the majesty of the world which transcends our senses, and still more the goodness of the One, can never be expressed in words: but if anyone ever could find adequate words for that world, Plotinus has succeeded in doing so. (Schwyzer [1951] 530, tr. Armstrong [1967] 219-20)

To this fine description I would add only that it is not always the "abstractness of the thought" which creates the difficulties we often encounter in reading the *Enneads*, but also the intensity of Plotinus' experience, both of the intelligible world and of mystical union with the One. Certainly, he does not eschew rigorous philosophical thought. What we find—especially in his discussions of the One and Intellect—is a metaphysics of experience, shaped and informed by the philosophical resources of rich and diverse traditions.

Chronology and Development

The texts I have selected for detailed examination are considered in the chronological order in which they were written. This principle of arrangement is not based on a hidden agenda according to which I see Plotinus' thought developing in radically new directions. We know, after all, that all the treatises in the *Enneads* were written during the last 17 years of his life; in short, during the period of his intellectual maturity. But reading in chronological order Plotinus' successive discussions of the problem of the relation between the One and Intellect affords us the opportunity to discern his reworkings and clarifications of

earlier discussions. Armstrong's assessment of this question is precisely on the mark.

There is a good deal of variation, and it is even sometimes possible to trace a genuine development, in his repeated handling of particular problems. Plotinus had an intensely active and critical mind, and was not easily satisfied with his own or other people's formulations. But in all essentials his philosophy was fully mature before he began to write; and we have very little evidence indeed upon which to base speculation about the stages of its growth. (*Loeb Plotinus* I.vii)

Careful exegesis confirms this judgement: Plotinus' central metaphysical doctrines are maintained consistently throughout his writings, but there are significant developments in his use of terminology and, in the later treatises, greater penetration into particularly difficult problems.

Note on the Text and Translation

The basic text is H-S², the OCT edition of the *Enneads*; but for the full apparatus criticus one must consult H-S¹. I have included translations of each text discussed in the commentary to indicate where I stand on textual disputes and on syntactical and interpretive questions. My aim has been to provide translations which are as accurate as possible, but I have not shied away from suggestive renderings where the text becomes metaphorical or allusive. Thus, Armstrong's excellent translation will occasionally be found to be more literal. For translations of texts quoted in the commentary itself I have used Armstrong's: its quality is high and it is now the standard English translation. I thank Professor Armstrong for making available to me his unpublished translation of *Ennead* VI.

I translate νόησις as "intellection" and νοεῖν as "to intelligize," fully aware that the latter will win no awards for euphony. But I believe it is important to express, however clumsily, the distinction between discursive and intuitive reason. The latter is for Plotinus a sort of transcendental cognition, a point that is obscured when νόησις is translated as "thinking" or "thought," the renderings favored by most translators.

Citations or quotations of Plotinian texts in the commentary are full except when they refer to other chapters within the treatise under discussion; in these cases I refer only to chapter and lines numbers.

CHAPTER ONE

ENNEAD V.4[7].2

Introductory Note

This is the earliest treatise in which P. discusses the relation of the One and Intellect. It may be a preliminary investigation of this problem which is also explored in V.1.[10], as Armstrong and Harder have suggested in their editions, but the treatise as a whole is more closely focused on the generation of Intellect, as its title indicates: “How that which is after the First comes from the First, and on the One.” Despite the scholastic tone and relative brevity of the discussion, this focus may help to explain some of the unusual statements made about the One in the second chapter. A summary of the first chapter will reveal that these apparently extraordinary descriptions of the One follow directly upon a rather straightforward presentation of P.’ normal doctrine.

He begins with a statement of his primary principle of ontological derivation: anything posterior to the first principle must come from it. Derivation from or ascent (ἀναγωγή) to the One must occur through the order of beings subsequent to it (2-4). Ontological derivation, therefore, provides metaphysical support for the hierarchy of being. Since the One is prior to all intelligible and sensible beings, it must be simple and different from them (5-6). Existing by itself and unmixed with what proceeds from it, the One is also present to other things (6-8). Here P. adumbrates a pervasive tension in his doctrine of the One: between its transcendence and immanence, its complete self-presence and its omnipresence. Relying next on two passages from Platonic dialogues that were particular favourites among the Neoplatonists, he asserts that we can have no knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of the One (*Parm.* 142a3-4) because it is “beyond being” (*Rep.* 509b9). Despite the fact that the One is an “essential unity” (ὄντως ἓν), P. insists that it is false to say that it is one (8-10).

Utter simplicity and self-sufficiency are necessary in the first principle so that everything else can come into existence. P.’ notion of ontological dependence requires, therefore, that complex beings “need” something completely simple (11-15) as well as incorporeal and ungenerated (17-20). What comes after the first principle is more precisely defined, in Platonic terms, as a one-many (21). But the crucial question for P. is “how does it come from the First?” (22-23) Not by chance, for this would impugn the great power and perfection that the first principle must have (23-26). Things other than the One—even fire and snow—have productive power, which both imitates and derives from the One’s primal power, but they do not remain in themselves when they generate (26-34). If

lesser things act as causes and produce effects without remaining in themselves, even more so must the Good which does not grudge to give of itself (34-36); and what is generated by the first principle must be most honorable and better than everything else (36-42).

Translation of V.4[7].2

If, then, that which generates is itself Intellect, what is generated must be more deficient than Intellect, but very close to it and like it; but since that which generates is beyond Intellect, what is generated must be Intellect. But why is that which generates not Intellect, whose activity is intellection? Intellection, which sees the intelligible object and turns toward it and is, in a way, being completed by it, is itself indefinite like vision, but it is defined by the object of its intellection. For this reason it is also said that from the Indefinite Dyad and the One derive the Forms and Numbers; that is, Intellect. Therefore, Intellect is not simple but many, and manifests a composition, though of course an intelligible one, and already sees many things. It is, then, also itself an intelligible object, yet it intelligizes as well: so it is already a duality. And it is also an intelligible object to something else, that which comes after it.

But how does this Intellect derive from the object of intellection? While the object of intellection remains in itself and is not deficient, like that which sees and intelligizes—I call that which intelligizes deficient in comparison with its object—it is not, as it were, unconscious; but all things belong to it and are in and with it; it is completely self-differentiating; life is in it and all things are in it; and it is its intellection of itself which exists by a kind of self-consciousness in eternal rest and in an intellection different from the intellection of Intellect. If, then, something comes into being while the object of intellection remains in itself, it comes into being from it when it is supremely what it is. So while the object of intellection remains “in its own proper character,” what comes into being comes to be from it, but does so while it remains in itself. Since, therefore, it remains as the object of intellection, what comes into being becomes intellection; and since it is intellection and intelligizes that from which it came into being—for it has no other object—it becomes Intellect, in a way another intelligible object and like that, an imitation and image of it.

But how, while that remains in itself, does Intellect come into being? Everything has an activity belonging to its substance and an activity proceeding from its substance; and the activity belonging to substance is each thing in actuality, whereas the other activity, which derives from it, must necessarily follow it in every respect and be different from the thing itself. In fire, for example, there is a heat which constitutes its substance, and another heat coming into being from the first when fire exercises the activity innate to its substance in remaining fire. It is this way also in the transcendent; and to a greater degree

there, while the One remains “in its own proper character,” the activity acquires existence which is generated from the perfection in it and its inherent activity, since it is from a great power, indeed the greatest of all, and attains being and substance; for that is “beyond being.” That is also the productive power of all things, and the second is already all things. But if this is all things, that is beyond all things, and so “beyond being”; and if the second is all things but the One is prior to all things and is not equal to all things, in this way too it must be “beyond being.” That is, also beyond Intellect, so there is something beyond Intellect. For being is not a corpse, nor is it without life or intellection; Intellect and being are in fact the same. For Intellect does not apprehend objects which exist prior to it, as with sense-perception and perceptible objects, but Intellect itself is its objects, assuming that their forms are not introduced from elsewhere. For where could they come from? But it is here with its objects and is identical and one with them. The science of incorporeal things is its objects.

Commentary on V.4[7].2

1-3 εἰ . . . ἀνάγκη. In Ch. 1 P. has argued that the first principle must be perfect, simple, self-abiding, and a great, productive power. It may seem somewhat disingenuous of him here at the beginning of Ch. 2 to ask why Intellect is not the primary, generating principle and why intellection is not the highest activity. There are at least two reasons for this turn in the discussion. First, in the concluding section of Ch. 1 the point is made that a perfect principle must produce something (34-39) and that what the One generates must be “most honorable” and “better than other things” (40-41). But because Intellect too is transcendent and divine—the splendour and greatness of the intelligible world is especially prominent in VI.4-5[22-23] and V.8[31]—some explanation is required as to why it cannot be the first principle.

Second, P. is determined to criticize those philosophers who did posit Intellect as the supreme principle, specifically Aristotle and many of the Middle Platonists. For Aristotle the first principle is an Intellect and the Unmoved Mover: ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον: *Met.* Λ 8.1073a23-24. Moreover, Aristotle’s divine Intellect is life and its “self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal” (Λ 7.1072b26-28, tr. Ross). (Note that P. ascribes “life” (ζωή) to the One later in lines 16-17.) But what is especially unacceptable to P. is the fact that Aristotle’s first principle is also a self-thinking Intellect (Λ 7.1072b19-21). P. devotes a great deal of attention to refuting this Aristotelian doctrine in later treatises, e.g. VI.7[38].37-41 and V.3[49].12-16. For further discussion see comm. on V.6[24].5.1-6 and III.8[30].9.11ff. and Krämer (1964) 127-73.

The evidence for Middle Platonic doctrines is extensive and diverse, but most Platonists considered the first principle to be an intellect. However, Platonists

like Albinus and Numenius argued for a bifurcation of the Intellect into the First and Second Gods. This important theory derives from a combination and reformulation of Plato's Demiurge and theory of Forms and, on the other hand, Aristotle's noetic theory. Specific aspects of the theory are discussed below on lines 12-13. On Middle Platonic theology see Wallis (1972) 30-35 and Dillon (1977) 45-49, 280-85, 366-73.

With respect to νοῦ ἐνδεέστερον in line 1, the apparent lack of a substantive led Volkmann and Bréhier to add τὸ ἐφεξῆς before νοῦ: "that which comes after Intellect must be more deficient than Intellect." But it is unnecessary to depart from the MSS; as H-S note τὸ ἐφεξῆς *subaudiendum*. The referent is clear when we read straight through from the last few lines of Ch. 1, where τὸ γεννῶν and τὸ γεννώμενον are distinguished.

In line 2 what generates Intellect is said to be "very close to and like it." Atkinson 48 argues correctly that "in the Intelligible World all physical relations such as 'near' and 'far' are excluded (VI.4.2.46; VI.5.8.7-8), since such relations are attributes of body." Nevertheless, P. often employs spatial, and even tactile, images and metaphors to express the relations between the hypostases.

3-4 διὰ τί . . . ἔστι νόησις. H-S, Cilento, and Armstrong accept the MSS οὐ preceded by a comma. This reading, the correct one in my view, makes οὐ . . . νόησις a subordinate clause. However, two proposed emendations transform the subordinate clause into an answer to the question "why is that which generates not Intellect?" Punctuating after νοῦς, Ficino, Müller, and Bréhier read ὅτι νοῦ, while Vitringa and Harder read νοῦ. With either emendation the answer to the question is: "because the activity of Intellect is intellection." Harder argues that if the question is extended to νόησις, "dann wäre die Antwort mit δὲ nicht gut angeknüpft." This is insufficient grounds for rejecting the MSS reading. Interpreting ὅτι . . . νόησις as the answer to the question why that which generates is not Intellect diminishes the efficacy of the true answer, which begins at νόησις δὲ, what Cilento calls "una risposta esclamativa." Transition to the explanatory sentence is smoother if οὐ . . . νόησις is read as a subordinate clause.

4-7 νόησις δὲ . . . νοητοῦ. P. here responds to the question asked in Ch. 1.23: "how did the universe come into being from the first?" Since Intellect is the first thing generated by the One and its activity is intellection, he focuses on how indefinite intellectual vision becomes actualized intellectual seeing. The account provided here is brief and schematic, but P. offers much more detail in the later treatises discussed below: V.6[24].5-6, III.8[30].8-9, VI.7[38].16-17, and V.3[49].11. It is noteworthy that unlike those fuller accounts the procession receives less attention in V.4[7].2 than the reversion. The procession has already

taken place and its immediate product is νόησις (4). And instead of the more dramatic images of overflowing and irradiation of light which dominate the later treatises, P. is content to employ the double-ἐνέργεια theory in Ch.1.31ff. and Ch.2.27ff.

The actualization of Intellect is achieved through the agency of the One and itself, as the fuller account in V.1[10].5.17-19 makes clear: μορφοῦται [sc. νοῦς] ἄλλον μὲν τρόπον παρὰ τοῦ ἐνός, ἄλλον δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ, οἷον ὄψις ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ νόησις ὄρασις ὁρῶσα ἅμω τε ἔν. P.' comparison of intellection and vision is based squarely on Aristotle's psychological theory. As Atkinson 122 points out P. "follows Aristotle's distinction between ὄψις and ὄρασις. "Ὀψις is the faculty of vision which is potential until actualised; ὄρασις is the exercise of this faculty." The relevant Aristotelian passages: ὄρασις γὰρ λέγεται ἡ τῆς ὀψεως ἐνέργεια (*De An.* Γ 2.426a13-14); αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἥτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὄρασις (3.428a6-7). Aristotle's distinction is not applied as precisely here as it is in V.1[10].5.17-19 or in later discussions like V.3[49].11.10-14 (see comm. *ad loc.*), but we can see the influence of Aristotle's technical vocabulary already evident in this early treatise. Before it is limited by the One, ὄψις is indefinite (ἀόριστος: 6-7), which is analogous to Aristotle's δύναμις. In line 4 intellection sees (ὁρῶσα) the One, though Intellect cannot be said to be actualized until line 10: πολλὰ ὁρῶν. Cf. also III.8[30].11.1-2: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὄψις τις καὶ ὄψις ὁρῶσα, δύναμις ἔσται εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθοῦσα.

One feature of this passage has attracted much comment. With the exception of Harder, who translates "das Gedachte (Geistige)," modern editors and translators accept that νοητόν in line 4 (and in line 13) refers to the One, though many would agree with the comment of Henry (1960) 421 that "l'expression demeure étrange." The difficulty arises from the fact that only one other passage contains such a reference. I cite it in full because it has much to tell us about interpreting line 4: ὁ τε νοῦς ὁ τὸ νοητόν ἔχων οὐκ ἂν συσταίη μὴ οὔσης οὐσίας καθαρῶς νοητοῦ, ὁ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν νοητόν ἔσται, καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοοῦν οὔτε νοητόν κυρίως ἔσται· τό τε γὰρ νοητόν ἐτέρω ὁ τε νοῦς τὸ ἐπιβάλλον τῇ νοήσει κενὸν ἔχει ἄνευ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἐλεῖν τὸ νοητόν ὁ νοεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ νοητοῦ ("And the intellect which has the object of thought would not exist if there was not a reality which is pure object of thought; it will be an object of thought to the intellect, but in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought in the proper, authentic sense; for the object of thought is object for something else, and the intellect has its intellectual effort empty of content if it does not grasp and comprehend the object which it thinks; for it does not have thinking without its object of thought": V.6[24].2.7-12).

Implicit in both texts is the doctrine that Intellect *qua* indefinite vision contemplates the One, but sees it as many instead of as the unity it is (cf. III.8[30].8.30-31, VI.7[38].16-17, and V.3[49].11 and comm. *ad locc.*). In line 4, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the One is an intelligible object for the indefinite vision that will become Intellect, but that “in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought in the proper, authentic sense” (V.6[24].2.9). However, the consensus view that νοητόν refers to the One has been strongly challenged by Corrigan. Applying what he calls a “theory of ambiguity,” Corrigan argues that νοητόν cannot refer exclusively or even primarily to the One, because Intellect has not yet been fully formed or defined. At this point in P.’ account, “the universe of discourse is intellectual” 196. This rather opaque remark is clarified to some extent by the claim that “from this *intellectual* point of view, an argument of procession of a second from a First must, logically speaking, *start* from a νοητόν, but *end* in the difference between the νοητόν and the One, since in the first moments of an argument of derivation the One and the νοητόν can not yet be properly distinct. This logical progression, or distinction, of νοῦς from its object, therefore, can only discover the full transcendence of the One explicitly in its final moment. . . . The ultimate object, the One itself, becomes explicitly distinct from the highest intelligible object only at lines 25-26 and finally at line 37, because it is only when the full subject is disclosed that one can separate the object into transcendent One and intelligible object” 198, author’s italics.

If I correctly understand this subtle argument, Corrigan does not allow νοητόν to refer to the One “simply and solely” (196) because as an “indefinite subject” the indefinite, processive stage of Intellect cannot see the One as distinct from itself. But since, as he says in the passage quoted earlier, “the One and the νοητόν can not yet be properly distinct,” should this not mean that the One is in fact what P. refers to by νοητόν? It would seem that there can only be two possible referents: either the One or what Corrigan calls the “indefinite subject.” But he appears to offer a third alternative in his notion of “the highest intelligible object,” which he attempts to define in this statement: “It should also be observed that the highest, proper object of thought (coincidental with the One, but not occupying the same universe of discourse, and from which νοῦς is perfected) is an internal ἀρχή, origin or cause of νοῦς” 197. This “highest intelligible object” must, it seems to me, be either the One (as in V.6[24].2 quoted above) or the indefinite subject. If it is the same as or belongs to the latter, then the subject is no longer indefinite; it would have to be the actualized, fully intelligible νοητόν, but this is clearly impossible. The articulation of a distinct “universe of discourse” distorts P.’ narrative perspective: he moves swiftly, in a few lines, from indefinite vision to fully actualized Intellect. Moreover, the claim that the One is not explicitly distinct from Intellect until lines 25-26 is inaccurate: beginning in line 8 (“for this is Intellect”), fully actualized Intellect sees

multiplicity (10), it is itself a noetic intelligible object (10-11), and it is engaged in its characteristic activity of intellection (11).

An interesting parallel to the One as νοητόν in the present passage is the following text, attributed by Dillon to Iamblichus: “That neither by opinion, nor by discursive reasoning, nor by the intellectual element of the soul, nor by intellection accompanied by reason is the Intelligible to be comprehended, nor yet is it to be grasped by the perfect conning-tower of the intellect, nor by the flower of the intellect, nor is it knowable by a mental effort at all, neither along the lines of a definite striving, nor by a grasping, nor by any such means as this, is a proposition to which, at the insistence of the great Iamblichus, we must accede” (*In Parm.* Fr. 2A, Dillon = Damascius *Dub. et Sol.* I.151.18ff.). Note also the phrase ἐν ἐνὶ μένειν τὸ νοητόν (*In Parm.* Fr. 2B.5, Dillon). Now Iamblichus posited two Ones to resolve the tensions he discerned in P.’ theory of the One, the utterly transcendent First One (παντελῶς ἄρρητον) and the Second One (τὸ ἀπλῶς ἓν); the latter is the creative first principle (on Iamblichus’ theory cf. Dillon [1973] 29-33). So if Iamblichus, who is even more concerned than P. to preserve the ineffability and transcendence of the One, feels comfortable enough to refer to the One in this manner, it is hardly surprising that P. does so also. It is to be noted that in Fr. 2A τὸ νοητόν does not actually appear, though it does in Fr. 2B.5 which may, however, refer to the Second One. Dillon’s translation of ἐκεῖνο in Fr. 2A as “the Intelligible” is correct, because of the appearance of the term in Fr. 2B and in other Iamblichean passages cited in his commentary on Fr. 2A.

Lloyd has recently interpreted the problem of the actualization of the inchoate Intellect by the One, defined as the former’s intelligible object, along the lines Corrigan follows, though in a more straightforward fashion. In Lloyd (1987) he argues that “it is not the One which actualizes the sight (or capacity to think) of Pre-Intellect, but *the One as seen (or thought) by Pre-Intellect*” 175, author’s italics. For Lloyd this establishes the corollary that “Intellect can be said to produce Existence. For it is the One as object of thought, not the One *simpliciter* which acts on Intellect/Pre-Intellect and makes it Existence . . . At the same time there is also a sense in which the One is responsible for Existence, namely the sense in which the One as thought is still the One just as a sound is also a vibration. But the sense in which it is not the same is more pronounced for Plotinus on account of his non-Aristotelian law that receiving always entails alteration” 176. (Note that in the present treatise being is not explicitly mentioned until line 37.) What Lloyd wants to argue, it seems, is that in the generation of actualized intellection and being, the One is assigned the role of a secondary causal agent and the potential Intellect—defined in the present context as indefinite vision—that of primary causal agent. Precisely the reverse is true, because P. does not articulate the procession and reversion strictly in terms either of the Aristotelian physical model of an agent actualizing a potentiality (on which

see lines 27ff. below and comm. *ad loc.*) or in terms of his psychological model. According to Aristotle, the intelligible form apprehended by the intellect represents a higher-level actuality than the actuality inherent in the object; cf. Lear 128-31. Hence, for P. Aristotle's psychological theory provides a framework and terminology for articulating the actualization of indefinite vision by its object, but unlike the latter he assigns ontological priority to the object. The One, therefore, continues to act as primary cause on the inchoate Intellect: it is not the case that the efflux from the One is left to itself. The latter is said to contribute to its self-actualization at V.1[10].7.13-14 and V.6[24].5.9-10, but even in those contexts the One's primary causality is always prominent: ῥώννυται παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ τελειοῦται εἰς οὐσίαν παρ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου (V.1[10].7.15-17); ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ <τὸ> γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό (V.6[24].5.16-17). One can also adduce passages like the following, not discussed by Lloyd, where the generation of Intellect results from the unceasing radiation and diffusion of the One's light: οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὸ μὲν ὁρώμενον, τὸ δὲ φῶς αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ νοῦς καὶ νοούμενον, ἀλλ' αὐγὴ γεννώσα ταῦτα εἰς ὕστερον καὶ ἀφείσα εἶναι παρ' αὐτῷ· αὐτὸς δὲ αὐγὴ μόνον γεννώσα νοῦν, οὗτι σβέσασα αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ γεννησῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μείνασα μὲν αὐτῇ, γενομένου δ' ἐκείνου τῷ τοῦτο εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο τοιοῦτον ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ὑπέστη ἐκείνο ("For there is not in that Good something seen and its light nor intellect and object of intellect, but a ray which generates these afterwards and lets them be beside it: but he himself is the ray which only generates Intellect and does not extinguish itself in the generation, but it itself abides, and that Intellect comes to be because this Good exists. For if this was not of the kind it is, that would not have come into existence": VI.7[38].36.21-27; cf. comm. *ad loc.*). This passage is certainly open to various interpretations, but in my view it suggests that the One's light directly and continuously actualizes the potential Intellect in its capacity as indefinite vision. In this model of procession, both the Aristotelian physical and psychological models of actualization cede priority to *Rep.* 507-509, for the importance of which cf. III.8[30].11.16ff. and comm. *ad loc.* But even in the present context Lloyd's argument will not do because, though the potential Intellect does not apprehend the One as it truly is, the One's reality determines Intellect's apprehension of it as object. Thus, there is an indissoluble causal link between the One itself and the One as νοητόν: the incessant activity of the former is necessary to make the latter an intelligible actuality for Intellect.

7-10 διὸ . . . ὁρῶν ἥδη. The procession of Intellect from the One and its return to the first principle is here expressed in the terms of the One/Indefinite Dyad relation. Though the Dyad is only mentioned in passing, its function in the present chapter's account of ontological derivation is analogous to the indefinite ὅψις borrowed from Aristotle's psychological theory. Only Szlezák 58-59, so

far as I know, has remarked on the curious juxtaposition of these two very different theories. But before addressing this problem we must examine the sources of the present passage.

P. follows the Platonic tradition according to which the Forms/Numbers are generated from the imposition of limit by the One on the unlimitedness of the Dyad. Drawing on this Platonic-Pythagorean inheritance, P. expresses the limitation of the indefinite aspect of Intellect in a variety of ways: what receives limit is defined as indefinite motion (II.4[12].5.31-33); νοῦς limits being (V.1[10].7.13); οὐσία must be something limited (V.5[32].6.6); life becomes limited when it looks to the One (VI.7[38].17.16-26). Particularly in the last passage it is clear that P. has interpreted the imposition of limit in terms of his theory of procession and reversion. The indefinite does not merely receive limit; as life and motion (in later treatises) or here as vision, it turns back to the One to receive limit.

The Platonic provenance of the mathematization of the Forms, as well as the technical terms ἀόριστος δυάς and τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν (“the Great and Small”), is a hotly debated problem owing to the fact that our evidence about these so-called Platonic doctrines is transmitted primarily through the often tendentious testimony of Aristotle. Merlan (1964) demonstrates that in the present passage P. relies specifically on *Met.* A 6.987b20-22: ὥς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν εἶναι ἀρχάς, ὥς δ’ οὐσίαν τὸ ἐν· ἐξ ἐκείνων γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἐνὸς τὰ εἶδη εἶναι (καὶ) τοὺς ἀριθμούς. This is Merlan’s text. He defends τὰ εἶδη against Ross and Zeller and τοὺς ἀριθμούς against Christ and Jaeger, thus preserving the variant τὰ εἶδη εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμούς in Asclepius. Merlan is correct that this text is the direct source for P.’ report (διὸ καὶ εἴρηται) rather than M 7.1081a13-15 cited in H-S¹ P. accepts this as Platonic doctrine, but for the differing views on the accuracy of Aristotle’s testimony see Krämer (1959), esp. Ch. 3; Findlay (1974), esp. Appendixes 1 and 2; Dillon (1977) 1-6; and, for negative judgments, Cherniss (1945) and Vlastos (1963).

Whether or not the theory P. draws on is Platonic, his account here and elsewhere is heavily influenced by Neopythagoreanism. Where Old Pythagoreanism and the views ascribed to Plato posit the One and Dyad as co-eternal, causal principles, P. follows Neopythagoreans like Moderatus, Eudorus and Alexander Polyhistor (on whom see Dillon [1977] 117-21, 126-29, 341-49) in deriving the Dyad from the One, or, in Neopythagorean terms, the supreme Monad; on this see also Whittaker (1969a), (1969b), and Rist (1965). P. articulates this view more fully in the contemporary treatise V.1[10].5.6-9: καὶ γὰρ πρὸ δυάδος τὸ ἐν, δεύτερον δὲ δυάς καὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς γεγεννημένη ἐκεῖνο ὀριστὴν ἔχει, αὐτὴ δὲ ἀόριστον παρ’ αὐτῆς· ὅταν δὲ ὀρισθῇ, ἀριθμὸς ἤδη (“The One is prior to the dyad, but the dyad is secondary and, originating from the One, has it as definer, but is itself of its own nature

indefinite; but when it is defined it is already a number”). It is quite evident that P., by deriving the Dyad from the One, dispenses with the dualism inherent in the Platonic and Academic scheme. Therefore, we should reject, *pace* Szlezák 65, 116-18, the argument of Krämer (1964) 308-18, that the Dyad in P. is a “Gegenprinzip” and that P. assimilates the Academic “Prinzipienlehre” without serious modifications. But since he deploys the Dyad here, though rarely elsewhere, what is its meaning and purpose?

According to the present account the Dyad is some sort of equivalent of the “indefinite” and the “infinite.” This point at least accords with Aristotle’s identification of τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν with the Platonic τὸ ἄπειρον (*Physics* Γ 4.203a15-16) and τὸ πλήθος and τὸ ἄνισον (*Met.* N 4.1091b31-32). P. employs τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πλήθος as synonyms in VI.6[34].3, though, surprisingly, the treatise “On Numbers” contains no reference to the Dyad. On the other hand, the Dyad is indefinite, but it is not indefinite multiplicity *per se*. P. is not explicit on this point, but the Indefinite Dyad is perhaps synonymous with the “multiplicity of life”: διὰ μὲν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ζωῆς πολλὰ ὀρισθεῖσα, διὰ δὲ αὖ τὸν ὅρον ἓν (VI.7[38].17.24-25; see comm. *ad loc.*). The Dyad, therefore, like indefinite life and indefinite vision (6), is potentially Intellect and hence potentially multiplicity; see Rist (1962a) 100 for Academic disputes on this point and its relevance to the present passage. This point is made clearly in the statement that “Intellect is not simple but many . . . and already sees multiplicity” (9-10). There P. is speaking about perfected Intellect, no longer about its pre-noetic, indefinite state.

A more perplexing question is: what is dyadic about P.’ Dyad? Szlezák 65 offers the view that duality pertains to actualized Intellect, but not to the inchoate Intellect *qua* indefinite vision or Indefinite Dyad. When the inchoate Intellect becomes actual, P. notes: πολλὰ ὁρῶν ἤδη . . . διὸ δύο ἤδη (10-11). For Szlezák the duality of subject and object in actualized Intellect replaces the duality inherent in the traditional notion of the Dyad, which leads him to the conclusion that for P “die ‘Unbestimmtheit’ und die ‘Zweiheit’ nicht mehr zusammen gedacht werden. . . . steht die Zweiheit schon zwischen dem ersten Gewordenen und dem Ursprung. Deshalb ist auch das ‘Zweiheit’, solange es unbestimmt est, in keinem präzisierbaren Sinne potentielle Zweiheit, sondern unmittelbar potentielle Allheit” 65. I agree with his first point, but I see no reason to exclude the Dyad—or indefinite vision, life etc.—from being defined as potentially dual. After all, “all things” are inherently dualistic. P. may in fact consider it reasonable to employ the Indefinite Dyad as a variant term for the inchoate Intellect, in so far as he moves back to a prior state from the duality of actualized Intellect, as Szlezák 118 argues; but even this reading does not justify his conclusion that “potentially dual” is an inappropriate definition of the Indefinite Dyad. Szlezák makes a final point, arguing that the inchoate Intellect, far from

being the Indefinite Dyad, is in fact “eine unbestimmte Einheit.” I address this difficult problem in the comm. on III.8[30].8.32, 11.5 and V.3[49].11.15-16.

The identification of Forms and Numbers indicates that P. accepted the doctrine as Platonic. His theory of intelligible Number is largely concentrated in VI.6[34]. Number is prior to and generates the Forms, but it is also in the Forms and in beings and identified with them (VI.6[34].9.29-37). In its former capacity Number seems to possess a universal, principial function with respect to the Forms—though inferior, of course, to the One—and in the latter capacity it serves to individuate the intelligible world (see IV.3[27].8.22-24) and to articulate its structure. But here P. ignores the more complex number-theory of VI.6[34] in his simple identification of Forms and Numbers. For further discussion see comm. on III.8[30].9.3-4, Atkinson 111-13, and Szlezák 90-104.

10-12 ἔστι . . . νοητόν. Intellect manifests the intelligible multiplicity characteristic of its perfected state. In Ch. 1.21 it is a one-many. Now it is both object of intellection and intelligizing subject; it is a duality, or, as Krämer (1964) 317 puts it, Intellect has become the Definite Dyad.

The next sentence—ἔστι . . . νοητόν (11-12)—has attracted much comment and several textual emendations, primarily due to the ambiguity of νοητόν in this chapter. In lines 4 and 13 it refers to the One, here and elsewhere to Intellect as its own object of intellection. The MSS offer a variety of readings. H-S read ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο τῷ μετ’ αὐτὸ νοητόν and translate: *est etiam diversus ab uno eo quod post illud intellegibilis est*. Thus, they follow (see H-S¹*ad loc.*) the text and translation proposed by Hadot (1958) 160: “et d’un autre côté, elle est aussi un Intelligible différent, par le fait (τῷ) d’être postérieure à cet Intelligible-là (αὐτὸ).” Armstrong translates the same text: “And it is also a different intelligible by being posterior to the One itself.” In support of this rendering Hadot cites the following passage: καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὁ νοήσει, ὅτι ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτῆς· καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ αὐτήν, οἷον καταμανθάνει ἃ ἔσχεν ἐκ τῆς ἄλλου θεας ἐν αὐτῇ (VI.7[38].40.49-51). The parallel is close: ἔστι μὲν οὖν κτλ. (10), which defines Intellect as both intelligible object and intellectual subject, is set off against ἔστι δὲ καὶ κτλ. (11), which establishes that this intelligible object (Intellect’s again) is different because it is after the One. I will return to this interpretation in a moment.

Igal also accepts the H-S text but translates: *est etiam intellegibile diversum ab Illo, quia post Illud* (1969) 363. H-S reject this rendering, though it differs very little from theirs or Armstrong’s. Harder emends the text: ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλο, τὸ μετ’ αὐτὸ τὸ νοητόν (“anderseits ist er aber vom Gedachtem selbst verschieden und nach ihm”). His justification for emending the text is that “der überlieferte Text würde auf eine zweite Art von νοητόν gehen, die hier nicht hergehört.” This criticism, it seems to me, is not pertinent to the text of H-S; and one might

supplement their text with Harder's own comma after ἄλλο. However, the criticism is cogent against Cilento's translation: "ma vi e ancora dell'altro: la realta spirituale che viene dopo de Lui."

Less appealing emendations have also been proposed. Bréhier reads τὸ instead of τῷ and translates: "mais après elle [sc. l'Intelligence] viennent tous les autres objects de sa pensée." This version must be rejected because there is no evidence that Intellect contemplates objects that are posterior to it: it intelligizes either the One or itself. (See the comment of H-S on VI.9[9].3.33-34 where they delete a phrase which refers to Intellect's apprehension of what it generates: *intellectus enim non curat quae post eum*.) Finally, Theiler (1959) 11 emends μετ' αὐτὸ νοητόν to μετὰ τὸ νοητόν. His is the only version that identifies νοητόν with the One. Although the emendation is grammatically sound, it contributes nothing new to the argument. In repeating that Intellect is after the One, in so far as the latter is intelligized, it ignores the μέν/δέ construction.

In my translation I have adopted the text of H-S, though with some misgivings. It should be noted that although ἄλλο is well attested (the Codd. in w and x), Codd. BUC all read ἄλλω. Construing ἄλλω with τῷ (or perhaps, as the dative of ἄλλο τι, ἄλλ- τῷ), the sentence would be translated: "and it is also an intelligible object to something else, that which comes after it." Moreover, even if ἄλλο τῷ is maintained, it is still possible to render the text in a similar fashion: "and it is also another intelligible object to that which comes after it." The primary difficulty with either text is the referent of αὐτὸ in line 12, which most editors interpret as referring to the One. On this reading it would have to refer to Intellect, in which case the reflexive would be necessary, not to mention a change to the masculine. On the other hand, αὐτὸ might refer to Intellect *qua* νοητόν. This interpretation is attractive for two reasons: first, it eliminates the redundancy of all the other versions and, second, it articulates a coherent progression in the meaning of νοητόν: from the One (4) to Intellect as the object of its own contemplation (10-11) and finally to Intellect's contents as the object of the soul's contemplation. It might be objected that there is no detailed reference anywhere in the treatise to what comes after Intellect. And the next sentence repeats the question how Intellect arose from the One in its capacity as intelligible object, with no indication that the soul has been introduced into the discussion. However, P. often interjects brief remarks that are not strictly relevant, but which he nonetheless adds for the sake of completeness.

12-14 ἄλλὰ πῶς . . . τὸ νοοῦν. Here begins an account of the One in itself. The first point P. wants to establish is that the One remains in itself while Intellect is generated from it. This claim, along with the fact that the One is referred to as τὸ νοητόν in line 12 as well as earlier in lines 4 and 7, has convinced several scholars that in this early treatise P. was under the influence of Numenius' theory of a double-νοῦς. (See Armstrong *ad loc.*, Dodds [1960a])

19-20, and Rist [1967] 42-44.) They also hear the phrase “the intelligible object remains in itself” echoed by lines 17-18, where the One’s self-intellection exists ἐν στάσει αἰδίῳ (see below *ad loc.* for a discussion of στάσις). On this view P.’ One and Intellect seem strikingly like Numenius’ First and Second Gods. For Numenius both Gods are intellects, but they are clearly distinguished: the Supreme God is called the Good (Fr. 16) and One (Fr. 19). The Second God is the Demiurge or God of generation who creates both himself and the cosmos (Fr. 16). The Numenian parallels adduced by these scholars appear in several fragments. Numenius’ First God exists in his own place by himself: ὁ θεὸς ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ὧν ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦς (Fr. 11.11-12). The First God is in a state of inactivity or rest: τὸν μὲν πρῶτον θεὸν ἀργόν (Fr. 12.12-13); ὁ μὲν πρῶτος θεὸς ἔσται ἐστῶς (Fr. 15.3). On the basis of these texts, these scholars conclude that since the One is “the intelligible object remaining in itself” (13) and its self-intellection “exists in eternal rest” (18) it closely parallels Numenius’ First God, which is a νοῦς ἐστῶς.

Dodds (1960a) 20 argues that the vital link between these Numenian texts and the present passage occurs in a roughly contemporary Plotinian treatise. In his commentary on *Timaeus* 39e7-9, P. explores the relation between Intellect and the Ideal Living Creature, here referred to as the intelligible object (τὸ νοητόν): ἢ τὸ μὲν νοητόν οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ νοῦν εἶναι ἐν στάσει καὶ ἐνότητι καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν τοῦ ὁρώντος ἐκείνον τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργειάν τινα ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, ἢ ὁρᾷ ἐκείνον (“Or there is nothing against [this solution]; the intelligible object is also an intellect at rest and in unity and quietness, but the nature of the intellect which sees that intellect which remains within itself is an activity proceeding from it, which sees that [static] intellect”: III.9[13].1.15-18). Since Numenius apparently identified his First God with the Ideal Living Creature (cf. Fr. 22.1-2), it is not unlikely that the view expressed here is his. It is, however, only one of the possible solutions to the initial *aporia*—whether Intellect is unitary or subdivided—entertained by P. Ultimately, he does not seem to accept it. Earlier in the essay he rejects the notion that the Forms lie outside the Intellect (7-9) and observes that, although Intellect and the intelligible object (i.e. the Ideal Living Creature) are conceptually different, they are not separate; rather they comprise a unity (12-14).

Despite Dodds’s admission that “this fragmentary essay [i.e. III.9] is extremely hesitant in tone,” (1960a) 20, he maintains that “the view to which Plotinus here inclines is something much nearer to Numenius’ scheme than to his own mature system” 19; Rist (1967) 41 too sees the position stated in III.9[13].1 as representative of P.’ early view. What requires greater emphasis is the truly “fragmentary” character of this treatise. As Dillon (1969a) 70 points out, III.9[13] is “a record of the results of one of the discussions that took place in Plotinus’ circle, transmitted to us by Porphyry from Plotinus’ papers in a more

unfinished, tentative state than that of any completed tractate. It is a piece of ‘work in progress’, work in which Amelius had a hand.”

Rist cites P.’s emphatic rejection of a divided Intellect in the only slightly later treatise II.9[33].1, knits together the various strands of this argument, and concludes: “What can be deduced from this except that in the early period of his life, quite probably under Numenian influence, Plotinus toyed with the idea of a double νοῦς, one active and the other static, the static and higher also being a νοητόν, but that he later came to reject such ideas? There is evidence then that at some time Plotinus might speak of a νοητόν which itself, though inactive, had some kind of intellection. This is almost what we have in 5.4.2” (1967) 42. Several objections can be brought against this interpretation. First, III.9[13].1 should not be employed to explicate V.4[7].2, because the former’s “intelligible object at rest,” in spite of the verbal similarity, bears little relation to the latter’s “intelligible object remaining in itself” (12) or its reference to the One’s “intellection existing in eternal rest” (18). P. does not seem to accept a double Intellect in III.9[13].1. More importantly, the problems explored in the two treatises are quite different: in III.9[13].1 the internal nature of Intellect, in V.4[7].2 how and why the One, which is clearly said to be beyond being and thought, generates Intellect. Second, in later treatises P. continues to refer to the One as νοητόν and as remaining at rest within itself: ὁ τε νοῦς ὁ τὸ νοητόν ἔχων οὐκ ἂν συσταίῃ μὴ οὔσης οὐσίας καθαρῶς νοητοῦ, ὃ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν νοητόν ἔσται, καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοοῦν οὔτε νοητόν κυρίως ἔσται (V.6[24].2.7-9; cf. above on line 4); δεῖ οὖν, ἵνα τι ἄλλο ὑποστῇ, ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖνο (V.3[49].12.35-36). More important than Numenius in the present passage is P.’s quotation and interpretation of *Timaeus* 42e5-6, where the Demiurge is said to remain “in its own proper character” as it generates the cosmos. P. quotes the Platonic phrase in lines 21 and 33-34 as well as in V.3[49].12.34, just before the passage quoted above. This recurring pattern of thought is convincing evidence that P. relies more on Plato than Numenius, especially since V.3[49] is a very late treatise in which P. devotes considerable attention to refuting the notion that the One thinks. It is to be noted in this regard that further support for the arguments of Dodds and Rist that Numenian influence is to be discerned here is garnered from the reference to the One’s intellection and self-consciousness in lines 18-19.

15-19 οὐκ ἔστιν . . . νόησιν. This is one of the most widely discussed and hotly debated passages in the *Enneads*, since it appears to attribute a host of activities and predicates to the One. Especially troubling to many scholars are διακριτικόν (16), κατανόησις (17), and συναίσθησις (18). Since these activities are either ignored or specifically rejected in later discussions of the One and because they seem at odds with its absolute transcendence, many scholars have strictly limited the implications of the passage by arguing that it is an early

position that P. later abandoned: Harder *ad loc.*; Dodds (1960a) 20; Becker (1940) 31; Blumenthal (1974) 205: an “aberrant description of the One”; Armstrong *ad loc.*: “this passage stands alone in the *Enneads* in the clarity with which it attributes a kind of thinking to the One” (cf. also Armstrong [1940] 3ff.); Theiler [1970] 296 n2. Corrigan, as noted above on line 4, argues that these activities are predicated of “the highest intelligible object” and not of the One; similarly, Lloyd (1987) 157: “It is at least remarkable that in later accounts they are *not* attributed to the One and they *are* attributed to the One as νοητόν which is between it and Intellect” author’s italics. This assertion is all the more puzzling given his brief reference to VI.8[39].16.11-29, which, he correctly observes, “has been surprisingly passed over in this controversy” 160. The Arabic interpreter, the author of the *Epistola de Scientia Divina*, assumes that P. is here talking about a first Mind (H-S¹ II.337). Scholars rejecting the view that this is a unique, aberrant account include: Schwyzer (1960) 375-76; Krämer (1964) 395-96; Graeser 132-35. To evaluate the accuracy of the interpretations that have been proposed by these and other scholars, it will be necessary to examine carefully each of these terms employed to characterize the One.

15-17 οὐκ ἔστιν . . . πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ. After claiming that the One is not ἀναίσθητον, P. launches his exploration of the inner life of the One with the statement that “all things belong to it and are in and with it” (15-16). This recalls the bold opening of V.2[11].1.1-3: τὸ ἐν πάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ πάντων, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνως πάντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἶον ἐνέδραμε· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐπω ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἔσται (“The One is all things and not a single one of them: it is the principle of all things, not all things, but all things have that other kind of transcendent existence; for in a way they do occur in the One; or rather they are not there yet, but they will be”). The difference between the two passages is not significant, for in the former P. does not intend to suggest that the One is only all things; the transcendence of the One is reasserted near the end of the chapter (40-43). I agree with the acute assessment of Schroeder (unpublished) that the present passage “doubtless implies the radical συνουσία in the One of the characteristics which may reside outside itself in the other, but in itself remain comprehended in an undivided unity.”

When he repeats that all things are in the One in line 17, P. adds, somewhat surprisingly, that “life is in it” (16-17). Life, of course, is one of the primary attributes of Intellect, comprising a famous triad along with being and thought; cf. Hadot (1960) 107-37 and Atkinson 76. But the attribution of life to the One is not unique: “a sort of life” (οἶον ζωή) is predicated of the One in the late passage VI.8[39].7.51. This late, and much neglected, treatise is extremely important in demonstrating that P.’ positive descriptions of the One are not limited to the early treatises; cf. comm. on VI.8[39].16.12ff.

16 πάντα διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ. This is perhaps the most striking of the positive statements made about the One in this treatise. Armstrong's "it is completely able to discern itself" is virtually the same as the versions of Bréhier, Cilento, and MacKenna. My rendering "it is completely self-differentiating" is closer to Harder's "es vermag sich selber durchaus zu sondern und scheiden." Other more figurative translations include Trouillard's "il a une parfaite lucidité" (1955b) 102 and Rist's "it is transparent to itself" (1963) 81. Adopting in his later study the generally preferred "self-discerning," Rist concludes that the phrase "is little more than an absolute affirmation of the One's simplicity, and that it means little more than would a statement that whatever the One could distinguish would be itself" (1967) 44. It may be that the phrase does not compromise the One's simplicity, though this is a claim that requires some defence; but it is difficult to see how it can be understood as confirming the One's simplicity.

The only other instances of διακριτικόν in the *Enneads* occur in VI.3[44].17, where P. provides an account of the perception of color, derived from Plato's more extensive analysis in *Timaeus* 67d-68a. However, the term's association with the physics of vision provides no help in the present context. P. does use the verb in accounts of the intelligible world. Intellect's capacity to distinguish itself is asserted or denied, depending on whether P. wishes to emphasize its omnipresence and unity or its multiplicity in unity. The relevant passages can be divided into three groups: (a) Intellect both distinguishes and does not distinguish itself: VI.4[22].14.3-5, VI.9[9].5.15-16, and V.9[5].6.3-4; (b) Intellect does not distinguish itself: V.3[49].15.20-21; and (c) Intellect does distinguish itself: VI.7[38].41.13-14 and 39.4-9.

Three instances of the verb pertain to the One. The first is quite interesting because it appears in the midst of an account of Intellect's generation from the One: ὅπως δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων; ἄρα, ὅτι αὐτὰ σ-ζει ἐν ἑκάστων αὐτῶν ποιήσασα εἶναι; ἢ καὶ ὅτι ὑπέστησεν αὐτά. πῶς δὴ; ἢ τῷ πρότερον ἔχειν αὐτά. ἀλλ' εἴρηται, ὅτι πλῆθος οὕτως ἔσται. ἀλλ' ἄρα οὕτως εἶχεν ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα· τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ ("But how is that One the principle of all things? Is it because as principle it keeps them in being, making each one of them exist? Yes, and because it brought them into existence. But how did it do so? By possessing them beforehand. But it has been said that in this way it will be a multiplicity. But it had them in such a way as not to be distinct: they are distinguished on the second level, in the rational form": V.3[49].15.27-32). Rist (1967) 44 curiously reverses the meaning of the crucial last two lines: "Here Plotinus considers and rejects a theory that the many are in the One potentially and in an indistinct manner (ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα). This is rejected on the grounds that such an indistinct potentiality would have to be explained." It would seem that Rist follows the misleading translation of MacKenna: "May we think, perhaps, that the First

contained the universe as an indistinct total whose items are elaborated to distinct existence within the Second by the Reason-Principle there?" Both MacKenna and Rist appear to accept the emendation of Kirchhoff, who reads ἄρα instead of the MSS ἄρα.

This passage does not flatly contradict the present passage, but it comes close. If there is a distinction at all, it would have to be between the One's undifferentiated *contents* and the *One* as self-differentiating. But since the One is simple, how could there be a distinction between it and its contents? The fact that V.3[49] is a late treatise does not provide conclusive evidence that P. has simply revised the view expressed in the early V.4[7], for a passage in the nearly contemporaneous VI.9[9] is quite consistent with the text quoted above from V.3[49]. In the mystical union the soul cannot discern the One: "So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish (οὐδὲ διακρίνει) and does not imagine two" (VI.9[9].10.14-15). A parallel account of mystical union offers the same conclusion: "nor could you still make a distinction while it is present" (οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι: VI.7[38].34.14).

On the basis of this considerable evidence it is difficult to resist Szlezák's conclusion that "die 'Selbstunterscheidung' . . . eine nicht zu integrierende Singularität im Werk Plotins darstellt" 164 n539. Two other considerations might contribute to preserving some semblance of consistency. First, the phrase may have seemed appropriate to P. since it is used in conjunction with κατανόησις and οἶον συναίσθησις, terms usually predicated of Intellect. But this argument does not fully satisfy. Second, later Neoplatonic usage of διακριτικόν suggests at least the possibility that P. may have conceived of self-differentiation as leading to procession. Proclus speaks of a διακριτικὴ δύναμις which is one of the causes of procession, though on the intelligible and sub-intelligible levels: cf. *In Tim.* I.184.10, II.134.3ff., and II.158.17ff. Such tenuous evidence is not particularly convincing either. It would seem, therefore, that on this occasion P. employs a rather inappropriate term to define the One's inner life.

18 οἶονεῖ συναίσθησει. In the case of συναίσθησις we have an activity that is predicated of each of the three hypostases, though of the One perhaps only in this passage (but see V.1[10].7.11-13 and comm. *ad loc.* where I argue that the One does possess συναίσθησις). It should be noted, however, that P. is careful to add the qualifying οἶον, a term that abounds in VI.8[39]; cf. Ch. 13.1-5, 47-50 of that treatise for a formal statement of the importance of this qualifier in positive accounts of the One, discussed in comm. on VI.8[39].16.12. The qualification does not remove the obligation of investigating what P. means by his attribution of συναίσθησις to the One, but it does indicate that he does feel some misgivings about the use of the term and that he does not intend it to be taken literally.

The excellent studies of συναίσθησις and its synonym σύνεσις by Schwyzer and Schroeder (unpublished) obviate the need to take an exhaustive inventory of all its instances and various shades of meaning. Both have demonstrated that P. is indebted to Aristotle's conception. P.' notion of self-awareness is derived from Aristotle's discussions of our awareness of perception and thought: cf. *Eth. Nic.* I 9.1170a28-33; see Schwyzer (1960) 355-56. Also influencing P. is the Aristotelian notion of συναίσθησις as sharing feelings with a friend (*Eth. Nic.* I 9.1170b10; see Schwyzer 355). The Stoic association of self-consciousness (συναίσθησις) and self-constitution may also have attracted P.' attention; cf. Schwyzer 357-59; Graeser 126-29; Hadot (1968) I.237, 289.

Schwyzer (1960) 376 argues that for P. συναίσθησις signifies in the soul, Intellect, or the One an intensive, internal self-consciousness of self-identity in unity, with the connotation of "Verinnerlichung." In his unpublished study Schroeder sees a complementary relationship between the "epistemic continuity" implicit in συναίσθησις and the "ontic continuity" connoted by συνουσία. Schwyzer carefully notes that for the soul or Intellect συναίσθησις can designate self-consciousness of either's inner reality in so far as it arises from a falling away into separateness from Intellect (for the soul) or from the One (for Intellect). I would add that σύνεσις, the more widely used synonym of συναίσθησις, defines the soul's consciousness when it transcends intellection in its *unio mystica* with the One (cf. VI.9[9].4.2, 17). Though P. never uses συναίσθησις in this context, Proclus does, when he describes the ascended soul's consciousness of the One: πρὸς τὴν ἄρρητον καὶ ἀπερίληπτον τοῦ ἐνὸς συναίσθησιν ἐνθεατικῶς ἀναδράμωμεν: *In Parm.* 1071.17-19.

There are several instances where Intellect possesses συναίσθησις of itself being gathered into unity, e.g. V.3[49].13.13ff., V.8[31].11.23, and VI.7[38].16.19-20 (see comm. *ad loc.*). But P. also states, in line 22 of the first passage, that συναίσθησις is of multiplicity. At the same time, as Graeser 130 properly emphasizes, this activity is reflexive: "Thus, Plotinus, when speaking of the self-consciousness of the 'self-thinking' Intelligence, does not think of συναίσθησις as some sort of concomitant or concurrent consciousness in the sense that Intelligence becomes aware of the act which it is performing. Συναίσθησις, in this particular case, is meant to refer to the self which has reference to itself and is aware of itself as subject." If this connotation of συναίσθησις is intensified, it does not seem inappropriate as a characterization of the One's inner life, for in using the term as a predicate of the One, P. would intend no distinction between the One's "self" and its "self-consciousness." However, on other occasions, when he links συναίσθησις with intellection, he argues that the One is beyond both: V.6[24].5.2-5 and VI.7[38].41.26-27. These assertions would seem to suggest once again that in later treatises P. no longer accepted his earlier view. But the matter is not so simple, as Rist has correctly pointed out. After noting that P. leaves unanswered the question

whether the One is “unconscious of itself” (ἀναίσθητον ἑαυτοῦ: V.3[49].13.6-7), he observes: “What this appears to mean is that one must not jump from the view that the One has no συναίσθησις of itself to the conclusion that it must therefore be ἀναίσθητον” (1967) 41. The reticence expressed in the later treatise—owing to its focus on the One’s transcendence of intellection—is absent at the very beginning of the present passage: οὐκ ἔστιν οἶον ἀναίσθητον (15). Nevertheless, attributing self-consciousness to the One does not seem to me to make the One too much like Intellect. The qualifying οἶον is intended to distinguish the One’s from Intellect’s self-consciousness. Surely there is some significance in the fact that in the many references to Intellect’s συναίσθησις only one includes οἶον (V.8[31].11.23). Hence I think it is misleading for Szlezák 164 n539 to attach great importance to the fact that P. does not employ συναίσθησις to describe the One in later treatises.

18 οὔσα ἐν στάσει αἰδίῳ. As I note above on line 13, the statement that the One “remains in itself” suggests to Dodds and Rist among others that in this treatise P. is under Numenian influence. This is further confirmed for such scholars by the term στάσις (18) which seems to be an echo of Numenius’ νοῦς ἐστῶς. But in the case of στάσις, as with many other terms, P. is often much less interested in consistently limiting an activity to one sector of reality than he is in eliciting the broadest symbolic resonance of a term on a given level of reality. Fundamentally, στάσις is characteristic of any level of reality or hypostasis. It is even attributed to nature, which “quietly holds contemplation in itself, not directed upwards or even downwards, but at rest in what it is, in its own repose and a kind of self-perception (ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς στάσει καὶ οἶον συναισθήσει)” (III.8[30].4.16-19). The conjunction of στάσις and συναίσθησις in both passages is rather striking. That rest and a kind of self-consciousness can be attributed to nature, the least conscious and most externalized level of reality, is strong evidence that the positive description of the One in the present passage does not derive simply from a failure to distinguish clearly between the One and Intellect.

Now it is certainly true that P. consistently and most often attributes rest to the intelligible world, but he usually does so by also linking it with “motion” (κίνησις): cf. V.1[10].4.21-22, 35-36; VI.3[44].27.27-34. The inclusion of rest and motion, as well as difference and sameness, in the intelligible world derives, of course, from Plato’s discussion of the μέγιστα γένη in *Sophist* 254ff. But the question remains: is P. here attributing something to the One that properly belongs only to Intellect? Consideration of two passages can allay this suspicion. The first demonstrates that rest and motion pertain to two different parts of Intellect: ὃν δὲ τὸ πάντων ἐδραιότατον καὶ περὶ ὃ τὰ ἄλλα, τὴν στάσιν ὑπεστήσατο καὶ ἔχει οὐκ ἐπακτόν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ λήγει ἡ νόησις οὐκ ἀρξαμένη στάσις, καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ ὡρμηται οὐχ

ὁρμήσασα στάσις· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ κινήσεως κίνησις οὐδ' εἰς κίνησιν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἰδέα ἐν στάσει πέρας οὖσα νοῦ, ὁ δὲ νοῦς αὐτῆς ἡ κίνησις (“And since being is the most firmly set of all things and about which the other things [are set], it has made rest exist and possesses it not as brought in from outside but from itself and in itself. It is that in which thought comes to a stop, though thought is a rest which has no beginning, and from which it starts, though thought is a rest which never started: for movement does not begin from or end in movement. And again the Form at rest is the defining limit of Intellect, and Intellect is the movement of the Form”: VI.2[43].8.18-24). Although this passage concerns the intelligible world, it has much to teach us about how to interpret the One’s rest in the present passage. First, rest is a purely self-derived, internal activity. Second, thought ceases when it attains being, which is at rest. Third, Intellect reaches its defining limit in Form. Particularly relevant is the notion that Form is what limits intellectual motion. The One as νοητόν (4, 7, 12-13) and at rest fulfills precisely this function in the present treatise.

The second text associates immobility with non-thinking: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ ἐν πάντῃ εἰς τί ἐνεργῇσει, ἀλλὰ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον ὃν πάντῃ στήσεται . . . εἰ δὲ μή τι προελεύσεται ἐπ' ἄλλο, στήσεται· ὅταν δὲ πᾶσαν στάσιν, οὐ νοήσῃ (“For what is absolutely one has nothing to which to direct its activity but since it is ‘alone isolated’ will remain absolutely immobile . . . But if a thing is not going to go forth to something else, it will be immobile: but when it is altogether immobile, it will not think”: V.3[49].10.16-18, 21-23). The association of rest with non-thinking in the One in this passage and the conjunction of rest with self-consciousness and a kind of self-intellection in the present text depends, of course, on P.’ insistence that these two activities of the One are not the same as Intellect’s.

It should also be noted that in another early treatise P. states that the One “is not in movement or at rest” and that it exists “before all form, before movement and before rest” (VI.9[9].3.42-43). On the other hand, in the same treatise, when the soul attains the One at the peak of the ascent, it ceases to move and to think: ἐστὼς πάντῃ καὶ οἷον στάσις γινόμενος (VI.9[9].11.15-16). The lack of movement, and particularly the use of the qualifier οἷον, indicates that the soul in union with the One has taken on the latter’s attributes.

17-19 ἡ κατανόησις . . . νόησιν. Taken by itself κατανόησις does not tell us very much about the One’s consciousness. At best, in Rist’s words, “the κατά could perhaps suggest intensity” (1963) 81. Schroeder (unpublished), drawing on the connotations of συναίσθησις, translates ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτό “its introspection itself.” However, such speculative semantics leave unconvinced those who see the attribution to the One of κατανόησις (17) and νόησις (18) as conclusive evidence that in this aberrant passage P. has made the One a higher Intellect: cf. Dodds (1960a) 20; Becker 31; Szlezák 164. Now it is

certainly true that in their few occurrences *κατανοεῖν/κατανόησις* are synonymous with *νοεῖν/νόησις*. Moreover, much has been made of the fact that τὸ κατανοεῖν is denied to the One at III.9[13].9.2, for example by Sorabji (1983) 154 n97, following Rist (1967) 43. But Sorabji seems not to have considered Rist's important qualification that P. might understand *κατανόησις* differently in the two treatises. This is indeed the case. First, lines 18-19 assert strongly that the One's self-consciousness "exists . . . in an intellection different from the intellection of Intellect." Second, the implication of this claim—that the One's intellection does not entail the duality and multiplicity of Intellect's intellection—is strengthened by the grammatical construction of lines 17-19. Schroeder (unpublished) acutely points out: "For the One . . . its introspection is itself. The verb 'to be' is omitted in the Greek. . . . The presence of the copula would suggest predication and hence duality" author's italics. Finally, it is likely, in my view, that *κατανόησις* is synonymous with the *ὑπερνόησις* attributed to the One at VI.8[39].16.32 (see comm. *ad loc.*). Nevertheless, Armstrong (1980) 99 argues that "just prefixing 'super' or 'hyper' to a term which one wishes to use about God does not really say very much." This statement differs little from Dodds's assertion that *ὑπερνόησις* "means nothing" (1960a) 20. But surely these terms, understood in their contexts, indicate at the very least that the One's consciousness does not make it into an Intellect nor do they abrogate the One's unity. Moreover, they suggest that the One does possess a rich inner life, though this is little explored by P., excepting VI.8[39].16.

19-26 εἴ τι . . . εἰδῶλον ἐκείνου. Quoting or paraphrasing *Timaeus* 42e5-6 several times in this passage, P. maintains that Intellect proceeds from the One, defined here once again as "the intelligible object," while the latter "remains in itself" (see above on line 13). Most interesting here is the statement that when Intellect comes into being it is ἄλλο οἶον νοητὸν καὶ οἶον ἐκεῖνο (25). This repeats in a somewhat expanded fashion what is said in lines 10-11. Once Intellect attains full and actual existence, it becomes a distinct intelligible object. But it is even more evident in this passage how P. employs νοητὸν to suggest the relation between the One and Intellect. Because both are intelligible objects, he can make the not unexceptionable claim that Intellect is "in a way that One." That the notion of ontological derivation envisioned here is not only a matter of the One generating Intellect or serving as a paradigm of which Intellect is "an imitation and image" (26) is demonstrated by the One's self-consciousness in lines 15-19 and the even stronger reference to the τὸν οἶον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα (VI.8[39].18.21-22; see comm. on VI.8[39].16.15-16). In lines 15-26, therefore, P. does not blur the distinction between Intellect and the One, rather he sees that the One, in the words of Krämer (1964) 395-96, "primär als Ermöglichung, Medium, Potenz und Substrat des Denkens, Kurz: als Denk-

Prinzip und Denk-Element bestimmt ist, und weil darum das Denken immer schon auf ein Denkhafte im Ursprung selber zurückweist.”

P. often expresses the relationship between the One and Intellect in terms of archetype and image. Intellect is also an εἶδωλον of the One in V.1[10].6.46-47, 7.1, and VI.8[39].18.35; and it is a μίμημα/μίμησις in V.3[49].16.41 and V.5[32].5.22.

26-37 ἀλλὰ πῶς . . . οὐσίαν ἦλθεν. The text of lines 27-28 is disputed in two places. In the first part of the sentence printed by H-S—γίνεται; ἐνέργεια . . . ἐκάστου—Cilento and Harder read γίνεται; ἐνεργεία· ἡ μὲν κτλ., which to my ear is quite rough and unnecessary. Kirchhoff and Bréhier terminate the question after ἐνέργεια instead of after γίνεται. This is clearly wrong, because Intellect must be the subject of γίνεται in line 26 as well as in line 25. The text of H-S provides more coherent meaning for a sentence which makes a new point in the account of how Intellect is generated from the One.

In line 28 Kirchhoff's emendation ἐνεργεία has been adopted by Bréhier, Harder, and Cilento against the MSS reading ἐνέργεια, accepted by H-S and Armstrong. In this case I accept the emendation, which reads: “and the activity belonging to substance is each thing in actuality.” Armstrong's translation of the alternative text: “that [activity] which belongs to substance is the active actuality which is each particular thing.” This is a bit awkward, though by no means impossible for P.' often idiosyncratic syntax. On either reading, the meaning is clear.

P. attempts to explain the procession of Intellect from the One by means of the double-ἐνέργεια theory. Further examples can be found at II.9[33].8.22ff.; V.2[11].1.16ff.; V.3[49].7.19-22; and, with reference to the soul arising from the external activity of Intellect, IV.3[27].10.31ff. and IV.5[29].7.17ff. The contrast between an inner and perfect activity (34-35) and an external activity necessarily proceeding from it and acquiring substantial existence (29-30, 35-36) is illustrated by analogy with fire and heat. In Ch. 1.31-34 fire/heat, as well as snow/coldness and drugs/their effects, are cited as examples, but there P. does not simply draw an analogy; rather he argues, quite remarkably, that these natural processes (τὰ ἄψυχα: Ch. 1.30) “impart themselves to others as far as they can . . . all imitating the First Principle as far as they are able by tending to everlastingness and generosity.” The generosity or ungrudgingness of the One derives from Plato's characterization of the Demiurge in *Timaeus* 29e1-2.

An equally important influence in this treatise is Aristotle. That even natural processes imitate and depend on a single divine principle for their productive activity probably derives, at least in part, from Aristotle's teleological conception of nature, e.g. πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον (*Eth. Nic.* H 13.1153b32); cf. also the important passage where Aristotle speaks of the Unmoved Mover as an ἐνέργεια: ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἥρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ φύσις (*Met.* Λ

7.1072b13-14). In his penchant to envision procession analogously to fire's production of heat, he is more directly indebted to Aristotle, as Atkinson 57-58 points out: e.g. οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότερον· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ αἷτιον τοῦτο τῆς θερμότητος (*Met.* α 1.993b25-26). Atkinson 57 also argues for Aristotelian influence in P.' connection of the internal ἐνέργεια with οὐσία, which is clearly evident in lines 30-31.

In his important recent discussion of Aristotelian influence, Lloyd (1987) adduces *Physics* Θ 4 as well. Aristotle's general point is that ὅταν ἅμα τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν ᾖσιν, γίγνεται ἐνεργείᾳ δυνάμει ("whenever that which can act and that which can be acted on are both present, that which has a capacity comes to be actually what it was potentially": 255a34-255b1, tr. Ross [1936] 696 *ad loc.*). As Lloyd (1987) 167 notes, "the potential (the scholastic *potentia prima*) becomes actual (*actus prior* = *potentia secunda*) whenever agent and patient are compresent." (These scholastic definitions are provided in Ross's note *ad loc.*) As applied in Aristotle's psychological theory, the ability to think actively can be defined as a second-level potentiality (cf. *De An.* B 5.417a24-b19) or, with respect to the developed state of the soul, as a first-level actuality (cf. Γ 4.429b5-9 and Lear 103-09). Aristotle applies this model first to the process of learning (*Physics* Θ 4.255b1-5) and then, which is more relevant to P.' discussion, to the transmission of heat (255b5-7). Also relevant is the point from *Physics* Γ 3: "the agent's activity 'is not cut off—it is of something in something else'" (οὐκ ἀποτετμημένα, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε: 202b7-8). P. often invokes this formula, as at V.3[49].12.44-45: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀποτετμηται τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδ' αὖ ταῦτόν αὐτῷ ("For what comes from him has not been cut off from him, nor is it the same as him"). But, as Lloyd 168 correctly points out, "Where his version departs from Aristotle is over the inferiority, the lower degree of reality, of the effect or product to that of the cause or agent." Finally, Lloyd 169 argues that P. combines Aristotle's physical and psychological models in his theory of procession and reversion: "The first act in his series is on the part of the One, and this can only be an 'activity from' which has no prior potentiality but which nevertheless corresponds to the *actus secundus* and is therefore to be described by the physical model. On the other hand, what this activity produces is without equivocation a potentiality, for it requires 'perfecting'; and if there is an Aristotelian model it will naturally be the one from his psychology which explains how a prior potentiality is perfected or actualized." P. would perhaps accept Aristotle's further point, though it is not explicitly mentioned, that the actuality of the object itself has a potentiality for being apprehended.

Not only does P. employ both the physical and psychological explanations of actualization he finds in Aristotle, but he also finds places for the latter's two different, but complementary, senses of ἐνέργεια as actuality or activity and ἐνέργεια as form or substance. The former defines states of a substance, for example perceiving or thinking, which are contrasted to their potential correlates;

the distinction is between having and using a power as at *Top.* E 5.129b33ff. To express the distinction Aristotle often uses the dative noun adverbially, as P. does in the present passage. (For a more explicit Plotinian example of this usage see VI.7[38].17.7 and comm. *ad loc.*) Graham 192 summarizes his excellent discussion of this point in Aristotle with the remark that “actuality and potentiality are thus without direct connection to the substance. They signify ways of being *F* for some attribute *F* of a substance.” According to Aristotle’s other definition, matter is to form as δύναμις is to ἐνέργεια: cf. *Met.* Θ 6.1048b3-9; thus ἐνέργεια is the substance and the form: cf. 8.1050b2. In this sense ἐνέργεια is not a state of a substance, rather it is identified with the substance itself. The completeness this sense of ἐνέργεια carries with it is adumbrated in line 5 above as well as in the claim that, once actualized, Intellect attains existence (35-36): actual Intellect is more complete and more real than potential Intellect. Graham 193 distinguishes these two senses of Aristotelian ἐνέργεια, asserting that ἐνέργεια/actuality possesses “kinetic value,” whereas ἐνέργεια/substance has “ontological value.” Though these two senses are complementary, and often synonymous, in both Aristotle and P., each contributes something to P.’ account of the generation of Intellect. Considerably more discussion would be necessary to explore all of the ramifications of Aristotle’s distinction in P.’ noetic theory, but in the present context it is possible to discern the kinetic force of the first notion in P.’ two accounts of actualization—the psychological model employed in lines 4-7 and the physical model in the present passage. The second notion would apply to Intellect in its actualized state as substance, being and form: ἡ γεννηθεῖσα ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν λαβοῦσα . . . εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν ἦλθεν (35-37).

At this point the theme of the One as δύναμις or productive power complicates P.’ use of Aristotle, for his double-ἐνέργεια theory must be understood in conjunction with his notion of the One as δύναμις or productive power (36, 38). In the present passage it is clear that the One’s potency is supremely active and hence is quite different from Aristotle’s concept of δύναμις as potentiality. But he also articulates another sense—δύναμις as power—in *Met.* Δ 12. The initial definition of this type of ἐνέργεια reveals its “transitive” or “transeunt” nature (Graham 200-01): δύναμις λέγεται ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἡ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἑτερον (1019a15-16). Though Aristotle tends to conflate δύναμις as power and δύναμις as potentiality in *Met.* Θ, the definition of δύναμις as “the source of movement or change in another” clearly parallels P.’ notion of the One as δύναμις τῶν πάντων. Strengthening this hypothesis is Graham’s point that δύναμις as power can be defined in itself, whereas δύναμις as potentiality is a correlative notion that can only be understood by comparison with its corresponding ἐνέργεια. Evidence for this distinction can be found in the fact that the One is defined here as “productive power,” whereas Intellect is a potentiality that becomes actual. Finally, it should

be noted that Stoic influence on P.' notion of δύναμις as power has been argued by Schroeder (1980) 44-45 and Hadot (1968) I.228-30; this too is important, but I think it is subordinate to Aristotelian influence: for further discussion see III.8[30].10.1ff., where P. most fully discusses the One as δύναμις πάντων, and comm. *ad loc.*

In lines 35-36 P. states that the One's internal activity generates another activity which "acquires existence" (ὑπόστασιν λαβοῦσα). The term ὑπόστασις is quite flexible for P. (cf. Atkinson 55-56), though when it refers to the soul or Intellect it usually indicates their fully actualized state when they have been defined by their priors and have achieved distinct existence. Here this is confirmed in the statement that the generated activity "attains being and substance" (37). For an extensive discussion of the term see Dörrie (1955).

The double-ἐνέργεια theory has important implications for the proper understanding of lines 15-19 where P. speaks of the One in such positive terms. Generally, the One's self-consciousness and super-intellection are specifications of the One's inner life or activity. Moreover, there are specific verbal connections between these two passages. Schroeder (unpublished) connects the One's "inherent activity" (συνούσης ἐνεργείας; 35) to the συναίσθησις of line 18. The statement that life is in the One (16-17) is also connected indirectly to the One's inner activity. Life and activity are often linked together by P., as in III.8[30].10.2-4, though it is important to note that in that passage P. places the One beyond life (see comm. *ad loc.*) The notion that Intellect is activity and life derives clearly from Aristotle: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή (*Met.* A 7.1072b25-26).

37-43 ἐκεῖνο . . . νοῦ. Here Intellect is finally said to attain being or existence, an aspect of the generation of Intellect that is more explicitly mentioned at V.1[10].7.13-14, 21-26. Lloyd (1987) 183 succinctly observes that this "second stage explains what it means to be an object of thought; and what it does mean coincides with what it means to exist". (Note that Intellect is said to be ἄλλο οἶον νοητόν at line 25.) In raising the interesting problem of the possible difference between an object (τὸ ὄν) and an object of thought (νοητόν), he speculates that "one difference among others might be that an object—something that happens just to be there—can be logically independent of every other object, while an object of thought cannot be independent of every other object of thought. . . . That would have been Plotinus' opinion. It was also his opinion that there were no objects which were not objects of thought, except the limiting case of the One—limiting case because *eo ipso* it is not an *on*" 183. P. argues the former point at, for example, III.8[30].9.5ff. (see comm. *ad loc.*), and the latter in the present passage. Lloyd's comment makes readily apparent—because it is expressed in bald, philosophical prose—how radically different intellection is from discursive reasoning.

P. quotes *Rep.* 509b, the Neoplatonists' favourite Platonic text, to reassert that the One is "beyond being" (38). It is even more significant that he repeats ἐπέκεινα four more times in the next few lines. The One is also prior and not equal to all things. In short, P. drives home the point unequivocally that the One is beyond being and Intellect. It seems to me that this emphatic assertion of the One's absolute transcendence further weakens the position of those who argue that in this early treatise P. had not yet clearly distinguished the One from Intellect. It is instructive to note that towards the end of the most positive account of the One's inner life P. also invokes the Platonic tag: cf. VI.8[39].16.34 and comm. *ad loc.*

43 τὸ γὰρ ὄν . . . οὐ νοοῦν. The claim that being is alive and associated with active intellection is a paraphrase of *Sophist* 248e-249a, as Szlezák 63 remarks. ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥαδίως πεισθησόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀκίνητον ἐστὸς εἶναι; . . . ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζῶν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν; (*Soph.* 248e6-249a4). Because Intellect is a living moving reality, following the late Platonic view, it must be distinguished from and transcended by the One which, P. notes above in line 18, exists ἐν στάσει αἰδίῳ.

Fully alive, therefore, Intellect is not a corpse: οὐ νεκρὸν. P. seems to have a particular fondness for this image, especially in the earlier treatises. The term is used of Intellect in the same sense in VI.9[9].2.24-25: ἔχει δὲ καὶ ζωὴν τὸ ὄν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ νεκρὸν· πολλὰ ἄρα τὸ ὄν; and of being in IV.7[2].9.23-25: τὸ ὄν πρῶτως καὶ αἰεὶ ὄν οὐχὶ νεκρὸν, ὥσπερ λίθον ἢ ξύλον, ἀλλὰ ζῶν εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ ζωὴ καθαρᾶ κεκρῆσθαι. Before it is ensouled the universe is a corpse (V.1[10].2.25-26). And there is the splendid description of intelligible matter as a "decorated corpse" before it is defined by turning back to the One (II.4[12].5.15-18): οὐ μὴν ζῶν οὐδὲ νοοῦν, ἀλλὰ νεκρὸν κεκοσμημένον.

43-48 νοῦς . . . τὰ πράγματα. P. here provides a quick overview of some of Intellect's salient characteristics. The statement that "being and Intellect are the same" (43-44) is a clear echo of Parmenides Fr. 3 which is preserved in P.' discussion of Parmenides (V.1[10].8.17-18). The eccentric doxography of that treatise is further evidenced here in the claim that "Intellect itself is its objects," an accurate quotation of Aristotle *De An.* Γ 7.431b17. In that passage, of course, Aristotle is not discussing his transcendent Intellect, for he immediately raises the question whether Intellect can think objects which have no spatial magnitude, which for P. is ruled out by the very nature of intelligible reality. As is well known, P. takes over much of Aristotle's noetic theory, both its transcendent and immanent parts, and applies it to his intelligible universe. For further discussion of identity in Intellect see comm. on III.8[30].9.5-11.

P. has shifted his attention so rapidly to the nature of Intellect in its self-contemplating phase that he says it “is not concerned with objects which exist prior to it” (44-45). The One as intelligible object is no longer the focus of the discussion, so he can say that Intellect does not see the One. We might infer that this self-contemplating phase of Intellect’s life is distinct from its reversion phase, but the reversion is an eternal state which makes self-contemplation possible. Strictly speaking, this statement is at odds with the theory of Intellect existing in distinct phases eternally and simultaneously. The unity of Intellect is now asserted (47-48), an echo of Ch. 1.21 where Intellect, following Plato *Parmenides* 144e5, is defined as a one-many.

Modern editors have accepted Harder’s emendation of the MSS nonsensical ἐπιστολή μὴ δὲ to read ἐπιστήμη. Hence the sentence reads as a rough quotation of *De An.* Γ 4.430a3-4: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν. The latter is quoted more fully in the early treatise V.9[5].5.30-31.

CHAPTER TWO

ENNEAD V.1[10].7.1-26

Introductory Note

In this treatise P. provides a synopsis of his view of the structure of reality, as indicated by its title “On the Three Principal Hypostases.” In the first two chapters the soul is summoned to transcend its state of alienation and rediscover its true nature. Chs. 3-4 describe Intellect as the immediate source of the soul and as the archetype of the soul’s limited reality. The intellectual stage of the ascent raises the crucial problem of the source of Intellect, which is identified as the One in Ch. 5. The following two chapters explore at length how the One generates Intellect. Ch. 6 focuses on the doctrines of procession and reversion, employing the double-activity theory and laying the groundwork for a more detailed account of the two formative events in the life of Intellect. In this respect the progression of thought is quite similar to that presented in V.4[7].1-2.

The account of ontological derivation in the first half of Ch. 7 reveals the same interest as V.4[7].2 in tracing the origin of the potential phase of Intellect to the inner activity of the One. Similar problems emerge in this chapter: what are the differences between the One and the various aspects of Intellect? How precisely does the One function as an unchanging, eternal cause? What role does Intellect play in its self-constitution? Complicating efforts to decipher P.’ solutions to these difficulties is the fact that much of this important passage is plagued by obscure and elliptical expressions as well as by lacunae, which have attracted an unusually large amount of scholarly attention.

Translation of V.1[10].7.1-26

But we say that Intellect is an image of that One; for we must speak more clearly: first because what has come into being must in some way be that One and preserve much of it and be a likeness of it, just as light is of the sun. But Intellect is not that One. How then does it generate Intellect? Because by turning to itself the One sees; and this seeing is Intellect. For what apprehends something else is either sense-perception or Intellect; sense-perception is a line etc., but the circle is such that it can be divided, whereas this [potential Intellect] is not so. Now there is certainly unity here, but the One is the productive power of all things. The things, then, of which the One is the productive power are those which intellection sees, in a way separating them off from the power; otherwise it would not be Intellect. For Intellect already has within itself a kind of inner

awareness of the One's productive power, that the One has the power to produce substance. Intellect certainly through itself even defines its being for itself by the power which comes from the One, and because its substance is, in a way, one part of the One's contents and what comes from the One, it is strengthened by the One and it is perfected into substance by it and from it. And Intellect sees coming to itself from the One, just as to something divided from the undivided, life and intellection and all things, because the One is not one of all things. For in this way all things come from the One, because it is not contained by any shape; for that One is one alone: if it was all things, it would be included among beings. For this reason that One is none of the things in Intellect, but all things come from it. For this reason they are substances; for each has already been defined and has a kind of shape. Being must not, as it were, toss about in the indefinite, but must be fixed by limit and stability; and for intelligible objects stability is limit and shape, by means of which they also attain existence.

Commentary on V.1[10].7.1-26

1-4 εἰκόνα . . . ἡλίου. The opening statement of the chapter—that Intellect is an image of the One—indicates that P. is gradually, though not abruptly, shifting his attention from the procession of Intellect (discussed in the previous chapter) towards its return to the One, by which it is formed and perfected. The image-motif has been introduced already in Ch. 6, when the analogy is drawn between the soul as a λόγος and ἐνέργεια of Intellect and the similar relationship between Intellect and the One. Here Intellect is εἰκὼν (1) and ὁμοιότης (3-4) of the One and it “must in some way be that One” (2). The similarity between the two principles is stressed in analogous terms in V.4[7].2.25-26: Intellect is οἶον ἐκεῖνο καὶ μῖμημα καὶ εἰδῶλον ἐκείνου. Absent from the earlier account is the comparison in the present passage of the One to the sun diffusing its light (4). This brief statement is an echo of the more extended description of the archetype/image relation in terms of the sun and its light presented earlier in Ch. 6.27-34; see also VI.8[39].18.32ff., V.3[49].12.40, and I.7[54].1.24-28. The analogy of the Good and sun in *Rep.* 508e6ff. is the source and inspiration of this theme and the related expressions of it, e.g. that Intellect is ἀγαθοειδής: see comm. on V.6[24].5.13, III.8[30].11.16, and VI.7[38].16.5-10. For a penetrating discussion of P.' treatment of this difficult Platonic doctrine see Szlezák 153, 159, 163.

What is particularly interesting philosophically about P.' exploration of the Good/sun analogy is the tension between the similarity and difference of One and Intellect. Platonic paradeigmatism, whether expressed in terms of the relation between the Good and its offspring or between the Forms and particulars, determines P.' approach. In the present passage emphasis clearly falls on the similarity between the two, a fact which has important implications for

understanding the ensuing lines. And this fundamental similarity continues to be stressed in later discussions: οὐ μὴν ἄλλοειδὲς τὸ σκεδασθὲν εἰδωλὸν ὁ νοῦς: VI.8[39].18.36. But this view must be balanced against the difference between One and Intellect, an equally important consideration which arises from the Plotinian theories of ontological derivation and vertical causality. Thus the One ἔστι γὰρ παρῆναι χωρὶς ὄν (VI.4[22].11.20); more generally, τὸ αἷτιον οὐ ταῦτὸν τῷ αἷτιατῷ (VI.9[9].6.54-55). A close parallel to the latter passage may be *Rep.* 509e3-6, as Szlezák 153 points out.

There are two minor textual disputes in these opening lines. In line 2 Vitringa emends the MSS ἐκεῖνο to ἐκείνου, the reading adopted by Volkmann, Bréhier, and MacKenna. I follow the majority of editors and scholars in retaining the MSS reading, with ἐκεῖνο standing for the One predicatively. It is sufficient to note that πῶς becomes redundant with the genitive. In line 3 H-S and Armstrong prefer τὸ γενόμενον, all other editors τὸ γεννώμενον. H-S defend the former by referring to the previous chapter: γέγονεν (2), τὸ γενόμενον (22). But this is hardly conclusive since, as Atkinson points out, γεννᾶν is used four times at the end of Ch. 6. In claiming that τὸ γενόμενον in Ch. 6.22 “refers not to Intellect proper, but to Intellect in its inchoate state” Atkinson *ad loc.* seems to suggest that, because τὸ γενόμενον or τὸ γεννώμενον in line 3 represents Intellect proper (a point that we are not compelled to accept), P. might be differentiating these two modes of Intellect’s life by means of these two expressions. If this is his intention, I see no evidence in the text of this or any other treatise to support it. In any case, I prefer τὸ γενόμενον; but neither reading alters the meaning of the sentence over against the alternative.

4-5 ἀλλ’ . . . γεννᾷ. The translation of these two sentences is not disputed, but there is some debate as to how we are to construe the question in the second sentence. Hadot (1963b) 95 argues that the question “How then does the One generate Intellect” follows naturally from the previous discussion of the similarity between One and Intellect. On this reading the assertion “But Intellect is not that One” initiates a request for an explanation of how something that is like but also different from the One (cf. Ch. 6.53: ἑτερότης separates Intellect from the One) can be produced by it. Atkinson 156, following Igal (1971) 129-30, contests the continuity in the discussion Hadot discerns with the argument that the “present passage is an objection by an imaginary opponent of P. which interrupts the flow of P.’s previous argument. P.’s answer to this objection begins in 7,5 with ἦ. The conjunction of ἀλλά and ἦ is quite common in contexts of question and answer.” P. certainly employs a dialectical method in many passages, and the present case is no exception; but Atkinson wishes to characterize the objection as rather “polemical”: “The objector shrugs aside the previous talk about similarity and resemblance, and returns to the old question of Chapter 6. How can plurality derive from unity?” 157. It seems to me, however,

that a properly polemical objection, to which P. feels compelled to respond, would be one he opposes. An example occurs near the beginning of V.4[7].2: “But why is that which generates not Intellect, whose activity is intellection?” (3-4). In this case the opponents are Aristotelians whose first principle is Intellect, a position strongly and consistently rejected by P. But the assertion that “Intellect is not that One” can hardly be taken as a polemical objection, since it is a succinct statement of the lynchpin of Plotinian metaphysics. What the dialectical play of question and answer indicates is that P. is now ready to explore how the procession of Intellect can be explained in terms consistent with both its similarity and difference with respect to the One. The final three lines of the previous chapter have already prepared us for this necessity: “but when the parent is the highest good, the offspring is necessarily with him and separate from him only in otherness” (Ch. 6.51-53). The relation of One and Intellect involves the dialectical oscillation between presence and absence, similarity and difference.

5-6 ἢ ὅτι . . . αὐτῇ νοῦς. This sentence is one of the most significantly ambiguous and hotly debated in the entire *Enneads*. Understanding the many difficulties in the passage has been greatly advanced by Atkinson’s discussion. I assume familiarity with it in what follows.

This sentence answers the question “How does the One generate Intellect?” There are two possible answers: (i) “Because by turning to itself the One sees”; (ii) “Because by its [sc. Intellect’s] return to it [sc. the One] it [sc. Intellect] sees” (tr. Armstrong). Most of the proponents of the alternative interpretations are listed by H-S¹ III.397 (up to 1973) and by Atkinson 157-58 (up to 1983). A few important discussions are not mentioned by either, and scholars have continued to weigh in on this problematic passage. In favor of (i) are Hadot (1968) I.320-21 n4; Santa Cruz 312-13; Graeser 133-34; Beierwaltes (1967) 14-15 and (1985) 45, 52-53; those continuing to argue the case for (ii) include: Rist (1967) 267 n44; Szlezák 70 n227; Armstrong *ad loc.*; Corrigan 196-98; Schroeder (1986) 187; Lloyd (1987) 160.

A strong argument for identifying Intellect as the subject of the ἐπιστροφή is the fact that this is P.’s consistent position throughout the *Enneads* and that he nowhere else states that the One is subject to an ἐπιστροφή (first argued by Schwyzer [1960] 41). However, the latter claim depends upon how one reads the equally ambiguous passage in Ch. 6.15-19. Since most scholars refer often to this text in their discussions of the present passage, it will be useful to quote it here for ease of reference: παντὶ τῷ κινουμένῳ δεῖ τι εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ κινεῖται· μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐκείνῳ μηδενὸς μὴ τιθώμεθα αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ εἴ τι μετ’ αὐτὸ γίνεται, ἐπιστραφέντος αἰεὶ ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀναγκαζόν ἐστι γεγονέναι (“Everything which is moved must have some end to which it moves. The One has no such end, so we must not consider that it moves. If anything

comes into being after it, we must think that it necessarily does so while the One remains continually turned towards itself"). Here too the ambiguity turns on whether the One or Intellect has the ἐπιστροφή. As Atkinson *ad loc.* neatly summarizes the problem: "Either (a) ἐκείνου refers to the One and αὐτὸ [Atkinson is following the reading of H-S¹; αὐτὸ is the reading of H-S²] is reflexive or (b) ἐκείνου refers to the subject of Ch. 6.17-18 (τὸ μετὰ τὸ ἓν) and αὐτὸ to the One." On this passage too Atkinson provides a full list of the adherents of the alternative interpretations as well as an excellent discussion of its problems and powerful arguments in favor of (b). Although I do not wish to consider all the details in the interpretations of this passage, at certain points our understanding of Ch. 7.5-6 will be affected by Ch. 6.17-19. Most commentators adopt a consistent view on both passages, but it is significant that some split their opinion: Armstrong; Igal (1971) 135; and Lloyd (1987) 160 argue in favor of Intellect as subject in Ch. 7.5-6 while adopting (a) in Ch. 6.17-19. I agree with the comment of Lloyd (1987) 160 that "it is certainly better not to translate it [ἐπιστροφέντος] 'reverts', for that suggests its correlation with remaining and proceeding and would be unsuitable in the present context," which is further supported by his just claim "that the passage is about the generation of Intellect without distinction of indeterminate and determinate stages."

Turning now to the present passage, it will be useful to begin with Hadot's interpretation which first raised the problem. Hadot (1963b) 95 calls attention to the harsh change of subject if the ἐπιστροφή applies to Intellect (also a difficulty in Ch. 6.17-19): from the One, the subject of γεννᾷ in line 5, to Intellect, i.e. τὸ γενόμενον from line 3, the subject of ἐώρα in line 6. But if Intellect is the subject, then the sentence does not answer the question how the One generates Intellect. Moreover, this reading creates an unattractive and uninformative redundancy: "on ne comprend pas bien la précision: 'Cette vision, c'est l'Intelligence', si 'Intelligence' est déjà sujet de ἐώρα. On ne voit pas comment le second membre de phrase s'oppose au premier." More importantly, he argues that Intellect has not yet been engendered, so it cannot be the subject of the ἐπιστροφή. To support his claim that the One is the subject Hadot argues that just as the One's ἐπιστροφή in Ch. 6.17-19 does not undermine its immobility, so in the present passage its ἐπιστροφή is purely self-directed. On this view the One's ἐπιστροφή is synonymous with its "remaining in itself," a central theme of the contemporary treatise V.4[7].2.21, 33-34. This leads him to apply a version of the double-ἐνέργεια theory to the relationship between the One's vision (i.e. ἐπιστροφή) and Intellect's vision: "sa [sc. the One's] vision reste indéterminée, en puissance, parce qu'elle est absolue. L'Intelligence, au contraire, est vision en acte (ὄρασις; cf. V.1.5.19: ἡ νόησις ὄρασις ὁρώσα). Alors que la vision propre à l'Un consiste en sa conversion vers lui-même, la vision propre à l'Intelligence suppose une séparation entre l'Intelligence et son objet" 95. In his later study, (1968) I.321 n4, he makes the point more explicitly:

“La vision de l’Intelligence représente en quelque sorte un acte second qui suit nécessairement la présence de l’acte premier qu’est l’Un”; cf. V.4[7].2.35-36. I have quoted Hadot’s arguments at length because in his discussion of Hadot’s interpretation Atkinson omits some crucial points.

The counter-attack against Hadot’s position has been extensive; and it took on increased vigor in the wake of the decision by Henry and Schwyzer to reverse the view of H-S¹ and accept (i) in H-S². (Hadot had already convinced Schwyzer earlier: see Schwyzer [1969] 260). The strongest case against reading the One as subject of the ἐπιστροφή has been made by O’Daly and Atkinson, but we might begin with Armstrong’s general remarks *ad loc.*: “The sentence would then mean ‘The One by its return to itself sees: and this seeing is Intellect’. But this simple identification of Intellect with the self-vision of the One does not agree with anything else which is said about the relationship of the two hypostases in the *Enneads*; and it seems to me most unlikely that Plotinus would ever have spoken of the One as ‘returning’ upon itself and seeing itself as the unity in multiplicity which is Intellect: for in his thought there can be absolutely no separation from itself or multiplicity in the One. . . . I therefore, with Cilento, Igal and others, suppose an abrupt change of subject (by no means unprecedented in Plotinus) and take αὐτό as non-reflexive . . . and understand that Plotinus is expounding his normal doctrine that Intellect constitutes itself by returning in vision or contemplation upon the One.” We must now consider the more detailed arguments espoused by O’Daly and Atkinson which issue in similar conclusions.

O’Daly (1973) 71 acknowledges the force of Hadot’s points that the harsh change of subject “would appear to make the text meaningless. For, one might argue, Plotinus would then be asking, ‘How does the One produce *nous*?’ and answering by saying ‘Because *nous* looks upon the One’—in other words, assuming an act of conversion on the part of an already produced *nous*, instead of accounting for the latter’s production.” O’Daly proceeds to a solution of this difficulty by reformulating the question posed in the text: “The question πῶς νοῦν γεννᾷ; can be seen to mean more than ‘How does the One produce *nous*?’: by reason of the emphatic position of *noun* one can translate it as follows—‘How is it that the One produces *nous*?’ or ‘How is it that what is produced, τὸ γεννώμενον—Ficino’s *genitum*—is *nous*?’ seeing—as the context has just told us—that the One is not *nous*? This alters the meaning of the passage radically. We are not now dealing with the creative act of the One *per se*, but with the fact, subsequent to creation (which remains unexplained), that the created is *intelligence*. And Plotinus accounts for this by saying that it is intelligence because of its conversion towards the One” 72. To my mind this restatement of the problem does not alter the meaning of the passage radically, especially since the point raised by Hadot—that the production of Intellect is not accounted for—is not adequately addressed. O’Daly’s parenthetical remark is a token acknowledgement of the persisting difficulty; but his argument that what is

generated looks back to the One is a forceful one in as much as this is P.' normal doctrine as he, Armstrong and others point out.

Atkinson 158 articulates this position further, arguing that what P. has in mind here is the reversion of the inchoate Intellect: "In our present passage the use of the imperfect ἔωρα, contrasted with the word ὄρασις, emphasises the transition of Intellect in its inchoate state to the fully actualised Intellect which is the second hypostasis." Discerning this transition is rather important to the argument, given the sudden change of subject on this interpretation. (Atkinson's solution to the latter problem is to interpret lines 4-5 as an interruption, which, even were it true, offers little support to his argument. See above *ad loc.*) Atkinson is frank in admitting that his reading of the first six lines of the chapter requires a shift in the meaning of τὸ γεννώμενον. In line 3 τὸ γεννώμενον "refers to fully-actualised Intellect, whereas in 7.5 it must mean Intellect in its inchoate state" 159; Schroeder (1986) 187 makes the same argument. What is troubling about this analysis is the tendency to overstress the precision with which P. is supposedly defining the stages of Intellect. We are being asked to accept an implicit reference to the inchoate Intellect by reading back from the end of the sentence: ἡ δὲ ὄρασις αὕτη νοῦς. It is not impossible that this ὄρασις is code for "actualized Intellect" as Atkinson argues. But if the fully actualized Intellect is now on the scene, then why do lines 10-19 seem to provide significant detail on different aspects of the transition from potential to actualized Intellect? (This objection is even more cogent given Atkinson's interpretation of lines 12-13; see below *ad loc.*) In sum, throughout the chapter P. oscillates back and forth between the two aspects of Intellect or is unclear as to which he is referring to.

Now Atkinson argues correctly that P. often does distinguish between the two aspects of Intellect by means of potential and actual vision: "ὄρασις is fully actualized ὄψις 158, as he correctly observes, referring to Ch. 5.18-19: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ νόησις ὄρασις ὁρῶσα ἄμφω τε ἔν. (Note for the moment that Hadot quotes this same passage, cited above, in support of the opposite interpretation of the passage.) But it is important to note that neither in V.1[10] nor in any of the other early treatises does P. precisely distinguish between the two phases of Intellect's life *qua* vision. To support his position Atkinson is forced to refer to passages from late treatises: on 158 he refers to III.8[30].11.1ff.; V.3[49].11.10; VI.7[37].15.16 and 16.10; on 136-38 (containing his comm. on the related passage at Ch. 6.17-19) he refers to other passages from the same treatises. Among the latter references he includes this passage: νόησις δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὁρῶσα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιστραφεῖσα καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου οἶον ἀποτελουμένη (V.4[7].2.4-5). Here ὁρῶσα is clearly attributed to the inchoate Intellect, which undermines Atkinson's strong assertion that ὄρασις in our present passage must refer to actualized Intellect, even if it does in Ch. 5.18-19. This leads me to the conclusion that we must not press P.' use of terminology too far when he himself is not explicit.

If Atkinson's proposed solution to the difficulty of the abrupt change of subject is not fully convincing, his argument that P. would never ascribe an ἐπιστροφή to the One is considerably more formidable. In his commentary on Ch. 6.17-19 he provides an excellent discussion of the early (he emphasizes the testimony of V.2[11].1.9-11, the immediately subsequent treatise) and late passages which clearly indicate P.' standard account of Intellect's reversion to the One. His strongest claim, in my view, is that an ἐπιστροφή cannot be attributed to the One because "ἐπιστροφή is explicitly called a movement in VI.7[38].16.16 . . . If an ἐπιστροφή πρὸς αὐτό is to be the cause of the birth of Intellect, then this ἐπιστροφή must be motionless" 136-37. He acknowledges that this is precisely the point made by Hadot (1963b) 94 who "thinks that ἐπιστροφή πρὸς αὐτό means the same as 'repos en soi-même' and he compares V.4.2.19ff. (εἴ τι οὖν μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται κτλ." To Atkinson this move is quite unacceptable, for "it is paradoxical, to say the least, to think of self-ἐπιστροφή and μονὴ ἐν ἑαυτῷ as synonymous" 137. I agree: Hadot should have been more precise in his comparison of these two notions. Moreover, Atkinson might have criticized Hadot for his definition of the One's ἐπιστροφή as "vision en puissance." But the point is not whether the two phrases are synonymous but whether they are or can be consistent and complementary. Certainly, P. is careful to deny in many passages that the One is in motion, but when Atkinson refers to the late treatise VI.7[38] for the description of ἐπιστροφή as a κίνησις, we must be wary. And as my analysis of συναίσθησις in V.4[7].2.18 indicates, it is not at all unusual for P. now to affirm and now to deny an activity of the One.

Now P. never specifically attributes κίνησις to the One, but in VI.8[39].16 he comes very close and, in fact, he finds a host of activities going on inside the One. The most relevant passage reads: ὁ [sc. τὸ ἐν] δ' εἰς τὸ εἶσω οἶον φέρεται αὐτοῦ οἶον ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπήσας (12-13; see comm. *ad loc.* for further discussion). This passage is doubly significant for understanding how the One's ἐπιστροφή might be conceived by P. First, the phrase "being carried [or: penetrating] into its own interior" suggests that P. is not averse to ascribing activities to the One that may seem to predicate motion of it. Second, movement inwards is on at least one occasion synonymous with an ἐπιστροφή: in an account of the soul's mystical ascent to the Good in a contemporary treatise, P. exhorts that "the soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within (ἐπιστραφεῖναι πρὸς τὸ εἶσω πάντη)": VI.9[9].7.17-18. Similarly, Intellect attains mystical vision of the One by "veiling itself from other things and drawing itself inward" (συναγαγὼν εἰς τὸ εἶσω: V.5[32].7.31-32; see comm. *ad loc.*) In the former passage the ἐπιστροφή concerns the soul's mystical reversion to the Good, not the ἐπιστροφή of the inchoate Intellect which brings it into its fully actualized state. But surely this is significant: ἐπιστροφή, like so many other activities employed by P., is a very elastic

notion. It seems to me possible, therefore, on the basis of the evidence of VI.8[39].16.12-13 and VI.9[9].7.17-18 that P. could discover an ἐπιστροφή in the One, though this would not require that the One be in motion.

Even if the One can be said to turn towards itself, two very knotty problems remain: (i) in its self-reversion the One sees and (ii) this seeing is Intellect. Atkinson adroitly seizes on both these difficulties. Following Igal (1971) 132, he argues that “the use of the demonstrative αὕτη makes it quite certain that ὄρασις picks up the subject of the verb ἐώρα. This means that if the One’s ἐπιστροφή is in question P. must be saying that the actual self-vision of the One is Intellect. This would imply that Intellect is something internal to the One, and this in turn contradicts the important Plotinian law that each of the three hypostases is distinct and separate from its cause, and is the external activity of its producer” 158. However, with respect to the One the notions “external” and “internal” must be used with extreme caution. Complicating Atkinson’s statement is the equally, if not more, important Plotinian principle that lower realities are “in their principle” (V.2[11].2.13; cf. also V.5[32].9.33). More fully: “The last and lowest things, therefore, are in the last of those before them, and these are in those prior to them, and one thing is in another up to the First, which is the Principle” (V.5[32].9.5-7). It is this principle, I think, which provides at least a possible foundation for the present speculation on the One’s seeing.

Atkinson admits that the One is said to possess self-vision in VI.8[39].16.19-21. The text is important: οἷον πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει καὶ τὸ οἷον εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει; for analysis of this passage see comm. *ad loc.* Atkinson dismisses this passage on the grounds that the One’s vision “is qualified by the word οἷον . . . and is in any case an internal activity of the One” 159. The first point is insufficient grounds for ignoring this passage. P. usually does employ οἷον as a warning that we must read a phrase or passage with special care, especially when it pertains to the One, but the term does not empty a phrase or passage of all its meaning. Cf. VI.8[39].13.1-5, 47-50 for P.’ fullest explanation of how the use of οἷον affects his statements about the One; my discussion of these texts appears in my comments on VI.8[39].16.12.

Atkinson’s second objection—that the One’s self-vision is “an internal activity of the One”—misses the point: if P. does attribute an ἐπιστροφή to the One in the present passage, it would, of course, be an internal activity. His real objection is that this self-vision “is nowhere associated with the genesis of Intellect.” This should be taken with the objection, quoted above, that construing the One as subject “would imply that Intellect is something internal to the One.” I think that Atkinson can be challenged on both counts. In VI.8[39].16 P. attributes self-vision and movement inwards to the One, as we have seen, but he also articulates activities and modes of the One’s inner life that are quasi-, pre-, or hyper-intellectual. He states that the Good is “an abiding active actuality and the most lovable of things in a way rather like Intellect. But Intellect is an

actualization, so that he [sc.. the Good] is an actualization” (ἐνέργεια μένουσα καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον οἶον νοῦς. νοῦς δὲ ἐνέργημα· ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός: VI.8[39].16.15-16.) In the comm. on this important passage, I also discuss a lengthy and complex passage from Ch. 18 of the same treatise, the most relevant part of which for the present passage is the striking claim that what is generated and flows out from the One is “evidence of something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect: for it is one. . . . For something like what is in Intellect, in many ways greater, is in that One” (μαρτυρεῖν τὸν οἶον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα· ἔν γάρ. . . . οἶον γὰρ τὸ ἐν νῶ, πολλαχῇ μείζον ἢ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκείνῳ: VI.8[39].16.21-22, 32-34).

6-7 τὸ γὰρ . . . νοῦς. For all editors and translators, except Harder, this sentence introduces the two types of apprehension which see “something else”—sense-perception and intellection. For Harder, however, τὸ καταλαμβάνον refers back to the One’s self-vision: “Denn das was dies Auffassen tätigt, ist etwas anderes als Wahrnehmung oder Geist.” In Harder’s view this association is strengthened by τοῦτο δὲ in line 8, which he sees as referring to the One, but there is no dispute about that referent. Atkinson correctly dismisses Harder’s reading, but only on the grounds that the vision mentioned in line 6 is Intellect’s and not the One’s, which I prefer. But there is another reason for rejecting Harder’s interpretation. It is quite unlikely that P. would refer to the One as τὸ καταλαμβάνον. The word rarely connotes apprehension of any sort, and only once is it a variant for intellection—IV.7[2].8.5.

The standard translation of the sentence fits quite well with what precedes it. If the One is endowed with self-reversion and self-vision as I have argued, then the reference to sense-perception and Intellect as “that which apprehends something else” makes even better sense. We can discern P. making a distinction between what sees itself and what sees something other than itself.

7-8 † αἰσθησιν γραμμὴν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα †. This elliptical insertion of geometric imagery has been considered corrupt by many editors. Two problems require elucidation: the brevity of the passage and its possible meanings. Harder Ib.389 recognizes the passage as an example of the notes which P. wrote for his own use during oral delivery. Igal (1971) 141 and Armstrong *ad loc.* understand the note as a reminder of familiar doctrine. However, Atkinson 161-62 objects that “the whole theory of ‘notes’ is suspect” and since “Porphyry’s edition was intended to disseminate P.’ work to a larger public than had previously been possible, it seems improbable that he would have left in the new edition notes which the larger public could hardly be presumed to understand.” Porphyry certainly tells us he will “try to revise all the books and put in the punctuation and correct any verbal errors” (V. *Pl.* 26.37-40), but it is doubtful that Porphyry had in mind a readership so large as to require him to spell out everything that was

ambiguous in the text he received from P. In any case, Porphyry makes it clear that the first twenty-one treatises, those composed before he joined P., were made available only to a very select group, i.e. P.' close disciples (see *V. Pl.* 4.13-17). On the complex issues involved in Porphyry's edition of the *Enneads* see Goulet-Cazé, especially 284-87, 305-07 and Goulet 371-74.

As to the sense of this note which says "and sense-perception is a line etc." there has been little disagreement since Igal (1971) 140-41 proposed this supplement: αἴσθησιν γραμμὴν λαβέ, νοῦν κύκλον, τὸ ἐν δὲ κέντρον. What has made this explanation compelling is its apparent agreement with the geometrical imagery in the ensuing lines: the circle in 8 and the contrast between a one and the One in line 9. However, reading back from lines 8-9 to this ingenious addendum leaves several unanswered questions, as Atkinson has adroitly pointed out. If the circle is an image of Intellect and the center of the One, "how does the visual perception (αἴσθησις) as a γραμμή fit in?" Noting that γραμμή usually means "radius" (based on reference to Euclid), he recognizes correctly that since radii are parts of the circle, the distinction between sense-perception and Intellect would disappear if this were the image P. has in mind. This acute difficulty leads him to the fruitful observation that γραμμή must indicate linear motion which is implicitly contrasted with the circular motion of Intellect. Atkinson is on the right track here, but I think his point has greater significance than he realizes.

First, there is more to be learned, than Atkinson is willing to recognize, from a passage in the immediately preceding treatise VI.9[9], which is cited by Harder and Igal as the foundation text for the present "note." He rejects the relevance of the text in question because there is no reference to αἴσθησις. But a careful examination of the passage reveals that the distinction between sense-perception and Intellect is very much in P.' mind: "If then a soul knows itself for the rest of the time, and knows that its movement is not in a straight line, except when there is a kind of break in it, but its natural movement is, as it were, in a circle around something, something not outside but a center, and the center is that from which the circle derives; then it will move around this from which it is and will depend on this, bringing itself into accord with that which all souls ought to" (VI.9[9].8.1-7). αἴσθησις is not specifically referred to, but it is clear that P. clearly distinguishes between the lower and higher activities of the soul: the former indicated by linear motion, which represents a break in its natural, circular motion. P. is not more specific because his primary focus in the treatise is the mystical ascent of the soul to the One. Also relevant in this passage is the emphasis on modes of cognition: the comparison concerns two different activities of the soul, not a distinction between the ontological levels of reality *qua* hypostases. This point has a direct bearing on our understanding of the "note" in the present passage.

What is confusing about the geometric imagery of line, circle, and center is that it fails to represent the relations between soul, Intellect, and the One. Atkinson is rightly troubled by this incongruity, remarking that “the MSS. text as it stands . . . is no equivalent of Igal’s paraphrase.” So he regards the text as corrupt; but he continues to employ Igal’s addendum in his interpretation of the following lines—a curious strategy. The problem with Igal’s supplement is that it involves a combination of two geometric schemes. Atkinson discusses the common Plotinian image of One as center and Intellect as the circle revolving around it and then, to his credit, breaks with the image and introduces the distinction between linear and circular motion. This is the right move and there are compelling reasons to press it further. If P. has in mind a distinction between the activities of sense-perception and intellection, then we should drop the ontological distinction between soul, Intellect, and One. The center/circle-image belongs to the latter and it is out of place in the present passage as well as in the preceding and succeeding lines. A brief discussion of the geometric terms will demonstrate the point.

The common geometrical scheme of ontological derivation includes, in descending order, the point, line, plane, and solid. P. has little interest in this model, but it is quite prevalent in the Old Academy, Middle Platonism and is still alive in Proclus. (See Speusippus Frr. 50, 52 Taran and his commentary *ad locc.* 359, 362 with abundant references and 55 for general discussion; the very different ontological classification of the same geometric terms in Xenocrates Fr. 34 and discussion by Krämer [1964] 32 n8 and 122; Albinus *Did.* 165.15ff. with discussion by Krämer [1964] 106; Proclus *In Euc.* 96.16-97.25. For more extensive discussion of the sources cf. comm. on III.8[30].8.36-38.) This scheme of ontological derivation in terms of the progression from the point to the solid cannot be what P. has in mind in the present passage, for the line is in second position and neither for P. nor for any other adherents of this traditional scheme can sense-perception occupy such a lofty status. Moreover, it is unlikely that sense-perception would be included in an ontological scheme. Point or center and circle do represent the relation between the One and Intellect according to Plotinian ontological criteria—indivisibility and unity vs. divisibility and multiplicity as well as circular motion—but the line, as Atkinson argues, does not fit at all either with the circle or the point/center. The distinction, therefore, is between sense-perception/line and intellection/circle and the One as center should be excluded from Igal’s addendum. Adopting this view will enable us to understand better lines 8-10.

Additional evidence for this distinction, beyond what VI.9[9].8 provides, appears in Proclus: “the soul contains in advance the straight and the circular in her essential nature, so that she may supervise the whole array of unlimiteds as well as all the limited beings in the cosmos, providing for their forthgoing by the straight line and for their reversion by the circle, leading them to plurality by the

one and collecting them all into unity by the other" (*In Euc.* 107.20-108.2); "Since the soul is intermediate between sensibles and intelligibles, she moves in circular fashion insofar as she is allied to intelligible nature but, insofar as she presides over sensibles, exercises her providence in a straight line" (108.21-109.4, tr. Morrow). These texts are in essential agreement with VI.9[9].8.1-7 and articulate the important analogy between sense-perception and the line that P. briefly mentions. Moreover, it is evident from Proclus' use of the traditional scheme of ontological derivation in terms of point, line etc. that this model illustrates a very different set of relations than that indicated by the comparison of a straight line to the circle.

8-10 ἀλλ' ὁ κύκλος . . . πάντων. This passage is rather vague and thus has inspired recent efforts to decipher its meaning. Once again Igal (1971) 142-44 and Atkinson interpret the first sentence as an objection by an imaginary opponent who wishes to understand, as in lines 4-5, how the One generates Intellect. The objector, in their view, picks up the geometric image of the previous sentence and, in Atkinson's words, "retorts that even if the analogy holds, the genesis of Intellect still presents difficulties because the circle is divisible . . . and the centre of the circle is not." This interpretation of the limitations of the geometric image is plausible if one accepts Igal's unnecessary addendum; but I see no reason to interject another "imaginary opponent": P. here shifts his attention to consider what the circle represents.

Igal and Atkinson also argue that τοῦτο refers directly to the center of the circle and only indirectly to the One, against the view of most translators who assume that it refers simply to the One. In his translation Armstrong offers an intriguing new interpretation: "but the circle is of a kind which can be divided; but this [intellectual apprehension] is not so." Despite the geometric imagery in lines 7-8, and the hypothesis of Igal, which Armstrong accepts, that P. may have referred there to the One as center of the circle, Armstrong sees τοῦτο as picking up the discussion of intellection in lines 6-7. Although he provides no comment on his unique translation, Armstrong may have decided on this version for reasons parallel to, but also different from, those which convince Igal and Atkinson. Where they see P. limiting the analogy between the One and the center of the circle, Armstrong may wish to discern a limitation of the analogy between Intellect and the circle. But it is not completely clear what he intends to suggest by this distinction between Intellect and intellectual apprehension. By the latter does he mean actualized Intellect's self-intellection or potential Intellect's vision?

Schroeder (1986) 189 argues that the referent of τοῦτο is the inchoate Intellect: "Here, to the objection that νοῦς is divisible . . . it is answered that the inchoate νοῦς is not such, i.e. it is neither a circle nor is it divisible. Circularity, divisibility and intellection are produced when it has looked to the One, i.e. when two stages of the series of the geometrical analogy, viz. centre and circle, are

established.” He supports his interpretation with a reference to VI.7[38].16.10-16: “Did Intellect, when it looked (ἑώρα) towards the Good, think that One as many, and because it was itself one being (ἐν ὃν αὐτὸς) think him as many, dividing (μερίζων) him in itself by not being able to think the whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect when it looked at him, but looked unintellectually. Or rather we should say that it did not yet see (ἑώρα) the Good, but lived towards it and depended on it and turned to it” (Schroeder does not translate the underlined text). There are analogous passages concerning the development of Intellect not cited by Schroeder: “For when it [sc. Intellect] contemplates the One, it does not contemplate it as one: otherwise it would not become Intellect. But beginning as one (ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἓν) it did not stay as it began, but, without noticing it, became many, as if heavy, and unrolled itself because it wanted to possess everything . . . for it became like a circle unrolling itself” (III.8[30].8.31-36; see comm. *ad loc.*); “it [sc. potential Intellect] was, certainly, one before seeing” (III.8[30].11.5).

Now Schroeder’s purpose in comparing V.1[10].7.8-9 with VI.7[38].16.10-16 is to establish that “vision, intellection and division are denied to the inchoate νοῦς” 190. (It is worth noting that Schroeder’s denial of vision to the inchoate Intellect, indicated in VI.7[38].16 by the second ἑώρα, contradicts his statement on 187 that “the subject of the imperfect ἑώρα [in V.1[10].7.6] must be the inchoate νοῦς.”) He is drawing an analogy between τοῦτο in line 8, which is said to be indivisible, and μερίζων in VI.7[38].16.12. The analogy is not exact because in the second case the text seems to imply that the inchoate Intellect is not capable of dividing the One. More significant for the determination that lines 8-10 may indicate a distinction between actualized and potential Intellect are the two underlined passages: in VI.7[38].16 and III.8[30].8 P. describes potential Intellect as a unity. ἐνταῦθα ἐν in line 9, therefore, could refer to inchoate Intellect in contrast to τὸ ἐν in the succeeding clause. If it is objected that support for this interpretation comes from the accounts of procession and reversion in the same late treatises which I earlier excluded from consideration as evidence in the effort to determine what is the subject in lines 5-6, it would still be possible to argue that ἐνταῦθα ἐν refers to actualized Intellect, since it too is a unity, though a multiple one: V.9[5].8.21-9.2, 14-16 and V.3[49].5.7-21 stress that actualized Intellect is a unity and is not divisible. Since in the early part of the chapter P. has not emphatically indicated that he is speaking about the potential phase of Intellect, it seems more likely to me that he is simply referring to the fact that Intellect is an indivisible unity (and he probably means actualized Intellect, since the subtle distinctions between potential and actual Intellect articulated in III.8[30] and VI.7[38].16 are lacking in the present treatise), whereas its image, the circle, is divisible. On the other hand, in the ensuing lines (10-17) the potential state of Intellect is quite prominent and in lines 16-17 (see below *ad*

loc.) Intellect is divided while the One is undivided, so Schroeder's thesis must remain a distinct possibility.

Atkinson's discussion of this passage is excellent, as usual, but I think he is forced to overinterpret the text on the basis of Igal's doubtful addendum. He notes first that Ficino, Cilento and Harder merely translate ἐνταῦθα literally as "here," which sidesteps the problem. Bréhier's "dans l'Intelligence aussi il y a unité" is better (in my view, but not Atkinson's). Atkinson translates the passage: "Yes, in the case of the geometric centre, too, there is a unity, but the One is the potentiality of all things" 165. It seems to me that the contrast he wishes to draw between the geometric center of the circle, which represents the One, and the One in reality is too subtle for the text to bear. And it is especially tenuous in light of his conclusion that αἰσθησιν γραμμῆν (7) is corrupt. If my interpretation of the geometric "note" is correct, Atkinson's ingenious interpretation is unnecessary.

10-11 ὧν . . . καθορᾷ. With this sentence P. finally begins to speak with some precision about the transition from potential to actual Intellect. Potential Intellect, here designated by νόησις (see Theiler [1970] 295), begins the process of self-differentiation and pluralization in its vision of the One. Unlike V.4[7].2.4-5, however, where νόησις looks at and reverts to the One, here the inchoate Intellect looks at things (ταῦτα: line 10) derived in some way from the One's productive power. We need not conclude that significant development in P.' view of procession is announced here, for slight variants in the numerous accounts of procession occur in virtually all the texts examined in this commentary.

There has been discussion about how to translate the sentence. Atkinson 166 provides a useful summary of scholars who read σχιζομένη as middle or passive. He accepts Igal's argument, (1971) 147, that the verb can have a middle sense, though none is attested in *LSJ*. He translates: "The act of thought separates off, as it were, from the potentiality the items of this potentiality and sees them." (Translating νόησις with "act of thought" undermines slightly his correct view that the term denotes potential Intellect). Armstrong too reads the verb as middle, but in his translation he adopts a slightly different perspective: "The things, then, of which it is the productive power are those which Intellect observes, in a way cutting itself off from the power." Hadot takes the verb passively and translates: "Ces choses donc, dont l'Un est la puissance, l'intellection les voit, comme si elle était séparée de cette puissance" (1963b) 95. Though the sentence is ambiguous and these slightly different translations do not offer significantly different meanings, I prefer to take σχιζομένη as middle with Armstrong, Atkinson and others. And I prefer Armstrong's rendering to Atkinson's because the latter's seems to attribute to the inchoate Intellect's vision rather more discriminatory power than it has in other accounts of procession and reversion. VI.7[38].15.20-22, which he quotes, is strong evidence for his

position, but vision is not mentioned in that passage. Moreover, there potential Intellect “received” the One’s δύναμις and, unable to hold it, broke it up. To my ear this sounds like a more passive, and typically mysterious, process than what Atkinson’s translation suggests. Cf. also V.3[49].11.4-8: “it moved to it not as Intellect but as sight not yet seeing, but came out possessing the multiplicity which that sight itself made; so that it desired one thing, having vaguely in itself a kind of image of it, but came out having grasped something else which it made many in itself.” (On the latter passage see comm. *ad loc.*) Neither of these passages is exactly parallel to the present text and the evidence they provide should not be pressed too far in either direction, but I think both, and especially the latter, nicely indicate P.’ reticence—or inability—to specify precisely what causes the “overflow” from the One to begin to differentiate itself.

For discussion of the One as δύναμις see comm. on III.8[30].10.1ff.

11-13 ἐπεὶ . . . οὐσίαν. This sentence contains several problems: what are the subjects of ἔχει and δύναται and what is the referent of τῆς δυνάμεως? Both Igal (1971) 149-50 and Atkinson 167 list the scholars who read the One or Intellect as subjects. Including the positions of scholars not listed by Atkinson, these can be tabulated as follows: (i) the One as subject of both verbs: Becker, Cilento, Harder, Hadot, O’Daly, Theiler (1970) 296 n2 and H-S¹ (ii) Intellect as subject of both verbs: Ficino, Bouillet, Bréhier, Volkmann-Schluck, Trouillard, Igal, Armstrong, Atkinson, and Lloyd (1987) 161; (iii) Intellect as subject of ἔχει and the One as subject of δύναται: Rist, Deck, Schroeder (1986) 191-93, and H-S². In my view (iii) is correct, but there are many issues to consider.

Schwyzler (1960) 375, 389 initially defended (i) and the ascription of οἶον συναίσθησις to the One by comparison with V.4[7].2.18. For Hadot (1963b) 95 the One’s reversion and self-vision in lines 5-6 are sufficient grounds for reading the One as subject in lines 12-14. Against this Igal 152 and Atkinson 168 argue that συναίσθησις properly belongs only to actualized Intellect, so that οἶον συναίσθησις should be predicated of the inchoate Intellect. (Atkinson compares V.3[49].11.4ff. where potential Intellect possesses only a vague notion of its object.) Lloyd (1987) 161 remarks that “Intellect is credited with consciousness (συναίσθησις) elsewhere in the *Enneads* and in the same context (VI.7.19-20, 7.35.1-2).” However, neither of these passages includes the term συναίσθησις; in fact neither discusses the inchoate Intellect at all. The only occurrence of the term as applied to Intellect occurs at VI.7[38].16.19 where it, typically, defines actualized Intellect’s internal self-awareness. Rist (1967) 46 (and Schroeder [1986] 191 agrees) adds that making the One subject “would apparently involve introducing further duality into the One itself.” And Henry (1960) 387 objects that such a consciousness would necessarily constitute “une conscience d’une activité tournée vers le dehors.” (Against the validity of this specific point Schroeder [1986] 191 correctly argues that the One “need not

address itself to any extern to produce νοῦς.”) None of these objections, however, are sufficient to undermine Schwyzer’s argument; cf. my discussion of V.4[7].2.18. What is decisive against Schwyzer’s view, and what probably led to the reading printed in H-S², is that this would involve an abrupt change of subject, from Intellect in the previous sentence (11) and back again to Intellect in the succeeding sentence (αὐτὸς: 13). The force of ἐπεὶ is clearly retrospective and ἥδη indicates a temporal modality that would be inappropriate to the One; thus Atkinson and Schroeder (1986) 191. Lloyd (1987) 161 adds the further point, which is not decisive in my view, that if the One were the subject “the ἐπεὶ which governs the clause would be wrong because the clause would not be explaining the relative independence of Intellect that is being attributed to it; and if what was to be explained was rather the power of the One, whatever Intellect is conscious of would not be a good explanation of that.” However, despite the “relative independence of Intellect,” the One’s productive and perfecting power is very much a continuing topic of discussion in the following lines.

The referent of τῆς δυνάμεως is also a problem, though it has been little discussed. It makes sense for P. to say that Intellect in its potential state has a quasi-awareness of the One’s productive power. To ascribe δύναμις to Intellect here (as do Igal, Armstrong, and Atkinson) requires an abrupt change of referent. In line 10 it is the One’s δύναμις that Intellect cuts itself off from and in line 14 it is again the One’s power that partially enables Intellect to define itself. With respect to the latter Atkinson argues, unconvincingly I think, that “the change of reference is marked by the addition of παρ’ ἐκείνου” 168. Even if one accepts his and Armstrong’s view that Intellect is the subject of δύναται in the next line, it is unnecessary and implausible to read Intellect as the referent of τῆς δυνάμεως. But it is this consideration which leads Atkinson to his translation in which he actually dispenses with translating the phrase, merging it with the ὅτι-clause: “since it has already an intrinsic awareness, as it were, that it has the power to create substance.”

Since it is Intellect and not the One that possesses a οἶον συναίσθησις of the One’s productive power, there is much less, in fact no, difficulty in reading the One as subject of δύναται. The verb simply indicates that the One’s productive power causes Intellect’s substance (also argued by Rist [1967] 46-47), a statement so unexceptionable it is difficult to see why it has been disputed. And if there is doubt as to the expression P. employs here, a late passage is pertinent: “For it [sc. Intellect] will know all that it has from him, and what he gives, and what his power is (ἃ δύναται ἐκείνος)” (V.3[49].7.3-4; see also VI.8[39].18.16 where δύνασθαι is used with the simple accusative). If Intellect is regarded as the subject, it would be endowed with a productive power for which there is no close parallel in the *Enneads* so far as I know. Atkinson 169 adduces several passages which he claims provide clinching parallels to his reading; however, all but one simply describe how Intellect pluralizes the One’s

unity (most designate Intellect's causal activity with forms of ποιεῖν); and the one passage which mentions Intellect's δύναμις indicates that this δύναμις εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν comes to Intellect from the One (εἶχε παρ' ἐκείνου: VI.7[38].15.18). Lloyd (1987) 161 argues that Intellect must be the subject on the grounds that "Intellect's own power to make/be substance is . . . Plotinus's universal doctrine." For criticism of this view cf. comm. on V.6[25].5.9-10.

13-17 αὐτὸς γοῦν . . . ἐξ ἐκείνου. In this sentence potential Intellect acquires the characteristics which define it as fully actualized Intellect: limit, substance, and perfection. The terms are familiar from V.4[7].2.6-7, except that there the passivity of the indefinite, potential phase of Intellect is complete (ἀποτελειούμενη, ὀριζομένη). Significantly, in the present passage inchoate Intellect is an active, contributory factor in the transition to its actual state: Intellect is the subject of ὀρίζει. (I fail to see how Atkinson 168 understands ὀρίζει τὸ εἶναι and δύναται οὐσίαν as closely analogous expressions. Certainly, "they refer to the same process," as he observes, but from significantly different perspectives.) At the same time, this greater participation on Intellect's part in its self-formation depends on the supervening activity of the One, for it is because of the One's power that it is able to act in this way: τῇ παρ' ἐκείνου δυνάμει. Moreover, it is "strengthened" and "perfected into substance" by the One. Cp. Ch. 5.17-18 where Intellect both shapes itself and is shaped by the One. Schroeder (1986) 194 captures well the double-causality suggested in this passage: "νοῦς is autonomous in that the consciousness which it has of the One's power is self-constituting within the framework of its continuity with its source in the One."

Following several editors Atkinson argues that the ὅτι-clause in lines 14-17 parallels the ὅτι-clause in line 13 (ὅτι δύναται οὐσίαν), with both depending on ἔχει συναίσθησιν in line 12; so too Lloyd (1987) 161-62. Atkinson translates: "it is also aware that substance is, as it were, an item of the One's contents and comes from it, and that itself, inchoate Intellect, is strengthened by the One and is perfected into substance by it and from it." His reading of lines 14-17 as a result-clause depends on his interpretation of lines 10-17 as a whole, whereby "the first ὅτι-clause explains the generation of Intellect in terms of Intellect's own power (ὅτι δύναται οὐσίαν), the second in terms of the One's power, since substance is οἷον μέρος ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου, and Intellect is perfected into substance and strengthened by the One" 170. I have two objections to Atkinson's reading. First, it invests inchoate Intellect with a remarkable degree of awareness of how it derives from the One, which is unparalleled in both early and late discussions of the problem. It is not inappropriate for Intellect in its potential stage to have a quasi-awareness of the One's productive power, but to expand this to include an awareness that its substance is part of the One neglects a fundamental aspect of the doctrine of

reversion—that Intellect fails to see and understand the One properly. Second, interpreting ὅτι . . . οὐσία (14-15) as a result-clause instead of the casual-cause it is (here I agree with H-S, Armstrong, and Harder) assumes that the entire passage is much more elliptical than it seems to be. That is, because its substance is a kind of individuated portion of the One’s reality, Intellect is perfected into its actualized substance. Arguing that “αὐτὸς γοῦν . . . δυνάμει [13-14] is better taken as a parenthesis,” Lloyd (1987) 161-62 objects to Armstrong’s translation of ἡ οὐσία (15): “ἡ οὐσία is not ‘its’ substance: it is certainly the οὐσίαν of line 13.” So it is, but the possessive pronoun is quite in order, since the next line states that Intellect becomes οὐσία.

A final point. This reference to οὐσία as a part of the One is consistent with, though it hardly counts as support for, my interpretation of lines 5-6, where the One’s self-reversion gives rise to Intellect as vision. More importantly, it anticipates, albeit dimly, the remarkable statements about the One’s inner life made in VI.8[39].16 and 18, e.g. τὸν οἶον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα: 18.21-22. Cf. also the contemporary treatise V.2[11].1.1-3.

17-19 ὁρᾷ δὲ . . . πάντων. I follow Igal (1971) 151 and Atkinson 171 in reading δὲ as a continuative connective rather than as an adversative particle, but the latter seems equally plausible as in Armstrong’s translation (which I quote for consideration of additional points in this sentence): “But Intellect sees, by means of itself, like something divided proceeding from the undivided, that life and thought and all things come from the One, because that God is not one of all things.” An adversative is quite possible here, since P. may be contrasting the claim of the previous sentence—that substance is a part of the One’s contents—with the present statement: everything comes from the One, but only because the One is not any part of everything.

Against Armstrong’s translation of αὐτῷ (“by means of itself”) I prefer *pace* Atkinson to interpret the text as saying that Intellect sees all things coming *to itself*. The translations of Bréhier, Cilento and Harder curiously ignore or diminish the force of ἐκεῖθεν, which must mean “from the One,” and emphasize instead that all things come to Intellect from its reversion.

Atkinson and Igal argue that οἶον μάλιστα ἐξ ἀμέριστου is consistent with the geometric imagery of lines 8ff. where, on their view, Intellect is represented by the divisible circle and the One by the indivisible center. I have argued above that this interpretation should be rejected, though the present passage does give one pause. Nevertheless, the phrase need not be—and on my interpretation cannot be—related directly to the earlier passage, if we take it as a rather generalized image. Atkinson 172 himself admits that Intellect is usually characterized as ἀμέριστος and refers to several illustrative texts.

19-20 ταύτη . . . ἐκεῖνο. Now that the generation of Intellect is completed, P. stresses the ontological difference between the One and Intellect in terms of the familiar paradox that the One produces what it is not. Because he has earlier in this chapter accounted for the emergence of the potential Intellect from the inner activities of the One (the self-reversion and vision of the One in lines 5-6) and linked the contents of the One and Intellect (14-15), P. here shifts his perspective to differentiate clearly between the two. A very similar transition appears in V.4[7].2: from the One's self-consciousness and quasi-intellection (15-19) to the assertion that if the product of the One is all things, the One must be beyond all things (39-40). The same pattern of thought recurs in VI.8[39].16, the bulk of which articulates a host of activities within the One, but at the end of the chapter the Platonic tag ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας (34) indicates that the Plotinian hierarchy of being is still intact.

20-22 καὶ εἰ . . . πάντα. Atkinson 173-74 lists the views of earlier editors who consider καὶ . . . ἦν unsatisfactory, assuming lacunae or corruption. All recent editors have adopted Harder's emendation εἰ for the MSS ὁ, which makes very good sense, as well as the deletion of ἐν . . . ἦν (22-23), clearly a repetition of line 21.

The points that warrant comment here are the statements that the One is not to be classed among τὰ ὄντα or τὰ πάντα and, more interestingly, that the One is not part of Intellect's contents, a direct clarification (or restatement) of the claim that οὐσία is a kind of part of the One's contents (14-15). Again, P. here highlights the ontological discontinuity between the One and Intellect, whereas earlier, before the full actualization of Intellect, continuity is more prominent.

It is to be noted that in lines 20-21 the One is referred to with ἐκεῖνο, shifting from ἐκεῖνος in previous lines. For a brief discussion of this common Plotinian practice see Schwyzer (1951) 515.

23-26 διὸ . . . λαμβάνει. The retrospective διὸ reiterates the connection between substance, limitation and shape; see further V.6[24].5.5-6 and comm. *ad loc.* Surprisingly perhaps, the distinction between the One and Intellect is rarely expressed in terms of shapelessness and shape; but cp.: τὶ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τι, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὄν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὄν οἶον μορφήν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἔχει, ἄμορφον δὲ ἐκεῖνο καὶ μορφῆς νοητῆς (VI.9[9].3.36-39). All the other references to the One as ἄμορφον occur in VI.7[38]: 17.18, 40; 32.38. Most uses of the term can be found in II.4[12] where they describe matter. Once εἶδος is ἄμορφον: VI.7[38].33.4.

With most recent editors (with the notable exceptions of Bréhier and Cilento), I accept Heintz's brilliant emendation θεωρεῖσθαι for the MSS αἰωρεῖσθαι. οἶον would seem to require a metaphorical term as does the contrast with πεπηχθαι in the next line. Harder's reference to movement in the infinite at

VI.6[34].3.24 is also very much to the point. One way of reading this sentence is to see it as a demand on P.' part that Intellect cannot always remain in its potential mode, which in V.4[7].2 is described as ἀόριστος ὄψις (6) and ἀόριστος δυάς (7-8), though the indefiniteness of the inchoate Intellect is not specifically mentioned in V.1.

With the statement that Intellect has attained "substantial existence" (ὑπόστασις), P. answers the question raised at the beginning of Ch. 6: πῶς οὖν ὄρᾳ καὶ τίνᾳ, καὶ πῶς ὅλως ὑπέστη καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνου γέγονεν, ἵνα καὶ ὄρᾳ; (1-2). Here the term indicates that Intellect has separate existence. (For a useful discussion of the term see Atkinson 55-56.) This concludes the account of the procession of Intellect and the relation of the One and Intellect in this treatise.

CHAPTER THREE

ENNEAD V.6[24].5.1-6.11

Introductory Note

The One and Intellect are carefully distinguished in this treatise, especially with respect to intellection, as the first part of the title suggests: “On the fact that that which is beyond Being does not possess Intellection.” In the first chapter P. examines the two aspects of intellection: Intellect’s self-intellection and its apprehension of being and the Forms. These two modes of intellection illustrate how the intelligible universe is a one-many. On the basis of *Parm.* 143a he asserts that ὅτι νοεῖ, δύο, καὶ ὅτι αὐτό, ἓν (Ch. 1.23). Since Intellect is a unity-in-duality, in Ch. 3 P. rejects Aristotle’s view (*Met.* Α 1074b17-18) that self-intellection constitutes the highest reality or first principle. As a one-many Intellect falls short of the Good’s absolute unity.

In Ch. 2 Intellect’s duality is intrinsic because for its very existence Intellect requires a νοητόν which is purely object of intellection (7-8), which is the One (cf. V.4[7].2.4, 7, 11). However, although the One is an object of intellection for Intellect, in itself it is neither an object of intellection nor does it possess intellection (8-9). The One’s perfection and self-sufficiency place it beyond intellection (12-16). Moreover, because Intellect is a multiple actuality, the simple One cannot have intellection (Ch. 3.21-22). These points provide the foundation for the principle of ontological dependence and derivation: for the One, simplicity means lack of need (Ch. 4.1), whereas Intellect needs the One as its object of intellection for its self-determination (Ch. 4.12-13). Complementary to the doctrine of ontological derivation is the One’s omnipresence. While simple in itself the One’s unity is immanent and hence functions as a defining νοητόν for Intellect. In the next section he turns to examine the reversion of Intellect to the One, specifically how intellection characterizes both the inchoate and actualized Intellect.

Translation of V.6[24].5.1-6.11

5. Further, the multiple might search for itself and it might wish to converge on itself and to be directly conscious of itself. But that which is one in every way, how will it go to itself? And in what way will it need self-consciousness? But it is the same thing that is better than self-consciousness and all intellection. For intellection is not first either in being or in value, but is second and is what has come into being, since the Good existed and moved what had come into being

towards itself, and it was moved and saw. And this is intellection, a movement towards the Good on the part of that which desires that Good; for the desire has generated intellection and has established it in being with itself: for vision's desire is seeing. The Good itself, therefore, must not intelligize anything; for the Good is not other than itself. Since when what is other than the Good intelligizes it, it has intellection by being good-in-form and by possessing a likeness to the Good, and it intelligizes it as Good and as its object of desire, and having received a kind of impression of the Good. And if it is eternally in this state, it intelligizes the Good eternally. And again, in its intellection of the Good it intelligizes itself incidentally; for in looking towards the Good it intelligizes itself. For in fact it intelligizes itself in activity; and the actuality of all things is directed to the Good.

6. If this is correctly stated, the Good would have no place whatsoever for intellection; for the Good for that which intelligizes must be something different. So the Good is without activity. And why should actuality be active? For generally no actuality has yet again another activity. But even if some are able to attribute the other activities to something else, yet the first actuality of all, on which the others depend, must be that very thing which it is, with nothing further being added to it. Such an actuality, therefore, is not intellection, for it has nothing to intelligize: it itself is the first. Moreover, intellection does not intelligize, but that which possesses intellection; so again a duality comes to be in that which intelligizes, but this Good is in no way two.

Commentary on V.6[24].5.1-6.11

5.1-2 ἔτι . . . αὐτοῦ. Having stressed in Chs. 3-4 the fundamental differences between the simplicity and transcendence of the One and the complexity of Intellect, here P. takes up the problem how the inchoate Intellect becomes actualized. Analysis begins in mid-course, as it were, with the potential phase of Intellect defined as τὸ πολὺ. The multiplicity of actualized Intellect is an essential aspect of P.'s noetic theory (cf. V.1[10].5.1), and to account for this multiplicity, which is also a unity, he often defines what proceeds from the One as τὸ πολὺ or τὸ πλῆθος, especially in later treatises: V.1[10].6.7; III.8[30].8.33; V.3[49].11.14, 12.1-10. What is prominent throughout this chapter and in the later accounts (III.8[30].8-9, VI.7[38].16-17, and V.3[49].11) of the procession/reversion of Intellect (and absent in V.4[7].2 and V.1[10].7) is the movement, striving, and desire associated with the inchoate Intellect. In the first three lines there are three verbs of motion or striving: ζητοῖ, ἐθέλοι, and χωρήσεται. The fact that the potential phase of Intellect is characterized in dynamic terms indicates that Intellect, from the beginning of its existence, is subject to an internal tension which leads inexorably to its differentiation from the One.

The indefinite striving of this multiplicity also possesses an innate tendency towards self-convergence and self-consciousness, the σύννευσις and συναίσθησις of line 2. The latter would seem to be a typical activity of the inchoate Intellect (cf. V.1[10].7.12, VI.7[38].16.19-20 and comm. *ad locc.*). σύννευσις, and the related term νεῦσις, present an excellent case-study in P.' use of terminology. The latter is a Gnostic term which P. employs to describe the descent of the soul. (For references and discussion see Atkinson 225 and Lewy 294 n136. Lewy indicates that the later Neoplatonists continue to use the term in this sense.) But as happens so often, his usage is not consistent, for on one occasion he even attributes self-convergence to the One, employing the uncompounded term: νεῦσις αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν (VI.8[39].16.24; see comm. *ad loc.*). And in accounts of the soul's mystical ascent to the One, νεῦσις is synonymous with ἐπιστροφή (VI.9[9].9.11-12). On the other hand, σύννευσις is a technical mathematical term signifying "convergence." See V.1[10].11.14-15 where the term appears in the context of a geometrical metaphor and Atkinson's comments *ad loc.* with references to mathematical writers. In only one other passage does σύννευσις, in its verbal form, refer to the inchoate Intellect and its self-convergence: "for in Intellect there is desire and a movement to convergence with its form" (ἔφεις γὰρ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ σύννευσις πρὸς τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ: III.8[30].11.26). In the later Neoplatonists σύννευσις is used freely as a synonym of ἐπιστροφή: cf. Proclus *Elem. Theol.* 78.4, 128.30-31; *In. Tim.* II.72.51 (= Iamblichus *In. Tim.* III. Fr. 49 Dillon); III.116.4.

5.2-5 δ δ' ἐστὶ . . . νοήσεως. The movement, self-convergence, and self-consciousness of the inchoate Intellect are here denied of the One. We might well ask why this is the case, since elsewhere it is said that the One is its self-consciousness (V.4[7].2.18) and its self-convergence or self-inclination (VI.8[39].16.24). On the other hand, P. also stresses that the One utterly transcends συναίσθησις and νόησις: V.3[49].13.15-16 and VI.7[38].41.25-30; the latter passage adds that the One has no need of Intellect and its activities. When confronted with such a discrepancy, we can choose among three options: (i) P. ascribes noetic or quasi-noetic activities to the One in earlier treatises (e.g. V.4[7].2.15-19), but rights himself in later treatises and denies that these same activities have anything to do with the One; (ii) he simply contradicts himself; or (iii) P. carefully calibrates his often provocative statements about the One's inner life, and so, when he now attributes and then denies the same attributes to the One, we must consider his use of language with great sensitivity to the context in which he addresses specific problems. In my comments on V.4[7].2 and VI.8[39].16 I argue for the third approach. Szlezák 87 refers to the present passage as providing incontrovertible evidence for (i). But in face of VI.8[39].16 and other passages discussed in the comm. on that important text, this view is

untenable. Bales is one of the very few who supports (ii), but in my estimation this is an evasion of the problem.

We must, therefore, attend to the context of the present passage. As the very title of V.6 indicates, the treatise aims at establishing that the One does not think and at articulating the differences between One and Intellect. The reason for this may be, as Armstrong suggests in his introductory note to the treatise, that V.6[24] immediately follows VI.4-5[22-23]. In the latter “Plotinus had laid less emphasis than he did anywhere else in the *Enneads* on the distinctions between his three hypostases, and had allowed the First, the One beyond Being, to fall very much into the background. In the present treatise [V.6] he seems concerned to make clear that the distinctions between the hypostases were still real and important to him, and in particular to insist on the sharp differentiation of the First Principle, the One which does not think, from the Second Hypostasis, the living Intellect which forms a unity-in-duality with duality.” I think these comments are quite important in assessing how we are to understand the negations applied to the One in this treatise. Similar considerations determine how we are to read V.3[49], which, though it does not follow a treatise which ignores the One or attributes positive activities to it, does concern itself with the claim that the One does not think. I would emphasize the importance of V.6[24] being preceded by VI.4-5[22-23] even more than Armstrong does, because there the One is not only in the background; often Intellect seems to be described in terms that elsewhere apply to the One. The significance of this point is that when and to what purpose P. investigates the central problem of the relation of the One and Intellect must always be kept clearly in mind.

5.5-6 τὸ γὰρ νοεῖν . . . γενόμενον. Heintz’s τὸ νοοῦν for the MSS τὸ νοεῖν is preferred by Harder and B-T on the grounds that τίμιον and γενόμενον (6) require a reference to an intelligizing subject rather than to the activity of intellection. Certainly, as Theiler argues, here and throughout this chapter P. criticizes Aristotle’s first principle, the self-thinking νοῦς, and the supreme value he ascribes to it in *Met.* A 9.1074b15-35. But there Aristotle emphasizes the transcendence of νόησις as much as that of νοῦς since, of course, the former is the activity of the latter. Moreover, the MSS reading could very well refer to the Aristotelian claim that διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει (1074b20-21). See also VI.7[38].37 *passim*, another extensive critique of the Peripatetic elevation of νοῦς and νόησις to primary ontological status. In any case, it is quite unnecessary to tidy up P.’ statements, when on so many occasions νοῦς and νόησις are virtually synonymous. An excellent example is the opening section of V.1[10].7, where in the first nine lines what proceeds from the One is designated by νοῦς, but suddenly in lines 10-11, where we would naturally expect νοῦς to be the subject of καθορᾶ, νόησις appears on the scene.

5.6 ὑπέστη. Gollwitzer's ὑπέστησε for the MSS ὑπέστη has been adopted by Cilento. Although he retains the MSS reading, Theiler remarks that "ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθὸν ist seltsam, mythenhaft ausgedrückt, wohl nicht unmöglich." This usage is unattested elsewhere in the *Enneads*, but I would argue that it is not impossible for P. In his final thoughts, however, Theiler changed his mind and accepts the emendation (B-T Vc.173 §2). This reading is certainly attractive and considerable support can be found in two passages: (i) whoever has contemplated the intelligible world must "enquire who it is who has brought into being (ὑποστήσας) such a thing" (III.8[30].11.37); (ii) "But how is that One the source of all things? Is it because it preserves them, causing each one of them to exist (ποιήσασα εἶναι)? Yes, and because it brought them into existence (ὑπέστησεν αὐτά)" (V.3[49].15.27-29). In addition to these close parallels, it might also be argued that ὑπέστησε balances ἐκίνησε better, though with P. we cannot rely much on such considerations. Despite these important points, I would argue for retaining the MSS reading on the grounds that P. is not thereby asserting anything out of the ordinary. But if we keep ὑπέστη, it is necessary to insert <τὸ> before γενόμενον with H-S² and Armstrong; otherwise the syntax is too strained. Thus, it is unnecessary to delete γενόμενον with Vitringa, Müller, Volkmann, and Harder. Finally, Bréhier prints ὑπέστη, but curiously translates ὑπέστησε: "le Bien le fait exister."

5.7-10 τὸ γενόμενον . . . αὐτῇ. This is a most interesting passage. Despite the emphatic rejection of intellection and consciousness in the One, the One is said to move the inchoate Intellect to itself: <τὸ> γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό; a rather stronger statement of the One's active involvement in the actualization of Intellect than we encounter in the earlier treatises. In V.4[7].2.5-7 Intellect is limited and perfected by the One; in V.1[10].7.15-17 it is strengthened and perfected by the One. Hence we need not take this phrase as indicating a consciousness in the One that is directed outside itself, attracting the inchoate Intellect to itself. Rather, what we have here is a metaphorical definition of the One's presence in terms of what potential Intellect is defined as—κίνησις.

With the addition of the terms κίνησις and ἔφεσις, an expansion of the terms employed to define the initial processive stage of Intellect is to be noted. (The association of movement and striving with incipient intellection is increasingly common in the later treatises: cf. III.8[30].11.23 , V.3[49].11.12 and comm. *ad locc.*) In the earlier treatises Intellect is initially indefinite vision (cf. V.4[7].2.7, V.1[10].5.6-8), though κίνησις defines the indefinite aspect of Intellect in II.4[12].5.31ff. That the inchoate Intellect moves and strives for the Good suggests it is a dynamic entity and more active in its self-actualization than it is in earlier treatises; but cf. V.1[10].7.13-14 where Intellect defines its being for itself with the productive power of the One. By stating that ἔφεσις generated intellection (9), P. more precisely articulates the transition from the potential to

the actualized Intellect. (For a more explicit statement of Intellect “making itself” cf. VI.7[38].15.15-16: οὗτος ὁ ποιήσας ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνου.) And the inchoate Intellect as ἔφεσις is co-existent with actual Intellect: συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ (10). Here at least P. retreats from settling the question of ontological priority, an issue that he more carefully explores in III.8[30].10-11, VI.7[38].16-17, and V.3[49].11. In any case, he seems to prefer that the transition be instantaneous, which is neatly stated in the phrase ἔφεσις γὰρ ὀψεως ὄρασις (10).

Lloyd (1987) 174 argues, specifically with respect to VI.7[38].15-17, but also including the present passage, that “it is Intellect not the One which is to be credited with generating this existence although the power to do so was a gift of the One”. It is possible to refer to passages like ἡ νόησις πεποίηκεν αὐτόν [sc. τὸ εἶναι] (VI.7[38].41.19), but such statements must be considered in context. Lloyd expands the causal power of the inchoate Intellect’s “self-creation” to the point that Intellect actualizes its own vision as well, as I note in comm. on V.4[7].2.7. Actualized seeing, on his view, is generated by the “One as seen” not by the One itself. Similarly, in the case of being or existence, “Intellect can be said to produce Existence. For it is the One as object of thought, not the One *simpliciter* which acts on Intellect/Pre-Intellect and makes it Existence: but equally it is Intellect/Pre-Intellect which makes the One an object of thought” 176. Lloyd does recognize that the One is a causal agent, but here, as in V.4[7].2, he shifts the primary causality from the One to Intellect. This interpretation should be resisted, because it removes the One as a continually active causal agent from the process of actualizing the inchoate Intellect, both as intellection and being. Hence, the ἐγέννησε in line 9 is not to be taken in such an absolute sense. Lloyd’s fracturing of the causal scheme is a result of his excessive reliance on the Aristotelian psychological model for the actualization of a potentiality, which, in turn, leads him to divide the procession and reversion into clearly defined, self-creative phases. For further discussion of Lloyd’s challenging interpretation cf. comm. on VI.7[38].16.17ff.

In the present passage, and in the later accounts of procession, Armstrong has called attention to a problem. He finds serious difficulties in the conception of indefinite movement or striving being transformed into an eternal, changeless, and perfect Intellect. For Armstrong “it seems to imply that Intellect has a history of at least two episodes, and that something happens to it, when it should have no history and nothing should happen to it at all. . . . Again, I find the recurrent insistence on an ἔφεσις of Intellect towards the One (3.8.11.23, 5.3.11.12, 5.6.5.9-10) difficult to interpret non-durationally” (1971) 71-72. Against this it can be argued that P. understands the striving of the inchoate Intellect for the One non-durationally in that the change occurs instantaneously. It should also not be forgotten, though it does constitute a solution, that some of the difficulties in P.’ theory of procession and reversion derive from his attempts to integrate the noetic theories of Plato and Aristotle with his doctrine of the One as the Transcendental

Absolute. For him the Platonic account of νοῦς contemplating the Forms did not explain the origin of either Intellect or the Forms. Aristotle's differentiation of the potential and actual states of νοῦς in *De Anima* Γ 4-5, 7, and 10 afforded P. the crucial distinction he required. Note also the parallels Aristotle draws in his analysis between thought (διάνοια) and, on the other hand, desire (ὄρεξις) and movement (κίνησις) at Γ 10.433a17ff. However, P.' theory differs from Aristotle's in identifying the potential state of Intellect as the first "event" in the life of the universal Intellect, which for Aristotle is always actual and primary, and in deriving this potentiality from the One which transcends Intellect. The definition of the Indefinite Dyad in terms of movement and desire may have come to P. from the Pythagoreans and/or the Old Academy. In his treatise *On the Pythagoreans* Aristotle notes their definition of the Dyad: ἔλεγον δὲ καὶ κίνησιν αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπίθεσιν: Fr. 13, 139.5 Rose. Whether attributed to the Pythagoreans or to Xenocrates, the ascription of desire (ὄρεξις and ἔφεσις) for the Good to the Numbers criticized by Aristotle (*Eth. Eud.* A 8.1218a24-32) may also have influenced P.

In his attempts to explain how Intellect derives from the One, P. reveals the influence of yet another tradition, the Neopythagorean, which derives reality from the Monad. On the background and sources of this doctrine see Krämer (1964) 193-292 and Whittaker (1969a) and (1969b). P.' efforts to integrate Platonic and Aristotelian noetic theory with the Neopythagorean doctrine of the transcendent One is often rough and not without serious difficulties. But since his One is for Intellect both the transcendent object of contemplation and the generating source, the differentiation of Intellect into two distinct aspects is metaphysically necessary. Moreover, it is sufficiently clear, I think, that for P. these two moments are logically distinct and yet non-durational. In II.4[12].5.29ff. otherness and movement are co-eternal with the intelligible matter they produce. Otherness is the essential pre-condition for both the procession and the self-intellection of Intellect; Intellect is distinct from its objects because of otherness: V.1[10].4.34-37. If there were no otherness we should have only the stillness and silence of the One (cf. V.1[10].4.38-39). Thus, pre-noetic movement and striving persist in the life of the fully actualized Intellect; see Krämer (1964) 317-18. In other words, an eternal, unchanging, and perfect Intellect is impossible, in P.' view, without an eternally indefinite and striving element within it.

5.9 ἐφιέμενον. The MSS ἐφιέμενον is not impossible: for H-S the case of the participle is *neutrum pro feminino propter* νοεῖν. I prefer Kirchhoff's ἐπιεμένον which is more correct grammatically. It makes better sense for the participle to refer to Intellect to which κίνησις belongs. For the characterization of the potential Intellect with this phrase cp. V.3[49].15.11: ἐφιέμενον δὲ ὁμῶς τοῦ ἐνός.

5.10 ἔφεσις γὰρ ὄψεως ὄρασις. Bréhier suspects ὄρασιν for ὄρασις and translates: “le désir de voir engendre la vision.” This rendering is unexceptionable, since it represents a close parallel to the previous sentence: ἡ γὰρ ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε. With all other editors I think the MSS text should be preserved, but then what does “for desire of sight is seeing” (tr. Armstrong) mean? Beutler’s translation offers no help: “denn Sehen is Sehen-Wollen.” Lloyd has claimed recently that the problem arises from taking ὄψεως as an objective genitive. Taking it as a possessive genitive, he correctly identifies ὄψις as the indefinite vision, i.e. the faculty *in potentia*, of the inchoate Intellect, and ὄρασις as actualized seeing. The distinction between ὄψις as potential and ὄρασις as actual intellectual vision seems to be implicit in V.1[10].5.18-19; see V.1[10].7.5-6 with Atkinson’s and my comm. *ad loc*. It is more explicit here and in other later treatises, e.g. III.8[30].11.1-2: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὄψις τις καὶ ὄψις ὁρῶσα, δύναμις ἔσται εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθοῦσα. On this distinction Lloyd (1987) 164 argues that “there is some exaggeration in identifying the seeing with desire but not the dubious sense of identifying it with the desire for seeing: what is desired is a visible object.” His conclusion is necessary if we can be confident in this case that the two terms designate potential and actual seeing, respectively. I think we can; otherwise both terms would have to refer to actualized seeing, rendering the sentence tautologous. However, translating the sentence with a possessive genitive—“for vision’s desire is seeing”—is not terribly felicitous; still, I think it yields the best sense.

5.10-14 οὐδὲν . . . νοεῖ. This passage displays the many difficulties created by P.’ ambiguous use of the intensive and reflexive pronouns. In lines 10-11 Cilento and B-T favor the reflexive and read οὐδὲν adverbially. With Bréhier, H-S, and Armstrong, I prefer the intensive with οὐδὲν as object, which makes the statement more emphatic: P. denies intellection categorically to the Good, i.e. it intelligizes neither itself nor anything else.

In line 11 H-S² now print αὐτοῦ (in agreement with Bréhier, Cilento and B-T) instead of the αὐτοῦ in H-S¹. This change is salutary and is but one example of the many changes of the intensive to the reflexive in the second edition of H-S. It is worth noting that H-S¹ suffers throughout from what Cherniss (1952) 249 terms “the conservation of the intensive.” He observes that in most cases where H-S read the intensive instead of the same form of the reflexive pronoun they “have all the MSS or a significant preponderance of them in their favour; but in the mere matter of a breathing surely no MS or group of MSS can be trusted against sense and usage, and Henry and Schwyzer themselves abandon the MSS in such matters often enough to cast doubt upon the infallibility of the tradition in other cases. Where either the intensive or the reflexive could conceivably stand, it is reasonable to follow the consensus of the MSS; but in many, if not most, of the places where Henry and Schwyzer ‘restore’ the intensive it is clear that the

reflexive is required.” This cogent advice has been adopted in the present passage and in many others. However, other editors are sometimes too zealous in reading the reflexive, as Kirchhoff and Bréhier do in reading αὐτό in line 12. The reflexive would indicate that Intellect intelligizes itself, but this seems incorrect, because P. continues to describe the reversion until line 16, when Intellect finally attains its actualized state of self-intellection. Thus, αὐτό must refer to the Good as object of the inchoate Intellect’s vision.

The passage as a whole establishes that intellection cannot be attributed to the Good because it is not other than itself. Other texts confirm this point: there is no otherness in the Good (VI.9[9].8.33-34); Intellect is other than the Good (V.6[24].4.5). On the other hand, Intellect can think the Good only because it is like the Good and possesses an ὁμοίωμα of the Good. This Platonic pattern of thought is pervasive in P.’ analysis of the relation between the Good and Intellect. It is clearly evident in the early treatise V.1[10].7.1-4 where Intellect is defined as an image of the One and is said to be like it. But here, on the basis of the definition of potential Intellect as ἔφεσις, the original of which Intellect is the likeness is described as an object of desire or striving (ἐφετόν). This is further evidence that the indefinite movement and striving of the inchoate Intellect persist in actualized intellection.

5.15-16 οἶον φαντασίαν . . . τοῦτο. For Intellect’s apprehension of the Good to be described as φαντασία is surprising, though clearly P. here does not have in mind the soul’s imaginative faculty which is intermediate between αἴσθησις and νόησις. Cf. IV.3[27].23.21-33 and especially lines 32-33: φανταστικὸν οἶον νοερόν, καὶ ὁρμὴ καὶ ὄρεξις, φαντασία καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμενα. In this passage the οἶον serves the purpose of sufficiently broadening the epistemological function of φαντασία to bridge the gap between soul and Intellect. In the present passage, on the other hand, the οἶον φαντασία Intellect has of the Good denotes its limited awareness. Similarly, at V.3[49].11.7 the indefinite desire of potential Intellect has φάντασμά τι of the One; cf. comm. *ad loc.* What would seem to make φαντασία an acceptable description of the inchoate Intellect’s dim apprehension of the Good in both passages is its associations, on the psychic level, with image-making and with desire.

The statement εἰ δ’ ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἀεὶ τοῦτο is uncontroversial as a brief, though rather vague, summation of the present account of procession and reversion: Intellect always has an inadequate intellection of the Good. But the point is not applicable universally to all aspects of Intellect’s multifarious life. See the distinction between νοῦς ἑμψρων (Intellect in its self-intelligizing mode) and νοῦς ἐρῶν (Intellect in its self-transcending, mystical mode) at VI.7[38].35.23-26 and comm. *ad loc.*

5.16-19 καὶ γὰρ . . . ἀγαθόν. Disagreements about the pronouns complicate the understanding of lines 16-17 as well. For H-S, Armstrong, and B-T αὐτοῦ (16) refers to the Good and αὐτό (17) to Intellect (H-S¹ has αὐτό). Cilento follows most of the MSS in reading αὐτοῦ and αὐτό, which he refers to Intellect and the Good, respectively. He argues that κατὰ συμβεβηκός must go with the preceding rather than the following pronoun, which would be rendered: “in thinking itself incidentally, it thinks the Good.” The former reading is necessary, against Cilento, because Intellect must first think the Good before, or so that, it can think itself. Bréhier has the impossible combination αὐτοῦ and αὐτό.

The clause πρὸς . . . νοεῖ contains more uncertainties. With the received text we have a sudden change from the neuter (αὐτό νοεῖ in line 17) to the masculine (βλέπων). This elicited Kirchhoff’s emendation βλέπον, which is adopted by Bréhier and B-T. The real question, however, is what does the MSS αὐτό refer to. H-S¹ and Cilento think it is the Good. Cilento argues that P. wants to stress the identification of intellection with vision. But it seems to me rather redundant for P. to say “looking towards the Good it intelligizes it.” To alleviate the problem Creuzer suggested αὐτό, preferred by Bréhier and B-T. H-S continued to mull this over and in H-S² they read βλέπων αὐτόν, which is also printed by Armstrong. Making the pronoun masculine, so that it agrees with both the preceding participle and the masculines in the following sentence, is a useful and necessary alteration. Without it the changes of gender become too reckless even for P. In any case, there is nothing unusual about his changing to the masculine βλέπων.

The clause πρὸς . . . νοεῖ is an abbreviated statement of the widely expressed view that Intellect looks at the Good, but ends up seeing itself: cf. III.8[30].8.31ff. Is there, then, a distinction between self-intellection κατὰ συμβεβηκός (16) and actualized self-intellection (ἐνεργοῦντα ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ: 17-18)? If there is—and I think this is the case—νόησις in line 16 might denote the intellectual vision of the inchoate Intellect which is directed first at the Good and, thus, at that stage, is only incidentally self-referential. In lines 17-18, therefore, Intellect slips imperceptibly and instantaneously into its actual activity of self-intellection.

In the last sentence of the chapter P. arrives at Intellect in its perfect and actual state. Self-intellection is its characteristic activity, but it is the focus on procession and reversion that seems to occasion the final words: “the actuality of all things is directed towards the Good.” In fact, P. normally thinks that intellectual ἐνέργεια is entirely self-referential, as in V.3[49].7.18-20: τὸ εἶναι οὖν ἐνέργεια, καὶ οὐδέν, πρὸς ὃ ἡ ἐνέργεια· πρὸς αὐτῷ ἄρα. ἑαυτὸν ἄρα νοῶν οὕτω πρὸς αὐτῷ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἴσχει (“The Being of Intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing to which the activity is directed: so it is self-directed. Thinking itself, it is thus with itself and holds its

activity directed to itself"). Nevertheless P. wishes to maintain that the activity of Intellect is dual in nature in the sense that it is directed both to itself and to the Good. The following passage offers more clarity on this point: τὸν νοῦν ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ νοεῖν εἶναι καὶ τὸν γε ἄριστον καὶ τὸν οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔξω βλέποντα νοεῖν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἐπιστρέφων εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέφει. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸς τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, διπλοῦς ἔσται καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦς οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν· εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον βλέπει, πάντως πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ οὕτως δεύτερον. καὶ χρὴ τὸν νοῦν τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι, οἷον παρεῖναι μὲν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ βλέπειν εἰς ἐκείνον, συνεῖναι δὲ καὶ ἑαυτῷ νοεῖν τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ νοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὄντα τὰ πάντα ("it is necessary that intellect exists in its thinking, and that the best intellect, the one which does not look outside itself, thinks what is before it: for in turning to itself it turns to its principle. And if intellect itself is what thinks and what is thought, it will be double and not single and so not the one: but if it looks to another, it must certainly be to that which is better than it and before it. But if it looks both to itself and to what is better than it, in this way also it is second. And one must suppose that intellect is of such a kind that it is present to the Good and the first and looks to him, but is also present with itself and thinks itself, and thinks itself as being all things": VI.9[9].2.33-43). This is one of the clearest expressions in the *Enneads* of the principle that self-reversion has two logically distinct aspects: the self is both Intellect and the One. Awareness of this dual reference is what defines Intellect's very nature. Note also in this passage the subtle distinction between being "present to the Good" and being "present with itself," which is carefully marked by the respective verbal prefixes παρ- and συν-. The latter indicates a more intimate relation.

Questions about ἐνέργεια and its referents will continue to occupy us in Ch. 6; but here it may be observed that the complexity of the procession/reversion phases of Intellect and the often elusive metaphors with which P. endeavours to express them sometimes leads him to emphasize one aspect at the expense of the other. It may in fact be, as I have suggested, that in the present passage Intellect's ἐνέργεια is directed both to the Good and to itself because this statement is meant to cover both the processive/reversive and the self-contemplating moments in Intellect's life: in the former it looks to the Good, in the latter to itself.

A final point: although the idea is not explicitly developed here, it is possible to discern in the reference to Intellect as ἐνέργεια the implicit assumption, from earlier in the chapter, that Intellect as indefinite κίνησις is potentiality or δύναμις. But the transformation of intellectual potentiality into intellectual actuality is not defined here as sharply as it is in III.8[30].8-11.

6.1-3 εἰ δὴ . . . ἀνενέργητον οὖν. The definition of νόησις as ἐνέργεια in the immediately preceding lines obligates P. to deny that the Good possesses intellection. The ineluctable duality of νόησις is evidenced by otherness (ἄλλο: line 2), which is absent from the Good. Otherness, in fact, is what enables, and necessitates, Intellect to see the Good. Thus, the ἐνέργεια of Intellect operates in the gap between Intellect and the Good. It is this intellectual actuality that is denied of the Good in the statement that the latter is ἀνενέργητον, though later in line 8 the Good would seem to be an ἐνέργεια that is distinct from νόησις. See below *ad loc.*

The view that the Good is not an active actuality and does not intelligize is most fully explicated at VI.7[38].40.24-36: μεταβαίνων τοίνυν τις ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας καὶ νοήσεως οὔτε ἐπὶ οὐσίαν ἥξει οὔτ' ἐπὶ νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα ἥξει οὐσίας καὶ νοήσεως ἐπὶ τι θαυμαστόν, ὃ μήτε ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ οὐσίαν μήτε νόησιν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἔρημον αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν δεόμενον. οὐ γὰρ ἐνεργήσας πρότερον ἐγέννησεν ἐνέργειαν· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν ἦν, πρὶν γενέσθαι· οὐδὲ νοήσας ἐγέννησε νόησιν· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν νενοήκει, πρὶν γενέσθαι νόησιν. ὅλως γὰρ ἡ νόησις, εἰ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ, χεῖρον αὐτοῦ· ὥστε οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἂν εἴη· λέγω δὲ οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐχ ὅτι μὴ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀγαθόν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστω—ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐκ ἂν εἴη νόησις· ἢ ἐν ἔσται ὁμοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον αὐτοῦ, ἢ νόησις αὐτοῦ (“So then when one goes on from this substance and thought one will not arrive at substance or thought, but will come, beyond substance and thought to something wonderful, which does not have in it substance or thought, but is alone by itself, with no need of the things which come from it. For it did not act before it generates activity: for then activity would have been there before it came to be: nor did it think before it generated thought: for then it would have thought before thought came to be. For in general thought, if it is to be of the Good, is worse than it: so that it would not be thought of the Good: but I mean ‘not of the Good’ not in the sense that it is impossible to think the Good—this may well be so—but that there would be no thought in the Good itself: otherwise the Good and what is less than it, the thought of it, would be a unity together”). This important passage is the culmination of the sustained attack, beginning in VI.7[38].37, on Aristotle’s doctrine of the first principle, the Unmoved Mover, which is οὐσία and νοῦς. Even more strongly than the present passage, it asserts the Good’s utter transcendence of intellection and substance. P. also declares that the Good “did not act before it generates activity” (29-30), a position that sets some limits on his use of the Aristotelian double-ἐνέργεια theory, as in V.4[7].2.27ff. But, significantly, he does not specifically deny that the Good *is* an ἐνέργεια. I will return to this point below on line 8. What he specifically rules out, therefore, is that the Good is active in the generation of Intellect. Activity with respect to something besides itself, e.g. intellection, must be rejected in the case of the Good. This leaves the door open

for P. to characterize the Good as an ἐνέργεια that is not directed to other things; cf. VI.8[39].16.15-18 and comm. *ad loc.*

6.3-8 καὶ τί . . . οὐ νόησις. Lines 3-5 are at first sight obscure. Since the Good has just been declared to be “without activity,” we would assume that these two sentences are intended to tell us something about intellectual ἐνέργεια, and this may be the case. But can P. really be claiming that Intellect *qua* ἐνέργεια is not active? If this is his view, it is especially puzzling in light of the double-ἐνέργεια theory, which he adverts to throughout the *Enneads*: cf. V.4[7].2.27-34 and V.3[49].7.21-25. On this theory, there is an inner-abiding ἐνέργεια that is identical with substance and an outgoing ἐνέργεια that is productive of an external and lower level of reality. If the double-ἐνέργεια theory is not contradicted in the present passage, P. must have a much more limited and specific point in mind. I think he does, but it is not fully evident until we reach lines 9-10. First we must tackle the knotty difficulties in the next sentence.

The sentence εἰ . . . προστιθέντας (5-8) is obscure as it appears in the MSS and it has been emended and interpreted in various ways. Starting with the protasis εἰ . . . ἐπανενεγκεῖν, H-S render the MSS text: *quodsi actibus aliis in aliud agentibus actum rursus possunt quidam [i.e. philosophoi] attribuere*. Armstrong, who follows this interpretation, translates: “But even if some philosophers are able to attribute yet another activity to the other active actualities which are directed to something else . . .” There is no reason to challenge the addition of “some philosophers” to make sense of the passage, but the justification for the supplemental “activity” is not self-evident. H-S maintain it is an implicit reference to πάλιν ἐνέργειαν in lines 4-5. On this view, “the other actualities directed to something else” would refer to Intellect *qua* actuality which is directed to the Good (cf. Ch. 5.18-19). But, then, to what does the implied “activity” refer? Armstrong *ad loc.* makes this suggestion: “The reference is to the Aristotelian doctrine of ‘first and second actuality’: cp. Aristotle *De An.* B 412a-b. This applies only to human minds which exercise their activity of thinking intermittently; the Aristotelian Divine Mind is always completely active and actual, and no distinction of ‘first and second actuality’ can apply to it.” The distinction, as it applies to human minds, is between actuality ὡς ἐπιστήμη (knowledge as ἔξις) and ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν (knowledge as ἐνέργεια, as activity: *De An.* B 1.412a22-23). Now this Aristotelian point would make sense of the text, but why would he deny the relevance to the Good’s actuality of a distinction that applies to human minds when Aristotle himself, as Armstrong correctly notes, would agree with P.’ point—as applied to his own divine intellect? This is a distinctly odd use of Aristotle, if in fact P. has in mind the notion Armstrong points to.

Bréhier’s solution is to adopt Kirchhoff’s ἐχούσαις for the MSS ἔχουσιν. He translates: “Et si l’on peut donner des attributs aux autres actes, parce qu’ils

se rapportent à autre chose qu'à eux-mêmes." But removing ἔχουσιν leaves the infinitive ἐπανενεγκεῖν hanging in the air. A better solution has been proposed by Theiler, who emends ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς to τὰς ἄλλας, with τινές making more explicit the "some philosophers" of H-S and Armstrong. Beutler translates: "und wenn schon irgendwelche Philosophen die anderen auf anderes zurückzuführen für möglich halten." In his note Theiler does not explain what this is supposed to mean, but presumably the sense of this reading would be that P. is criticizing philosophers, like Aristotle, who hold that the first principle is an intelligizing Intellect: "they attribute the other actualities [i.e. Intellect's] to something else [i.e. the Good]." This makes much better sense in the present context where P. is denying intellection and intellectual actuality of the Good. It could also be argued that the phrase "the other actualities" is more intelligible on this reading, for the Good too is an actuality ("the first one of all": line 6), but an actuality that is different from "the other actualities" of Intellect.

In line 7 H-S² and Armstrong have proposed εἶναι for the MSS εἶναι in order to alleviate the necessity of adding νομίζειν after δεῖ, the course followed by Müller, Bréhier, and B-T. I do not see a problem with εἶναι: with it we have the quite coherent statement "it must be that very thing which it is." The concluding phrase οὐδὲν . . . προστιθέντας is rather vague. Theiler thinks προστιθέντας refers back to τινές, Armstrong to the "we" understood with εἶναι δεῖ. The point is clear, but I think the passage makes better grammatical sense with Volkmann's οὐδενὸς . . . προστεθέντος: "with nothing further being added to it."

6.8-11 ἡ οὖν . . . δύο. P. here states that the Good *is* an actuality, but it is an actuality that transcends intellection. On the second point, as lines 2-3 imply, intellection requires otherness (cf. VI.7[38].39.1-20) and the Good has nothing distinct from itself upon which it could exercise the activity of intellection. Nevertheless, in apparent contradiction of line 3 (there the Good is ἀνεέργητον), the Good is said to be an ἐνέργεια. What follows is even more problematic, but first it is to be noted that P. elsewhere refers to the Good as ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ: VI.8[39].16.31; see comm. *ad loc.* Unlike the later passage, P. here does not tell us what it means to say that the Good is an ἐνέργεια. Instead he proceeds in lines 9-10 to make the rather obscure observation that it is not intellection, but what possesses intellection, that intelligizes. On the face of it, this remark sounds curiously similar to the statement in lines 3-5 that "generally no actuality possesses yet another activity or actuality." Now the present passage seems to suggest, uncontroversially, that there is a distinction between νόησις and the νοῶν. But the relevance of this comment to lines 3-8 can perhaps be more clearly established by considering two parallel passages: τὸ δὲ μόνον [sc. τὸ ἔν] οὔτε γινώσκει, οὔτε τι ἔχει ὃ ἀγνοεῖ, ἐν δὲ ὃν συνὸν αὐτῷ οὐ δεῖται νόησεως ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ συνεῖναι δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἵνα τηρῇ τὸ ἔν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ νόησιν καὶ τῶν

ἄλλων· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν νοοῦντα δεῖ τάττειν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν νόησιν. νόησις δὲ οὐ νοεῖ, ἀλλ' αἰτία τοῦ νοεῖν ἄλλω ("But the One alone does not know and has nothing of which it is ignorant, but being one and in union with itself does not need intellection of itself. For in order to keep to the One you should not add the 'in union', but take away intellection and being in union and intellection of itself and of the others: for we must not put him on the level of the thinker, but rather on that of the intellection. But intellection does not intelligize, but is a cause of intellection to another": (VI.9[9].6.48-54). Like the present passage, this passage too stresses the Good's transcendence of intellection, but in addition to the distinction between activity (νόησις) and subject (ὁ νοῶν) we find that the Good should be classified, so to speak, along with νόησις rather than with ὁ νοῶν. Now, I do not think this means that the Good *is* νόησις, though I think it is evidence that is relevant to the statements that the Good is κατανόησις (or ὑπερνόησις: VI.8[39].16.32) as well as other specifications of its inner life in VI.8[39].16; but it does suggest that the Good is an ἐνέργεια, and thus analogous to νόησις as ἐνέργεια, but unlike νοῦς (or ὁ νοῶν) which is not, at least in the present context, an ἐνέργεια. Nevertheless, this comparison of these passages with VI.8[39].16 is not fully satisfying, for in the latter the Good is envisioned as the supreme self, as the repeated use of the intensive pronoun throughout indicates. Thus, one might suppose that if P. wishes to employ noetic terminology to characterize the Good's inner life he could speak of it as ὁ νοῶν just as easily as he classes it with νόησις in the passage cited.

A second passage is helpful in seeing precisely how the Good and intellection differ, despite the fact that both are actualities: τοῦτο [sc. τὸ ἐν] δ' ἐστὶν ὑποστήσας αὐτόν, εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητότατον οἶον νοῦς. νοῦς δὲ ἐνέργημα· ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός. ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενός· ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτός. οὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός ("But this means that he gives himself existence, supposing him to be an abiding active actuality and the most pleasing of things in a way rather like Intellect. But Intellect is an actualization: so that he is an actualization. But not of anything else: he is then an actualization of himself. He is not therefore as he happens to be, but as he acts": VI.8[39].16.14-18; for further discussion see comm. *ad loc.*). Thus, the Good is clearly an actuality, but unlike Intellect its reality does not comprise an actualization of something else: it does not have a substrate, it is not an actualization of a prior potentiality, and, of course, its actuality involves no duality. On the basis of these two parallel passages, as well as the present passage, we might conclude that Intellect is an actualization of something else—its initial inchoate state, i.e. its original desire for and vision of the Good, which gives rise to intellection, an activity which requires differentiation of subject and object as well as activity and agent. This distinction between νόησις and ὁ νοῶν defines Intellect's duality (lines 10-11).

If this is correct, it is useful to see the statements in lines 3-5—that an ἐνέργεια does not have another ἐνέργεια—as referring both to the Good and to intellection, since the activity absolutized, as in VI.8[39].16, is a fitting quasi-attribute of the Good in P.' view. This interpretation also fits better with the reading of lines 5-6 which I prefer, against the view of H-S and Armstrong.

CHAPTER FOUR

ENNEAD III.8[30].8.26-11.45

Introductory Note

This treatise, “On Nature and Contemplation and the One,” is the first part of the long work, the *Großschrift*, which includes V.8[31], V.5[32], and II.9[33]. In its focus on the universality of contemplation, the treatise presents in briefer form many aspects of intellectual life that are more extensively explored in the two following portions of the *Großschrift*, whose topics are the location of the Forms within Intellect and intelligible beauty, respectively. As the opening word *παίζοντες* suggests, P. here wishes to exercise his imaginative powers to the fullest. The result is a vision of *θεωρία* that is truly universal as compared with Aristotle’s. Even nature manifests at least a dreamlike contemplation (Chs. 1-4), though P. is careful to stress the weakness of contemplation in both nature and the soul: in both realms *θεωρία* is externalized in *πρᾶξις* and *ποίησις* (Ch. 4-6). But all forms of contemplation have as their ultimate goal the perfect contemplation to be found in the intelligible world (Ch. 7). In Ch. 8, then, P. turns to the universal life of Intellect and the identity of subject and object on the intelligible level. The concept of “life” is crucial, for it pervades the entire universe, on both the sensible and intelligible levels, and in the latter makes possible the unity and universality of Intellect.

The structure of the treatise is quite similar to V.1[10]: in both P. explores the levels in the hierarchy of being in ascending order. The dynamic picture of the intelligible universe and of its generation by the Good, which in some respects is at odds with the eternally static nature of Intellect presented in many treatises, may have to do with the fact, as Armstrong observes, that P. is “working up from below to the One” (1971) 73 n3. But I do not think, with Bréhier, that the activity of contemplation on all levels of being requires that “l’Un soit quelque chose comme une contemplation” (*Notice* to III.8[30]), though this observation is in fact appropriate to VI.8[39].16.

Translation of III.8[30].8.26-11.45

If, then, the truest life is life by intellection, and this life is the same as the truest intellection, then the truest intellection lives, and contemplation and the corresponding object of contemplation live and are life, and the two together are one. Given, then, that the two are one, how in turn is this one many? Because what it contemplates is not one. For it also, when it contemplates the One, does

not contemplate it as one; otherwise Intellect would not come into being. But beginning as one it did not remain as it began, but unwittingly became many, as if weighed down, and unrolled itself in its desire to possess everything—how much better it would have been for it not to desire this, for it became the second—for like a circle unrolling itself it became shape, surface, circumference, center and radii, some above and some below. The better is “that from which,” the worse “that towards which.” For the “that from which” is not of the same nature as the “that from which-and-that towards which,” nor again is the “that from which-and-that towards which” the same nature as the “that from which” by itself. And, in other terms, Intellect is not the intellect of any one individual, but it is universal; and being universal, it is also the Intellect of all things. Since, then, it is all things and is the Intellect of all things, its part must possess everything and all things; otherwise it will have a part that is not Intellect, and it will be composed of non-intellecets, and it will be a heap that is thrown-together waiting to become an intellect made out of all things. For this reason also it is unlimited in this way and, if anything comes from it, neither that which comes from it is diminished, because it too is all things, nor is that from which it comes, because it is not something composed of parts.

9. This, then, is the sort of reality Intellect is; therefore it is not the first, but that which is beyond it must exist, at which our discussion has aimed, first, because multiplicity is posterior to unity; and Intellect is number, but the source of number, even number of this sort, is that which is one in reality; and it is Intellect and object of intellection together, so that it is two things at once. But if it is two, it is necessary to grasp what is prior to the duality. So what is it? Intellect only? But the object of intellection is joined together with every intellect; if, then, the object of intellection must not be joined together with it, it will not be Intellect. If, then, it is not Intellect, and is going to avoid duality, that which is prior to these two is beyond Intellect. What, then, prevents it from being the object of intellection? It is because the object of intellection is joined together with Intellect. If, then, it is neither Intellect nor object of intellection, what is it? We will claim that it is that from which derive Intellect and the object of intellection with it. What, then, is this and what kind of thing will we imagine it to be? For surely it will be either intellective or something non-intellective. If intellective, it will be Intellect, but if non-intellective it will be ignorant even of itself; so what is venerable about it? For even if we say that it is the Good and absolutely simple, we will not say anything clear and precise, even though we speak the truth, so long as we have nothing upon which to support our reasoning when we talk about it.

For again, since knowledge of other things derives from Intellect, and we can know Intellect by Intellect, by what sort of immediate intuition could one grasp that which transcends the nature of Intellect? To whomever requires elucidation how this is possible we will say that it is by the likeness in ourselves. For

something of it is also in us; or rather there is nowhere where it is not in things which can participate in it. For by making present at any point that which can have it, from there you have that which is everywhere; just as if there was a voice filling an empty space, or in the empty space there were men too, by directing the ear at any point in the empty space you will receive all the voice and yet not all of it. What is it, then, that we will receive when we apply Intellect to it? Rather, Intellect must, as it were, withdraw backwards, and, since it faces in two directions, it must give itself up, as it were, to what is behind it, and there, if it wishes to see that One, it must not be completely Intellect. For it is the primary life, an activity present in the outgoing of all things; but outgoing does not mean that it is progressing, but that it has progressed. If, then, it is life and outgoing and it contains all things distinctly and not in a rough general way—for then it would contain them imperfectly and disjointedly—it must derive from something else, which is no longer involved in outgoing, but is the source of outgoing, the source of life, and the source of Intellect and all things. For all things are not a source, but they derive from a source, but this is not all things nor any one of them, in order to insure that it can generate all things and not be a multiplicity, but the source of multiplicity; for that which generates is in every respect simpler than that which is generated. Therefore, if this generated Intellect, it must be simpler than Intellect. But if anyone should suppose that the One itself is also all things, it will be either each one of them individually or all of them together. If, then, it is all of them gathered together, it will be posterior to all things; but if it is prior to all things, they will be different from it and it will be different from them; but if it and all things are simultaneous, it will not be a source. But it must be a source and exist prior to all things, so that all things also may exist after it. And as to its being each of them, first, any one will be the same as any other, then all will be together without any distinction. And thus it is not one of all things, but is prior to all things.

10. What in fact is it? The productive power of all things; if it did not exist, neither would all things nor would Intellect be the primary and universal life. But that which is beyond life is cause of life; for the activity of life, which is all things, is not primary, but is itself poured out, so to speak, as if from a spring. For imagine a spring having no other source, but which gives itself to all rivers, and is not exhausted by the rivers but remains itself at rest, but the rivers that have proceeded from it, before each flows in a different course, still are united all together, yet each is already aware, in a way, in which direction it will let its streams flow. Or imagine the life of a great plant which pervades the whole of it while its source remains and is not scattered over the whole, since it is, so to speak, fixed in the root. So this is what provides all the multiple life to the plant, but itself remains not multiple but the source of the multiple life. And no wonder. Or, rather, it is a wonder how the multiplicity of life derives from what is not multiplicity, and the multiplicity would not have existed unless what was not

multiplicity had not existed before the multiplicity. For the source is not divided into everything, for were it divided it would destroy everything too, nor, again, could everything come into being without the source remaining by itself, different from it. Hence, too, there is reference upwards everywhere to a one. And for each thing there is some one to which you will refer it, and this in every case to the one prior to it, which is not simply one, until one reaches the simply one; but this cannot be referred to something else. But if one takes the one of the plant—this is its abiding source—and the one of the animal, the one of the soul, and the one of the universe, one grasps in each case what is most powerful and esteemed in it; but if one takes the one of truly existent beings, their source and spring and productive power, will we be doubtful and suppose that it is nothing? Certainly it is none of the things whose source it is; but it is of such a nature—since nothing can be predicated of it, not being, not substance, not life—as to be beyond all of these things. But if by excluding being you grasp it, you will be struck with wonder. And, casting yourself towards it and attaining rest within it, you comprehend it more intimately, knowing it by an intuitive grasp and seeing its greatness by what exists after it and through it.

11. And then think further in this way; for since Intellect is a kind of vision and a vision which sees, it will be a potentiality which has achieved actuality. Therefore, matter and form will be distinct in it—like seeing in actuality—but matter that exists in the intelligible world; since actual seeing also has duality, certainly, before seeing it was one. So the one has become two and the two one. For seeing, therefore, filling and a sort of perfecting depend on the object of sensation, but the Good is what fills the vision of Intellect. For if it itself was the Good, why should it have to see or to be active at all? For other things have their activity with respect to the Good and because of the Good, but the Good needs nothing; therefore it has nothing but itself. So when you have said “the Good,” think no more; for if you add anything, you will diminish it by whatever you have added. Nor, for this reason, should you add even intellection, so that you do not add something else and make it two, intellect and good. For Intellect needs the Good, but the Good does not need it; hence, also, by attaining the Good it becomes good-in-form and is perfected by the Good, as the form coming upon it from the Good makes it good-in-form. Just such a trace of the Good is seen in it as is appropriate to conceive its true archetype, envisioned from the trace of it diffused over Intellect. The Good, therefore, has given the trace of itself upon Intellect for Intellect to possess by seeing, so that desire is in Intellect, and it is always desiring and always attaining, but the Good is not desiring—for what could it desire?—nor is it attaining, for it did not desire anything. Therefore, it is not even Intellect. For there is desire in Intellect and convergence towards its form.

Now Intellect is beautiful and the most beautiful of all, abiding in pure light and pure radiance and enveloping the nature of real beings, of which this

beautiful universe is a shadow and image; and it abides in all splendour, because there is nothing unintelligent or dark or without measure in it, and it lives a blessed life; so wonder would seize the person who saw this too and, as one should, penetrated it and became one with it. Just as one who looks up to the heaven and sees the light of the stars thinks of their creator and seeks him, so the one who has contemplated the intelligible universe, gazed into it, and wondered at it must seek its creator as well, he who brought such a reality into existence, and where and how he generated such a son as Intellect, a beautiful boy who has become plenitude from himself. Certainly he is neither Intellect nor plenitude, but prior to Intellect and plenitude; for Intellect and plenitude come after him, since they needed to be filled and to be intelligent; they are close to that which is without need and has no need of intellection, but they have true fulfilment and true intellection, because they have them in the primary sense. But that which is prior to them neither needs nor possesses; otherwise it would not be the Good.

Commentary on III.8[30].8.26-11.45

8.26-30 εἰ τοῖνυν . . . τὰ δύο. The ascent in the discussion from lower to higher forms of contemplation and life culminates in the intelligible world where life is synonymous with intellection or contemplation. Life is such a pervasive notion in P.' noetic theory that its lesser role in the earlier treatises has not been sufficiently observed. Surprisingly few passages attribute ζωή to any aspect of the intelligible world, and there is a marked tendency in these few instances to link ζωή to being or to the objects of intellection: ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ὁμοῦ πάντων ὄντων, ὃ τι ἂν λάβῃς αὐτῶν, οὐσία καὶ νοερά, καὶ ζωῆς ἕκαστον μετέχον (V.9[5].10.10-12); τὸ γὰρ ὄν οὐ νεκρὸν οὐδὲ οὐ ζῶν οὐδὲ οὐ νοοῦν (V.4[7].2.43); ἔχει δὲ καὶ ζῶν τὸ ὄν (VI.9[9].2.24); αἰδία ἐν οἰκείᾳ συνέσει καὶ ζῶῃ [sc. τὰ νοητά] (V.1[10].4.7); ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ [sc. τὸ ὄν] ἐν ζῶῃ καὶ ἐν τελείᾳ ζῶῃ εἶναι (III.6[26].6.15). With the last passage we are already in the treatises of P.' later period of writing, when references to intellectual ζωή abound with remarkable frequency, particularly in VI.7[38] and V.3[49], which are often presented dramatically, as in the following: μηδεμιᾶς ἐκεῖ πενίας μηδ' ἀπορίας οὔσης, ἀλλὰ πάντων ζωῆς πεπληρωμένων καὶ οἷον ζεόντων (VI.7[38].12.22-23; the entire twelfth chapter of this treatise is replete with descriptions of intelligible life). Too much should not be made of the greater emphasis on intellectual life in the later treatises, but it does seem as if P. employs ζωή to envision the intelligible universe in more dynamic terms, as he does in the present passage. It is also significant, I think, that here ζωή envelops both the activity (θεωρία) and the object (θεώρημα) of the intelligible world, an additional move on P.' part to understand how Intellect is a one-many. Life imbues the intelligible world with cohesiveness, as the end of the sentence seems to suggest: ἐν ὁμοῦ τὰ δύο. Cp. ἔχει τὸ ζῶον ἕκαστον ζωῆς κοινῆς ἐπὶ

παῖσιν ὑπαρχούσης (VI.7[38].16.7-8). Yet life is also the source of intelligible multiplicity: διὰ μὲν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ζωῆς πολλὰ ὀρισθεῖσα, διὰ δὲ αὖ τὸν ὅρον ἔν (VI.7[38].17.24-25). The present passage lacks the precision of these later texts, perhaps because P. has yet to focus on procession and the first stage of the reversion.

The sources of the doctrine linking life and intelligence have been extensively discussed; especially valuable are Hadot (1960) and Szlezák 122-25. Foremost among them is Plato's "intelligible living creature" in *Timaeus* 30c^{ff}. and his attribution of motion, life, and intelligence to true being in the *Sophist* 248e-249d. Also important is the divine life of Aristotle's self-thinking Intellect in *Met.* Λ 7.1072b26.

8.30 ἔν οὖν ὃν . . . τὸ ἔν. This sentence marks an abrupt transition in the treatise. Having reached the highest type of θεωρία, Intellect's universal and living νόησις, which comprises the complete unity of subject and object, P. abruptly interjects the question how this intelligible unity is also multiple. There is, therefore, some discontinuity between the first two thirds of the treatise and the remaining three and one-half chapters, as Bréhier points out in his *Notice*. But, as we have already observed, it is not unusual for P. to turn suddenly to the question of Intellect's origin and the theory of procession and reversion when he has finished a discussion of the internal nature of the intelligible universe; cf. the analogous transitions at the beginnings of V.1[10].7, V.6[24].5, and VI.7[38].16.

8.30-33 ἡ ὅτι . . . ἔμεινεν. The view that what proceeds from the One becomes the multiple Intellect is presented in each of the three texts discussed above: V.4[7].2.4^{ff}., V.1[10].7.10^{ff}., and V.6[24].5.9^{ff}.; but this is the first account of procession and reversion where P. clearly states that the inchoate Intellect does not see the One's unity. The passage closest to the present one is V.6[24].5.17: "it is in looking to the Good that it thinks itself." In the present passage, therefore, P. speculates on an earlier moment in the reversion of the potential Intellect. What is stressed here in the statement that Intellect does not see the One's unity—and this is developed further in the following lines—is that Intellect's vision is distorted and that it is on this misapprehension that Intellect's very existence depends. It is to be noted also that P. here expands his vocabulary for describing pre-intellectual vision to include θεωρία. The use of this variant term is unusual, but it is quite understandable in the context of a treatise where θεωρία is an activity which operates on all levels of reality.

In lines 32-33 P. asserts that Intellect "beginning as one did not remain as it began." On the face of it, P. would seem to be suggesting that in the first ontological moment of the procession the inchoate Intellect is a unity from which, as the following lines make clear, it falls away. (Cf. below Ch. 11.5: πρὶν γοῦν

ἰδεῖν ἦν ἓν and comm. on Ch. 9.29-32.) The oneness of the efflux from the first principle is not mentioned in most accounts of procession, but it is referred to often enough to warrant our attention. This notion first appears in an analysis of intelligible matter, which is synonymous with indefinite life and the other characterizations of the inchoate Intellect: εἰ δὲ πολλὰ ὄν ἀμέριστόν ἐστι, τὰ πολλὰ ἓν ἐνὶ ὄντα ἓν ὕλη ἐστὶ τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτὰ μορφαὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντα· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῦτο νόησον ποικίλον καὶ πολύμορφον. οὐκοῦν ἄμορφον αὐτὸ πρὸ τοῦ ποικίλου· εἰ γὰρ τῷ νῷ ἀφέλοις τὴν ποικιλίαν καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ νοήματα, τὸ πρὸ τούτων ἄμορφον καὶ ἀόριστον καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ (“But if intelligible reality is at once many and partless, then the many existing in one are in matter which is that one, and they are its shapes: conceive this unity as varied and of many shapes. So, then, it must be shapeless before it is varied; for if you take away in your mind its variety and shapes and forming principles and thoughts, what is prior to these is shapeless and undefined and is none of these things that are on it and in it”: II.4[12].4.14-20). This passage does not, of course, focus on the procession, but I think P. may be suggesting that the initial, undifferentiated state of the inchoate Intellect persists as a unity *qua* intelligible matter and that it is chronologically, though not necessarily ontologically, prior to the unified multiplicity of actualized Intellect. For extensive analysis of intelligible matter as well as its unity see comm. on Ch. 11.2-5.

Two passages in VI.7[38] offer more direct parallels to the present passage: ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τούτω· ἦν γὰρ ἐκομίζετο δύναμιν ἀδυνατῶν ἔχειν συνέθραυε καὶ πολλὰ ἐποίησε τὴν μίαν, ἵν' οὕτω δύναιτο κατὰ μέρος φέρειν (“But from the Good himself who is one there were many for this Intellect: for it was unable to hold the power which it received and broke it up and made the one power many, that it might be able so to bear it part by part”: VI.7[38].15.20-22); ἄρα, ὅτε ἐώρα πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐνόει ὡς πολλὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐν ὄν αὐτὸς ἐνόει αὐτὸν πολλὰ, μερίζων αὐτὸν παρ' αὐτῷ τῷ νοεῖν μὴ ὅλον ὁμοῦ δύνασθαι; ἀλλ' οὕτω νοῦς ἦν ἐκείνῳ βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔβλεπεν ἀνοήτως (“Did Intellect, when it looked towards the Good, think that One as many, and because it was itself one being think him as many, dividing him in itself by not being able to think the whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect when it looked at him, but looked unintellectually”: VI.7[38].16.10-14; cf. comm. *ad locc.*). In the first passage the inchoate Intellect is not one, rather it pluralizes the one power flowing from the One. This is the view P. usually maintains and it is consistent with that expressed in lines 30-31, that Intellect does not see the One as a unity. The second passage picks up this point, but adds, in agreement with the present text, that the inchoate Intellect—specified precisely as that which “was not yet Intellect”—is also one when it looks to the One, and *then* breaks it up into a multiplicity. These two passages indicate, I

think, that P. tends to obscure the differences between the unity of the One's outflowing δύναμις and the unity of the initial phase of the inchoate Intellect.

In the determination of the sources of unity and multiplicity of the one-being, P. again refers to this underlying unity: "and it is one being, but makes itself many by what we may call its movement: and it is one whole, but when it undertakes, one might say, to contemplate itself, it is many (οἷον δὲ θεωρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦν ἑαυτὸ πολλά): as if it cannot bear its being to be one when it is capable of being all the things that it is. And its contemplation (θεωρία) is the cause of its appearing many, that it may think (νοήση): for if it appears as one, it did not think, but is that One (ἐὰν γὰρ ἐν φανῇ, οὐκ ἐνόησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡδὴ ἐκεῖνο)" (VI.2[43].6.15-20). It would be very difficult indeed to make any sense of Plotinian metaphysics if the protasis of this sentence were intended as a real and permanent possibility. Simply put, Intellect *cannot* "appear as one" absolutely; in fact, the word "appear" itself indicates the hypothetical nature of this remarkable passage. The putative identity of the one-being (i.e. Intellect) with the One would suggest that the former term cannot be differentiated from the latter, a position that P. is willing countenance, in my view, only in the *unio mystica*. The latest discussion of this issue establishes why the processive Intellect cannot be a super-essential unity: "Now it has been said that, if anything comes from the One, it must be something different from it (ἄλλο δεῖ παρ' αὐτό); and in being different it is not one (ἄλλο δὲ ὄν οὐχ ἓν): for if it was, it would be that One (τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐκεῖνο)" (V.3[49].15.37-39). This is quite consistent with an early statement of the same point: in Intellect "one must include movement if there is thought, and rest that it may think the same; and otherness, that there there may be thinker and thought; or else, if you take away otherness, it will become one (ἐν γενόμενον) and keep silent" (V.1[10].4.35-39). I take P. to be arguing that if we wish to speak about Intellect in the strict sense, including its pre-intellectual phase, we must stipulate that it is different from the One. On this view even the incipient unity of the inchoate Intellect, if such is actually P.' position, is to be differentiated from the One as absolute unity.

Another discussion of a unity prior to the pluralized unity of Intellect should be noted. In VI.6[34] P. attempts to explicate ontological priority and derivation in mathematical terms: ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὄν ἐν ὄν ἐστι καὶ τὰ δύο ὄντα δύο ὄντα ἐστί, προηγῆσεται τοῦ τε ὄντος τὸ ἐν καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν ὄντων (Ch. 9.11-13). Further on he adds: καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντα, ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἡριθμήθη· ἀλλ' ὅσα ἔδει γενέσθαι δηλὸν ἦν. πᾶς ἄρα ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἦν πρὸ αὐτῶν τῶν ὄντων. ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἦν ὄντα. ἢ ἦν ἐν τῷ ὄντι, οὐκ ἀριθμὸς ὦν τοῦ ὄντος—ἐν γὰρ ἦν ἔτι τὸ ὄν—ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δύναμις ὑποστᾶσα ἐμέρισε τὸ ὄν καὶ οἷον ὠδίνειν ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν τὸ πληθὸς ("And certainly the beings were not numbered at the time when they came to be: but it was [already clear] how many there had to be. The whole

number, therefore, existed before the things themselves. But, if numbers were before beings, they were not beings. Now number was in being, not as the number of being—for being was still one—but the power of number which had come to exist divided being and made it, so to speak, in labour to give birth to multiplicity”: Ch. 9.22-27); ἀρ’ οὖν τὸ μὲν ὄν ἀριθμὸς ἡνωμένος, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ἐξεληλιγμένος ἀριθμὸς (“Is not Being, then, unified number, and the beings number unfolded . . .?”: 29-30); ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς γενόμενον τὸ ὄν, ὥς ἦν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, δεῖ αὐτὸ οὕτως ἀριθμὸν εἶναι (“Since, because Being came into existence from the One, as that One was one, Being must also in this way be number”: Ch. 9.31-33); ἐστὼς οὖν τὸ ὄν ἐν πλήθει ἀριθμὸς, ὅτε πολὺ μὲν ἡγείρετο, παρασκευὴ δὲ οἶον ἦν πρὸς τὰ ὄντα καὶ προτύπως καὶ οἶον ἐνάδες τόπον ἔχουσαι τοῖς ἐπ’ αὐτάς ἰδρυθησομένοις (“Being, therefore, standing firm in multiplicity was number, when it woke as many, and was a kind of preparation for the beings and a preliminary sketch, and like unities keeping place for the beings which are going to be founded on them”: Ch. 10.1-4); τὸ δὲ ὄν γενόμενον ἀριθμὸς συνάπτει τὰ ὄντα πρὸς αὐτὸ· σχίζεται γὰρ οὐ καθὼς ἓν, ἀλλὰ μένει τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ (“But being, when it has become number, joins the beings to itself: for it splits, not in so far as it is one, but its one abides”: Ch. 15.29-30).

Many difficulties present themselves in these texts, particularly as regards the various aspects of number in the intelligible world; for general discussions see Krämer (1964) 299-304, Bertier et al. 32-85. For our present purpose these must be set aside in order to focus on the following hierarchy of being: τὸ ἓν—τὸ ὄν—ὁ ἀριθμὸς—τὰ ὄντα/οἱ ἀριθμοί (cf. Bertier et al. 53-55). This scheme does not reflect the typical account of procession from the One in precise detail, but rather articulates ontological derivation, in Late Academic and Neopythagoreanizing terms, of intelligible plurality from a monadic, mathematical unity. Nevertheless, specific terms and phrases are familiar: ἡ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δύναμις ὑποστᾶσα ἐμέρισε τὸ ὄν (Ch. 9.26); ἐξεληλιγμένος (Ch. 9.30); σχίζεται (Ch. 15.30; cf. V.1[10].7.11: οἶον σχιζομένη ἡ νόησις). If these passages constitute a parallel but distinct version of P.’ procession theory, what is most interesting is the assertion that τὸ ὄν, the first efflux from the One, is one (Chs. 9.25-26, 10.1-4). This entity is so much like the One (Ch. 9.31-32) that it is what is pluralized by the δύναμις (Ch. 9.26; the meaning of δύναμις here probably includes both “potentiality” and “power”), which is here predicated of number. This pluralizing activity is described similarly in VI.7[38].15.20-22 and 16.10-14 quoted above. Also to be noted is how the progression from τὸ ὄν (which is ἓν) to ἀριθμὸς to τὰ ὄντα occurs through “unfolding” (ἐξεληλιγμένος: Ch. 9.30), analogously to the present context: ἀρξάμενος ὥς ἓν (III.8[30].8.32) . . . ἐξείλιξεν αὐτὸν (34) . . . κύκλος ἐξελίξας αὐτὸν (36). It is necessary to conclude, I think, that at least in VI.6[34].9 τὸ ὄν is virtually synonymous with the potential Intellect, specifically its initial phase.

This is also the view of Szlezák 98-101, who sheds the most light on these difficult texts. I am not fully convinced by his argument that the reason for this remarkable use of τὸ ὄν to represent the potential Intellect stems in part from *Sophist* 248eff. “wo der Begriff des blossen Seins unter dem Namen ὄν (nicht z.B. οὐσία oder εἶναι) verhandelt wird, während die Gesamtheit der Dinge unter der Bezeichnung ὄντα in den Blick rückt” 98 n308. But P.’ difficulty in fitting this conception into his theory of ontological derivation probably does arise, as Szlezák 101-02 argues, from the tension in P.’ mind between the theory of Forms and being in the Platonic dialogues and, on the other hand, the positing of an indefinite potentiality prior to the development of the realm of Forms in the Unwritten Doctrines. It is clear, at any rate, that, whatever the precise ontological status of τὸ ὄν in these passages, its unity, which exists prior to τὰ ὄντα and νοῦς, is related to the present passage.

Lines 32-33 have been adduced as evidence by several scholars, in conjunction with other, less ambiguous passages, to support the view that this initial stage of Intellect’s life is identical to Intellect’s hyper-noetic, mystical vision of the One. For a detailed examination of this interpretation see comm. on III.8[30].9.29-32, VI.7[38].35.19-27, and V.3[49].11.9-12, 15-16. Relying on the arguments presented in these other contexts, I would suggest that in the present passage P.’ statement must not be taken to mean that in its initial, processive phase Intellect is a fully conscious (or super-conscious) unity. This position admittedly runs into the difficulty of making sense of the next clause: “but it unwittingly became many” (ἀλλ’ ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν πολὺς γενόμενος). Does this puzzling comment mean that Intellect originally (“beginning as one”) possessed a higher degree of knowledge than it does in the potential and, subsequently, in the actualized state? I think such an interpretation of this passage is most unlikely; to maintain this view certainly requires reading a great deal into this distressingly brief account. The more difficult problem of how this text interacts with the others cited above is considered in greater detail in those contexts.

8.33-36 οἶον βεβαρημένος . . . ἐγένετο. Before addressing the larger question of whether P. in this passage seriously entertains the idea of a wilful fall of the Intellect, it will be useful to determine the implications of the diverse terms and imagery employed here to characterize Intellect in its processive phase. First, Intellect is said “to be weighed down, as it were” (οἶον βεβαρημένος), possibly a reminiscence of *Symposium* 203b5-6, where the drunken Poros is weighed down with sleep in the garden of Zeus. Cilento’s “sonnacchioso” and Beutler’s “schlaftrunken” reflect the influence of the Platonic source. Ferwerda 84 n2 objects that the presence of ἐξείλιξεν “rend le contexte différent de celui du Banquet.” A closer examination is necessary to determine whether this criticism is cogent.

The *Symposium* myth is used by P. for a variety of allegorical purposes and most extensively in III.5[50]. In his exegesis of the account of the birth of Eros, Penia symbolizes the soul in its indefinite and receptive state (Ch. 7) and Aphrodite the soul when it ascends to and participates in Intellect (Ch. 8). In Intellect's generation of soul, Poros is the λόγος τῶν πάντων (Ch. 8.3-4), which proceeds from Intellect, when Poros, "getting drunk on nectar" (*Symp.* 203b5), becomes "a rational principle (λόγος) which has fallen from a higher origin to a lesser one" (Ch. 9.6). In this allegorized account, soul in its poverty and indefiniteness receives form and is illuminated by the λόγος coming to it from Intellect. The procession of the λόγος = Poros ensues through drunkenness, while Intellect remains in itself in a state of satiety (Ch. 9.19). The metaphysical implications of P.' use of the myth are well articulated by Dillon: "The drunkenness arouses a desire demanding external fulfillment. . . . The desire arises, in this case, within νοῦς, or within the λόγος of νοῦς. The results are twofold: simultaneously a flood of energy is let loose which imposes Form, through soul, on Matter to create the physical world; and the divine force, Eros, is born, which creates in each being a capacity, and an urge, to strive upwards. The Way Down and the Way Up, in fact, spring together from this drunkenness" (1969b) 38.

Now drunkenness is not part of the present account of procession, but Intellect's heaviness and its lack of awareness (ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν: line 33) correspond to the myth's image of the sleeping Poros. The desire for fulfillment on the part of the drunken Poros corresponds to Intellect "desiring to possess all things" (πάντα ἔχειν θέλων: line 34). That the descent of the λόγος = Poros is a "fall" is analogous also to the parenthetical remark at lines 35-36, but I defer full treatment of this theme for the moment. What is significant about these correspondences is that the procession of Intellect is here presented in terms that are much more appropriate to the descent of the soul. This inference is strengthened when we compare the role of weight in the descent of individual souls: καὶ αἱ [sc. ψυχαὶ] μὲν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ εἰς σώματα τὰ κατωτέρω, αἱ δὲ ἀπ' ἄλλων εἰς ἄλλα εἰσκρινόμεναι, αἷς ἡ δύναμις οὐκ ἤρκεσεν ἄραι ἐντεῦθεν διὰ βάρυνσιν καὶ λήθην πολὺ ἐφελκομέναις, ὃ αὐταῖς ἐβαρύνθη ("And some souls come from heaven to lower bodies; others pass from one body into another, those whose power is not sufficient to lift them from this region because they are weighed down and forgetful, dragging with them much that weighs upon them": IV.3[27].15.4-7). Here weight is associated with forgetfulness, the loss of an original, higher state of knowledge, which is typical of many accounts of individual souls' descents. But this notion is foreign to the great majority of accounts of Intellect's procession. Becker 10 also feels that it "scheint sich mit der steigenden Wachheit der höheren Hypostasen nicht zu vertragen"; but it is difficult to see how his rendering "als ob er müde wurde" escapes his own objection. MacKenna's "as though pregnant" fits rather well the

context in which the potential Intellect is about to generate a host of intelligible beings. Also worthy of consideration are the less figurative “comme accablée par une charge trop lourde” (Trouillard [1955b] 107) and “s’apesantit sous le poids des êtres” (Bréhier). Finally, it is interesting that P. expresses the original descent of Intellect, i.e. its procession, with the same term βαρύνειν, which is used on one occasion to explain the individual soul’s falling away from mystical union with the One: VI.9[9].9.59.

We must now confront lines 35-36 which assert that it would have been better for Intellect not to have desired all things. This statement implies that Intellect somehow declines wilfully from a better to a worse state. Thus, it has been justifiably linked with the bolder remark that Intellect ἀποστῆναι δέ πῶς τοῦ ἑνὸς τολμήσας (“though it did somehow dare to stand away from the One”: VI.9[9].5.29). Merlan (1975) 124 sees in these passages an explanation of the origin of intellectual plurality which is incompatible with the much more common idea of the One’s overflowing. In his view, there is considerable tension between the metaphysical necessity and involuntariness of the latter and the voluntarism of the former. The pessimistic tone of these two passages is often construed by reading them together with the more common descriptions of the soul’s τόλμα in proceeding from Intellect: cf. V.2[11].1.18-28 and III.7[45].11.15ff. That the blameworthy self-assertion of the soul is related to that of Intellect cannot be denied, but many of the problems in the descent of the soul are foreign to those we find in the procession of Intellect. For further discussion of the soul’s τόλμα see Atkinson 4-6; Wallis (1972) 78, 81-82; and Armstrong (1978) 118-20.

The possibility that the pessimistic tone associated with Intellect’s τόλμα might indicate some affinity on P.’ part for Gnostic use of the term has been adequately disposed of by Atkinson 4-5, Baladi (1970) and (1971), and Rist (1965). Dodds (1965) 24-26 argues that before his anti-Gnostic treatise II.9[33] P. maintained the pessimistic view of Numenius and the Gnostics that the soul falls through self-assertion. For a judicious discussion of the impact of Gnosticism on P. see Igal (1981). The precedent for P.’ use of the term is probably to be found in the Neopythagorean identification of τόλμα with the Dyad, though Neopythagorean accounts of the generation of the Dyad from the Monad are so brief and fragmentary that it is impossible to establish with certainty to what degree P. is indebted to them; see Rist’s valuable discussion of this problem (1965) 333-37. The evidence is collected by H-S *ad* V.1[10].1.4 and in H-S¹ III.346 in *Fontes Addendi*; for discussion cf. Atkinson 4; Krämer (1964) 341 n545; Armstrong (1978) 116-17.

Rist and Armstrong have offered strong reasons for deemphasizing the pessimistic connotations of Intellect’s τόλμα. First, I agree with Rist’s argument that Intellect’s daring to stand apart from the One (in VI.9[9].5.29) “does not in fact concern the generation of Intellect but rather its attitude after it has been generated”; thus, the passage “does not mean that it recklessly broke away, but

that it has ‘faced up’ to living apart after its generation—indeed it had no option” (1965) 341. Rist’s emphasis on the metaphysical necessity of Intellect’s procession, even in the two passages under discussion, is correct. Moreover, I think we must read lines 35-36—which seem to imply that Intellect has made the wrong choice in wanting to possess all things—in conjunction with passages in the anti-Gnostic treatise II.9[33] which breathe a more optimistic spirit: “we must lay down that there is one Intellect, unchangeably the same, without any sort of decline, imitating the Father as far as is possible to it” (Ch. 2.2-4); “But each of necessity must give of its own to something else as well, or the Good will not be the Good, or Intellect Intellect, or the soul this that it is, unless with the primal living some secondary life lives as long as the primal exists. Of necessity, then, all things must exist for ever in ordered dependence upon each other” (Ch. 3.7-12); “It is not contracting the divine into one but showing it in that multiplicity in which God himself has shown it, which is proper to those who know the power of God” (Ch. 9.35-37). In light of passages like these—and there are many more—considerable scholarly boldness would be required to argue that in the present passage Intellect indulges in an act of illegitimate self-assertion. If we are to allow P. to maintain the metaphysical necessity and ultimate goodness of the procession, as I think we should, then we must agree with Armstrong (1978) 117 “that the ultimate responsibility for τόλμα must lie with the One or Good itself. And if it originates in the Good, it cannot be bad.” The fact that Intellect is “weighed down” and “unwittingly becomes many” points much more to the kind of unconsciousness we expect in the inchoate Intellect than any sort of conscious rebellion. Hence, Intellect’s desire to possess all things should be seen as a perhaps excessively voluntarist personification of the typical indefinite striving or desire which ultimately leads to the constitution of actualized Intellect. To characterize the tone of the passage as whole I would subscribe again to Armstrong’s view “that the passage represents a passing emotional intensification of the mystic’s sense of the worthlessness of all things in comparison with the Absolute Good, which leads him for a moment to say that it would have been better if they had never been” (1978) 118. In this vein, perhaps the truest key to P.’ mood when writing these lines is the ascription of weight to the soul which falls away from mystical union with the Good: “set on fire then, but the fire seems to go out if one is weighed down (βαρύνοντο) again” (VI.9[9].9.59-60).

8.36-38 οἶον γὰρ κύκλος . . . τὰ δὲ κάτω. P. abruptly deploys a geometrical model for the procession of Intellect. “Unrolling” (ἐξελίττειν) is one of the many metaphorical terms P. uses to represent the procession of soul or Intellect: in the former case, cf. III.7[45].11.22-27 and IV.3[27].5.10; in the latter cf. V.3[49].10.52. Here the process of unrolling is linked to the geometrical image of Intellect as a circle, for which see also V.1[10].7.8 and comm. *ad loc.* Spinning off from the unrolling circle are shape, surface,

periphery, center, and lines/radii. The movement from point to solid figure is a commonplace in Old Pythagoreanism (cf. Burkert 66-69 and Aristotle's discussion at *Met.* Δ 6.1016b24-31), in Old Academic discussions (cf. Krämer [1964] 105ff.), and among Neopythagoreans: Nicomachus of Gerasa, *Introd. Arithm.* II.6.2; Alexander Polyhistor in Diogenes Laertius VIII.25; also Iamblichus, *Theolog. Arithm.* 84. For discussion of these sources see Whittaker (1969b) 110-12 and Krämer.

It is important to note that in this case all the geometrical entities are to be understood as intelligible realities, even shape (σχήμα) and surface (ἐπίπεδον) which are usually predicated of physical objects. At VI.6[34].17.21-29 these two are specifically included in the intelligible realm as unextended figures, as distinct from their extended physical instantiations. As to the metaphysical interrelationships among circle, center, and lines/radii, the following text provides a helpful exposition: "Just as a circle (κύκλος), therefore, which touches the center all round in a circle, would be agreed to have its power from the center and to have in a way the center's form (κεντροειδής), in that the radii (γραμμαί) in the circle coming together to one center (πρὸς κέντρον ἐν συνιοῦσαι) make their terminal point at the center like that to which they are carried and from which they, so to speak, grow out, though the center is greater than is proportionate to these lines (τὰς γραμμὰς) and their terminal points (τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν), the points of the lines themselves (σημεῖα τῶν γραμμῶν)—and the terminal points are like that center, but only a dim image of that which has power to produce them in having power also to produce the lines: and what the center is like is revealed through the lines; it is as if it was spread out without having been spread out (οἷον ἐξελιχθὲν οὐκ ἐξεληλιγμένον)" (VI.8[39].18.7-18). This text is useful in many ways for explicating the present passage, though there are important differences. We have Intellect symbolized as a circle whose lines/radii (the lines above and below in lines 37-38 of the present passage) extend from the One as center to their terminal points on the periphery. The one center as the One is not clearly evident in the present passage, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that this notion is implicit, given its abbreviated form. Also different is the hesitant attribution of ἐξελίττειν to the One as center: the One, of course, cannot develop or spread it; this pertains only to Intellect *qua* line and circle.

What, then, is the referent of κέντρον in line 37? I do not think that it refers, strictly speaking, to the One, though the One as center is in the background, as I have argued. For this κέντρον is generated, like the other geometrical figures, by the unrolling of Intellect. Within the geometrical image, therefore, the derivative center represents the internal unity of Intellect, the limit of the converging radii, which renders Intellect κεντροειδής, in the language of the later passage. Another possibility is to take κέντρον as referring to the many νοητά, the multiple centers of the intelligible circle, which converge on the One

as center, as is clearly stated in VI.5[23].5.3-23; cf. especially lines 17-19: εἰ δ' οὖν κέντροις πολλοῖς ἀπεικάσαμεν πάντα τὰ νοητὰ εἰς ἓν κέντρον ἀναφερομένοις καὶ ἐνομένοις κτλ. Also relevant is this passage: τὸ κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημείον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο ("the center of a circle exists by itself, but every one of the radii in the circle has its point in the center and the lines bring their individuality to it": V.1[10].11.10-13). (Atkinson has an excellent discussion of this and other passages concerning this theme. He also offers plausible arguments that for his metaphysical use of these geometric figures P. may be indebted to Alexander of Aphrodisias.) The unity of Intellect is also symbolized with σημείον when all aspects of the intelligible universe are concentrated into the point: Intellect is "a partless completion, as if they were all together in a point, and had not yet begun to go out and flow into lines" (III.7[45].3.19-20); for further discussion of this passage see Beierwaltes (1967) 168-69. The metaphorical οἶον, and the context in which this statement appears, indicates that to see Intellect's essential unity we must return in a way to its primordial unity, but with a full awareness of Intellect's infinite life.

The notion of an intelligible κέντρον is developed much more systematically by Proclus in a discussion which serves as a valuable commentary on all the texts we are considering: "The circle is an image of Intellect; for it remains in accordance with what is within it and goes forth in accordance with its generative potencies and turns towards itself in accordance with the knowledge which everywhere surrounds it in the same way. The center is an image of the intelligible object in Intellect, of that which is partless and desirable; the lines arising from the center are like its unlimited potencies, through which it brings forth the entire multiplicity of intelligible objects in it; but the periphery, through which it from every direction is again rolled up and enfolded into it, [is like] the intellections which are turned back towards the One and the intelligible object" (*In Remp.* II.46.18-27, my translation). Proclus' view that the center "is an image of the intelligible object in Intellect" offers a fine analogy to P.' doctrine that when Intellect looks to the One it receives an image of it, but cannot grasp the One itself. The center generated by the unrolling Intellect, therefore, is like the One (and this echoes the phrase "beginning as one" in line 32), but instantaneously generates multiple, intelligible centers or intelligible objects. Such detailed exegesis of Plotinian texts, especially terse ones like the present passage, is often necessary because of P.' unsystematic method, which is to be contrasted to the scholastic and systematic procedure of a Proclus. On the mathematical and metaphysical concept of the "point" cf. Beierwaltes (1965) 173-79.

8.38-40 βελτίω . . . μόνον. Determination of the precise referents in this brief excursus on the metaphysics of prepositions has been rendered even more

difficult by the disputes over the text. Fortunately, the first dispute can be disposed of rather easily. For εἰς ὅ in line 38 Sleeman proposed εἰς ᾧ, which has been adopted by B-T, on the grounds that ᾧ is necessary because of the preceding τὰ δὲ κάτω. With all other editors I remain unconvinced, for the good reason that εἰς ὅ is grammatically unrelated to the prior phrase. I agree with Cilento (1971) 146 who correctly observes “εἰς ὅ indica il tendere del raggio verso una direzione, simbolo del processo d’individuazione.”

In contrast, the second emendation affects the meaning of the sentence considerably. For τὸ γὰρ ἄφ’ οὗ in line 39 Dodds proposed τὸ γὰρ εἰς ὅ, arguing that if the MSS text is preserved we are confronted with a “monstrous tautology.” With the emended text, however, “we should then have the correct Neoplatonic triad τὸ εἰς ὅ [μόνον], τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ καὶ εἰς ὅ, τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ μόνον in which the two extremes are linked by a mean term” (1956) 111. The alternatives can be expressed in symbolic terms as follows:

MSS: $A \neq A + B$; $A + B \neq A$

Dodds: $B \neq A + B$; $A + B \neq A$

This logical and tidy emendation has been adopted by subsequent editors: H-S², B-T, Cilento, and Armstrong. Despite such widespread rejection, I think the MSS text may be defensible; in any case, the passage deserves more careful scrutiny than it has yet received.

The first problem which must be addressed is whether these prepositional phrases refer to the relation between the One and Intellect or to relationships within Intellect as circle. Any solution to this difficulty must determine to what extent, if any, the sentence depends on the preceding clause. In line 38 χείρω δὲ εἰς ὅ apparently refers to something ontologically inferior to the ὅθεν. Now if ὅθεν represents the intelligible center (as well as the One), χείρω δὲ εἰς ὅ most likely indicates, in the terms of the preceding sentence (lines 36-38), the lines/radii of the intelligible circle extending outward towards the circumference or periphery. And if the troublesome sentence is explanatory of this, with the γὰρ as exegetical, τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ would be equivalent to ὅθεν and τὸ εἰς ὅ τὸ χείρω δὲ εἰς ὅ. Thus, reading the passage as referring to parts of the intelligible circle yields the following:

τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ = the center as source

τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ καὶ εἰς ὅ = the center and the circumference (i.e. the circle as a whole)

τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ μόνον = the center alone, i.e. in itself

With Dodds’s text we have: the circumference \neq the center and the circumference; the center and the circumference \neq the center alone. With the MSS text: the center \neq the center and the circumference; the center and the circumference \neq the center alone. The former obviously makes sense, but I would argue that the MSS text

does as well, for it can be interpreted as making other, important distinctions: (i) the center of the intelligible circle *qua* source of its lines/radii is to be distinguished from the circle; (ii) also to be distinguished from the circle is (a) the center alone, i.e. the center in itself, considered apart from the lines/radii which derive from it or (b) perhaps the center alone might refer to the One in itself as distinct from the center of the intelligible circle. Whether we adopt (ii) a or (ii) b—though, of course, they are not significantly different—the MSS text is not susceptible to the objection that it is tautologous. In my estimation it seems to provide more meaningful distinctions in the context than Dodds’s more schematic reading. Though I think it is a less valid way of interpreting this sentence, it is also possible to see each of the prepositional phrases as referring to the One:

τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ = the One as originating center of the intelligible lines/radii and circle

τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ καὶ εἰς ὃ = the One as the originating center to which also the lines/radii converge

τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ μόνον = the One in itself

Support for construing the sentence in this manner can be gleaned from VI.8[39].18.10-14 (quoted above): “the radii (γραμμαί) in the circle coming together to one center (πρὸς κέντρον ἐν συνιοῦσαι) make their terminal point at the center like that to which they are carried and from which they, so to speak, grow out, though the center is greater than is proportionate to these lines (τὰς γραμμάς) and their terminal points (τὰ πέρατα αὐτῶν), the points of the lines themselves (σημεῖα τῶν γραμμῶν)”; cf. also V.1[10].11.10-13, quoted above.

Even more succinct and systematic on this score are the remarks of Proclus in his interpretation of a fragment from the *Chaldaean Oracles*: κέντρον, ἄφ’ οὗ πᾶσας μέχρις ἀντιγος ἴσαι ἕασιν (“the center from which all the lines to the rim are equal”: Fr. 167): ἀλλ’ ὥς μὲν τῆς διαστάσεως ἀρχὴ γραμμῶν τῷ “ἄφ’ οὗ” σημαίνεται, ὥς δὲ μέσον τῆς περιφερείας τῷ “πρὸς ὃ.” πρὸς γὰρ τὸ κέντρον αὕτη συνάγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν ἑαυτήν (“But *qua* origin of the divergence of the lines it is given the signification ‘from which’, but *qua* center of the circumference it is termed ‘towards which’; for the circumference in all its extent gathers itself towards the center”: *In Eucl.* 155.6-9, tr. Morrow). Assuming that πρὸς is equivalent to εἰς (though given the formulaic character of these phrases the assumption might be dangerous), these two passages enable us to read the sentence from a very different perspective, one that would have us interpret it more in relation to lines 30-33 than with lines 34-38. Here too, on this reading, I think the MSS text makes better sense than Dodds’s, for it makes an important distinction between the One as ἀρχή and νοητόν, i.e. as the originating center to which also the lines/radii converge (τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ καὶ εἰς ὃ), and the One in itself (τὸ ἄφ’ οὗ μόνον). But, in conclusion, I think it would be

rash to be dogmatic about either text or either perspective from which to interpret this telegraphic passage.

8.40-45 καὶ ἄλλως . . . πάντων. It is difficult to determine precisely why P. sets off in a new direction here and asserts that he is not speaking of individual intellects but of the universal Intellect. He may have assumed that his listeners and readers would be thinking in terms of multiple intellects, an impression suggested perhaps by the abundant geometrical figures, specifically the “lines above and below.” Thus, he insists that each part of the intelligible universe and each individual intellect is the universal Intellect, a view sustained in many passages: οὐχ ἑτέρα τοῦ νοῦ ἐκάστη ἰδέα, ἀλλ’ ἐκάστη νοῦς. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ὁ νοῦς τὰ πάντα εἶδη, ἕκαστον δὲ εἶδος νοῦς ἕκαστος (V.9[5].8.2-4); ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ μέρους ἄλλο ἄλλου γίνοιτο ἄν, καὶ εἴη ἄν μόνον ἕκαστον μέρος, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐξ ὅλου αἰεὶ ἕκαστον καὶ ἅμα ἕκαστον καὶ ὅλον· φαντάζεται μὲν γὰρ μέρος, ἐνορᾶται δὲ τῷ ὁξεῖ τὴν ὅπιν ὅλον (V.8[31].4.21-24). The explanatory clause which concludes the second passage is important for establishing that whether or not the intelligible universe has parts depends on one’s perspective. In the present passage P. speaks as if Intellect does have parts, i.e. the Forms as individual intellects, but elsewhere the emphasis is different: ἄτοπος ὁ μερισμὸς ἑαυτοῦ [sc. ὁ νοῦς]· πῶς γὰρ καὶ μεριεῖ; (V.3[49].5.7-8; the entire chapter attacks the notion that Intellect has parts); νοῦς γὰρ καὶ νόησις ἓν· καὶ ὅλος ὅλῳ, οὐ μέρει ἄλλο μέρος (V.3[49].6.7-8). On the other hand, later in the same treatise P. accepts the notion that Intellect has parts: “that which is deficient in relation to itself achieves self-sufficiency by being a whole, with an adequacy deriving from all its parts (ικανὸν ἐξ ἀπάντων γενόμενον)” (V.3[49].13.19-21). These emphatic rejections of Intellect having parts do not challenge the present passage, because P. is careful to spell out that there are no unintellectual parts of the intelligible universe. He even employs the Megarian sorites or heap argument (the only instance in the *Enneads*) to his own advantage in arguing that Intellect does not suddenly become Intellect when one has added enough pieces to the pile (σωρός; cf. σύνθεσις in line 48).

A. Smith (1981) 104 adroitly points out that “the basic problem here lies in the creation of hierarchies *within* the hypostases. Plotinus sometimes seems to do this but strives against it. He is also less guarded than Proclus in claiming that ‘each is all’. Whilst Plotinus can say *homou panta kai hekaston panta*, Proclus vigorously denies that *hekaston esti panta* (*In Parm.* 751f.)” author’s italics. P.’ aversion to articulating hierarchical divisions within the intelligible world preserves the unity of Intellect at the cost of some clarity. It seems to me that the overriding impetus for the abruptness with which he asserts this position and its lack of scholastic precision is his own noetic experience.

Though the problem is not visible in the present passage, the relation of whole and parts often involves the introduction of potentiality into the intelligible world, yielding, in Smith's formulation, these two points: (i) the whole possesses the parts potentially; (ii) each part possesses the whole potentially (1981) 100-02. The distinction between whole and parts can be applied, for example, to the difference between generic and specific knowledge: *πάσα* [sc. *ἐπιστήμη*] *μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν μέρει δύναμις πάντων, ἕκαστον δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκείνο, καὶ δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθόλου ὡσαύτως* ("for every body of knowledge is none of its partial contents but the potentiality of all of them, but each part is actually that part which it is, and potentially all of them, and the same is true of universal knowledge": VI.2[43].20.4-7); or, in the same chapter, to the distinction between universal Intellect and individual intellects in lines 10-16; or again in terms of genus/species at lines 24-27. In its claim that Intellect is all things and a whole comprising parts the present passage ignores these subtler distinctions; cf. also VI.7[38].17.26-34 and comm. *ad loc.* For an illuminating discussion of VI.2[43].20, with consideration of P.' criticism of Aristotle, see Wurm 233-36.

8.46-48 διὸ . . . μορίων. If P. appeared to be pessimistic in lines 35-36, this is not the case here. Prominent now is the infinite power and productivity of Intellect, a perspective often found in the *Enneads*, especially in VI.4-5[22-23] and V.8[31], the third treatise of the so-called *Großschrift*. A passage from the latter is very close to the present one: *οὐδὲ μέρη ἄλλα ἔχων ἄλλοις ἢ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ ἕκαστον οἷον δύναμις κερματισθεῖσα καὶ τοσαύτη οὖσα, ὅσα τὰ μέρη μετρούμενα. τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ δύναμις πᾶσα, εἰς ἄπειρον μὲν ἰοῦσα, εἰς ἄπειρον δὲ δυναμένη· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐκείνος μέγας, ὡς καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄπειρα γεγονέναι* ("nor does each [intelligible] god have parts different from himself belonging to other gods than himself, nor is each whole like a power cut up which is as large as the measure of its parts. But this, the [intelligible] All, is universal power, extending to infinity and powerful to infinity; and that god is so great that his parts have become infinite": V.8[31].9.22-27). Also to be noted here is the extremely positive view that even the procession of soul from Intellect does not constitute a diminution. This must be a reference to the World-Soul which always remains close to the intelligible universe: cf. II.9[33].2.4ff. and 4.1-10.

Intellect's infinite power to generate is inextricably linked with the presence in it of *τὸ ἄπειρον*, an essential aspect of the intelligible world: *καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον οὕτως ἐν νῷ, ὅτι ἐν ὧς ἐν πολλά, οὐχ ὧς ὄγκος εἷς, ἀλλ' ὧς λόγος πολὺς ἐν αὐτῷ* (VI.7[38].14.11-12). *τὸ ἄπειρον* also appears in the form of intelligible matter, for which see Ch. 11.3-4 below and comm. *ad loc.*

9.1-4 οὐτως . . . ἔν. Despite its infinite power Intellect is not the primary reality. The discussion continues its ascent up the hierarchy of being. Quotation of the Platonic tag ἐπέκειννα (*Rep.* 509b9) anticipates lines 11ff.

For the moment P. wishes to fill out his picture of the intelligible world, first with a reference to intelligible number, a topic he devotes considerable attention to in VI.6[34]. In the earlier accounts of the generation of Intellect from the One at V.4[7].2.4ff. and V.1[10].5.8ff., Intellect and number (= τὰ ὄντα) are produced by the action of the One on the Indefinite Dyad. In his commentary on the latter passage, Atkinson 110-11 correctly points out that the part of this traditional Platonic-Pythagorean numerical theory which derives the numbers from the One and Dyad ceases to play much of a role in the later treatises (he also has a valuable discussion, on 109, of the influence on P. of the Platonic doctrine of ideal numbers). But the articulation of intelligible being by number and the use of number to define the structure of Intellect continue to play an important role in P.' noetic theory. See VI.6[34].9.22-37, especially 27-31: ἡ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἢ ἡ ἐνέργεια ὁ ἀριθμὸς ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ζῶον αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀριθμὸς. ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μὲν ὄν ἀριθμὸς ἠνωμένος, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ἐξεληλιγμένος ἀριθμὸς, νοῦς δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινούμενος, τὸ δὲ ζῶον ἀριθμὸς περιέχων; This numerical theory provides with P. an alternative vocabulary to describe the ontological derivation and dependence of the intelligible world. Thus, as multiplicity number is posterior to unity in lines 3-4: cf. V.1[10].5.6: ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς οὐ πρῶτος.

In line 4 Kirchhoff's ὄντως for the MSS οὕτως has been accepted by all modern editors. The phrase τὸ ὄντως ἔν refers to the principle of intelligible number as well as of τὰ ὄντα and νοῦς, which in the present context most likely means the One (cf. line 2). However, later in this large treatise, a one posterior to the One itself is prior to and generates number: ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς μένοντος μὲν τοῦ ἔν, ποιούντος δὲ ἄλλου, ὁ ἀριθμὸς γίνεται κατ' αὐτό (V.5[32].5.2-4). But we need not impose this distinction on the present abbreviated passage, for in this same treatise P. refers to the One with similar phrases: ἀληθῶς ἔν and τὸ καθαρῶς ἔν καὶ ὄντως (V.5[32].4.1-7).

9.5-11 καὶ οὐτως . . . τῷ νῷ. This brief statement of the unity of subject (νοῦς) and object (νοητόν) in the intelligible world, like so many passages in the *Enneads*, offers no argument: cp. V.4[7].2.43-44 νοῦς δὴ καὶ ὄν ταυτόν. While P. certainly does not always abjure arguments in defence of the transcendental unity to be found on the intelligible level, these frequent assertions of what he assumes is self-evident often issue from an impatience with any doubt as to the self-authenticating reality of Intellect, as in this uncompromising pronouncement: καὶ γὰρ αὖ οὕτως οὐδ' ἀποδείξεως δεῖ οὐδὲ πίστεως, ὅτι οὕτως—αὐτὸς [sc. νοῦς] γὰρ οὕτως καὶ ἐναργῆς αὐτὸς αὐτῷ . . . καὶ οὐδεὶς πιστότερος αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτοῦ—καὶ ὅτι ἐκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ὄντως. ὥστε

καὶ ἡ ὄντως ἀλήθεια οὐ συμφωνοῦσα ἄλλω ἀλλ' ἑαυτῇ, καὶ οὐδὲν παρ' αὐτὴν ἄλλο λέγει, (ἀλλ' ὃ λέγει), καὶ ἔστι, καὶ ὅ ἐστι, τοῦτο καὶ λέγει. τίς ἂν οὖν ἐλέγξει; ("And then again, it will need no proof and no confirmation that it is so, for it is so, and is manifest to itself . . . and nobody can confirm this about it better than itself—and it knows clearly that all this is there in the intelligible world, and really there. So that the real truth is also there, which does not agree with something else, but with itself, and says nothing other than itself, but it is what it says and it says what it is. Who then could contradict it?": V.5[32].2.13-15, 17-21). The attitude exhibited here—one that is unlikely to endear P. to contemporary philosophers—is only one of the ways in which P. approaches philosophical problems, but it should be recognized for what it is: an emphasis on the incommensurability of intelligible reality with anything ontologically inferior to it.

On the other hand, there are occasions when P. does argue for the identity and unity of subject and object, albeit within the parameters of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics and epistemology, as e.g. at V.3[49].5.21-48: δεῖ τὴν θεωρίαν ταῦτόν εἶναι τῷ θεωρητῷ, καὶ τὸν νοῦν ταῦτόν εἶναι τῷ νοητῷ [Aristotle *Met.* Λ 7.1072b21-22]· καὶ γάρ, εἰ μὴ ταυτόν, οὐκ ἀλήθεια ἔσται· τύπον γὰρ ἔξει ὁ ἔχων τὰ ὄντα ἕτερον τῶν ὄντων, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια (21-25); ἐν ἅρα οὕτω νοῦς καὶ τὸ νοητόν καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ πρῶτον ὄν τοῦτο καὶ δὴ καὶ πρῶτος νοῦς τὰ ὄντα ἔχων, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τοῖς οὖσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ νοητόν ἓν, πῶς διὰ τοῦτο τὸ νοοῦν νοήσει ἑαυτό; ἡ μὲν γὰρ νόησις οἷον περιέξει τὸ νοητόν, ἡ ταῦτόν τῷ νοητῷ ἔσται, οὐπω δὲ ὁ νοῦς δῆλος ἑαυτὸν νοῶν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ νόησις καὶ τὸ νοητόν ταυτόν—ἐνέργεια γάρ τις τὸ νοητόν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ δύναμις (lines 26-33); οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος δυνάμει οὐδ' ἕτερος μὲν αὐτός, ἡ δὲ νόησις ἄλλο· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πάλιν τὸ οὐσιώδες αὐτοῦ δυνάμει. εἰ οὖν ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια, ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἂν εἴη· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ νοητόν· ἐν ἅμα πάντα ἔσται, νοῦς, νόησις, τὸ νοητόν (lines 39-44). I quote at length from this passage not only because it illuminates the unity of subject and object only adumbrated in the present passage (and never fully articulated in the passages discussed in this commentary which focus on the relation of the One and Intellect), but also because in it P. specifies why, on his view, this unity is necessary. (As the quotation from *Met.* Λ indicates, P.' noetic theory is heavily indebted to Aristotle's conception of the divine Intellect, a topic that is well discussed by Szlezák 126-29).

First, true intellection requires the identity of subject and object to overcome the ineluctable duality and imprecision of sensation, imagination, and discursive reasoning: the impressions of objects received and processed in the activities of αἴσθησις and διάνοια are inadequate to convey true reality, subject as they always are to ontological difference and epistemological separation. Second, identity or unity is necessary if true thought is to be self-intellection. Third,

complete intellectual actuality, without any admixture of potentiality or epistemological distance, requires this unity. The arguments stated in this important text, therefore, must be assumed in the many passages, as in the present case, where P. simply notes essential aspects of the intelligible universe. We must remember, however, that in the intelligible world “sameness” co-exists with “otherness”: “For one must always understand Intellect as otherness and sameness if it is going to think. For [otherwise] it will not distinguish itself from the intelligible by its relation of otherness to itself, and will not contemplate all things if no otherness has occurred to make all things exist” (VI.7[38].39.4-9). Both of these aspects of Intellect’s internal structure—sameness and otherness—must be kept in view if we are to have a firm grasp of P.’ noetic theory. Certainly, P. thinks that the positions stated in these apparently disparate texts are compatible with one another, so it is necessary to balance any statement of one with the other.

P. uses the metaphorical συζευγνύναι to express the close bond between intelligible subject and object elsewhere at V.7[18].3.11 and V.5[32].1.23-24. Remarkably, however, he denies this in one place, asserting that τὸ συνεζευχθῆναι means that αἱ νοήσεις τύποι ἔσονται (V.5[32].1.24-25); another example of how random quotation of texts can lead to misleading conclusions.

9.11-12 εἰ οὐν . . . εἴη. The denial that the One can be a νοητόν has no bearing, in my view, on the description of the One as such in V.4[7].2.4-7. The respective contexts are quite different: in the earlier treatise the generation of Intellect through procession and reversion, here the internal structure of actualized Intellect.

9.12-16 ἐξ οὗ . . . σεμνόν. The assertion that the One does not think is quite common: cf. V.6[24].5.2-7, VI.7[38].41 *passim*, and V.3[49].13 *passim*. In the present context the dictum is especially relevant because the entire treatise is devoted to an exploration of the universality of θεωρία, which on the intelligible level is synonymous with νόησις. But what is most interesting is the way P. addresses the problem. In line 14 he stipulates that the One will be either intelligent or unintelligent, i.e. it will either possess or lack intellection. In the former case, he concludes we must be talking about Intellect; but defining the One as unintelligent is also unacceptable, for thereby we predicate ignorance of it. If it is unintelligent, what is σεμνόν about it, he asks in line 16, repeating the question Aristotle asks with respect to his supreme reality, the divine Intellect: εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη ὁ καθεύδων, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν (*Met.* Λ 9.1074b17). This is an interesting use of Aristotle, because, on the one hand, P. does not want to attribute intellection to the One and he is quite critical of Aristotle for making Intellect the primary reality; but, on the other

hand, he recoils from the thought that the One is unintelligent or unconscious (an echo of Aristotle's ὁ καθεύδων). Hence, P. is using Aristotle for his own purpose, which is to establish that the One *is* σεμνόν, but also not Intellect. Cf. V.5[32].2.13 and V.3[49].13.2-3 where Intellect is said to be σεμνόν. A similar reticence about carrying negations about the One too far is expressed at V.3[49].13.6-8. Ascribing lack of self-consciousness (ἀναίσθητον ἑαυτοῦ) and self-intellection (οὐδὲ οἶδεν αὐτό) to the One, he implies, is a necessary procedure, but negations too fall short of the One's reality. Rist's comment on this passage is most apt: "What this appears to mean is that one must not jump from the view that the One has no συναίσθησις of itself to the conclusion that it must therefore be ἀναίσθητον" (1967) 41.

9.16-19 οὐδὲ γὰρ . . . λέγομεν. The claim that any name or predicate attributed to the One is inadequate to convey its reality is the foundation of P.' negative theology. The way he defines the practice of negation tells us a great deal not only about his ontology (i.e. that the One is beyond being and Intellect) but also about his epistemology and his strictures concerning the limitations of language. Some parallel passages reveal more precisely than the present text what is the locus of negation: "It is, therefore, truly ineffable: for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a 'something'. But 'beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect' is the only one of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is not its name (ὄνομα), but says that it is not one of all things and has no name, because we can say nothing of it: we can only try, as far as possible, to make signs (σημαίνειν) to ourselves about it" (V.3[49].13.1-6); "we have it in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak about it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it" (V.3[49].14.5-8); "for to say that it is the cause is not to predicate something incidental of it but of us, because we have something from it while that One is in itself: but one who speaks precisely should not say 'that' or 'is'; but we run round it outside, in a way, and want to explain our own experiences of it (τὰ αὐτῶν ἐρμηνεύειν ἐθέλειν πάθη), sometimes near it and sometimes falling away in our perplexities about it" (VI.9[9].3.49-54). These passages, in conjunction with the present one, imply several propositions which underlie P.' negative theology. (i) All statements about the One, even "Good," are inadequate because they entail positing the One as an object, a "something" (τί). From this principle derives P.' criticism of using substance-language, especially Aristotelian, with respect to the One. (ii) Predications of the One are ultimately self-referential in that the names we give it are signs to ourselves which function as hermeneutic devices to articulate our own experiences of the One's presence in us, usually in terms of realities ontologically inferior to it. (iii) Rigorously applied, negation has as its primary purpose to determine what the One is not; we cannot say what the One is in itself.

In the present context these methodological strictures function as a sort of preface to the ensuing exploration of a higher mode of cognition or consciousness which can approach the One in itself.

9.19-22 καὶ γὰρ . . . ἐπιβολῇ ἀθρόα. In the effort to specify a mode of apprehension that is both beyond intellection and capable of attaining the One P. employs the unusual word ἐπιβολή, a term that has a rather undistinguished ancestry for a Platonist. It is used philosophically only by Epicurus and his followers: “Thus Epicurus, in the *Kanon*, says that sensations, preconceptions and feelings are the criteria of truth. The Epicureans add the ‘focusings of thought (ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας) into an impression’” (Long-Sedley 17A = *DL* X.31). In Rist’s judgment “ἐπιβολή then is a comprehensive (ἀθρόας, *DL* 10.35) view of the data provided by the senses or the mind . . . In addition to its ‘comprehensiveness’ we should notice that an ἐπιβολή can be not a grasping of new external data but a casting back of the mind on itself and whatever impressions it has” (1967) 50. In their discussion of the mental activity designated by ἐπιβολή, Long-Sedley I.77-78, 90 suggest that it is a process of visualization or mental assessment of empirical data which is intended to provide direct apprehension of external reality.

Now P. may have appropriated this Epicurean term for his own use, as Rist argues, but it seems to me more likely that P. uses the word simply because of the root meaning of ἐπιβάλλειν: “to fall or cast upon.” Coming into contact with the One is what P. has in mind here rather than “a casting back of the mind on *itself*.” In ἐπιβολή, then, we probably have a non-technical term chosen for its non-noetic connotations. We can see P.’s penchant for avoiding noetic terminology in an account of Intellect’s apprehension of the One: “if you want to grasp (λαβεῖν) the ‘isolated and alone’, you will not think” (V.3[49].13.32-33). Clearly, the literal meaning of “grasping” is what appeals to him in the attempt to describe mystical apprehension, and the same strategy may be at work in the case of ἐπιβολή. But it is useful to consult other Plotinian uses of this term and its cognates.

Theiler *ad loc.* and Cilento (1971) 148 cite IV.4[28].1.20 as a parallel to the present passage. There the soul on the noetic level apprehends the intelligible objects in a unified intuition: “What then prevents the soul too from having a unified intuition of all its objects in one (ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἀθρόαν ἀθρόων)?” This is certainly a valuable parallel, but there are many others which provide much greater insight into the sort of hyper-noetic apprehension P. alludes to with ἐπιβολή. Foremost among them is the important passage in which P. distinguishes two types of intellectual activity: “Intellect, then, has one power for thinking (τὸ νοεῖν), by which it looks at the things in itself, and one by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception (ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ)” (VI.7[38].35.19-22); see comm. *ad loc.* The

association of ἐπιβολή with the notion of “receiving” casts a different light on its possible meanings. Its root meaning of “casting upon” may be tempered somewhat in mystical apprehension when Intellect’s ability to focus or concentrate slips away. Or perhaps P. is trying to capture the paradoxical character of Intellect’s mystical awareness of what transcends it, stressing both Intellect’s supreme effort to move beyond itself and to receive what streams from the One. The former sense is strongly suggested by a passage later in the present treatise, Ch. 10.32-35: by “throwing (βαλὼν) yourself upon it” one “knows it by intuition (τῇ προσβολῇ συνείς).” Two points are significant here: the root meaning of “throwing” or “casting upon” is quite prominent in P.’ deployment of this figurative language, and, secondly, προσβολή is clearly synonymous with ἐπιβολή, confirming that the latter is hardly a technical term. The former term is also employed for the purpose of characterizing hyper-noetic apprehension of the One. Intellect is likened to “the eye [which] sees it [sc. the medium of light which represents the presence of the Good] by an instantaneous immediate perception (ἀθρόα προσβολῇ)” (V.5[32].7.8); see comm. *ad loc.*

The final passage I would like to consider adds significantly to our understanding of ἐπιβολή, for it attributes this awareness to the Good itself: “Now nothing else is present to it, but it will have a simple concentration of attention on itself (ἀπλῇ τις ἐπιβολὴ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔσται). But since there is no distance or difference in regards to itself, what could its attention be other than itself” (VI.7[38].39.1-4). In this case, ἐπιβολή is a mode of apprehension, or an activity, from which difference is absent, which it is valid to assume is also characteristic of Intellect’s awareness of the One in the other passages. What emerges from this review of P.’ use of ἐπιβολή is the term’s flexibility: it serves to describe the heightened awareness of both the soul and Intellect, which, in some way, is very close, if not identical to, the One’s self-directed activity. Note the similarly broad use of the term συναίσθησις; see comm. on V.4[7].2.18.

The later Neoplatonists continue to employ ἐπιβολή to define Intellect’s mystical apprehension of the One. Cf. Proclus *In Parm.* 1125.20: τὴν ἀθρόαν ἐπιβολὴν τοῦ νοῦ; Damascius *Dub. et Sol.* I.43.22: αὕτη [γνώσις] ἐφάπεται τοῦ ἐνὸς κατὰ ἐπιβολήν. For a compendium of later Neoplatonic usage cf. Proclus *In Parm.* VII.92 and the note on 56.27 by Klíbanky-Labowsky.

9.22-24 πρὸς . . . αὐτοῦ. The close affinity between the One’s and Intellect’s ἐπιβολή is strengthened by this reference to the doctrine of “likeness” and the subsequent discussion of the One’s omnipresence. The traditional source for the soul’s likeness to the One is the Platonic formula ὁμοίωσις θεῷ (*Tht.* 176b1). In VI.9[9].4.24-28 P. links the notions of likeness, omnipresence, mystical apprehension, and the soul’s innate ability to actualize its essential unity with the One: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄπεστιν οὐδενὸς ἐκεῖνο [sc. τὸ ἐν] καὶ πάντων δέ,

ὥστε παρὼν μὴ παρεῖναι ἀλλ' ἢ τοῖς δέχεσθαι δυναμένοις καὶ παρεσκευασμένοις, ὥστε ἐναρμόσαι καὶ οἶον ἐφάψασθαι καὶ θιγεῖν ὁμοιότητι καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Analogous to “grasping” and “touching” in this text is ἐπιβολή in lines 20-21. Note also the parallel between the notion of “receiving” (δέχεσθαι) here and the association of ἐπιβολή with “reception” (παραδοχή) in VI.7[38].35.21-22, as well as τὸ δυνάμενον ἔχειν ἔχεις ἐκείθεν (lines 25-26 below). When the soul attains the hyper-ontic state, it sees itself as a likeness of the One: εἴ τις οὖν τοῦτο αὐτὸν γενόμενον ἴδοι, ἔχει ὁμοίωμα ἐκείνου αὐτόν (VI.9[9].11.43-44). For the claim that “being made like” carries one beyond Intellect and intellection cf. VI.7[38].35.44-45 and comm. *ad loc.*

P. varies his expressions of the omnipresence doctrine: here he says that “something of the One is in us”; but often he reverses the perspective and asserts that everything is in the One: lower realities are “in their principle (ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ)” (V.2[11].2.13; similarly at V.5[32].9.33: ἐν αὐτῷ), a view that justifies the claim that “all things are the One and not the One” (V.2[11].2.24-25). These brief statements of the doctrine are based on the principle that all of reality is a continuum (Atkinson 213-14 offers illuminating remarks on this theory), extending from the lowest to the highest, and that as one ascends, one finds lower realities within the higher: “The last and lowest things, therefore, are in the last of those before them, and these are in those prior to them, and one thing is in another up to the First, which is the Principle” (V.5[32].9.5-7). The One, therefore, is said to “encompass all things” (V.5[32].9.9-10).

P. also endeavors to express the omnipresence doctrine by playing with the notions of “nowhere” and “everywhere.” In the present passage he says “there is nowhere where it is not”; in a similar vein “if it possesses and is not itself possessed, there is nothing in which it is not (οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν)” (V.5[32].9.11-12). This closely parallel chapter echoes the association of participation in the One and the omnipresence doctrine in the present passage with the statement that if the One were not everywhere, “what comes next would be without a share of it (τὰ ἐφεξῆς ἄμοιρα αὐτοῦ)” (V.5[32].9.16). As might be expected, P. more often uses Platonic participation to define the relationship between the sensible or psychic and the intelligible, but he is not averse to saying, as he does here, that we participate in the One: cf. also VI.9[9].2.23-24, 9.48; VI.5[23].4.20; VI.8[39].17.20, 21.21; V.3[49].15.27, 17.9; I.7[54].1.10. Platonic paradigmism plays an important role in defining the relation between the Good and Intellect later in this treatise at Ch. 11.16-30.

9.24-26 τῷ γὰρ . . . ἐκείθεν. Uncertainties about the text have attracted several emendations and interpretations. In the disputed part of the sentence the MSS read τὸ γὰρ πανταχοῦ παραστήσας. Kirchhoff proposed τῷ for τὸ,

and Theiler παρὸν στήσας for παραστήσας. Modern editors have reconstructed the text in variety of ways:

- (a) τῷ γὰρ πανταχοῦ παραστήσας . . . ἐκεῖθεν: Bréhier, Cilento, H-S²
 Bréhier: “et, puisqu’il est partout, il n’est pas d’endroit où nous ne puissions tenir quelque chose de lui, en lui présentant ce qui, en nous, est capable de le recevoir.”
 Cilento: “Di Certo, a Lui che è dappertutto, basta che gli si presenti un qualunque ricettacolo capace di possederlo ed ecco che tu possiedi, di quella fonte.”
- (b) τὸ γὰρ πανταχοῦ παρὸν στήσας . . . ἐκεῖθεν: B-T, Armstrong, H-S³ (H-S² III.320 *Addenda ad Textum*).
 B-T: “Denn gleichviel wo man beim überall Gegenwärtigen das zu seiner Aufnahme Fähigkeit aufstellt, man nimmt es von der Stelle auf.”
 Armstrong: “For, wherever you are, it is from this that you have that which is everywhere present, by setting to it that which can have it.”
- (3) τὸ γὰρ πανταχοῦ παραστήσας . . . ἐκεῖθεν: Cilento (1971) 148, H-S¹
 Cilento: “In effetti tu, presentando ovunque ti piaccia un ricettacolo, ricevi da quel stesso ciò che è dappertutto presente.”

The MSS reading can be maintained on the basis of these considerations. First, Kirchhoff’s τῷ is unnecessary, if we follow the comment *ad loc.* in H-S¹: τὸ γὰρ πανταχοῦ *quod ubique est, accusativus pendens ab* ἔχεις. Second, in support of his emendation, Theiler argues, unconvincingly I think, that his proposed στήσας in line 25 supplies the needed parallel to στήσας in line 28. But it can be objected that the MSS παραστήσας has a parallel in line 29—παραστησάμενοι, a point also made by Cilento. Moreover, τὸ γὰρ πανταχοῦ does not require the participle παρὸν to mean “that which is everywhere.” Cf. VI.8[39].16.1-8 where the Good is twice designated as τὸ πανταχοῦ. In the present case at least, textual conservatism is not required to defend the reading of the MSS, which is quite coherent.

9.26-28 ὥσπερ . . . οὐ πᾶσαν. This remarkable auditory metaphor for describing how the soul can actualize the presence of the One has received little attention. P. often uses the sound of a voice to symbolize metaphysical doctrines. In the cosmic metaphor at III.2[47].17.64-75 the sounds of all voices harmonize in a universal melody. At V.1[10].12.14-20, to dramatize the omnipresence of Intellect to the soul, he counsels the soul to rouse its “power of hearing to catch what, when it comes, is the best of all sounds which can be heard” (16-17), i.e. that of the intelligible world. But the passage which best illustrates how the sound of a voice symbolizes omnipresence is VI.4[22].12. Here the pervasiveness of sound is employed as an image of Intellect’s presence to the soul and also to explain how soul encompasses the body. As in the present

passage, there in lines 1-5 we encounter the notions of setting the ear to the sound as well as the ear receiving the sound. The reason why one can get a sense of the omnipresence of soul is that “the sound was everywhere in the air and not as one sound divided into parts, but as one whole sound everywhere (ἦν δὲ ἡ φωνὴ πανταχοῦ τοῦ ἀέρος οὐ μία μεμερισμένη, ἀλλὰ μία πανταχοῦ ὅλη)” (9-10). Hearing is contrasted favorably with vision for its ability to attend to what is omnipresent: “But with the sound it is clearer that the whole form is in all the air (ἐν παντὶ ἀέρι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐστίν): for everyone would not have heard the same thing if the spoken word had not been in each and every place as a whole, and each hearing had not alike received the whole” (14-18). Now, since in the present passage the sound of the voice symbolizes the presence of the One, P. adds that we can hear the whole voice and again not the whole, thus elaborating the double-ἐνέργεια theory in a novel fashion: the One in its effects must be distinguished from the One in itself. In assessing the import of these passages it is necessary to remember that these are metaphors which symbolize omnipresence; for P. human language and the human voice (λόγοι and φωναί) are incapable of expressing intelligible truths. On one occasion he specifically denies that words or speech are to be found in the intelligible world: cf. IV.3[27].18.13-20; and for an illuminating discussion of the role of language and sound in P.’ theory of representation see Lamberton 87-89.

In a very different manner P. emphasizes the symbolic power of the voice in making the One present. At V.5[32].5.19-28 the utterance of ἔν, ὄν, οὐσία, and εἶναι “intend to signify the real nature of that produced by the birth-pangs of the utterer, imitating, as far as they are able, the generation of real being” (lines 26-28). Like most ancient Greek philosophers, P. often employs ocular metaphors in his analysis of sensation and thought, but in these passages it is evident that auditory metaphors serve him just as well for elaborating his central metaphysical doctrines. I have not been able to find a direct source for this auditory metaphor; Ferwerda 118 cites a Senecan text whose relevance escapes me. It is likely that the metaphor developed by analogy with the role of light as a medium in perception, which provides the foundation for the Platonic and Plotinian metaphysics of light: see V.5[32].7-8 and comm. *ad loc.* The analogy is at work in this fragment of Posidonius: καὶ ὥς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεται τοῦ λόγου: Fr. 85 = Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* VII.93. This fascinating passage escaped the notice of Witt, the most extensive examination of Posidonian influence on Plotinus; though Witt 199, 206 notes the Stoics’ use of light and vision.

This minor theme in Plotinian thought can be compared with the central importance of “hearing” and “hearkening” in Heidegger’s metaphysics: cf. *Being and Time* 206-07, 211-12, 315-16, and 33, where “the λόγος is φωνή.”

9.29-32 τί οὖν . . . νοῦν εἶναι. Scholars have long doubted the soundness of the MSS *κάκεινα* in line 31. Kirchhoff suspected that *κάκει* is the correct reading, the position sustained by Bréhier, Cilento, and H-S¹. Against this reading Dodds (1956) 112 argued that *καί* in line 31 is otiose, with respect to either the preceding or succeeding words. Suspecting also that words explaining *ἀμφίστομον ὄντα* must have fallen out, he suggested P. might have said: *ἀμφίστομον ὄντα (πρὸς τὰ προιόντα) κάκεινα*. In this reconstructed text *ἐκεῖνα* would refer to *τοῖς εἰς ὀπισθεν αὐτοῦ*; Igal (1973) 81 agrees. In H-S² the text receives a dagger. There probably is a lacuna after *ὄντα*, but I doubt that Dodds's solution is the correct one. The supplement *πρὸς τὰ προιόντα* derives from his interpretation of *ἀμφίστομον*, according to which it is a relic of the Numenian double-*νοῦς*, which he thinks exercised a dominating influence in P.' early period: "And in fact *νοῦς*, though no longer 'double' [cf. comm. on V.4[7].2.18], remains for Plotinus *ἀμφίστομος* 'facing both ways'. . . *νοῦς* looks towards the cosmos; but in contemplating the One it looks backwards and retreats from its own nature" (1960a) 21. I argue in the comm. on the earlier passage that even there any influence of the Numenian double-*νοῦς* is to be eschewed. In the present context also, such speculation is highly tendentious, given the quite different doctrinal orientations of the two philosophers. The only evidence Dodds is able to garner for his assertion that Intellect faces towards what has proceeded from it is this ambiguous passage at VI.9[9].3.33-34: *δύναται δὲ ὁρᾶν ὁ νοῦς ἢ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ* (1956) 112. This is the MSS text, which is printed by Bréhier and Harder; but it has been correctly emended by H-S. In H-S¹ *ἢ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ* is simply deleted with the comment *intellectus enim non curat quae post eum*; in H-S² *ἢ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ* is deleted and *πρό* replaces *παρ'*. I agree with Armstrong that this change is necessary, for the ensuing lines speak only of what is prior to or in Intellect; there is no reference to what is posterior to Intellect.

It is also possible that *ἀμφίστομος* is borrowed from the *Chaldaean Oracles* where it and its companion *ἀμφιπρόσωπος* describe the multi-faceted Hecate. Cf. Lewy 93 n111 and 355 n166; Des Places accepts only *ἀμφιπρόσωπος* as an authentic Chaldaean term in his Fr. 189. Proclus ascribes both terms to the soul in its capacity to ascend to the intelligible universe or to descend into the sensible world; cf. *In Tim.* II.130.23, 246.10, 293.23. For P., and even for Proclus, it is quite unlikely that Intellect would be "two-faced" in this way. Even if P. has borrowed *ἀμφίστομος* from the *Chaldaean Oracles*, in using it for his own purposes he would hardly do so with a Numenian agenda.

The other Numenian echo Dodds brings to his exegesis of *ἀμφίστομος* is the phrase *ἐνέργεια ἐν διεξόδῳ* in line 33. The phrase *ἐν διεξόδῳ* does appear in Numenius Fr. 12.16; and at VI.7[38].13.48 *διέξοδος* appears in close proximity to *ἀργεῖ* (50), which is also found in the same Numenian passage. To support his exegesis of *διέξοδος* Dodds might also have referred to IV.8[6].7.17-18: *ἡ*

νοερὰ διέξοδος κατάβασίς ἐστὶν εἰς ἔσχατον τὸ χεῖρον. But there and in line 33, διέξοδος refers to Intellect's processive or outgoing ἐνέργεια, as distinct from its inner, abiding ἐνέργεια. Thus, in all these cases there may well be verbal echoes of the Numenian διέξοδος, but no doctrinal indebtedness. In lines 33-35 διέξοδος pertains to Intellect's procession from the One, a doctrine which finds no place in Numenius' thought. So we are left with the problems of discerning the meaning of ἀμφίστομος and of deciding on the validity of κἀκεῖνα.

The key to solving these two problems, so far as this is possible, is to examine more carefully than has been done the relatively unambiguous parts of the passage. If Intellect is to receive the presence of the One (line 29) and to see the One in a hyper-noetic mode (the implicit meaning of εἰ ἐθέλοι ἐκεῖνο ὁρᾶν: line 32), it must transcend itself, a process which is characterized in three ways: it must (i) "as it were, withdraw backwards" (οἷον εἰς τοῦπίσω ἀναχωρεῖν); (ii) "give itself up, as it were, to what is behind it" (οἷον ἑαυτὸν ἀφέντα τοῖς εἰς ὀπίσθεν αὐτοῦ); and (iii) "not be completely Intellect" (μὴ πάντα νοῦν εἶναι). The third phrase is a less specific synonym of other phrases employed by P. in his effort to articulate a hyper-noetic phase of Intellect: cf. τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῶ (V.5[32].8.22-23; see comm. *ad loc.*); νοῦς ἐρῶν καὶ ἄφρων (VI.7[38].35.24; see comm. *ad loc.*); νοῦς καθαρὸς καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τὸ πρῶτος (VI.9[9].3.26-27); and ὁ ἔνδον νοῦς (V.3[49].14.14-15).

The first two phrases express Intellect's self-transcendence by means of the unusual image of "moving backwards." "Back of" and "behind" Intellect is the One, but we should also define the ontological perspective adumbrated in this image in relation to the statement at Ch. 8.32-33 that Intellect began as a unity but did not remain so. I argue *ad loc.* that this is a description of the potential or inchoate Intellect, which should be distinguished sharply from Intellect's hyper-ontic, mystical apprehension of the One. But in their discussions of the present passage, as well as other passages including those cited at the end of the previous paragraph, Hadot and O'Daly wish to assimilate, or even to identify, these two moments in Intellect's life. The former observes: "On reading this text [III.8[30].9.29-32], we cannot fail to think of the formula that H. Bergson used, more or less summing up his own philosophy: 'Intelligence, reabsorbing itself in its principle, will relive its own formation in reverse'. In this way, thought is born from a sort of loving ecstasy in this type of drunkenness [a reference to VI.7[38].35.19-27], which is produced by nonintellectual contact with the Good from which it emanates" (Hadot [1986] 243). Similarly, O'Daly (1974) 164: "Mystical vision can, therefore, imply the self's procession from the One, as well as being a realization of the self's radical 'coincidence' with the One. More precisely, the 'return' of the self to this 'coincidence'—the so-called mystical ascent—is *identical* with its incipient procession" emphasis added. In the present passage P. is saying that, in the mystical ascent to the One, Intellect is moving

back or returning to the “moment” when it is, or was, ontologically closer to the One, but this does not imply that Intellect’s states of consciousness in the procession and mystical return are identical. They are only similar, it seems to me, in that the pre- or potential Intellect and the hyper-Intellect are both minimally differentiated from unity; but the former is pre-conscious or unconscious, whereas the latter is hyper-conscious. In Plotinian terms the former is “not yet Intellect,” the latter is “no longer Intellect.” Here the adverbial phrases make an enormous difference, even if it is difficult to interpret such qualifications non-temporally. For more extensive discussion of this problem see comm. on VI.7[38].35.19-27 and V.3[49].11.9-12, 15-16.

What, therefore, is the relation between Intellect’s “withdrawing backwards” and its facing in two directions? There are two possibilities, I think, both of which are clearly superior to Dodds’s position. First, ἀμφίστομος might very well refer to Intellect’s awareness of τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ αὐτοῦ (VI.9[9].3.34, cited above), i.e. Intellect’s mystical vision of the One or its self-intellection. Strong support for this view can rely on the fact that to this point in Ch. 9 P. has concentrated his attention on these two types of apprehension. But a case can also be made for a second alternative, according to which the term refers to Intellect facing “away” from the One in the procession (note the return of procession as a topic of discussion in lines 33ff.) and “towards” the One in the mystical ascent. This has the advantage of making the two directions which Intellect faces opposites, in a way. It is not absolutely necessary, of course, that the directions be construed in this manner, but this interpretation is no less likely than the other. In any case, it is difficult to specify the referents of this word with greater precision given P.’ single use of the Chaldaean term.

These considerations, unfortunately, cannot definitely solve the textual problem with κἀκεῖνα, but they do limit the field of possibilities. If something has dropped out, it is probably a reference to τὰ αὐτοῦ, i.e. τὰ ὄντα, as opposed to τοῖς εἰς ὅπισθεν αὐτοῦ. On the other hand, if ἀμφίστομος refers to procession and mystical reversion, then it is possible to conclude that nothing has been lost. On this view, the safest course is to adopt Kirchhoff’s ἐκεῖ, with “there” indicating the ontological moment when Intellect transcends itself. With Armstrong, I prefer this reading, which at least requires no radical surgery. It should also be noted that B-T and Cilento (1971) print ἐκεῖνο in place of the MSS κἀκεῖνα, relying on Theiler’s argument that κἀκεῖνα is a mistake for ἐκεῖνο in line 32, which he deletes. The resulting text is intelligible, but the change makes the transition to the last part of the sentence unduly abrupt.

9.32-39 ἔστι μὲν . . . πάντων. Dodds argues that the phrase ἐνέργεια ἐν διεξόδῳ is Numenian, so too H-S: cf. H-S² III *Fontes Addendi*. This is the relevant passage: τὸν δημιουργικὸν δὲ θεὸν ἡγεμονεῖν δ’ οὐρανοῦ ἰόντα. διὰ δὲ τούτου καὶ ὁ στόλος ἡμῖν ἔστι, κάτω τοῦ νοῦ πεμπομένου ἐν

διεξόδῳ πᾶσι τοῖς κοινωνῆσαι συντεταγμένοις (Fr. 12.14-16). In his brief comment on the parallel, Dodds (1960a) 21 equates Numenius' descent of the demiurgic νοῦς into the realm of the cosmic spheres with P.' purely intellectual travel: "as an ἐνέργεια ἐν διεξόδῳ . . . νοῦς looks towards the cosmos." This interpretation must be rejected, because P. never states that Intellect looks below itself in the hierarchy of being. Hence, P. may very well be quoting the Numenian phrase, but applying it to a very different noetic theory.

The description of Intellect as "primary life" is a recapitulation of the first part of Ch. 8, but here P. differentiates between the inchoate and actualized modes of intellectual life by employing different senses of the word διέξοδος and different tenses of the verbs διεξίεναι and διεξέρχεσθαι. Actualized intellectual life is defined as ἐνέργεια οὖσα ἐν διεξόδῳ τῶν πάντων, which is distinct from the inchoate Intellect's original going-out from the One. The latter phase is pushed back into the past (τῇ διεξεληούσῃ), as an ontological moment that no longer endures. The One, he adds, is not subject to this "passage through all things" since it is the ἀρχὴ διεξόδου κτλ. (38-39). The notion that Intellect traverses the intelligible world is common (cf. V.8[31].3.35, V.3[49].17.24-25) and is an appropriate activity for Intellect which earlier is defined as ἄπειρος (Ch. 8.46) and here as a differentiated whole (πάντα ἀκριβῶς καὶ οὐκ ὀλοσχερῶς ἔχει). If it did not possess everything it would not be a perfect actuality. (Note the provenance of the term ἀδιαφθρότως, which Aristotle uses often in his biological treatises to define the inarticulate development in the new-born of certain animals: *HA* 579a24, *GA* 774b15ff.).

The most remarkable passage illustrating Intellect's journey through itself is surely VI.7[38].13. The entire chapter is worth consulting on this theme, but is too long to quote in its entirety. Prominent there are the same epithets of Intellect, ἐνέργεια and ζώή, but they are elaborated in relation to the notions of intellectual ἐτερότης and κίνησις as well as the doctrine that Intellect is a one-many: "For if it has no change (ἐξαλλαγὴν) in it, and no otherness wakes it to life (μηδέ τις ἐξεγείρει αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἐτερότης), it would not even be an active actuality (ἐνέργεια)" (11-12); "but it must live all things and from all directions and there must be nothing it does not live. It must therefore move to all, or rather have moved to all" (15-16); "But since it is all that is the same and all that is other, there is no one of the others that it leaves out. Its nature therefore is to become other in every way (ἐπὶ πᾶν ἐτεροιοῦσθαι)" (24-25); "It is not then possible for the real beings to exist if Intellect is not actively at work (ἐνεργήσαντος), forever working one thing after another, and, we may say, wandering down every way and wandering in itself (οἷον πλανηθέντος πᾶσαν πλάνην καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ πλανηθέντος) . . . and it is natural for it to wander among substances while the substances run along with its wanderings (πέφυκε δ' ἐν οὐσίαις πλανᾶσθαι συνθεουσῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν ταῖς αὐτοῦ πλάναις). But it is

everywhere itself: so its wandering is an abiding one (μένουσας οὖν ἔχει τὴν πλάνην)” (lines 28-34).

The most stimulating discussion of this and related passages is Armstrong (1971). He argues, justifiably I think, that it is very difficult to interpret passages like this non-durally or to read them as consistent with the many accounts of the intelligible world as an absolutely timeless and perfect realm of unchangeable essences: “it seems to me that he has in these passages irrevocably introduced into his account of the eternal life of Intellect the idea of intellectual travel and exploration, and so of duration and succession. The inner life of Intellect has a history, the history of a mind endlessly exploring the rich and varied life which is itself” 73. Armstrong 71-72 finds the same difficulty with P.’ descriptions of the indefinite life of the inchoate Intellect. He concludes, then, that these accounts “are not fully consistent or coherent, and in particular that he is not always successful in confining his descriptions of it within the limits imposed by the concept of non-dural eternity” 74. But, as he points out earlier, 70, these dynamic accounts of Intellect’s life usually occur in contexts where Intellect’s relation to the One is the major focus and that when the intelligible world is contrasted with the sensible or psychic realms, its changless eternity is emphasized. A highly pertinent example occurs in IV.4[28] where the soul’s discursive reasoning is sharply contrasted with the unified intellection which it seeks: “But each and every thing is present there; so there is no discursive thought (διέξοδος) or transition (μετάβασις) from one to the other. . . . What then prevents the soul too from having a unified intuition (ἐπιβολήν) of all its objects in one? Can it really see them as one thing, all together? Rather, it is as if all its acts of intelligence, with their many objects, were all together. For since its object of contemplation is richly varied, the act of intelligence too is richly varied and multiple, and there are many acts of intelligence, as there are many acts of perception of a face when the eyes and the nose and the other features are all seen at once” (IV.4[28].1.14-16, 19-25; cf. also V.3[49].17.24-25). Most interesting here is the juxtaposition of the denial of διέξοδος in Intellect and the affirmation of intelligible multiplicity and diversity. Discursive consistency certainly is not to be found in P.’ vision of intellectual life, but just as certainly this is not what P. sought. The intuitive, mystical vision which is intellection comprises both the unity of subject and object (sameness) and a primordial duality (otherness), which makes it universally alive and self-contemplative. These accounts derive, it seems to me, from P.’ experiences of the transcendent intelligible world, which often fail the test of logical coherence; but the pervasive use of oxymoron (μένουσας οὖν ἔχει τὴν πλάνην above) and paradox suggest that P. is at least trying to express a reality “boiling with life,” which traditionally had been defined conceptually. For P. the Platonic Forms, and even the Aristotelian νοῦς, are not abstractions but visionary realities, a crucial point that is too often ignored. Parallels in other mystical traditions abound: cf. Wallis (1976) 137-39

for Buddhist examples and Corbin for parallels in Islamic mysticism and metaphysics.

On the problem whether or not Intellect's activity of intelligizing its objects and itself is propositional, I agree with Lloyd (1969-1970) against Sorabji, though I differ with Lloyd as well on crucial points. Lloyd argues that Intellect's non-discursive thought involves no complexity, that it is not directed to propositions, and that it is not self-referential. I agree with Sorabji 152-53 in rejecting Lloyd's first and third claims: the intelligible world is complex, but it is also a transparent unity. The latter point is the basis for my view that Intellect's complexity is quite different than that of discursive rationality. Thus, Intellect's exploration of itself, though paradoxical owing to its self-identity, is not a movement from one proposition to another, as Sorabji claims. In arguing that νόησις is propositional because it is involved with "discovering the definitions of things, in terms of genus and species," Sorabji confuses it with διάνοια. Finally, I differ strongly from Lloyd's view that non-discursive thought is incoherent, though, ultimately, P.' understanding and experience of intellection as a mystical, universal consciousness may strike some as philosophically unintelligible.

9.39-54 οὐ γὰρ . . . πάντων. The concluding section of the chapter prepares the way for the great meditation on the One as δύναμις τῶν πάντων in Ch. 10 by driving home the point, from every possible perspective, that the One is utterly transcendent, simple, non-composite, and ontologically prior to all things.

The doctrine of undiminished giving, dramatically envisioned in the next chapter, requires for P. that the One not be any of the things it generates; cf. also V.2[11].1.1-9; V.3[49].15.37-40. The passage as a whole is a recitation of the central metaphysical doctrines concerning the One/Intellect relation for which there are abundant parallels. On the simplicity of the One see V.4[7].1.5; II.9[33].1.8; VI.2[43].10.20; V.3[49].13.34-35. Especially important for understanding how we are to conceive the One's simplicity without predicating anything of it is the following passage: συστήναι οὖν δεῖ εἰς ἓν ὄντως παντὸς πλήθους ἕξω καὶ ἀπλότητος ἡστινισσοῦν, εἴπερ ὄντως ἀπλοῦν ("There must therefore be a concentration into a real one outside all multiplicity and any ordinary sort of simplicity, if it is to be really simple": V.3[49].16.14-16). On Intellect as many or a multiplicity: V.1[10].5.4; V.3[49].12. On the production of plurality see V.3[49].11 and comm. *ad loc.*

Two points are worth noting here. The assertion in lines 46-47 that the One cannot be an agglomeration of all things is analogous to the argument at Ch. 8.44-45 that Intellect is not a "heap" of discrete parts. The present argument, therefore, builds upon the earlier one to establish that the One is not ὁμοῦ πάντα. Related to this is the point (51-54) that if the One were each thing taken

separately, there would be no distinction (οὐδὲν διακρίνει) in its state of being ὁμοῦ πάντα. This rhetoric about the One, so to speak, is at odds with what P. says elsewhere about differentiation in the intelligible world. In an unusual elaboration of ontological derivation he asks: “But how did it [sc. the One] do so? By possessing them beforehand. But it has been said that in this way it will be a multiplicity. But it had them in such a way as not to be distinct (ὥς μὴ διακεκριμένα): they are distinguished (διεκέκριτο) on the second level, in the rational form” (V.3[49].15.29-32). This peculiar passage (on which see also comm. on V.4[7].2.16) would seem to contradict the present text’s characterization of both the One and Intellect. First, with respect to the One, ὥς μὴ διακεκριμένα should be taken loosely, because, as is evident elsewhere (e.g. in V.4[7].2), P. is apt to endow the One with quasi-predicates in accounts of procession. In the present passage he simply wants to eliminate any possibility of predication and hence he is more rigorous. Second, denying that the One is ὁμοῦ πάντα, a common description of Intellect, leads him to the position that there is no distinction in this “everything,” which is inconsistent with the later account of intelligible differentiation. I think the rhetoric of the moment causes the slip, which in any case is not a serious problem.

10.1-3 τί . . . αἴτιον ζώης. P. introduces the splendid image of the One as an overflowing spring which begins in line 3 with the familiar assertion that the One is the δύναμις τῶν πάντων and αἴτιον. The extensive elaboration of the theme of the One’s δύναμις in relation to the procession of Intellect in this chapter warrants a brief discussion of the term’s provenance and meaning. It is widely agreed among Plotinian scholars that δύναμις, as applied to the One and even to Intellect, should be understood to mean “productive power” and not “potentiality” in the Aristotelian sense: cf. Armstrong *ad loc.*; Wallis (1972) 24, 60 and n2; Dodds (1963) 24. P. clarifies the issue himself: “But in what way is it the potency (δύναμις)? Not in the way in which matter is said to be in potency, because it receives: for matter is passive; but this [material] way of being a potency is at the opposite extreme to making” (V.3[49].15.33-35). The association of δύναμις with τὸ ποιεῖν indicates clearly that the One’s potency or productive power is to be construed with the One’s ἐνέργεια. For this meaning of δύναμις P. is probably indebted to Aristotle too, as I argue in the comm. on V.4[7].2.38, though δύναμις as potentiality is the predominant sense of the term in Aristotle. I will return to this point below.

However, when procession from the One is considered universally, and especially as it leads to the generation of the soul and the sensible world, some critics have tended to interpret the theory in Stoic terms, i.e. that the procession from the One constitutes the production of a potentiality which eventually attains full actuality. That P. expresses a kind of Stoic evolutionary pantheism was maintained long ago by Zeller (1923) III.2.561. Thus Theiler *ad loc.* sees the

One's δύναμις in this passage as influenced by the Stoics; and according to Armstrong (1937) 63 the Stoic πνεῦμα νοερόν καὶ πυρῶδες "involves a concealed admission of Stoic materialism into the system"; see also (1967) 240. Such views understandably come to mind when reading a passage like the following: "If, then, there must not be just one—for then all things would have been hidden, shapeless within that one, and not a single real being would have existed if that one had stayed still in itself" (IV.8[6].6.1-3; cf. also II.9[33].3.7-14). In his early study Armstrong was troubled enough by these passages to observe that "we have here expressed the conception of the evolution from the One to the sense-world as an evolution from potency to act, a passage to a greater fullness and extent of being"; however, he adds, "The One may be the beginning of all things, but it cannot be a spermatic beginning" (Armstrong [1940] 62; cf. also Rist [1967] 74-75). This point is confirmed in the last section of the previous chapter where P. argues strongly that the One is not a composite constructed out of all things. In my view, the One's δύναμις and the doctrine of procession generally is indebted to the Stoic idea of the σπέρμα or σπερματικός λόγος only to the extent that it represents a configuration of a first principle giving rise to lower and ontologically derivative realities, but without any hint of Stoic materialism; for a judicious discussion of this point see Wallis (1972) 68-69. It should be noted, however, that the σπερματικός λόγος provides P. with more explanatory power in his account of the sensible world's relation to the world-soul and Intellect, on which cf. Graeser 41-43.

At the same time it is necessary to be clear about the fact that the One's δύναμις produces the potential Intellect. As is evident in V.4[7].2, V.1[10].7, and V.6[24].5, the indefinite and inchoate Intellect is the direct result of the procession of the One's δύναμις. In other words, the One's productive power is transformed, or dissipates itself, into Intellect's potentiality. But with the latter we are dealing with a very different metaphysical entity, which in many respects is indebted to Aristotle's theory of the potential Intellect in *De Anima* Γ.4-5. (See comm. on V.4[7].2.6-10, V.1[10].7.6, and V.6[24].5.7-10 for discussion of the Aristotelian psychological model applied by P. to the actualization of Intellect's pre-intellectual vision). Now, Aristotle does distinguish the two senses of δύναμις as "power" and "potentiality": the former is mentioned briefly and defined as ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομική (*Met.* Θ 1.1046a26-27; see also 1.1045b35-46a6 and Ross's comm. *ad loc.*). But even though Aristotle does not preserve the distinction consistently and δύναμις as power plays a small role in this thought, as Ross points out, I think it is likely that P.' notion of δύναμις as power can be traced to Aristotle's discussion.

Perhaps more important is Plato's description of the Good: οὐκ οὐσίας τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος (*Rep.* 509b8-10). Also to be noted for its ascription of power to the transcendent world is the following: τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν

οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις (*Soph.* 247e3-4); see Cornford (1935) 234-37 for an illuminating discussion of δύναμις as power in Plato. Closely parallel to this Platonic view is P.' description of the Forms and intelligible numbers as δυνάμεις at VI.2[43].21.7-9. After Plato there is abundant evidence in the Neopythagorean tradition for predicating δύναμις of the first principle or monad, but great care is needed in sorting out the very diverse testimonies. It is doubtful that Nicomachus and Theon of Smyrna, for example, conceived this δύναμις as productive power rather than as potentiality; see Dillon (1977) 357. Hence, we should resist Krämer's attempt to define the One's δύναμις as "pure potentiality" and "pure negativity" and to assimilate it to these Neopythagorean conceptions, (1964) 346-51, or to the even less analogous notion of the ἀρχή as σπέρμα in Speusippus, 351-56. On the other hand, Neopythagoreans like Ps.-Brontinus and Ps.-Archytas continue to maintain the Platonic position and may have influenced P. With regard to the former Syrianus reports (*In Met.* 166.56) Βροτίνος δὲ ὡς νοῦ παντὸς οὐσίας δυνάμει καὶ πρεσβεῖα ὑπερέχει [sc. ἡ ἐνιαία αἰτία]. In a fragment of Ps.-Archytas preserved by Stobaeus the first principle is τὰν πρᾶταν τῇ δυνάμει (*Anth.* I.279.16, 280.14-15). For discussion see Whittaker (1969a) 95-102 and Dillon (1977) 121-22. Note also *Corpus Hermeticum* XI.5 (I.149.4-6 Nock-Festugière): τοῦτο ἐστὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς ἐνεργῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια θεοῦ, δύναμις οὐσα ἀνυπέμβλητος. For other references to the One as δύναμις τῶν πάντων in the *Enneads* see V.4[7].2.36-38; VI.9[9].5.35-38, 6.7-8; V.1[10].7.9-11; VI.8[39].9.45. For the One as αἴτιον cf. V.8[31].9.42; V.5[32].13.35; VI.6[34].14.27; VI.7[38].42.11-13; VI.1[42].9.9.

10.3-14 οὐ γὰρ . . . τῆς πολλῆς. In this dynamic image of procession from the One, P. envisions the ἀρχή as πηγὴ and ρίζα, and what proceeds from the One as rivers, streams, and the life of a plant. He manages to translate many features of his procession-theory into the terms of these images. According to the principle of undiminished giving, (i) the One as spring gives of itself to the rivers but is not exhausted thereby (6-7) and (ii) the One as root gives life to the plant (10). The One remains in itself while producing (7, 11-13). The One "remaining in itself" is taken from *Tim.* 42e5-6, on which see comm. on V.4[7].2.21, 33-34. The overflowing One is a familiar image as well: οἶον ὑπερερρῶν (V.2[11].1.8); Intellect too δύνανται προέχεις πολλήν . . . ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτοῦ πρότερον προέχει (V.2[11].1.14-16). Note also that νοῦς and τὸ ὄν come into being οἶον ἐκχυθὲν καὶ ἐξελιχθὲν (VI.8[39].18.20). P. is careful to ensure that the image of "pouring forth" not be taken literally or materialistically: being and Intellect "are not poured out (ἐκχεομένων) from him with the result that they diminish him: for there is no bulk" (VI.9[9].9.3-4). The use of "rivers" in this account may derive from Numenius' description of matter and the Indefinite Dyad: ποταμὸς γὰρ ἡ ὕλη

ρόωδης καὶ ὀξύρροπος, βάθος καὶ πλάτος καὶ μήκος ἀόριστος καὶ ἀνήνυτος (Fr. 3.11-12)—another example of literary borrowing on the part of P. without strict doctrinal dependence.

The terms *πηγή* and *ρίζα* are widely used by P. to refer to both the One and Intellect. Here, and in many other passages, *πηγή* is a synonym for *ἀρχή* because of P.'s reliance on *Phaedrus* 245c9 which defines the soul as *πηγή καὶ ἀρχή κινήσεως*. (Krämer [1964] 243 and 254 explores the wide diffusion of these terms in Valentinian Gnosticism, but I think it unlikely that P. depends directly on these sources.) The Good is *πηγή καὶ ἀρχή* of Intellect or intelligible reality: I.6[1].9.41; VI.9[9].5.36, 9.1-2, 11.31; VI.7[38].23.21; VI.8[39].14.30-31; Intellect or being as *πηγή* of soul or aspects of the intelligible world itself: II.5[25].3.40; V.8[31].10.13; VI.2[43].6.7; οὐσιώδης ἀριθμός is *πηγή καὶ ρίζα καὶ ἀρχή* of τὰ ὄντα at VI.6[34].9.38-39 and 15.34. We find that *ρίζα* also is used to express ontological derivation on several levels of reality, though primarily with respect to the soul: the One is the *ρίζα* of soul (VI.9[9].9.2); the One as *ρίζα λόγου* gives rational being to the plant which grows from it (VI.8[39].15.33-36; soul as *ρίζα* is the source of the universe as plant (III.1[3].4.5); soul/root is a reality which is separable and prior to body/plant (IV.7[2].8⁵.28; cf. V.2[11].2.14); the nutritive and generative part of the soul is the *ρίζα καὶ ἀρχή* of the appetitive part (III.6[26].4.33).

Two passages are worth considering with somewhat more attention. In the great description of Intellect “boiling with life” it is said that all things “flow, in a way, from a single spring (ἔστι δ' αὐτῶν ἡ οἶον ῥοή ἐκ μιᾶς πηγῆς), not like one particular breath or one warmth, but as if there was one quality which held and kept intact all the qualities in itself” (VI.7[38].12.23-26). By the reference to “breath” and “heat” P. probably wishes to indicate that the One is to be distinguished from Zeno's πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον (*SVF* I.135). The passage emphasizes the unity and power of the One standing behind the unity of the intelligible realities. The second passage may refer to either the One or the intelligible world, but it stipulates clearly the principle's self-abiding: “individual things proceed from this principle while it remains within; they come from it as if from a single root which remains static in itself, but they flower out into a divided multiplicity, each one bearing an image of that higher reality” (III.3[48].7.10-13). The cumulative force of these passages demonstrates (i) that as source or root the One remains in itself as a self-abiding, transcendent reality that is undiminished by what proceeds or derives from it and (ii) that the One as a great power generates lesser realities, but does not function as a spermatic beginning which evolves into a greater reality. These metaphors, therefore, depend for their metaphysical coherence on the double-ἐνέργεια theory.

10.6 πᾶσιν. For πᾶσιν *Mras* 277 reads πᾶσαν. The change is rejected by Bréhier, Cilento, and H-S¹⁺². B-T broke the consensus of modern editors in

accepting the emendation and are now followed by Armstrong and H-S. In support of the change Theiler relies on Mras's reference to Macrobius *In Somnium Scipionis* II.16.23: *fons . . . qui ita principium est aquae, ut cum de se fluvios et lacus procreet, a nullo nasci ipse dicatur*. Since it is the soul which is defined as *fons aquae*, this passage hardly clinches the matter. Now it is certainly possible that a simple copying mistake has occurred here, but the problem is more interpretive than philological. Can P. be saying that the One as a ceaseless spring gives *all* of itself? This seems unlikely to me, even though the logic of the image is rather loose. In support of the MSS reading is the reference in the next line to the source "abiding quietly at rest" and lines 12-13: "So this is what provides all the multiple life to the plant (τὴν πᾶσαν ζωὴν τῷ φυτῷ τὴν πολλήν)." Also, the origin of the plant οὐ σκεδασθείσης περὶ πᾶν (cf. VI.6[34].9.40). Therefore, I think the MSS reading can be retained, with Cilento (1971) 150; I can detect no confusion of thought or incongruity in the logic of the metaphor. But a dogmatic stance is to be resisted since the entire passage is metaphorical. In any case, Ch. 9.28-29, with its reference to receiving "all the voice and yet not all of it" might be construed as supporting either reading.

10.6-10 τοῖς ποταμοῖς . . . τὰ ρεύματα. Since the rivers represent the One's outflowing δύναμις, it is of some interest what P. says about them. He remarks that before they proceed in various directions, the rivers are gathered together (ὁμοῦ συνόντας ἔτι). Generally, συν- compounds signify unity, as in Intellect's mystical apprehension of the Good at lines 33-35 later in this chapter; συνεῖναι is also used in this sense of the soul's mystical union with the One (VI.9[9].3.11, 7.29, 9.45). Intellect's close proximity to the One is defined with the verb at V.1[10].6.52-53: σύνεστιν αὐτῷ. However, the unity in the present passage pertains to the first stage of the procession and hence is an echo of Ch. 8.32: ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἓν. A relatively analogous use of συνεῖναι in such a context, though from the perspective of the generating One, is V.4[7].2.34-36: ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος καὶ συνούσης ἐνεργείας ἡ γεννηθεῖσα ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν λαβοῦσα. The metaphorical aspect of the present passage is evident in the temporal referents (ἔτι, ἤδη) as well as in the reference to "rivers," when strictly speaking there should be an undifferentiated flow. But what strains the applicability of the metaphor to the philosophical accounts of procession is the statement that "each is already aware, in a way, in which direction it will let its streams flow." It strikes me as rather peculiar that the pre-Intellect knows how it will develop into actualized Intellect, or how the latter will generate the soul. Perhaps P. adds the οἶον because the view stated here is untypical.

10.11. Dodds (1956) 112 proposed that <ἀλλ> be inserted before αὐτῆς in line 11, but I agree with Theiler that this is unnecessary.

10.14-19 καὶ θαῦμα οὐδέν . . . οὔσης. The immediacy and freshness P. brings to his speculation on the generation of Intellect is evident here in the admission of “wonder,” the prime motivating factor in all philosophizing for Plato and Aristotle as well (*Tht.* 155d, *Met.* A 2.982b12). P. also registers wonder in line 32 when he begins to describe Intellect’s mystical apprehension of the One.

That the One is ἀπλοῦς and prior to intelligible multiplicity has already been emphasized in Ch. 9.42-44 and that it is not one of all things in the rest of the chapter (4-54). Repeating the point here is a sign that P. wishes to leave no room for interpreting the preceding metaphorical account of procession along the lines of an evolutionary pantheism. He also wants to reject, albeit without argument, objections against the principle of undiminished giving based upon the critical difficulties inherent in the Platonic theory of participation: procession is not a matter of breaking the One up into parts. The One for P. must be τὸ ἀμερές (VI.7[38].18.39, VI.9[9].2.21), for which view he finds support in *Parm.* 138a and *Soph.* 245a. This balances the discussion of intelligible μέρος in Ch. 8.42-45.

The emphatic conviction voiced here that reality (τὸ πᾶν) would be destroyed if plurality were derived by breaking a whole into parts invests the doctrine of procession with an overpowering metaphysical necessity, an assumption articulated later in the *Großschrift*: “But each of necessity must give of its own to something else as well, or the Good will not be the Good, or Intellect Intellect, or the soul this that it is, unless with the primal living some secondary life lives as long as the primal exists. Of necessity, then, all things must exist for ever in ordered dependence upon each other” (II.9[33].3.8-12). Moreover, despite its giving, the ἀρχή must remain different (ἐτέρας οὔσης) from what it produces (cf. V.1[10].6.53: τῇ ἐτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι). Here and elsewhere P. troubles himself not at all with the philosophical difficulties that plague χωρισμός, e.g. the arguments stated by Parmenides at *Parm.* 130bff. Note also the Platonic paradeigmatism that surfaces in Ch. 11.16-24.

10.20-26 διὸ . . . τὸ τίμιον. In line 21 the MSS are divided between τόδε πᾶν and τόδε τὸ πᾶν. Sensing something of an anacolouthon without a δέ to answer μέν in the previous line, Kirchhoff proposed τὸ δὲ πᾶν, adopted by Bréhier; but Cilento correctly argues that this reading would involve P. in a tautology. Harder (1936) 3 prefers τόδε αὖ to pick up ἐφ’ ἐκάστου in the previous line. This emendation is to be resisted because the referents are different: the second is an expansion of the first, from the particular to the totality of sensibles. B-T and H-S¹ read τόδε τὸ πᾶν, while Cilento, H-S², and Armstrong, I think rightly, prefer τόδε πᾶν. Each text offers a distinctive meaning which fits the context: B-T’s “das sinnliche All” neatly contrasts ἐφ’ ἐκάστου, Armstrong’s “this in every case” strengthens the reference to a one

beyond each thing. Although the former is faithful to normal Plotinian usage, I do not think it is appropriate here.

In line 22 Bréhier and B-T adopt Kirchhoff's <ἄν> after ἕως. But as Schwyzer (1951) 517 points out, in many passages in the subjunctive ἄν is often lacking. With H-S, Armstrong, and Cilento (1971) 152 I support the MSS reading: there is no justification for Atticizing P. in this instance.

The phrase ἀναγωγή πανταχοῦ ἐφ' ἓν is almost formulaic in the *Enneads*, unsurprisingly, given the universal imperative of the mystical return to the One: τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ (V.4[7].1.2-3); "We have said, then [in part a reference to the present passage], that the ascent must be made to a one (τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ποιήσασθαι εἰς ἓν), and this means truly one, but not one like all other things which are multiple and one by participation in a one . . . and that the intelligible universe and Intellect are more one than all other things" (V.5[32].4.1-5). P.' use of ἀναγωγή here combines the Platonic-Aristotelian reference to first principles (*Laws* 626d5-6; *Met.* Γ 2.1005a1, E 3.1027b14, K 3.1061a13) with the Platonic ascent (expressed verbally with ἀνάγειν) to the Good or the Forms (*Rep.* 521c2, 533d2).

The present passage serves as a transition to the ascent to the One, but for the moment P. holds in view the notion of a one as the inner nature or constitutive essence of each thing, e.g. the "the ones" of the plant, animal, universe, and soul. Unity is thus a principle of order and even of existence. Cf. VI.9[9].1 *passim*: τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ εἴη, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη; ἐπεὶ περ ἀφαιρεθέντα τοῦ ἓν ὃ λέγεται οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνα ("For what could anything be if it was not one? For if things are deprived of the one which is predicated of them they are not those things": VI.9[9].1.3-4; V.3[49].15.11-15 : "For all that is not one is kept in being by the one, and is what it is by this 'one': for if it had not become one, even though it is composed of many parts, it is not yet what one would call 'itself'. And if it is possible to say of each individual part what it is, one says it because each of them is one and it is it because of this very fact." In these passages this ensemble of unities can be viewed from three perspectives: (i) horizontally, a one is the essence of each individual thing; (ii) vertically, all unities are hierarchically arranged in a universal structure of degrees of reality (cf. Wagner 54, 70); and (iii) each one is such because of the presence of the supreme One. The final perspective yields the remark that the unity in each case is the most powerful and honourable thing about it. All three are most systematically examined in VI.2[43].10-11 where P. establishes several points: (a) each particular unity is not absolutely one because it is one member of a plurality; (b) "one" is predicated of intelligible and sensible things in very different senses; (c) even among sensible things, "ones" comprise different degrees of unity (here P. relies on Stoic formulations; cf. *SVF* III.366-68, Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* VIII.102); (d) among sensibles unity is incidental to existence; (e) all things strive for unity with themselves and with all other

things; and (f) both individually and universally (i.e. with respect to the One) a one is both ἀρχή and τέλος.

The explanatory functions of unity adumbrated in the present passage derive in part from earlier philosophical views. P. certainly agrees with Aristotle that ἐν γάρ τι ἕκαστον (*Met.* H 6.1045b20) and τὸ ἐν λέγεται ὡς περ καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς μία, but at the same time he departs from the view that it is φανερόν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἐν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων (*Met.* Z 16.1040b16-19). For P. Aristotle's πρὸς ἓν unity is ultimately unsatisfactory because of his focus on vertical causation in the hierarchy of being; P. is ever concerned with seeking out the unity behind or immanent in plurality, hence the crucial importance of the presence of the One, manifested imperfectly in the series of derivative unities discussed here. The difference and uniqueness of beings, Aristotle's ontological imperative, is of lesser importance. For the universal significance of unity P. is much more indebted to Hypotheses II-IV of the *Parmenides* and probably to specific aspects of Neopythagorean ontology. From the latter he may draw his concept of τὸ ψυχῆς ἓν, in particular from Moderatus who designates the soul as a "third one," based upon the traditional Middle Platonic interpretation of the Third Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*: cf. Dillon (1977) 348-49.

10.26-32 εἰ δὲ . . . ἔξεις. The precise meaning P. attaches to negation is clouded by a textual dispute in line 28. The MSS read τὸ μηδὲν²; Ficino's deletion of τὸ² is adopted by Bréhier and B-T (cf. VI.9[9].7.1: the One μηδὲν τούτων ἐστίν), whereas Cilento, H-S, and Armstrong follow the MSS. Interestingly, however, Armstrong's "It is certainly none of the things of which it is origin" is the same as B-T's "Gewiß, es ist nichts von dem, dessen Urgrund es ist". What does distinguish the two texts is the critical remark of H-S: τὸ μηδὲν² (praedicatum) *nihilum* mysticorum posteriorum. This interpretation is, I think, anachronistic, for P.' mystical theory lacks the notion of the nothingness of the "divine abyss" or "divine darkness" so common in medieval Christian mysticism. The rhetorical question of the previous sentence—ἀπιστήσομεν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ὑπονοήσομεν;—rules this out: despite the rigorous demands of the negative theology, P. is unwilling to carry it so far that he allows the One to be described as "the nothing of all things." Hence, I think Ficino's instinct is correct, but grammatically unnecessary.

In line 31 a corrector of MS A altered αὐτῶν to ταῦτα. This was accepted by all editors before H-S. Theiler argues that "Das sonst überlieferte αὐτῶν könnte nur ein unlogischer Genet. part. bei πάντα sein." Dodds too is troubled by the genitive, especially since he thinks the MSS αὐτῶν can stand only with <τὰ> αὐτῶν. Thus for αὐτῶν εἶναι he suggests αὐτοεἶναι: "it is like the Absolute Being beyond all things" (1956) 112. The emendation is ingenious and is supported by the οἶον (which governs εἶναι), as if P. is going to say something

daring. P. is fond of αὐτο-compounds as Dodds points out—he cites αὐτοουσία at VI.8[39].12.8—but there is no instance of an αὐτο-verb, so I think the emendation should be rejected. In support of the MSS reading H-S argue that αὐτῶν refers back to τούτων in line 29, i.e. the intelligible predicates of which the One is the source.

In this passage P. confronts directly the objection that if the One is different from all things, it must be nothing. Earlier in the chapter he was concerned with the opposite threat to his ontology: that the One as origin is a potentiality which develops into an actualized whole. Here the systematic ἀναγωγή πανταχοῦ ἐφ’ ἑν culminates in a brief and formulaic invocation of the negative theology. The concern that the One may be nothing is not only an ontological challenge, it is also an inescapable fact of mystical psychology: “What then could the One be, and what nature could it have? There is nothing surprising in its being difficult to say, when it is not even easy to say what Being or Form is: but we do have a knowledge based upon the Forms. But in proportion as the soul goes toward the formless (ἀνείδεον), since it is utterly unable to comprehend it because it is not delimited (ὀρίζεσθαι) and, so to speak, stamped by a richly varied stamp, it slides away and is afraid that it may possess nothing at all (φοβεῖται, μὴ οὐδὲν ἔχῃ)” (VI.9[9].3.1-6). This account complements the present passage in delineating the existential repercussions of a rigorous application of the negative theology. When the soul carries out the demand not to predicate being, substance and life of the One, it proceeds into formlessness. (For the One as ἀνείδεον cf. also VI.9[9].3.43-44; V.5[32].6.4-5; and VI.7[38].28.28, 32.9; the One as not being: οὐδὲ ὄν VI.9[9].3.38, μὴ ὄν VI.9[9].5.30). The statement that the soul “is not delimited” means that it now transcends intelligible ὅρος, an indication that the mystical trajectory of the soul involves a reversal of the inchoate Intellect’s reversion to the One whereby it is limited by the One (ὀριζομένη: V.4[7].2.6-7).

In the present passage P. briefly alludes to this theme in the formula ἀφελῶν τὸ εἶναι. This and synonymous phrases recur with great frequency in the *Enneads*: ταῦτα πάντα ἀφεῖναι δεῖ (I.6[1].8.24-25); ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ (VI.9[9].9.51-52); πάντα ἄρα ἀφελῶν καὶ οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπὼν (V.5[32].13.11); πάντα ἤδη ἀφίησιν (VI.7[38].35.7); ἀποτιθεμένοις δὴ πάντα (VI.8[39].8.9-10); τὸ “ἔστιν” ἀφαιροῦμεν . . . τό τε γὰρ “εἶναι” ἀφηροῦμεν (VI.8[39].8.14, 19-20); πῶς φθεγξόμεθα τοῦτο [sc. τὸ συνέβη περὶ τοῦ ἐνός], ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν ἀφαιρέσει πάντα τὰ περὶ τούτου λεγόμενα (VI.8[39].11.34-35); τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἀφέντες (VI.8[39].15.22-23); ἀλλ’ ὅταν αὐτὸν εἴπῃς ἢ ἐννοηθῇς, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἄφες. ἀφελῶν πάντα, καταλιπὼν δὲ μόνον αὐτόν, μὴ τί προσθῇς ζήτει, ἀλλὰ μή τί πω οὐκ ἀφήρηκας ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ (VI.8[39].21.25-28); ἄφελε πάντα (V.3[49].17.38). This epistemological and ontological procedure of abstraction or subtraction deepens the moral and psychological κάθαρσις.

The provenance and meaning of ἀφαίρεσις and ἀπόθεσις, as well as the terms denoting addition (προσθήκη, πρόσθεσις, and σύνθεσις) have been exhaustively discussed in the literature. (On προσθήκη see comm. on Ch. 11.12.) The relevant points are as follows. Aristotle appears to be the first to define ἀφαίρεσις to mean “abstraction” or “subtraction” as distinct from “negation” (ἀπόφασις); cf. Whittaker (1969b) 122; Mortley (1982) 434-35, 437. The terminology for addition is widely used in Pythagorean and Neopythagorean accounts of the generation of reality from the point to line, plane, and solid; cf. Whittaker (1969b) 114. The corresponding terminology for subtraction is employed by Middle Platonists and Neopythagoreans in their mathematical illustrations of the *via negationis*; cf. Whittaker (1969b) 112-18; Krämer (1964) 106-07, 115-19; Dillon (1977) 284-85. (It should be noted that Krämer argues for, and Whittaker correctly against, direct transmission of the theory of negation from the Old Academy to Middle Platonists like Albinus without Neopythagorean mediation.) Finally, though the use of ἀφαίρεσις by P. and others to define terminologically the negative theology is undisputed, there is controversy whether the term’s basic meaning of “subtraction” is synonymous with negation. Whittaker (1969b) 118-25 argues against Wolfson that “what Plotinus had in mind . . . was not negation [ἀπόφασις] but a mental process of abstraction” 123, though he hedges a bit in admitting that in some passages his use of ἀφαίρεσις “is not far removed therefrom” 124.

Mortley’s discussion builds upon Whittaker’s, but widens, too far I think, the difference between subtraction and negation: “The value of the notion of abstraction is that it is at once positive and negative—it is more an act of refinement or purification of a concept than an act of negation . . . Abstraction also implies the belief in continuity between the One and the lower results of emanation . . . The sheer negative would have emphasised the alien character of reality” (1975) 376. These remarks are generally accurate, but his conclusion does some violence to P.’s conception of negative theology: “Hence one may infer that for Plotinus negative theology is not radically ‘apophatic’: it is clear that where negation in its strict sense is employed in the theological process, there can be no thought, and no progress. Negative theology becomes the stalemate of rational procedures, and this is not Plotinus’ intention; he presents us with a method which is still moderate in character, and which is designed to be critical but productive” 376-77. Certainly, the negative theology is intended to be productive and not nihilistic, but it is P.’s conviction, it seems to me, that the negative theology can be efficacious in conveying the soul to mystical union with the One only if it carries the soul beyond not only discursive reason but also perfect intellection, which in itself is a type of mystical cognition. Stripping away being and thought is not, on P.’s view, a moderate procedure. Whittaker is probably correct that ἀφαίρεσις strictly speaking means “subtraction” and not “negation,” but I take this distinction to mean simply that P. does not apply

negative predications to the One itself. On the other hand, the removal of positive predications from one's understanding of the One represents the negation of those concepts in one's mind. Thus, negation is truly a radical procedure, whose epistemological and existential implications are incisively discussed by Armstrong (1975b) and (1977).

It should be noted that the denial of being to the One, though expressed in the mathematical terminology of subtraction, also owes a great deal to Plato's *Parmenides* 141e9-11 which for P. and other Platonists complements perfectly *Rep.* 509b9. See Charrue's 75-76 repertoire of passages and remarks concerning the influence of this passage from the *Parmenides* in the *Enneads*.

10.32-35 καὶ βαλὼν . . . οὖσιν. In line 33 the MSS ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ should probably be emended. Whether we take the phrase with ἀναπαυσάμενος or with τυχὼν, to Dodds (1956) 113 it "seems a strangely vague expression, particularly when we remember that the One has no attributes. I feel fairly confident that an uncial sigma has been mistaken for an iota, and that we should read ἐντὸς σαντοῦ." He quotes VI.9[9].11.38 where the soul enters into itself and argues further that the συν-compounds in the present passage highlight the interiority of mystical cognition. Theiler correctly objects that σαντοῦ does not go very well with ἀναπαυσάμενος, a trenchant criticism, because during the mystical ascent the soul is highly agitated and attains rest only in contact with the One, not when it enters into itself. The soul cannot be its own source of tranquility.

Bréhier, Cilento, B-T, and H-S¹ retain the MSS text. In defence of ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ, which seems to refer to attributes of the One, Theiler cites V.8[31].10.10: εἰς Αὐτὸν πάντες βλέπουσι καὶ εἰς τὸ Αὐτοῦ. This parallel certainly offers some support for the received text by reminding us that P. is quite capable of employing unusual expressions, but it can be objected that the parallel is not close enough, because looking towards the One usually implies that its simplicity is still obscured by the soul's pluralizing vision. Coming to rest within the One suggests a closer relation between the One and Intellect or soul, i.e. contact or identity. On these grounds I find attractive the emendation ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ proposed in H-S² and adopted by Armstrong. However, the MSS reading may well be correct, for it may mean nothing more than "find rest in the territory of the One".

The removal of all predicates from one's thinking about the One entails the transcendence of intellection itself. P. articulates the radical transformation required to properly apprehend the One in his use of βαλὼν and προσβολή as well as with the συν-compounds. βαλὼν (cf. also V.1[10].3.3 and II.4[12].5.10) is the verbal equivalent of ἐπιβολή, which in turn is a variant of προσβολή. In Ch. 9.21-22 (see comm. *ad loc.*) it is ἐπιβολῇ ἀθρώα that one grasps (ἀλίσκειτο) what transcends Intellect; ἐπιβολή also defines Intellect's

hyper-noetic apprehension of the One at VI.7[38].35.21. Also parallel to the present passage is V.5[32].7.6-9 (see comm. on V.5[32].7.31ff.) in which Intellect's mystical awareness of the One is compared to an ἀθρόα προσβολή, when the omnipresence of light obliterates the distinction between subject and object.

In the present passage P. emphasizes the transcendence of the subject-object duality by means of the συν-compounds συννόει, συννορῶν, and συνεῖς. The use of συν-compounds is one of his favourite linguistic devices for characterizing the *unio mystica*. In VI.9[9] alone there are many examples: συνεῖναι (3.11), συναχθεῖς (4.24), συγγενεῖ (4.28), συνέσται (10.10), συνάψας (10.17), and συγγίνεται (11.32). Whereas these examples articulate the ontological assimilation of the soul to the One, the terms in the present passage describe the epistemological transformation which occurs in mystical cognition. These are rarely used by P. to designate the hyper-noetic awareness he has in mind here. σύνεσις, the nominal form of συνεῖς, is widely used on the psychic and intelligible levels of reality. At VI.7[38].41.20 and V.8[31].11.23, for example, it denotes Intellect's intimate self-awareness; at VI.7[38].31.33 the ascending soul acquires σύνεσις when it becomes Intellect and sees intelligible beauty and life. But in one place σύνεσις refers to hyper-intellection: μηδὲ κατ' ἐπιστήμην ἢ σύνεσις ἐκείνου μηδὲ κατὰ νόησιν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα νοητά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα (VI.9[9].4.1-3). The term suggests the soul's intimate proximity to the One in this passage as well: εἰ δὲ σύνεσιν λάβοι, ὥς δεῖ μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμορφότερον, ἐκείνου ἂν ὀρέγοιτο (VI.7[38].33.27-28).

P. often employs ἀναπαύεσθαι to characterize the state of the soul at the end of its turbulent and difficult ascent to the One. Especially pertinent is this remarkable passage: τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἔχει [sc. τὸ ἐν] ἔλκον πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἀνακαλούμενον ἐκ πάσης πλάνης, ἵνα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναπαύσαιο (VI.7[38].23.3-4). For other examples of ἀναπαύεσθαι used in this manner see VI.9[9].4.19-20, 8.22, 9.13. On τύχων see Ch. 11.24 and comm. *ad loc.*

11.1-8 ἔτι . . . τὸ πληροῦν. This transition from discussion of hyper-noetic awareness of the One to Intellect's original reversion is extremely abrupt and is explicable only on the supposition that P. at this point feels, justifiably I think, that the accounts of procession and reversion presented earlier in the treatise (Ch. 8.30ff. and Ch. 10.1ff) were inadequate. In any case what we have here is a weaving together of the terms and events prominent in the earlier accounts of reversion with themes introduced in the present treatise. The distinction between potential and actual Intellect is more neatly expressed here: the inchoate Intellect is defined as δύναμις (*qua* potentiality, not power) = ὅψις τις and actualized Intellect as ἐνέργεια = ὅψις ὁρῶσα. The distinction and the terms used to articulate it are fully consistent with the earlier accounts of

procession and reversion as are the terms πλήρωσις and τελείωσις which define the actualization of the potential Intellect by the One: ἀόριστος ὄψις/νόησις ὁρώσα, ἐπιστραφεῖσα καὶ ἀποτελειούμενη (V.4[7].2.4-6); ἔστι γὰρ ἡ νόησις ὄρασις ὁρώσα ἅμω τε ἓν (V.1[10].5.18-19); τελειοῦται εἰς οὐσίαν παρ' ἐκείνου (V.1[10].7.16; cf. also lines 6-11); τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὗτος (V.2[11].1.9-11); ὄψις οὐπὼ ἰδοῦσα, ἀτύπωτος ὄψις/ἰδοῦσα ὄψις (V.3[49].11.5, 10-12). The account of the actualization of potential Intellect in V.6[24].5 is parallel in many respects as well, but in its focus on ἔφεσις and the ἀγαθοειδές-motif its terminology is closer to lines 15-25 below. The definition of reversion in terms of πλήρωσις is most fully elaborated in VI.7[38].16. All these passages (excepting V.2[11].1) are discussed in comm. *ad locc.*

The actualization of the potential Intellect is expressed in lines 6-8, as well as in the passages cited above, in terms consistent with Aristotle's psychological model of perception and thought presented in *De Anima* Γ 4-5, according to which the object functions as actualizing agent. Perhaps equally influential on P.—as suggested by Rist (1962a) 103 and Schroeder (1984) 244-46—is Alexander of Aphrodisias' un-Aristotelian interpretation of Aristotle's νοῦς ποιητικός, whereby the νοῦς ποιητικός (compared with light at *De Anima* Γ 5.430a15-17) makes τὰ νοητά intelligible. Combining the two accounts, P. can present the One as the actualizing agent of both Intellect and its objects. Therefore, as I argue with respect to V.4[7].2.4-6, I think that Lloyd makes two fine a distinction when he argues that “it is not the One which actualizes the sight (or capacity to think) of Pre-Intellect, but *the One as seen (or thought)* by Pre-Intellect. The two are not the same *simpliciter*: but Plotinus can call the One as seen the One because for him it is and is not the One” (1987) 175, author's italics. There is a distinction between the One in itself and the inadequate image of it which Intellect possesses, but Lloyd misses the point of a statement like τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πληροῦν, which is that the One itself, by its presence and ceaselessly outflowing productive power, continues to act on the inchoate Intellect despite the latter's phantasmal vision of it. See also V.1[10].7.13-17 and comm. *ad loc.*

P. combines these conventional features of procession and reversion theory with the point that before seeing the inchoate Intellect is one. The use of πρὶν is formulaic: πρὶν δέξασθαι (II.4[12].5.36), πρὶν πληρωθῆναι (VI.7[38].16.33); it is perhaps an echo of Aristotle *De Anima* Γ 4.429a22-24, as suggested by Szlezák 81 n254: ὁ νοῦς οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ πρὶν νοεῖν. The unity identified here recapitulates ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἓν (Ch. 8.32; cf. also Ch. 9.29-32). In the earlier context we also have ἐν οὖν ὃν τὰ δύο πῶς αὖ πολλὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἓν; (Ch. 8.30), which is echoed here, from the opposite perspective, with τὸ οὖν ἐν δύο γέγονε καὶ τὰ δύο ἓν. In both contexts the duality P. alludes to is the duality of intelligible subject and object which he elaborates at

Ch. 8.27-29 and Ch. 9.5-11. Unity, however, possesses two very different meanings: the incipient unity of potential Intellect and the unity of actualized Intellect, which, of course, is also a duality, i.e. a one-many. The latter is explicitly predicated of self-intellection: ἐξ ἑνός ἐστι δύο, ὅτι νοεῖ, ποιῶν αὐτὸ δύο, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄν, ὅτι νοεῖ, δύο, καὶ ὅτι αὐτό, ἓν (V.6[24].1.22-23).

11.2-6 ἔσται τοίνυν . . . τὰ δύο ἓν. Several scholars see various redundancies in this sentence, leading to two proposed deletions. The MSS are nearly unanimous: only family z omits ὕλη . . . ἔχει (4-5). Müller and Bréhier delete ὕλη . . . ἐνέργειαν, which is unsatisfactory because in connecting οἶον with ἔχει it leaves us with a poorly constructed sentence. H-S¹⁺² and Cilento follow the majority of the MSS, in which the parenthetical οἶον . . . ὁρασις (3-4) accurately explicates the form/matter distinction in accordance with the differentiation of potential and actual vision in lines 1-2. Theiler subsequently deleted the parenthesis as a gloss on lines 4-5, a view later adopted by H-S (see H-S² III.320 *Addenda ad Textum*) and Armstrong. Although a gloss is not improbable, I am inclined (with Thillet 199-200) to preserve the received text, on the grounds that the introduction of new subject matter (the distinction between form and matter) could easily occasion a parenthetical supplement.

The rare introduction of intelligible matter into an account of procession and reversion, as well as P.' theory of intelligible matter itself, has attracted considerable attention. On the difficult question whether the doctrine of intelligible matter represents a departure from P.' normal account of the intelligible world cf.: *pro* Merlan (1975) 125, 133-35; Heinemann 174-76; *contra* Armstrong (1955) 278 n1; Szlezák 82-83; Rist (1962a). Several passages in II.4[12].3-5 demonstrate that intelligible matter pertains to both the potential and actual Intellect. In a brief statement of the procession, intelligible matter is presented in two different ways. P. says first "For Otherness There (ἡ ἑτερότης ἡ ἐκεῖ) exists always, which produces intelligible matter" (Ch. 5.28-29), but a few lines further on a slightly different perspective appears: "The Movement and Otherness which came from the First are undefined (ἀόριστον), and need the first to define (ὀρίσθῃναι) them; and they are defined when they turn to it (ἐπιστραφῇ). But before the turning, matter, too, was undefined (ἀόριστον) and the Other (τὸ ἕτερον) and not yet good, but unilluminated from the First" (31-35).

In the best analysis of this text Szlezák 76-78 emphasizes P.' first statement—that ἑτερότης generates intelligible matter—and refers to Ch. 16.1-3 of the same treatise: "Is matter, then, the same thing as otherness? No, rather it is the same thing as the part of otherness which is opposed to the things which in the full and proper sense exist (ἀλλὰ μορίῳ ἑτερότητος ἀντιταττομένων πρὸς τὰ ὄντα κυρίως), that is to say rational formative principles (λόγοι)." Szlezák's comment on this passage is quite pertinent: "Die Paraphrase von *Soph.* 258e2

(τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον μόριον αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς θατέρου φύσεως] ἀντιτιθέμενον . . . ἐστὶν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν) zeigt, dass Plotin aus der indirekten Überlieferung die zwei Gleichungen *Materie = Nichtseiendes* und *Andersheit = Bewegung* (z.T. modifizierend) übernimmt, während er das für die Entstehung des Geistes entscheidende Verhältnis der beiden Begriffspaare auf den Platontext selbst stützen will” 77. This assessment is accurate, but it should be noted that II.4[12].16.1-3 refers to intelligible matter in actualized Intellect and not to the indefinite efflux from the One, which is the subject of Ch. 5.28-35. There P. does indicate that otherness is prior to intelligible matter, but the indefiniteness and reversion of the latter make it almost indistinguishable from the potential Intellect (so too Szlezák 99, seemingly at odds with 76-78). The ambivalence in P.’ position as to whether intelligible matter derives from or is congruent with otherness, as well as the other synonyms for intelligible potentiality, may stem from the introduction of the theme of the imposition of limit on this indefinite potentiality.

Thus intelligible matter, in both II.4[12] and in the present passage, is roughly equivalent to *δύναμις* and *ὄψις* here and with the Indefinite Dyad (see V.4[7].2.7-8 and V.1[10].5.14-15 with Atkinson’s valuable comments). Moreover, intelligible matter is identical with life, in both its potential and actual phases: “The divine matter when it receives that which defines it has a defined and intelligent life” (II.4[12].5.15-16). The statement here that “it was one before seeing” (5) parallels another passage in the earlier treatise, though the latter pertains primarily to the status of intelligible matter in Intellect’s actualized state: “But if intelligible reality is at once many and partless, then the many existing in one are in matter which is that one (τὰ πολλὰ ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντι ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ τῷ ἐνὶ), and they are its shapes: conceive this unity as varied and of many shapes” (Ch. 4.14-17). The unity of intelligible matter at both moments of Intellect’s life has a bearing on the interpretation of lines 5-6 in the present context: τὸ οὖν ἐν δύο γέγονε καὶ τὰ δύο ἓν. As a variant expression of the inchoate Intellect, intelligible matter corresponds easily enough with the unity that becomes a duality (cf. further comm. on Ch. 8.32 above), but the underlying unity which intelligible matter contributes to actualized Intellect (in II.4[24].4.14-17) is rather problematic, though it is not specifically referred to here in the statement that “the duality becomes one.”

In his excellent exposition of the consistency and defensibility of P.’ theory of intelligible matter, to which the previous discussion is indebted, Rist (1962a) 102 remarks on ὕλη δὲ ἐν νοητοῖς (4): “There can be no doubt that this means that the material element of the Second Hypostasis is not in Mind as seer but in the Forms as the objects of vision . . . the Second Hypostasis regarded as Mind is in a sense the representative at a more advanced level of Intelligible Matter which itself looks back at the One.” I wonder if this reading does not impute more coherence to P.’ account than is warranted. If we recall the Plotinian principle

that the intelligible subject and object are one, as well as different, then why would intelligible matter (= indefinite vision and potentiality) not also be present in Intellect *qua* subject? (Cf. also Szlezák 85 n268 who disputes Rist's position.) Lines 4-5 increase the suspicion: ἡ ὁρασις ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διττὸν ἔχει. Moreover, lines 1-3 would seem to establish these equivalents: ὅψις τις/δύναμις/τὸ ὕλη are distinguished from ὅψις ὁρῶσα/ἐνέργεια/τὸ εἶδος. The troubling inference that intelligible matter, as unity, is predicated of both modalities of Intellect is further strengthened by the identification of intelligible matter with κίνησις and ἐτερότης in II.4[12].5.31-35 noted above; but ἐτερότης is responsible for duality in the intelligible world, whereas ταυτότης contributes unity: ταὐτὸν δέ, ἐπεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ κοινὸν δέ τι ἐν πᾶσι· καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἐτερότης (V.1[10].4.40-41). As Szlezák 77, 83-85 adroitly points out, P.' problems on this point derive from his attempts (i) to integrate the Platonic μέγιστα γένη of the *Sophist* with the scheme of ontological derivation presented in the ἄγραφα δόγματα and (ii) to refute Aristotle's attacks on the Academic Indefinite Dyad and Plato's apparent introduction of potentiality into the world of the Forms by making his indefinite efflux from the One like the One. The terminological confusion shows the strain of trying to fit intelligible matter, an Aristotelian notion, into an already overpopulated field of terms drawn from different traditions. I think it is not at all unlikely that the disappearance of references to intelligible matter in the later treatises, in accounts of procession and reversion, is a sign that P. abandoned his earlier theory of intelligible matter, or, at the very least, the view that it contributed unity to actualized Intellect. For further analysis of the exceedingly complex problem of P.' assimilation of the Indefinite Dyad to intelligible matter and potentiality in the context of his rejection of Aristotle's criticism of the Dyad cf. comm. on V.4[7].2.7-8 and Szlezák 84-85, 93-95.

11.8-11 εἰ . . . αὐτό. For the Good as needing nothing see: V.6[24].4.21, V.5[32].12.41-47, VI.7[38].41.17, VI.8[39].8.46, V.3[49].12.49, 13.17; as not needing συναίσθησις: V.6[24].5.3 (see comm. *ad loc.*); as not needing intellection: V.6[24].4.2; as not needing itself: VI.9[9].6.20. These passages should be compared with VI.8[39].18.44-53 where the Good is what "it ought to be," i.e. the ἐνέργεια πρώτη, but not as a result of any external compulsion. For the denial of vision to the Good cf. VI.7[38].41.31-32 and on the Good's self-vision, an apparent contradiction, see comm. on VI.8[39].16.20-21. Here the claim that the Good does not see depends on the Platonic image of the Good as sun, which dominates Ch. 11: ὁ ἥλιος ὅψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης (*Rep.* 508b9-10).

11.12-16 φθεγξάμενος . . . ἐκείνου. The discussion resumes the exposition of the innate limitations of language and discourse concerning the

Good initiated in Ch. 10. P. employs the technical terms for addition πρόσθεσις/προστιθέναι, which complement the terms for subtraction ἀφαίρεσις/ἀφαίρεσθαι (see comm. on Ch. 10.31ff.). That “addition” has ontological implications is very clear from IV.7[2].13.5 where soul is generated from Intellect through τῇ προσθήκῃ τῆς ὀρέξεως. Here he provides only a brief summary of his position which receives greater elaboration elsewhere. Several passages in VI.7[38].41 are directly relevant: “With the best nature, then, which needs no assistance we must leave everything aside: for whatever you add, you have lessened by the addition the nature which needs nothing (ὁ γὰρ ἂν προσθῆς, ἡλάττωσας τῇ προσθήκῃ τὴν οὐδενὸς δεομένην)” (14-17); “therefore this Intellect needs to keep company with thinking and to be always getting an intimate understanding of itself (συνεῖναι οὖν δεῖ τῇ νοήσει τοῦτον καὶ σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν αἰεὶ; see Ch. 10.34 where σύνεσις defines Intellect’s mystical apprehension of the Good), that this is this, because the two are one: but if it was only one, it would have sufficed to itself and would not have needed to get understanding” (19-22); “But if the Good is anything, it is so in a greater way than by knowledge and thought and self-perception (μειζόνως ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ γνῶσιν καὶ νόησιν καὶ συναίσθησιν αὐτοῦ): since it is not anything for itself: for it does not bring anything into itself, but itself suffices. It is not, then, even good for itself, but for the others: for they need it, but it could not need itself: that would be ridiculous: for if it did it would be in need of itself. Nor, certainly, does it look at itself: for it must have and get something from the looking. For it has left all these things to the beings which come after it, and, so it seems, none of the additions to the others are with it (μηδὲν τῶν προσόντων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκείνῳ παρεῖναι), just as even substance is not: so not thinking either” (25-35); “Therefore ‘There is neither discourse nor perception nor knowledge’ [*Parm.* 142a3-4] because it is impossible to predicate anything of it as present with it” (37-38). Also pertinent is this passage: “It is, therefore, truly ineffable (ἄρρητον): for whatever you say about it, you will always be speaking of a ‘something’. But ‘beyond all things and beyond the supreme majesty of Intellect’ is the only one of all the ways of speaking of it which is true; it is not its name, but says that it is not one of all things and ‘has no name’ [*Parm.* 142a3], because we can say nothing of it: we only try, as far as possible, to make signs (σημαίνειν) to ourselves about it” (V.3[49].13.1-6); “But we have it in such a way that we speak about it, but do not speak it. For we say what it is not, but we do not say what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it” (V.3[49].14.5-8).

Considering the present passage from the perspective of these fuller accounts of the Good’s ineffability, it is clear that the technical vocabulary of addition and subtraction has been grafted on to the more fundamental negative dialectic displayed in Plato’s *Parmenides*. (Cf. the Plotinian passages parallel to *Parm.* 142a3-4 cited by Charrue 78-80 with his remarks.) The same strategy is

practiced by Neopythagoreans, but P. devotes more attention to eliminating any possibility of attributing predicates of any kind to the Good. But what is the significance of the “additions,” “predicates,” and “names” we must necessarily employ if we are to say anything about it? On P.’ view they limit our transcendental awareness, since they condition our thinking at every turn, but they are still crucially important. It is perhaps best to understand them as “charms” (ἐπωδαί), a term he employs in the conclusion to V.3[49].17 at line 20. Hence, the admission that “we speak about it, but do not speak it.” Discourse about the Good, therefore, constitutes the ἀναβασμοί (VI.7[38].36.8) we must traverse on the way towards the Good. In the mystical ascent the signs we make to ourselves lift us, a step at a time, closer to the Good, but each must be ruthlessly cast aside. But this method of subtraction or negative dialectic is directed not only to the soul’s thinking and speaking about the Good, as Mortley (1982) 435 argues: “It is a method of conceptual removal . . . but epistemological rather than ontological.” As is abundantly evident in the accounts of the mystical ascent to the Good (cf. comm. on VI.7[38].35-36), the removal of affirmative predicates from the soul’s apprehension of the Good precipitates the soul’s ontological transformation: first it becomes Intellect, and then it merges with the One. The Plotinian principle that “thought and being are the same” requires that the negative dialectic exert a transformative effect on both the soul’s thinking and its ontological state.

11.16-23 ὁθεν . . . ἔχειν. It is striking here that P. employs Platonic paradeigmatism not only to characterize the relation between the One and Intellect but also to explain the actualization of the inchoate Intellect through its reversion. There is nothing unusual in Intellect becoming ἀγαθοειδές (*Rep.* 509a3); P. employs the Platonic tag frequently to define Intellect: V.6[24].4.9; VI.7[38].15.9, 23; 16.5, 22-31; 18.1, 8, 14, 25; 21.3, 8, 16-17; 22.33; V.3[49].16.19; I.7[54].1.16. Also common is the description of the One-Intellect relation in terms of archetype and image or trace: ὥστ’ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι ἔχνος τοῦ ἐνός (V.5[32].5.13-14); ἦν ἡ ζωὴ ἔχνος τι ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἐκείνου ζωὴ (VI.7[38].17.13-14); τὸ γὰρ ἔχνος τοῦ ἀμόρφου μορφὴ (VI.7[38].33.30); ὥσπερ εἰκὼν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον (V.3[49].13.30-31).

What is striking here, compared at least to the earlier accounts of reversion, is the more active role assigned to the Good in the completion of the inchoate Intellect. This is specified in lines 17-19: τοῦ μὲν εἶδους τοῦ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἦκοντος ἀγαθοειδῆ ποιοῦντος. In his important recent discussion of the problem of the genesis of Intellect, Lloyd argues that in the present chapter, under the dominant influence of the form of the Good in the *Republic*, “Plotinus may have chosen to ignore, or just ignored, the details of his regular account of the genesis” (1987) 171. The details Lloyd has in mind are the extensive descriptions of pre-intellectual life presented in VI.7[38].15-17 and

V.3[49].11, which lead him to observe that “the form of the Good which it [i.e. III.8[30].11] does describe corresponds dubiously to the indefinite form when it has been (as in VI.7.15) multiplied by Intellect” 170. The position Lloyd sees P. moving towards in the later treatises VI.7[38].15-17 and V.3[49].11 is the “distinction between the creative activity of the One and a creative, or self-creative, activity of Intellect” 166; see comm. on V.1[10].7.13-14, V.6[24].5.9, and VI.7[38].16.20-31. It is, in fact, the latter which he sees as primary, once potential Intellect has been generated by the Good. If I correctly understand his subtle and allusive analysis, Lloyd wants to restrict the creative efficacy of the Good to the procession stage, after which point Intellect generates existence and actualized intellection through the reversion, which, on his view, is not really concerned with the Good, but rather with potential Intellect’s image of the Good. Lloyd 167-69 reaches this position on the basis of an illuminating discussion of Aristotle *Physics* Θ 4 and *De Anima* Γ 4-5; cf. comm. on V.4[7].2.27-33 for extensive discussion of Lloyd’s analysis. Though he is careful to give *Rep.* 507-509 its due in exercising influence on P.’s reversion-theory, 164-65, 170, it seems to me that Lloyd relies so much on Aristotle’s psychological model of the actualization of the subject by the object that he ignores the metaphysical implications of the “metaphysics of light,” derived from the sun-analogy in the *Republic*, in P.’s account of reversion in the present passage. These are that the Good manifests its creative activity throughout Intellect’s life, in the procession and the reversion, despite Intellect’s defective vision of the Good. On this view, the One’s is the primary creative activity, whereas the latter is secondary, though, of course, necessary, a position which can be sustained by a careful discussion of some of the texts Lloyd cites to support his position.

Several passages in VI.7[38].15-17 are relevant. I will summarize the crucial points; for more extensive discussion see comm. on VI.7[38].16-17; on the ἀγαθοειδέξ-motif specifically, cf. comm. on VI.7[38].16.4-10. Intellect is ἀγαθοειδέξ because it “possesses the Good in the Forms” (Ch. 15.9-10), but its objects came to Intellect “not as they were there [i.e. in the Good], but as Intellect itself possessed them” (Ch. 15.13-14). Intellect receives the power to generate from the Good, the one power it breaks into a multiplicity (Ch. 15.18-22). Similarly, Intellect does not see the One as one but as many (Ch. 16.10-13); the same point is made at Ch. 8.30ff. in the present treatise. Lloyd relies on these passages, and analogous ones in V.3[49].11, to emphasize the creative activity of Intellect. But hereafter P. lays greater stress on the primacy of the Good’s creative activity, which is fully consistent with the present passage. Intellect is filled (i.e. actualized) and sees its objects by the light which continues to stream from the Good (Ch. 16.20-22). Hence, “the Good is said to be the cause not only of substance but also of being seen” (Ch. 16.22-24) and “cause of substance and intellect and light” (Ch. 16.27-28). The creative activity of the Good, so prominent in the present passage, is echoed in the later treatise as well:

the Good is “the giver” (τοῦ δόντος) of the Forms (Ch. 16.21); “the giver gave life” (ὁ διδὼν ἐδωκε μὲν ζωὴν: Ch. 17.11-12); “giving by its light” (φωτὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ . . . παρέχων: Ch. 16.30-31); “being in the form of the good, all of them have in common what runs over (τὸ ἐπιθέον) them all” (Ch. 16.6-7; cp. τοῦ ἐπιθέοντος at line 21 in the present passage); the Good εἰδοποιεῖ (Ch. 17.41), but at the same time τὸ δὲ μορφῶσαν ἄμορφον ἦν (Ch. 17.18); the Good “makes other things good in form” (τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθοειδῆ ποιοῦσαν: I.7[54].1.16).

It might be argued that all of these passages employ highly figurative language and should not be interpreted literally, including lines 17-19 in the present context, which speak of a form coming upon Intellect from the Good. Lloyd, I suspect, would interpret this “form” as equivalent to the οἶον φαντασίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (V.6[24].5.15) received by the inchoate Intellect. But the indefinite vision of Intellect must direct the intentionality of its consciousness at something, which continues to act on it. Everything that the Good gives, whether it be form, light, life, or a trace, is a manifestation of its presence, i.e. the unceasing creative activity of the Good. Hence, Lloyd goes too far when he implies that the accounts of procession and reversion which follow closely the Aristotelian psychological model, e.g. parts of V.4[7].2, V.6[24].5, VI.7[38].15, and V.3[49].11, are somehow normative. In their focus on pre-intellectual vision they do reveal Intellect’s role in its self-actualization, but the role of the Good, though somewhat pushed into the background in these texts, is still primary in my estimation. A particularly strong statement of this principle is made in this passage: “Everything which is brought into being by something else is either in that which made it or in another thing . . . for, in that it is brought into being by something else and needed something else for its coming into being, it needs something else at every point: and this is why it is also in something else . . . and one thing is in another up to the First, which is the Principle” (V.5[32].9.1-7). Intellect’s need for the Good in every mode of its life, therefore, requires the Good’s omnipresence and its ceaseless, causal activity. For other references to Intellect in need of the Good cf. V.6[24].5.9, VI.7[38].32.26, and V.3[49].11.12, 15.10.

The prominence of the negative theology in Ch. 10.27-35 and here in lines 12-16 should dispel the concern of Szlezák 154 that the likeness of the Good and Intellect, expressed in terms of the ἀγαθοειδέξ-motif, conflicts with the negative, transcendent conception of the first principle. The significant point here is that the procession and reversion of Intellect are always presented as events which require the use of affirmative language, whereas the mystical return of the soul or Intellect to the Good relies primarily on negation, as discussed above on lines 12-16. In mathematical terms, procession/reversion = addition and the mystical reversion = subtraction. What is confusing in Chs. 10-11 is P.’ switching back and forth between these methods.

11.23-26 ὥστε . . . αὐτοῦ. Theiler's ἐκεῖ(νος) for the MSS ἐκεῖ or ἐκεῖνο is now rightly accepted by H-S and Armstrong; Cilento (1971) 155 still prefers ἐκεῖ. The presence of ἔφεις, desire or striving, and synonymous terms in Intellect is stressed increasingly as we proceed from the middle to the late treatises. It first appears at V.6[24].5.8-10: καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι νοεῖν, κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου· ἡ γὰρ ἔφεις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ· ἔφεις γὰρ ὅψεως ὄρασις (see comm. *ad loc.*). Other terms employed to define the desiring character of Intellect include: πόθος (V.3[49].10.49), θέλησις (V.3[49].11.2: cf. Ch. 8.34-45 above), ἐπιθυμία (V.3[49].11.6), ὑποστάσεως ἔφεις (III.6[26].7.13), ἔφεις πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν (III.4[15].2.14, with respect to the sensible world). ἔφεις is also used in one mystical setting: ἔφεις πρὸς ἀφὴν (VI.9[9].11.24). This last instance raises an interesting point: as is true with P.' vocabulary for seeing, he often employs a single term across the spectrum of the hierarchy of being. In the case of ἔφεις, it is attributed to the potential Intellect, as in V.6[24].5. In actualized Intellect it can be taken as synonymous with κίνησις, evident here in the phrase σύννευσις πρὸς τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ (26), which is analogous to the following passage in referring to Intellect's interior, converging self-awareness: when Intellect becomes all things ἔγνω τοῦτο ἐν συναισθήσει αὐτοῦ καὶ νοῦς ἤδη ἦν (VI.7[38].16.19-20). In accounts of the mystical ascent ἔφεις is replaced by, or transformed into, ἔρως. Nevertheless, when the Good is presented as the general object of all striving, without an emphasis on the mystical ascent, it can be understood simply as ἐφετόν (V.6[24].5.13). For a repertoire of passages illustrating the use of the terminology of desire, with brief discussion, cf. Arnou (1967) 59-64, 94-109.

It remains to determine what P. means by the statement that Intellect ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων (24-25). Armstrong (1971) 72 raises a legitimate concern about this phrase, noting that it "is appropriate to everlasting life, to a finite mind endlessly exploring the riches of the infinite with a desire ever stimulated by new revelations of the unbounded good into which it penetrates ever more deeply: but how can it apply to an absolutely timeless perfect intellect?" That Intellect is involved with self-exploration is also a problem in Ch. 9.35ff., but here the difficulty is perhaps greater, because P. employs ἔφεις and τυγχάνων, terms which normally are implicated in the actualization of the inchoate Intellect. This is made clear with respect to the second term in lines 16-17: τυγχάνων τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθοειδὲς γίνεται. Lloyd observes on the passage that "as lines 18-19 [sic] indicate this is no more than its full possession of the form of the Good" (1987) 164. However, I do not think that this comment adequately indicates the full resonance of τυγχάνων in line 24. Note that at Ch. 10.32-33 we have τυχὼν ἐντὸς ἀναπαυσάμενος συννόει κτλ.: the connotation of τυχὼν here is clearly mystical contact. On this basis I conclude that the phrase ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων is a very general,

inclusive definition of all aspects of Intellect's life. While ἔφεσις refers to both the potential and actualized Intellect, τυγχάνων denotes both the actualization of the inchoate Intellect and Intellect's hyper-noetic contact with the Good; so, by implication, does ἔρω, the ultimately hyper-noetic counterpart of ἔφεσις. Even from this universal perspective Armstrong's concerns can not perhaps be satisfied, but it is clear I think that the "desiring and attaining" P. has in mind characterize the two moments in Intellect's life when it is not "an absolutely timeless perfect intellect," i.e. when it becomes perfect and when it transcends itself.

On the absence of ἔφεσις in the Good in lines 24-25 cf. VI.8[39].15.1-8 and 16.13-15 (cf. comm. *ad loc.*) where ἔφεσις, ἔρω and ἀγαπή are attributed to the Good.

11.26-32 τοῦ δὴ νοῦ . . . μακαρίαν. The theme of intelligible beauty is introduced here, anticipating the extensive treatment of the subject in the next treatise V.8[31]. The reference to αὐγή derives from *Phaedrus* 250c4. Here it is clearly an attribute of Intellect, but in the context of the ἀγαθοειδές-motif, Intellect's radiance comes from the Good itself, which is described as αὐγή γεννώσα (VI.7[38].36.22-24) and αὐγὴν καθάραν (VI.8[39].16.13). Similarly, Intellect's ἀγλαία comes upon it from the Good: ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσι περὶ πᾶν τὸ οἶον μέγεθος αὐτοῦ ἐπιθέουσα (ἀγλαία) [Page] τελευταία ὁρᾶται (V.8[31].10.16-17); cf. ἐπιθέοντος at line 21 above. And at VI.9[9].4.17-18 the soul at the peak of the mystical ascent acquires an "intimate awareness" (σύνεσις; cf. Ch. 10.34) τῆς ἐκεῖ ἀγλαίας. Later in the same treatise the soul ἡγλαϊσμένον, φωτὸς πλήρη νοητοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ φῶς αὐτὸ καθαρὸν . . . θεὸν γενόμενον (VI.9[9].9.55-58). As Dodds (1960a) 18 points out, ἀγλαία is an old poetic word also employed by Numenius (Fr. 2.15) to describe the splendour of the Good.

Now that P. is emphasizing the brightness and splendour of the actualized Intellect he denies that there is anything dark or unmeasured about intelligible reality, his normal view; but note that in the analysis of intelligible matter Intellect's substrate is said to be ἄμορφον (II.4[12].2.4, 3.2, 4.17) and τὸ σκοτεινόν (Ch. 5.13). At the same time, because intelligible matter is completely receptive of intelligible form, he can say that it is never ἄμορφος (Ch. 3.14-15). On the surface these assertions are at odds with the present passage, but they pertain to distinct moments or aspects of Intellect's life and thus, in my view, are complementary rather than contradictory.

11.32-38 θάμβος . . . ἡ πῶς. For the third time late in this treatise P. invokes wonder: first, that multiplicity derives from unity (Ch. 10.14-17); second, when being is removed from our apprehension of the Good we are struck with wonder; and here (i) wonder accompanies looking into the intelligible

universe and (ii) wonder at this leads us to seek the maker of Intellect and the universe. Wonder evokes a desire on the part of the soul to return to its ultimate source, the Good. But note that, strictly speaking, the world-soul is the ποιητής of the stars and heaven: ἐνθυμείσθω τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο πᾶσα ψυχή, ὡς αὐτὴ μὲν ζῶα ἐποίησε πάντα ἐμπνεύσασα αὐτοῖς ζῶην . . . αὐτὴ δὲ ἥλιον, αὐτὴ δὲ τὸν μέγαν τοῦτον οὐρανόν, καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκόσμησεν (V.1[10].2.1-5). In his valuable discussion of this passage, Atkinson 25-26 remarks that P. closely follows Plato and later philosophers who venerated the heavenly bodies as visible gods. Note that ἐνθυμείσθαι also appears in the present passage. Eon 260 argues, with respect to the earlier context, that ἐνθυμείσθαι denotes “un acte d’attention porté sur une donnée immédiate et intérieure . . . il convient de la rapprocher du terme ἔννοια (II.9[33].12.1-10), lequel désigne habituellement . . . la donation d’une vérité intuitive, antérieurement au discours.” This interior intuition is also suggested here by ἐνείδε (36) and by εἰσδύντα (33). The latter word is employed elsewhere to describe the soul’s mystical penetration, beyond Intellect, within the sanctuary of the temple where it experiences the Good: ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἥδη ὑπερθέων, ὑπερβᾶς ἥδη καὶ τὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν χόρον, ὥσπερ τις εἰς τὸ εἶσω τοῦ ἀδύτου εἰσδύς εἰς τοῦπίσω καταλιπὼν τὰ ἐν τῷ νεφῷ ἀγάλματα, ἃ ἐξεληθόντι τοῦ ἀδύτου πάλιν γίνεται πρῶτα μετὰ τὸ ἔνδον θέαμα καὶ τὴν ἐκεῖ συνουσίαν πρὸς οὐκ ἄγαλμα οὐδὲ εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ αὐτό (VI.9[9].11.16-21). The same imagery appears at V.1[10].6.12-15. In his commentary *ad loc.* Atkinson 133 refers to the lay-out of the temple of Eleusis as well as Platonic use of the language of initiation into the mysteries as likely sources for P.’ use of this imagery in mystical contexts.

Also significant in this brief allusion to the soul’s mystical experience is the phrase αὐτῷ γενόμενον ἓνα (33). Dodds’s αὐτῷ is certainly necessary for the MSS αὐτοῦ, but it is unnecessary to adopt (as does Theiler) his ὡς δὲ for the ensuing ὡς δὴ (Dodds [1956] 113). The ascending soul can be said to enter into the intelligible universe only when it *becomes* Intellect, which again testifies to the ontological transformation entailed by the ascent to the Good. This process is mentioned often in mystical contexts: the soul participates in divine things διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον (IV.7[2].10.18-19); ὥσπερ γὰρ νοῦν ὁρῶντα οὐκ αἰσθητόν τι οὐδὲ τῶν θνητῶν τούτων, ἀλλὰ αἰδίῳ τὸ αἰδίον κατανοοῦντα, πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, κόσμον καὶ αὐτὸν νοητὸν καὶ φωτεινὸν γεγεννημένον, ἀληθείᾳ καταλαμπόμενον τῇ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃ πᾶσιν ἐπιλάμπει τοῖς νοητοῖς ἀλήθειαν (IV.7[2].10.32-37); θεὸν γενόμενον, μᾶλλον δὲ ὄντα (VI.9[9].9.58); ὅταν γὰρ ἐνίδῃ εἰς νοῦν, ἔνδοθεν ἔχει καὶ οἰκεῖα ἃ νοεῖ καὶ ἐνεργεῖ (V.1[10].3.16-17); τῇ δὲ ὑπάρχει ἐν τούτοις εἶναι συναφθείση, εἰ μὴ ἀποστατεῖν ἐθέλοι. πελάσασα οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ οἶον ἐν γενομένη ζῇ αἰεὶ (V.1[10].5.1-4); ἢ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὖσα ἔχει τὸ ἀμετάβλητον καὶ αὐτὴ. καὶ γὰρ

αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἅ ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν ἐν ἐκείνῳ ᾗ τῷ τόπῳ, εἰς ἔνωσιν ἐλθεῖν τῷ νῷ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἐπεστράφη· στραφεῖσα γὰρ οὐδὲν μεταξὺ ἔχει, εἷς τε νοῦν ἐλθοῦσα ἡρμοσται, καὶ ἁρμοσθεῖσα ἡνῶται οὐκ ἀπολλυμένη, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐστὶν ἅμφω καὶ δύο. οὕτως οὖν ἔχουσα οὐκ ἂν μεταβάλλοι, ἀλλὰ ἔχοι ἂν ἀτρέπτως πρὸς νόησιν ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα τὴν συναίσθησιν αὐτῆς, ὥς ἐν ἅμα τῷ νοητῷ ταὐτὸν γενομένη (IV.4[28].2.24-32); νοῦς γενομένος αὕτη θεωρεῖ οἷον νοωθείσα καὶ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τῷ νοητῷ γενομένη (VI.7[38].35.4-5); νοῦν νῷ θεωρητέον (IV.6[41].8.8).

In his commentary on V.1[10].5.1-4, Atkinson argues that in this passage and in IV.4[28].2.24-32 “soul does not lose its individuality”; thus “we have no right to interpret statements of unity as statements of identity.” For this interpretation he relies primarily on the statement οὐκ ἀπολλυμένη, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐστὶν ἅμφω καὶ δύο, and thus minimizes the strong indications to the contrary that the soul is no longer soul *qua* soul. Of course the soul is not destroyed when it becomes Intellect: what P. means to suggest is that its former ontological status as soul is now universally expanded. To speak of “individuality” *qua* soul simply will not do, for the soul now lives eternally the life of Intellect (cf. V.1[10].5.4 quoted above) as one part of the intelligible universe; but, importantly, each part *is* the whole (cf. III.8[30].8.43ff. and comm. *ad loc.*). Several passages underscore this point: “Now it is because you approached the All and did not remain in a part of it, and you did not even say of yourself ‘I am just so much’ but by rejecting the ‘so much’ you have become all (οὐδ' εἶπας οὐδὲ σύ ‘τοσοῦτος εἰμι’, ἀφεὶς δὲ τὸ ‘τοσοῦτος’ γέγονας πᾶς)—yet even before this you were all: but because something else came to you after the ‘all’ you became less by the addition (ἐλάττων ἐγίνου τῇ προσθήκῃ): for the addition did not come from being . . . but from non-being . . . You will increase yourself then by rejecting all else, and the All will be present to you in your rejection” (VI.5[23].12.16-25; cf. Ch. 7.1-12 in the same treatise); “for he has ceased to be the All now that he has become man; but when he ceases to be man he ‘walks on high and directs the whole universe’ [*Phaedrus* 246c1-2]; for when he comes to belong to the whole he makes the whole” (V.8[31].7.32-35). Evident here is a distinction between intelligible existence and individual human existence, which is made more explicit in this passage: “the man who knows himself is double, one knowing the nature of the reasoning which belongs to soul, and one up above this man, who knows himself according to Intellect because he has become that Intellect (τὸν γινώσκοντα ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὸν νοῦν γινόμενον); and by that Intellect he thinks himself again, not any longer as man, but having become altogether other and snatching himself up into the higher world, drawing up only the better part of soul” (V.3[49].4.9-13).

O'Daly (1973) 52-70 provides a brilliant analysis of the problem of the status of the individual self on the intelligible level, based on subtle and sensitive readings of many of the passages cited above. There is insufficient space to

discuss each point he makes, but his conclusions warrant serious consideration. On V.8[31].7.32-35 and V.3[49].4.9-13 he remarks that “it would be an unduly literal interpretation which would see here a loss of selfhood, meaning human identity, in the return to transcendence” 57. His effort to preserve human identity and individuality on the intelligible level derives from his conviction that P. maintains “the identity of the self at both levels” 58, which “self” O’Daly sees as specified in the pronoun αὐτός. But I fail to see why the universally flexible and expansive notion of αὐτός should be restricted to human identity and individuality: it is surely significant that VI.8[39] abounds with references to the Good as αὐτός. O’Daly’s theoretical concerns emerge at several points: he justifiably wants to avoid the conclusion that “becoming Intellect” amounts to “depersonalization,” “dehumanization,” or, *pace* Orientalizing commentators like Bréhier, an “annihilation of the self” 58, 62. However, it seems to me that this way of framing the alternatives is somewhat tendentious, not least in its superficial understanding of Oriental metaphysics. O’Daly draws attention to the fact that when the soul becomes Intellect it assumes the aspect of unity in duality characteristic of the intelligible universe. On IV.7[2].10.32-37 he states that “man, in self-vision, sees what he himself is, that is νοῦς. Subject and object are identical: man is himself the intelligible universe” 73-74. But then he goes on to argue that, even when the soul becomes an integral part of the activity of self-intellection, “the human self, reverting to the Intelligible, *remains itself*, while at the same time being one with the totality of Being” and “that one’s ceasing to be ‘man’ in no way compromises one’s individuality at this level: for the Whole and the self can be said to be a duality-in-unity, and vice versa” 65-66, author’s italics. I find this position contradictory, assuming that human individuality includes corporeality, sensation, the duality of subject and object, etc. If the self on the intelligible level exercises self-intellection and attains intelligible unity in duality, it seems to me we must conclude that human individuality is no longer present. Otherwise, it is necessary to predicate human individuality of Intellect *tout court*, and that, I think, is unacceptable. In other words, the subject-pole of intelligible consciousness, with which the soul becomes totally identified in all the passages noted, represents a radical transformation of what is normally defined philosophically as individual human consciousness. For further discussion of this difficult problem in the context of the soul’s mystical union with the One see comm. on VI.7[38].35.33ff.

11.38 ἡ ποῦ. Dodds (1956) 113 brackets ἡ ποῦ, which is adopted by H-S² and Armstrong, on the grounds that about the creator of the intelligible universe “it is not at all proper . . . to ask where he is or where he made it.” I agree with Theiler that the change is unnecessary. He refers to this parallel: ποῦ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας τὸ τοιοῦτον κάλλος . . . καὶ γεννήσας οὐσίαν (VI.7[38].32.1-2). In support of retaining the MSS reading I would also suggest that the

mythological allusions in the following lines make Dodds's concern less pressing.

11.38-45 ὁ τοιοῦτον . . . ἦν. The reference to Intellect as κόρος, both boy and fullness, here and in the later portions of the *Großschrift*, is part of P.' allegorical interpretation of the Hesiodic account of the generations of the gods Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus in the *Theogony*. Hadot (1981) provides an illuminating discussion of P.' use of the myth. It is clear from texts in V.8[31] and V.5[32] that Ouranos = the One, Kronos = Intellect, and Zeus = the soul. He demonstrates that the equation of Kronos = Intellect derives from Plato *Cratylus* 396b where it is established that Kronos "means *Koros-nous*, i.e. 'intellect' not as 'child' (*koros, kouros*), but as 'fulfillment' or 'fullness' (*koros*)" 127. For P.' preference for κόρος as "fullness" or "satiety," Atkinson 78-79 (on V.1[10].4.9-10 where the term appears) cites Stoic precedents, as do Lambertson 87 and Buffière 533-34. It is certainly true, as Atkinson argues, that κόρος always means "fullness" or "satiety" for P., but, against Atkinson and Lambertson, it would appear that P. combines the Platonic etymology with the Stoic interpretation of κόρος; Buffière concurs.

In Hesiod's account Kronos gives birth to his offspring and keeps them hidden within himself by swallowing them, a point significantly altered but partially preserved in V.8[31].12.3-7: swallowing is for P. the mythical image of the identity of Intellect and the Forms (Hadot 131); cf. V.1[10].7.35-36. But whereas in the myth Zeus binds his father Kronos in chains, P. has Kronos/Intellect bind himself, which metaphysically represents the self-limitation, i.e. filling, of Intellect through reversion to the Good. The mythical image of "giving birth to progeny" becomes, for P., the generation of the intelligible beings (Hadot 128). Moreover, V.8[31].13.1-11 indicates that Kronos limits the Father, an act which differentiates him from Ouranos by halting the processive outflow from the Good, the metaphysical equivalent of the myth's castration-motif (Hadot 129). Hadot also sensitively connects the themes of castration, swallowing and the desire of Kronos/Intellect to possess his offspring with Ch. 8.33-36, where Intellect's besotted drunkenness causes its "being weighed down" (βεβαρημένος) with the desire to possess all things and thus to be full or satiated (Hadot 134-35). On the basis of the equation Intellect = κόρος, the treatise ends with the assertion that the Good is prior to κόρος and its predicates intellection and need. For further discussion of P.' extensive use of the Hesiod myth cf. Pepin 190-209.

For P. and the later Neoplatonists myths possess a metaphysical dimension—if they are properly interpreted. The following theoretical assessment of the relation between myths and discursive accounts is a succinct statement of P.' exegetical practice: "But myths, if they are really going to be myths, must separate in time the things of which they tell, and set apart from each other many

realities which are together, but distinct in rank or powers, at points where rational discussions, also, make generations of things ungenerated, and themselves, too, separate things which are together; the myths, when they have taught us as well as they can, allow the man who has understood them to put together again that which they have separated” (III.5[50].9.24-29). This fascinating analysis is also applicable in many respects to P.’ accounts of the procession and reversion of Intellect, to the extent that he seems to interject succession and movement into what is supposed to be a timeless realm of pure essences.

CHAPTER FIVE

ENNEAD V.5[7].7.31-8.27

Introductory Note

This treatise is the third section of the *Großschrift*, comprising III.8[30], V.8[31], V.5[32], and II.9[33], and follows the extensive exploration of intelligible beauty in V.8[31]. The two topics announced in the title of the treatise are treated in the text to be discussed here: “That the Intelligible Objects are not outside Intellect, and on the Nature of the Good.” In the first two chapters P. discusses the truth of Intellect, the identity of Intellect and its objects, and the fact that the intelligible objects are living and thinking beings. Chs. 4-5 analyze Intellect as a realm of ideal number, distinct from the One from which it derives. The utter transcendence, unknowability and ineffability of the One are stressed in Ch. 6: “It would be absurd to seek to comprehend that boundless nature” (14-15). To contemplate the One properly, he goes on to argue, it is necessary to let go of the intelligible (20ff.). However, this application of the negative theology does not eliminate the possibility of truly seeing the One. In Ch. 7, then, P. focuses on the higher kind of interior vision that is capable of apprehending the One, by developing at length the analogy between perception and intellection of the light by which we see in both ways, apart from the objects illuminated by light.

Translation of V.5[32].7.31-8.27

In this way too Intellect, veiling itself from other things and gathering itself inward, without looking at anything, will see a light, not another light in something else, but the light itself suddenly appearing by itself alone, pure and independent, so that it is perplexed whence it has appeared, whether from outside or within, and after it has departed says “it was within and yet it was not within.” 8. But one should not seek whence it comes, for there is no “whence”; for it neither comes nor departs anywhere, but it appears and does not appear. For this reason one must not pursue it, but wait quietly until it appears, preparing oneself for contemplation, as the eye awaits the rising of the sun; and the sun appearing above the horizon—“out of Ocean” say the poets—gives itself to the eyes to see. But from where will he whose image is the sun rise? And what will he rise above when he appears? Surely he appears above Intellect which contemplates him. For Intellect will be stationed towards the vision, looking at nothing but the Beautiful, all turning and giving itself there, and, standing still and filled, in a

way, with strength, it first of all sees itself become more beautiful and glistening, because he is near. But he has not come as one expected, but he came as one who does not come. For he was seen not as coming, but as being present before all things, even before Intellect comes. It is Intellect which comes and again Intellect which departs, because it does not know where it should remain and where he abides, which is in nothing. And if it was possible for Intellect to abide nowhere—not that it is in place: for neither it nor he are in place, but absolutely nowhere—it would always see him, or rather not see him, but be one with him and not two. But in fact, because it is Intellect, it sees him, when it sees him, with that part of itself which is not Intellect. It is truly a wonder how he is present without coming, and how being nowhere, there is nowhere where he is not. One at first can certainly wonder in this way, but it would surprise one who knows if the opposite was true; but rather the opposite is impossible for one to wonder at.

Commentary on V.5[32].7.31-8.27

7.31-35 οὕτω δὴ . . . ἔνδον αἶ. It is at this point in Ch. 7 that the relation between the One and Intellect comes fully into view, but the extensive analogies drawn between αἴσθησις and νόησις earlier in the chapter are to be carefully noted, for they provide the framework for understanding the present passage.

subject	[ψυχή]	νοῦς
external object	τὸ εἶδος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ (2-3) τὸ πεφωτισμένον (7) τὰ ὁρατά (15-16)	τὰ πεφωτισμένα (17)
activity	ὄρασις (1ff.), [αἴσθησις] ὄρασις (16-21) νεύουσα (18)	ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ὄψις (16)
light-source	ἥλιος (11)	ἐκείνη ἡ πρώτη φύσις (17-18)
light/medium	τὸ δι' οὗ (3, 8) δι' οὗ (20)	δι' ἄλλου φωτός (17)
vision of light	ὅς...θεᾶται (23-25; cf. 8) φῶς ὁρᾷ (30)	φῶς καὶ φωτὸς ἀρχὴν ἂν βλέποι (21)
interior activity	ἀθρόα προσβολῇ (8)	θεάσεται...φῶς (32-33; cf. 8.21-23)

P. proceeds to establish these parallels step by step: (1A) αἴσθησις is dual in character, for it has two objects—τὸ αἰσθητόν and the medium of light by which it sees (1-16); (2A) similarly (οὕτως), νόησις is directed to the intelligible

objects and the light from the One which illuminates them (16-22); (1B) he focuses on the light internal to the eye, which is apprehended by not-seeing when external objects are removed from the field of vision (22-31); (2B) similarly (οὕτως), Intellect sees its internal light when it “veils itself” from its objects (31-35).

The analogy between the sun and the Good and between sense-perception and intellection in *Rep.* 507eff. is the direct source for this elaborate series of parallels. However, the emphasis in the present passage on the manifestation of light yields some different formulations. Where Plato stresses that the sun is not vision αἴτιος δ’ ὦν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ταύτης (*Rep.* 508b9-10), P. states that physical light (which comes from the sun) αἴτιον δὲ τῷ εἶδει τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι (Ch. 7.4-5). A slightly different variation on the Platonic text is evident when Plato’s point that sight is ἡλιοειδέστατον of all the sense-organs (*Rep.* 508b3) and ἡλιοειδῆ (509a1) is contrasted with P.’ description of both perceptible and intelligible objects as τὰ πεφωτισμένα (Ch. 7.7 and 17, respectively). In a similar vein, for Plato ἐπιστήμη and ἀλήθεια are ἀγαθοειδῆ (*Rep.* 508e6-509a3), whereas P. stresses that the objects of sight are φωτοειδῆ (Ch. 7.30). For the One as the source of light P. might also have in mind *Rep.* 540a8 where the Good τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, a phrase echoed by ὁ νῶ φῶς παρέχει (VI.7[38].23.1). Note also that Plato’s discussion of the visual ray at *Tim.* 45b-d (cf. also Empedocles Fr. B 84) is the source for the reference in lines 25ff. to the light within the eye that springs out at night or when the eyelids are closed, a point ignored by both Theiler and Cilento. In his note on IV.5[29].7.24ff., where the same phenomenon is discussed (cf. also IV.5[29].2.8ff.), Armstrong neglects the more important Platonic source in favor of Aristotle’s brief mention of phosphorescence at *De An.* B 7.419a2-6, which is much less pertinent.

Before turning to Intellect’s inner vision of the One in the present passage, it will be useful to articulate the two aspects of the Plotinian metaphysics of light presented in Ch. 7 in conjunction with important parallel passages. These are, on the intelligible level, (i) the One as the source of light and (ii) the luminosity of the intelligible world. The sources of sensible and intelligible light are only briefly mentioned in this chapter: the sun (11) and the primary nature (17-18). Elsewhere the procession of Intellect from the One is more explicitly presented in terms of light. Light is conjoined with the double-ἐνέργεια theory in the following: “we shall state that the first activity, which, so to speak, flows from it like a light from the sun, is Intellect and the whole intelligible nature (τὴν μὲν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ οἶον ρυεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν ὥς ἀπὸ ἡλίου φῶς νοῦν θησόμεθα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν), but that he himself, staying still at the summit of the intelligible (ἐπ’ ἄκρῳ τῷ νοητῷ), rules over it; he does thrust the outshining (τὸ ἐκφανέν) away from himself—or we shall make another light before light—but he irradiates (ἐπιλάμπειν) for ever, abiding unchanged over

the intelligible" (V.3[49].12.39-44); "It must be a radiation from it (περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ) while it remains unchanged, like the bright light of the sun which, so to speak, runs round it (οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν ὥσπερ περιθέον), springing from it continually while it remains unchanged" (V.1.[10].6.28-30); the Good is described as αὐγὴ γεννώσα ταῦτα εἰς ὕστερον . . . αὐτὸς δὲ αὐγὴ μόνον γεννώσα νοῦν (VI.7[38].36.22-24; see comm. *ad loc.*); for the Good as the cause of Intellect and intellection, closely following *Rep.* 508e-509b, cf. VI.7[38].16.21-31 and comm. *ad loc.* The representation of procession as περίλαμψις provides that the One's light always streams from it, so that it is always present within and without the intelligible universe; cf. Beierwaltes (1961) 349. The omnipresence of the One's light enables P. to define it as both source and goal.

On the second dimension of the metaphysics of light it, is P.' view that within the intelligible universe itself, considered apart from the One, light is pervasive: "for all things there are transparent (διαφανῆ), and there is nothing dark or opaque; everything and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything; for light is transparent to light (φῶς γὰρ φωτί)" (V.8[31].4.4-6); ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ ζῶη καὶ ἐνέργεια τὸ πρῶτον φῶς ἑαυτῷ λάμπον πρῶτως καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ λαμπηδών, λάμπον ὁμοῦ καὶ λαμπόμενον ("But the life and activity of Intellect is the first light shining primarily for itself and an outshining upon itself, at once illuminating and illuminated": V.3[49].8.36-38); φῶς τὸ νοεῖν (VI.7[38].41.5); cf. also VI.9[9].9.56-58 where the soul in the mystical ascent is said to be φωτὸς πλήρη νοητοῦ. On the basis of the principle of the omnipresence, and continuity, of light, Intellect is the source of light for soul: "So that sun in the divine realm is Intellect (ἦν δὴ νοῦς ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐκεῖ ἥλιος) . . . and next after it is soul, dependent upon it and abiding while Intellect abides" (IV.3[27].11.14-17); what derives from Intellect is φῶς ἐκ φωτός (IV.3[27].17.13-14); and, inverting the usual hierarchy, the One is likened to light, Intellect to the sun, and soul to the moon at V.6[24].4.14-16.

The One as the source of light and the luminosity of all aspects of the intelligible universe are the points of departure for the mystical vision of the One which begins in the present passage. The theophany begins as Intellect αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καλύψας (31), an indication that it is moving away from its normal, intellectual apprehension of the intelligible beings towards the direct, inner awareness of the One (cf. the distinction between νοῦς ἔμφρων and νοῦς ἐρῶν/ἄφρων at VI.7[38].35.24-25). An analogous withdrawal from the apprehension of objects is referred to in the case of sensation in lines 26-27: ὅταν μηδὲν ἐθελήσας τῶν ἄλλων βλέπειν. Intellect's turn to look at the light-medium by which it sees is also expressed earlier: ἀφήσει τὰ ὁρώμενα (20), a phrase that recalls the technical terminology of the negative dialectic at V.3[49].17.38: ἄφελε πάντα.

Simultaneous with Intellect's removal of itself from the vision of the intelligible objects is its turning inwards, συναγαγὼν εἰς τὸ εἶσω (32). Beierwaltes (1961) 337 n9 cites the Platonic περιαγωγή (*Rep.* 521c) as parallel to συναγαγὼν, which he links in turn with ἐπιστροφή. Generally, both Plato and P. envision a turning towards the Good, but I suspect that P. may be adapting, for his own very different purpose, the Platonic συναγωγή, the method of collecting things into a unity in the later dialogues: e.g. *Soph.* 267b1, *Pol.* 267b6, *Phil.* 23e5, 25d6-7. At any rate, his own use of the term leaves no doubt that it is a non-technical expression for gathering things into unity: Parmenides εἰς ταὐτὸ συνῆγεν ὃν καὶ νοῦν (V.1[10].8.16); the goal of the mystical ascent is to be εἰς ἓν συναχθεῖς (VI.9[9].4.23-24); souls on the intelligible level εἰς ἓν πάντα συνάγοντες (V.3[49].6.13-14); it is necessary to ἐπὶ τε τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἀναβεβηκέναι καὶ ἐν ἑκ πολλῶν γενέσθαι ἀρχῆς καὶ ἑνὸς θεατὴν ἐσόμενον ("ascend to the principle in oneself and become one from many, when one is going to behold the Principle and the One": VI.9[9].3.20-22). Unity is not mentioned explicitly in the present passage, but it is implied in the statement that Intellect θεάσεται οὐκ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ φῶς (32-33). We might infer, therefore, that intelligible "difference" is giving way to "sameness."

The phrase εἰς τὸ εἶσω is a signpost for the mystical approach to the One as in the assertion that "the soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within (ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἶσω)" (VI.9[9].7.17-18); τὴν ἐναντίαν δὲ δραμοῦσα ἤξει οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο, ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτήν ("But if it runs the opposite way [sc. "beyond substance"], it will arrive, not at something else but at itself": VI.9[9].11.38-39). The Good, in fact, is to be found only εἶσω ἐν βάθει (VI.8[39].18.3). Turning inwards is the mystical imperative not only because the Good is present within everything, but also because it too εἰς τὸ εἶσω οἷον φέρεται αὐτοῦ ("is, if we may say so, borne to his own interior": VI.8[39].16.12-13; cf. comm. *ad loc.*).

That Intellect's normal intelligible vision is undergoing a radical transformation is indicated by the phrase μηδὲν ὁρῶν, which parallels what occurs to the eye when it turns inward: τότε γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶν ὁρᾷ καὶ μάλιστα τότε ὁρᾷ· φῶς γὰρ ὁρᾷ (29-30). Intellect too sees light, but it is soon enveloped by the light and the distinctions between subject/object and inner/outer instantly break down. This hyper-noetic mode of cognition is analogous to the ἀθρόα προσβολή (8) attributed to the eye turned upon itself. The same term defines Intellect's intuitive apprehension of the One at III.8[30].10.33 as does its synonym ἐπιβολή at III.8[30].9.21 and VI.7[38].35.21 (cf. comm. *ad locc.*).

At this point the disappearance of the distinction between subject and object, between Intellect and light, is dramatized by the sudden appearance of the inner light of the One in ἀλλ' . . . φανέν (33-34), a passage heavily indebted to the Platonic account of the vision of τὸ καλόν at *Symp.* 210e2ff., as the remarkable

verbal correspondences attest: ἐξαίφνης κατόψεται τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν (210e4-5); οὐδὲ τις λόγος οὐδὲ τις ἐπιστήμη . . . ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν (211a7-b2); αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρὸν, ἄμεικτον (211e1). Note also that Intellect is situated ἐν φωτὶ καθαρῷ at III.8[30].11.26-27; cf. comm. *ad loc.* That the luminous reality apprehended is for P. beyond being is emphasized in a direct quotation of the Platonic text: ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μονοειδές, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνείδεον πρὸ εἶδους ὄν παντός (VI.9[9].3.43-44). The suddenness with which P. himself experienced the appearance of the light may also have been confirmed by Plato *Ep. VII* 341c7-d1, which speaks of knowledge communicated to pupil from teacher οἶον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς; cp. ἐξ αὐτοῦ προπηδήσαντος (Ch. 7.26). Numenius' account of an instantaneous vision of the Good, which is likened to a ship appearing amidst the waves of the sea, also may have influenced P., though less directly: οἶον εἴ τις ἐπὶ σκοπῇ καθήμενος ναῦν ἀλιάδα βραχεῖαν τινα τούτων τῶν ἐπακτρίδων τῶν μόνων μίαν, μόνην, ἔρημον, μετακυμίοις ἐχομένην ὅξυ δεδορκῶς μιᾷ βολῇ κατεῖδε τὴν ναῦν, οὕτως δεῖ τινα ἀπελθόντα πόρρω ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁμιλῆσαι τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνῳ μόνον (Fr. 2.7-12; cf. Festugière [1954] 129). If nothing else, the Numenian passage illustrates the imaginative and verbal resources available to later Platonists in the *Symposium* for their composition of accounts of visionary episodes.

The sudden appearance of the One or its light in the soul is referred to several times by P.: ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς λάβη (V.3[49].17.28-29); ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξαίφνης φανέντα—μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἅμφω· οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι (“and it sees it in itself suddenly appearing—for there is nothing between, nor are there still two but both are one”: VI.7[38].34.12-14). The latter passage is especially important for establishing that the boundaries between the soul and the One are obliterated, a notion that is implicit, though not clearly stated, in the present passage. The radical transformation of intelligible vision which occurs in mystical apprehension is suggested in the following: established in beauty and raised upon the wave of Intellect the soul εἰσείδεν ἐξαίφνης οὐκ ἰδὼν ὅπως, ἀλλ' ἡ θεὰ πλῆσασα φωτὸς τὰ ὄμματα οὐ δι' αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο ὄραν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς τὸ ὄραμα ἦν (“he sees suddenly, not seeing how, but the vision fills his eyes with light and does not make him see something else by it, but the light itself is what he sees”: VI.7[38].36.18-21; cf. comm. *ad loc.*). Hadot and Beierwaltes articulate well the epistemological implications of the luminous character of these theophanic events: “La vision est lumière et la lumière est vision. Il y a sorte d'autovision de la lumière: la lumière est comme transparente a elle-même” (Hadot [1963a] 82); “‘Nichts sehend’ sieht der Geist, weil Licht nicht als gegenständliches Etwas zu fassen ist, weil es nicht einem Anderen als Beschaffenheit innewohnt, sondern in sich seiend nur es selbst ist und nur von

sich selbst her scheinend ist. Licht ist licht, weil es einig in sich selbst ist. Nicht-Sehen aber ist die dem in sich seienden Licht allein entsprechende Weise des Sehens, das nicht mit Hilfe des Lichtes sieht, sondern nichtsehend-sehend mit ihm eins ist" (Beierwaltes [1961] 343). For a thorough conspectus of the passages illustrating the use of light imagery cf. Ferwerda 46-61. He argues, at 60-61 and 127-28, against Beierwaltes' theory of a "Lichtmetaphysik" in favor of the view that P. uses light figuratively, but I prefer Beierwaltes' interpretation.

Though P.' use of ἐξάφνης most likely stems from his close reading of the passages from the *Symposium* and *Ep.VII* cited above, I think it is not implausible that Plato's analysis of τὸ ἐξάφνης in the *Parmenides* may also have influenced him, especially given the great importance of this dialogue, not only for P. but also for the later Neoplatonists. Note that the relevant passage concerns the One of the Second Hypothesis, which for P. is equivalent to Intellect: "this queer thing, the instant (ἡ ἐξάφνης αὐτή), is situated between the motion and the rest; it occupies no time at all; and the transition of the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing to being in motion, takes place *to* and *from* the instant. Accordingly, the One, since it both is at rest and is in motion, must pass from the one condition to the other . . . and when it passes, it makes the transition instantaneously (μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξάφνης μεταβάλλει)" (*Parm.* 156d6-e5, tr. Cornford). Now it may be true, as Cornford (1939) 203 argues, that "Plato's businesslike account of the instant" cannot be "connected with the 'sudden vision' of the Beautiful," but P.' penchant for reading his Platonic source-texts selectively and combining them in idiosyncratic ways does not preclude such a conclusion in this case.

How, then, might the Platonic concept of "the instant" have shaped P.' account of the sudden appearance of the One's light? Two possibilities present themselves. First, Intellect's transition from its normal, actualized mode of existence to its hyper-noetic awareness of the One must occur in a timeless, durationless "moment." This fits rather well with the Platonic account that the transitional moment must be non-temporal, though Plato is concerned with the instant between changes as they occur in the realm of Becoming. It is possible, however, that P. could read the statement that the instant "is situated between the motion and the rest" as referring to aspects of Intellect, which, in the present passage, it transcends. Such a reading seems at least possible in light of P.' view that Intellect passes through various stages of its life, not least the intelligible (non-spatial and non-temporal) movement between subject and object. Second, that the Platonic instant contributes towards understanding the presence of the Form to particular things can be adapted by P. to explain the presence of the One to Intellect. Miller 118-19 states this point very well: "since, again, change requires the 'instant' as moment of transition, the 'instant' will be constantly present throughout the thing's existence. Thus what first appears as the saturation of the temporal stretch by countless 'instants' also appears . . . as the

everpresence of the ‘instant’ . . . In the ‘instant’ . . . it [i.e. the thing] has neither of any of the contraries as a character but, rather *is* the atemporal One of hypothesis I; that is, in the ‘instant’, the form . . . is present in the particular” author’s italics. This interpretation of the Platonic text makes it analogous to P.’ doctrine of the One’s presence; it is only necessary to substitute Intellect for “thing” and the One for “form,” a move that P. is not averse to making, as we saw above in his use of the vision of the Beautiful in the *Symposium*. I admit, however, that the relevance of the Platonic instant must remain speculative, since P. never discusses it explicitly. It does seem to be on P.’ mind in VI.1[42].16, but there the context is very different from the present one; on the relation between *Parm.* 156de and this text cf. Charrue 106-08.

In the concluding two lines of Ch. 7, P. combines the irruption in Intellect of the hyper-ontic light of the One in the timeless instant with the suggestion that the spatial categories of within and without cease to apply. The explanation for the oscillation between within and without is that Intellect is approaching union with the One but has not yet achieved it. Intellect is increasingly aware of the presence of the One’s light within it, but, because it sees that it is enveloped by this light, it almost seems as if the light is distinct from itself. The tension between these two perspectives continues in the next few lines.

8.1-4 ἢ οὐ . . . εἶναι. The transcendence of all ontological categories that P. proposes to explore in this chapter is announced in the assertion that “there is no whence.” The perplexity (ἀπορεῖν: Ch. 7.34) Intellect experiences at not being able to determine whence the light appears is not satisfied, but summarily rejected: οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν (1), οὐ χρὴ διώκειν (3). Instead there is the injunction “to wait quietly until it appears.” The active, seeking character of Intellect is supplanted by receptivity, as in VI.7[38].35.20-25 where the νοῦς ἐρῶν apprehends the One ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ; cp. δεξάμενος φῶς ἀληθινὸν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν περιφωτίσαν διὰ τὸ ἐγγυτέρω γεγονέναι (VI.9[9].4.20-21). The phrase ἡσυχῇ μένειν is also significant, for the One is often said to remain quietly within itself: cf. V.4[7].2.13, 21-22, 26, 33-34; at I.7[54].1.14 the Good lies ἐν ἡσυχῳ. Moreover, the One’s στάσις (V.4.[7].2.18) parallels Intellect’s: note ἐστήξεται (9) and στάς (11) below. In one passage the two notions are intimately connected: ὥσπερ ἀρπασθεῖς ἢ ἐνθουσιάσας ἡσυχῇ ἐν ἐρήμῳ καὶ καταστάσει γεγένηται ἀτρεμεῖ . . . ἐστὼς πάντα καὶ οἶον στάσις γινόμενος (VI.9[9].11.12-16). The assimilation of Intellect or soul to the One is revealed in the former taking on the latter’s attributes: διὸ οὐδὲ κινεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ τότε, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο. οὐδὲ ψυχὴ τοίνυν, ὅτι μηδὲ ζῇ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ τὸ ζῆν (VI.7[38].35.42-43).

The assertion that one must be “prepared” (παρασκευάσαντα) for mystical union with the One is common: “for that One is not absent from any, and absent from all, so that in its presence it is not present except to those who are able and

prepared to receive it (τοῖς δέχεσθαι δυναμένοις καὶ παρεσκευασμένοις)” (VI.9[9].4.24-26); the One appears “when that soul turns away from the things that are there, and has prepared (παρασκευάσασα) by making itself as beautiful as possible and has come to likeness—the preparation and the adornment (ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ κόσμησις) are clearly understood, I think, by those who are preparing themselves (τοῖς παρασκευαζομένοις)” (VI.7[38].34.10-12). Theiler considers παρασκευάζειν a “Mysterienausdruck,” though he provides no evidence. However, his reference to Porphyry is significant: παρασκευαστέον δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ κοσμητέον εἰς καταδοχὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιτήδειον (*Ad Marcellam* §19, *Des Places* 117.15-16 = Nauck 287.6-7; cf. also 125.4 *Des Places*). On Porphyry’s traditional piety in this work and its differences from P.’ spirituality see the trenchant remarks of Smith (1974) 104-05.

8.4-9 ὥσπερ . . . θεώμενον. The motionless and receptive state of Intellect is dictated in part by the image P. has chosen to represent the manifestation of the Good. It must wait for the sudden appearance of the sun rising above the horizon. What he wants to communicate with the analogy of Good and sun is Intellect’s vision of the Good itself, no longer the distorted image of the Good which Intellect receives during the reversion. In the terms of the analogy P. intends to go beyond the Platonic claim that “that body of Helios is seen by all, his soul by none” (*Laws* 898d).

The visionary geography P. employs to articulate this theophanic event warrants comment, especially since it has attracted little attention. The terms ὀρίζων and Ὀκεανός are integrated into a symbolic internalization of archaic astronomical and cosmological perspectives. Derived from the verb ὀρίζειν, ὀρίζων literally means “separating circle” (*LSJ*), as e.g. in Aristotle *De Caelo* B 14.298a1: ὁ ὀρίζων κύκλος. The horizon is the circular boundary where the heaven meets the spherical earth. This is imaginatively combined with the reference to Ὀκεανός, the primordial river circling the earth, which expresses the archaic concept of cosmic limits; see the excellent discussion by Onians 315-17. As H-S note this is a quotation from Homer *Iliad* VII.422; cf. also *Iliad* XIV.201, 246, 302; XXIII.205; *Odyssey* XI.13, 639; XIII.1; Hesiod *Theogony* 133ff., 337ff. The notion of Ὀκεανός as a bond or limit continues to possess a symbolic resonance in two passages quoted by Onians 316: ὁ Ὀκεανός . . . σφίγγει τὴν οἰκουμένην (Ps.-Aristotle *De Mundo* 393b); Ὀκεανός, τῷ πᾶσα περίρρυτος ἐνδέδεται χθών (Porphyry, schol. *ad Il.* XVIII.490). Theiler refers to Krates of Mallos as identifying Ὀκεανός with the horizon, citing Strabo IV; but, so far as I can determine, there is no discussion of Krates or Ὀκεανός in that section of Strabo. As a scientific allegorizer of Homer, Krates may very well have made the identification. In any case, Strabo does identify the

two explicitly in I.1.6, apparently drawing on the view of Heraclitus the allegorist; cf. Buffière 215-16.

On P.' quotation of Homer in this passage Lamberton 96 observes: "its primary function is undoubtedly the placing of the imaginatively charged diction of Homer at the service of the intellectual and imaginative demands Plotinus places upon his audience, to provide a substantial and physical image of extraordinary scale and beauty *beyond* which Plotinus can strive to make his own point" author's italics. I think it is possible to specify further how P. employs the image as reflecting his metaphysical doctrine. In identifying Intellect with the horizon he evokes the archaic associations of horizon (as well as ὤκεανός) with ὄρος and πέρας. Both terms designate the limits and definition of the intelligible universe. Further resonance is evident in the analogy between the horizon as limiting circle and Intellect as circle; cf. III.8[30].8.36ff. In this image, therefore, the horizon of Intellect denotes the boundary of its reality, the point where it meets what is beyond it in the image of the Good rising above it.

The imaginative play with the imagery of horizon and sun raises the question whether this passage is an account of P.' own mystical experience or an adaptation of traditional religious practice—or a combination of both. Considerable evidence for prayer to the rising sun is assembled by Festugière (1954) 245 n3, including Alcibiades' account of Socrates at *Symp.* 220d4; for examples in the Hermetic tradition cf. Fowden 145, 159. Proclus certainly prayed to the sun assiduously (Marinus, *Vita Procli* XXII), and in the following passage from the *Platonic Theology* it is possible to see a fusion of ritualistic practice and a metaphysically based spirituality: "And being at rest there and having transcended the intelligible object, if indeed there is something of such a nature in us, and lying prostrate as if before the rising sun with eyes closed—for it is not permitted for us to look at it directly anymore than it is for any other beings—having seen then the sun of the light of the intelligible gods shining forth from Ocean, as the poets say" (*In Plat. Theol.* II.11.64.19-65.2, my translation). This passage echoes the Plotinian account both in language and imagery (cf. the excellent notes by Saffrey-Westerink II.119-22), but the ritualistic elements—the closed eyes and prostration—are absent in the present passage. This is not to say that Proclus' religiosity is mechanical and ritualistic and without a strong foundation in philosophical contemplation, but there is still some difference between P. and Proclus. While there is precedent in the Plotinian text, including Ch. 7, for almost every aspect of Proclus' mystical recital, the latter is imbued with the scholastic tone that is typical of Proclus. For Proclus' combination of philosophy and theurgy I agree with the balanced perspective articulated by Sheppard 218-22, Smith (1974) 111-21, and Festugière (1966) and (1968) against Dodds (1951) 291ff., who sees Procline theurgy as essentially magical in character; cf. Sheppard 212 n3 for references to other scholars who continue to share Dodds's view.

I suspect that this visionary narrative is based on P.' own mystical experience of the One, into which he has woven traditional religious elements. There are also strong grounds for considering this fusion of experience and imaginatively shaped traditional motifs as another example of P.' spiritual exercises or creative visualizations; cf. especially Wallis (1976). The most famous examples, in V.8[31].9 and VI.4[22].7, involve the dematerialization and despatialization of a sphere to symbolize the omnipresence of intelligible light. The latter is quite relevant to the present passage. When one mentally removes the corporeal mass which transmits light from the center of a sphere "You will no longer rest in your thought on the place where it was before, and you will not any more say where it comes from or where it is going (καὶ οὔτε ἔτι ἐρεῖς ὅθεν οὔτε ὅπῃ), but you will be puzzled and put in amazement when, fixing your gaze now here and now there in the spherical body you yourself perceive the light" (VI.4[22].7.35-39); "the light would be everywhere as one and the same; it would have no beginning and no starting-point anywhere" (46-47). P. refers to the same inability of Intellect to discern the source of light in the present passage.

An interesting parallel to P.' image of the rising sun occurs in the great Persian mystical poet Rumi: "The Sun of Divine Knowledge has no motion: its place of rising is nowhere but the spirit and the intellect; especially the perfect Sun which is beyond: day and night its action is illumination" (*Mathnawi* II.43-44).

8.9-13 ἐστήξεται . . . αὐτοῦ. By its proximity to the One Intellect sees itself becoming more beautiful, a point often stressed in accounts of mystical progress towards the One. But the role beauty plays in the mystical ascent is complex. First, it is axiomatic for P. that Intellect's beauty comes from the One: ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ νοητῷ ἐπιστῖλβον [sc. τὸ ἀγαθόν] (VI.7[38].36.15). This is especially apparent to the ascending soul which sees that "since all things were made beautiful by that which was before them and held its light, Intellect held the splendence of its intelligent activity, with which it illumined its nature" (VI.7[38].31.1-3); "But when it sees the beauties here flowing past it, it already knows completely that they have the light which plays on them from elsewhere" (27-29); "There certainly it sees that all things are beautiful and true and gains greater strength, since it is filled with the life of real being, and has become truly real itself also, and has true awareness (σύνεσιν ὄντως), and it perceives that it is near to what it has long been seeking" (31-34). These statements, which reflect the perspective of the ascending soul, are quite relevant to the present passage. Once established in the intelligible world, the soul moves ever closer to the One the more it seeks the source of the light and beauty it sees in Intellect, a movement poignantly described in the reference to the beauties flowing past it. The soul's vision here is thoroughly mystical, as it gains greater strength to move beyond Intellect to the One. Despite the fact that Intellect's state in the present passage is static (ἐστήξεται: 9, σταῖς: 11), it is essentially the same as the

ascending soul's in its growing strength and luminosity: Intellect is moving closer to the One. But given the image of the rising sun which P. has chosen to represent this theophany, Intellect is described as waiting and as not moving.

But there is another aspect of intelligible beauty which bears upon the progress of the mystical ascent as it unfolds later in this chapter. Though not clearly stated here, the fact that Intellect ultimately sees the Good by transcending itself (see below lines 22-23) is related to the view that the beauty of Intellect can become a hindrance for the ascending soul, a transient stage it must pass through and beyond if it is to attain the One. In his earliest treatise, I.6[1] "On Beauty," P. describes how the soul must become beautiful and intelligible in its ascent to the Good, but ultimately it must realize that "That which is beyond this we call the nature of the Good, which holds beauty as a screen before it" (I.6[1].9.37-39). Even stronger objections are registered in the later treatises: "in the higher world also the Good itself does not need beauty, though beauty needs it . . . Beauty brings wonder and shock and pleasure mingled with pain. It even draws those who do not know what is happening away from the Good" (V.5[32].12.32-36). For the soul on its way to the Good intelligible beauties only "becomes desirable when the Good colours it, giving a kind of grace (*χάριτας δόντος*) to them . . . Before this it is not moved even towards Intellect, for all its beauty: the beauty of Intellect is inactive till it catches a light from the Good, and the soul by itself 'falls flat on its back' and is completely inactive, and, though Intellect is present, is unenthusiastic about it" (VI.7[38].22.6-14).

Armstrong (1975a) 162 makes good sense of these startling statements in suggesting that P. must "be talking about varying attitudes of our selves to intelligible beauty rather than giving variant objective accounts of that beauty itself and its relation to the Good." I would put the matter somewhat differently. That intelligible beauty must be transcended indicates that, for the ascending soul, beauty becomes ontologically and hence objectively inferior to the Good. The "divine boredom," as Armstrong describes it, experienced by the soul is an objectively more accurate view of things, because the reality of the Good is ontologically superior to that of Intellect. Thus, we must, as Armstrong goes on to argue, "always look beyond beauty when we contemplate it to the source of its radiance, travelling ever onwards till we reach the spring of living light; then the eros which beauty properly excites in us will be the true eros which comes from and will lead us back to the Good"; cf. also his discussion of these passages in (1973) 20-22. It is true that the erotic dimension of P.'s mysticism is absent from the present context, but ultimate attainment of the One on the part of Intellect necessitates its self-transcendence just as certainly as it does in the case of the soul. Hence the need for Intellect to move beyond its own beauty by seeing how this radiance derives from its source.

The assertion that Intellect's proximity to the Good entails its "being filled with strength" (*πληρωθεὶς μένους*) is noteworthy. Being filled or completed is

one of P.' ways of indicating the actualization of the inchoate Intellect in its reversion to the One; cf. V.1[10].7.15-17 and III.8[30].11.8. Here he intensifies the filling, as it were, by adding the word μένος, the only instance of the term in the *Enneads*. The word is Homeric, but it could be another borrowing from the *Chaldaean Oracles*: cf. Fr. 82.2 and comm. by Lewy 131 n247; and for the many synonymous designations of power in the *Chaldaean Oracles* cf. Lewy 440 n140. Lewy notes that in his *Philosophy of the Oracles* II Porphyry quotes a mystic hymn which attributes μένος to the Paternal Intellect: "Ineffable Father of the immortals, Eternal, Mystes, O Lord, Thou who ridest on the etheral back of the revolving worlds where the Vigour of Thy Strength (Ἀλκῆς Μένος) is fixed" (*Theosophia Tubingensis* No. 27.1-3 Buresch, tr. Lewy 9-10). The Chaldaean ascription of strength to the Supreme Intellect (on which cf. further Lewy's fine discussion 85-86) might have seemed particularly attractive to P., though, of course, he employs the term with respect to Intellect's relation to the One, unlike the Chaldaean scheme in which the Supreme Intellect exercises its power and strength over the lower orders of being.

Despite Intellect's waiting quietly for the appearance of the One, it is also evident that it must give itself to the vision: ἐκεῖ ἑαυτὸν πᾶς τρέπων καὶ διδούς (11); cp. ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ at VI.9[9].11.23. This act is a specific reciprocation for the eternal giving (ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν: 6) of the One. The One's giving should not be interpreted as a consciously willed act, but neither should we conclude that soul, or Intellect, attains the One simply by its own unaided effort. Specifically, the nature/grace antinomy should not be applied in the interpretation of P.' spirituality, for there is nothing "natural," in the strict sense of the term, about the soul's mystical awareness of the intelligible universe, let alone its hyper-ontic union with the One. Defining this experience as "supernatural" and "revelatory"—because it depends on the presence of the One—in no way compromises the radical transcendence of the One nor ascribes to it a voluntaristic concern for other realities. Yet, with Trouillard, it is still possible to speak of "grace": "Négation et dialectique, qui procèdent de ce sommet y ramènent, peuvent être regardées à ce titre comme des 'grâces', tandis que négation et conversion semblent impliquer un don de soi et un accueil de la grâce" (1955a) 66. For more extensive discussion of the inappropriateness of the nature/grace distinction in the interpretation of Plotinian mysticism cf. Trouillard (1955b) 122-32 and Armstrong (1957) 127-30.

8.13-16 ὁ δὲ . . . ἐλθεῖν. Because P. initially represents the manifestation of the One within the symbolic time and space suggested by the image of the rising sun, he must now acknowledge the limits of the analogy. And this he does with the oxymoron "coming without coming." (For numerous examples of oxymoron in the *Enneads* cf. Schwyzer [1951] 523.) From Intellect's perspective the One does come, because it suddenly appears, unexpectedly; but

in reality the One does not move towards Intellect because it is present before all things (15). Cp. *Isa Upanishad* Ch. 5: “The One moves and does not move; it is remote and near; it is within and beyond all things.”

8.16-21 εἶναι . . . ἐκεῖνον βλέπων. This coming and going of Intellect refers to attaining and falling away from union with the One; cf. ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων (III.8[30].11.24-25) and comm. *ad loc.* The One, however, is always there, always abiding within itself, which Intellect, because of its dualistic thinking, tries to seize upon as an object distinct from itself. But the One transcends all duality and every perspective, including “place”; so does Intellect, as P. is quick to add in the parenthesis at lines 19-20. This qualification is necessary because of the locative adverbs P. employs in this account. Like Intellect the One is beyond space and time, but the latter is always ἐν οὐδενί (18). This is the correlate of the familiar assertion that the One is not one of all things and that nothing is in it (cf. V.2[11].1.1-5). The adverbial expression of this same notion—that the One is οὐδαμοῦ—is elaborated in the opening section of VI.8[39].16: “this is everywhere and again is nowhere” (πανταχοῦ τε εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ αὖ εἶναι οὐδαμοῦ: 1-2); “For if he is nowhere, he has not happened to be anywhere, and if he is everywhere, he is as much as he is everywhere: so that the ‘everywhere’ and ‘in every way’ are himself; he is not in that everywhere, but is this himself and gives the others their being there with him in the everywhere” (εἰ γὰρ μηδαμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκε, καὶ εἰ πανταχοῦ, ὅσος ἐστὶν αὐτός, τοσοῦτος πανταχοῦ· ὥστε τὸ πανταχοῦ καὶ τὸ πάντῃ αὐτός, οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὧν τῷ πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς ὧν τοῦτο καὶ δοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τῷ πανταχοῦ παρακεῖσθαι: 4-8; cf. comm. *ad loc.*). We are not to conclude, P. urges us here, that the One’s omnipresence is a predicate or that the One is nothing at all. He warns especially against the latter inference in another mystical context: “in proportion as the soul goes towards the formless, since it is utterly unable to comprehend it because it is not delimited and, so to speak, stamped by a richly varied stamp, it slides away and is afraid that it may have nothing at all (ἐξολισθάνει καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει)” (VI.9[9].3.4-6). In the present passage too, Intellect is approaching the formlessness of the One, leaving behind its beauty and formal differentiation; hence its inability to know where to stand.

8.21-23 καίτοι . . . νῶ. When Intellect ceases to see, P. argues, its duality vanishes and it becomes unified with the One. But then he adds, somewhat confusingly, that when it sees the One, it does so “with that part of itself which is not Intellect.” It would seem that there is a distinction here between union with the One and even the sort of hyper-noetic vision Intellect now enjoys. The implications of this passage are difficult to construe with any certainty, but it is best to begin with the notorious problem of Intellect’s non-intellectual part.

When he wishes to describe Intellect's mystical communion with the One, P. differentiates a non-intellectual aspect of Intellect: when it has attained the transcendental state the soul is able καθαρώ τῷ νῷ τὸ καθαρώτατον θεᾶσθαι καὶ τοῦ νοῦ τῷ πρώτῳ (VI.9[9].3.26-27); οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς κινδυνεύομεν ἔχειν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὅταν νοῦν καθαρὸν ἔχωμεν, χρώμενοι, ὡς οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον νοῦς ("so we seem to be disposed towards the One, divining, when we have our intellect pure, that this is the inner intellect": V.3[49].14.13-15); εἰ ἐθέλοι ἐκεῖνο ὁρᾶν, μὴ πάντα νοῦν εἶναι (III.8[30].9.32; see comm. *ad loc.*). This "primary part of Intellect" is synonymous with the νοῦς ἐρῶν (VI.7[38].35.24). These passages present a cluster of recurring, non-technical terms and phrases: a higher mode of seeing, enveloped in light and apprehending no discrete object; an emphasis on interiority and purity; and the upward-driving force of mystical eros. The mode of apprehension P. attributes to this quasi-faculty or part of Intellect is defined as ἐπιβολή (III.8[30].9.21-22, VI.7[38].35.21), προσβολή, and σύνεσις (III.8[30].10.33-35).

What is the difference, then, between the vision of this non-intellectual aspect of Intellect and being unified with the One? Rist argues that in the mystical ascent to the One P. subordinates vision to touching and contact, which is normally expressed by the words ἐφάψασθαι, θιγεῖν, ἐπαφή or ἀφή: cf. VI.9[9].4.27, 7.4, 8.19-29, 9.19, 11.24-25; VI.7[38].36.4, 39.19-20, 40.2; V.3[49].10.41-44. On his view "The aim of the mystic is not a *seeing*, but a *being*. It is not vision but union which is the goal and end of life. Hence Plotinus has to say . . . that this language of vision, of seeing, of contemplation, is inadequate . . . Our aim is not to see the One, but to be 'oned', as later mystics would have translated it" (1967) 221, author's italics. Certainly, P. argues consistently that in the mystical union the dualistic intellection which never apprehends the One as it truly is must be transcended, but it is quite doubtful, in my estimation, that P. would subscribe to Rist's hard and fast distinction, particularly in light of the following passages, some of which Rist refers to briefly in his discussion. Touching and seeing can be complementary: the soul's true end is ἐφάψασθαι φωτὸς ἐκείνου καὶ αὐτῷ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι, οὐκ ἄλλου φωτί, ἀλλ' αὐτό, δι' οὗ καὶ ὁρᾷ ("to touch that light and see it by itself, not by another light, but by the light which is also its means of seeing": (V.3[49].17.34-37). Seeing, in fact, is said to be *identical* with "being one with the One": "But when the soul wants to see by itself, seeing only by being with it and being one by being one with it (καθ' ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἰδεῖν ἐθέλῃ, μόνον ὁρῶσα τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐν οὖσα τῷ ἐν εἶναι αὐτῷ), it does not think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought" (VI.9[9].3.10-13). At the culmination of the mystical ascent, when the soul transcends Intellect and intellection, it still sees: τὸ δὲ ἴσως ἦν οὐ θέαμα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν, ἔκστασις καὶ ἀπλωσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔφεσις πρὸς ἀφὴν καὶ

στάσις καὶ περινόησις πρὸς ἐφαρμογήν, εἴπερ τις τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ θεάσεται (“But that other, perhaps, was not a contemplation but another kind of seeing, a being out of oneself and simplifying and giving oneself over and pressing towards contact and rest and a sustained thought leading to adaptation, if one is going to contemplate what is in the sanctuary”: VI.9[9].11.22-25). Here contemplation within the sanctuary and another kind of seeing are indistinguishable from contact; and this reference to another kind of seeing is identical, it seems to me, with the argument in the present context that the light itself is the vision, i.e. the One as enveloping light which cannot be seen as a distinct object.

It is important to recognize the antecedent of “that other” which appears earlier in this passage: ἐπεὶ τοίνυν δύο οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἧν αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδὼν πρὸς τὸ ἑωραμένον, ὥς ἂν μὴ ἑωραμένον, ἀλλ’ ἡνωμένον (“Since, then, there were not two, but the seer himself was one with the seen—for it was not really seen, but united to him”: VI.9[9].11.4-6). I suggest that P.’ ambivalence here, and in the other passages cited below, about the persistence of seeing in mystical union derives in part, as Rist argues correctly, from the duality of subject and object inherent in the process of seeing. P. is wrestling with the very difficult problem of bridging the gap between the One and Intellect. His solution is to articulate a higher part of Intellect and a higher mode of apprehension so that there is something which can be said to experience the mystical union. Hence seeing, albeit a completely transformed type of seeing, persists in the mystical union: the soul εἰδήσει ὡς ἀρχῇ ἀρχὴν ὀρθῇ καὶ συγγίνεται τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον (“will know that he sees principle by principle and that like is united with like”: VI.9[9].11.31-32). Here, on the one hand, the soul’s vision is within and of the One, but, on the other hand, a minimal duality seems to be present in the reference to the conjunction of two like things. The same tension determines the following extensive discussion of seeing and mystical union: “seeing and that which has seen are not reason (τὸ δὲ ἰδεῖν καὶ τὸ ἑωρακός ἐστιν οὐκέτι λόγος), but greater than reason and before reason and above reason, as is that which is seen. When therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see himself as like this, or rather he will be in union with himself as like this and will be aware of himself as like this since he has become single and simple. But perhaps one should not say ‘will see’, but ‘was seen’, if one must speak of these as two, the seer and the seen, and not both as one—a bold statement. So then the seer does not see (τότε μὲν οὖν οὔτε ὀρθῇ) and does not distinguish and does not imagine two, but it is as if he had become someone else and he is not himself and does not count as his own there, but has come to belong to that and so is one, having joined, as it were, centre to centre (ἀλλ’ οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς οὐδ’ αὐτοῦ συντελεῖ ἐκεῖ, κάκεινου γενόμενος ἓν ἐστιν ὥσπερ κέντρῳ κέντρον συνάψας)” (VI.9[9].10.7-17). The same definition of hyper-noetic vision (by analogy with sense-perception of the light-medium) as

“not seeing” occurs in Ch. 7: τότε γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶν ὁρᾷ καὶ μάλιστα τότε ὁρᾷ (29), μηδὲν ὁρῶν θεάσεται (32). Moreover, the same imperceptible, and instantaneous, transition from seeing to union occurs here, in the present passage, and in the following: “But the soul sees by a kind of confusing and annulling the intellect which abides within it—but rather its intellect sees first and the vision comes to it and the two become one (μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς ὁρᾷ πρῶτος, ἔρχεται δὲ ἡ θεὰ καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ δύο ἐν γίνεται)” (VI.7[38].35.33-36; see further comm. *ad loc.*). In many of these passages P. is not as explicit as he might be in stating clearly whether or not transcendent, hyper-noetic vision is subordinate to or essentially synonymous with the mystical union, but the preponderance of the evidence convinces me that the latter conclusion is to be preferred.

Further support for this view can be gleaned from a proper understanding of the phrase “the two become one.” The passages from VI.9[9] and VI.7[38] cited above strongly suggest that in the mystical union only unity exists, i.e. the reality of the One itself. If hyper-noetic vision, as the activity of the higher part of Intellect, persists even in the state of mystical union, this is because there is seeing in the One itself (cf. VI.8[39].16.20-21 and comm. *ad loc.*) as well as because there is “something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect” (VI.8[39].18.21-22); cf. comm. on VI.8[39].16.15-16. P. finds himself in considerable difficulty when he tries to articulate adequately the sort of consciousness which exists in the state of mystical union, because his linguistic and conceptual resources are almost completely limited to those which pertain to the intelligible universe. In the present passage, however, he simply says the two become one, without specifying anything about the hyper-noetic mystical union. For a clear picture we must turn to VI.8[39].16 *passim*.

8.23-27 θαῦμα . . . ὧδε. The conclusion of the chapter reiterates the omnipresence theory, with the addition of the observation that we should not be surprised that the ultimate significance of the One’s presence is revealed in its theophany and the mystical union which follows. Hence the reference to τῷ γνόντι (25) indicates that the previous account of the mystical vision of the One is based upon experience. Particularly in mystical contexts—but extending as well to the metaphysical aspects of the relation of the One and Intellect—P. often refers to the experiential foundations of theory: ὅστις δὲ εἶδεν, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω (“Whoever has seen, knows what I mean”: VI.9[9].9.46-47).

CHAPTER SIX

ENNEAD VI.7[38].16-17

Introductory Note

In scope and depth this is the most impressive single treatise in the *Enneads*. Like the slightly earlier III.8[30], this treatise is an ascent from the sensible to the intelligible world and thence to the Good: “How the multitude of the Forms came into being and on the Good.” Here P. explores the themes of ontological derivation, the relation between image and archetype, and the mystical return of the soul to the Good with great rigour, speculative flair and emotional intensity.

The discussion of the relation between the sensible and intelligible worlds in the first twelve chapters focuses so intensely on finding the sources for all sensible realities—both activities and individual things—in the intelligible that, as Armstrong felicitously puts in his introduction to the treatise, “in the end we are left with the very strong impression that for Plotinus there are not two worlds but one real world apprehended in different ways on different levels.” The point of departure is Plato’s account of the creation of the universe and the embodiment of the soul in the *Timaeus*. In his analysis of the generation of the sensible world P. presents the soul’s procession from Intellect in dramatic terms. Everything already exists in a perfect and eternal form in the intelligible universe. The unity of cause and effect in the intelligible obviates the literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*’ creation account and thereby precludes the attribution of deliberation to Intellect and its creativity (Chs. 1-3). The composite nature of man (Chs. 4-5) and animals (Chs. 6, 8-10) is derived directly from human and animal existence on the intelligible level; even sense-perception exists there, an extraordinary view that culminates in the assertion that “these sense-perceptions here are dim intellections, but the intellections there are clear sense-perceptions” (Ch. 7.29-31).

Exploration of the close correspondences between the sensible and intelligible worlds is the springboard into the intelligible world itself, the source of the soul’s life which is “boiling with life” (Ch. 12.23-24). But in order to contain this universal life and complexity Intellect must be a one-many (Chs. 12-13). P. then makes the transition from the intelligible world as archetype of the sensible world to Intellect as product of the One. The soul ascends to the pure Intellect, and, finding its true self there, seeks to discover the source of intellectual goodness (Ch. 15). At this juncture, as in III.8[30].8, further progress in the ascent requires an explanation of how Intellect came to be.

Translation of VI.7[38].16-17

16. But one must not always remain in this multiple beauty but ascend further rushing upwards, discarding even this, not out of this heaven, but out of that, in wonder as to who generated it and how. Each thing there is a form, and each is a sort of distinctive impression; but being good-in-form, all have in common what is diffused over all of them. They also have being diffused over all, and each has the living being as the common life is in all, and perhaps even other things. But what is it according to which and by which they are good? For such an investigation perhaps it would be useful to begin from the following point. When Intellect looked towards the Good, did it intelligize that One as many and while it itself was one intelligize it as many, dividing the Good in itself because it was not able to intelligize it as a whole at once? But it was not yet Intellect when it looked at that, but it looked unintellectually. Or rather one should say that it never saw the Good, but lived towards it and was dependent on it and turned towards it, and its movement was filled by moving there and about that and it filled Intellect, and it was no longer movement only, but satiated and full movement; next it became all things and knew this in its self-consciousness and was now Intellect, filled up in order that it might possess what it would see, and looking at them in light, receiving this light also from that which gives them. For this reason, it is said to be the cause not only of substance but also that it is seen. And just as the sun, which for perceptible objects is cause of their being seen and of their coming into being is somehow also cause of vision—certainly it is neither vision nor the things which have come into being—in this way too the nature of the Good, which is cause of substance and Intellect and, by the analogy, light for the things seen there and for that which sees, is neither the real beings nor Intellect, but rather is cause of these, providing by its light intellection and being intelligized to the real beings and Intellect. So as it is filled, Intellect came to be, and when it was full it existed, and it was completed and saw at the same time. Its initial state was that which it was prior to being filled, but different was the first principle which, so to speak externally, fills it, from which in being filled it was in a way imprinted.

17. But how are these things in Intellect and how is it these things, since they are not there in what fills it nor again in it which is filled? For when it was not yet filled, it did not possess them. Now, it is unnecessary for something to have what it gives, but in such cases one must consider what gives greater and what is given as less than what gives; for such is the manner of generation among real beings. For that which exists in actuality must be first, and subsequents must be potentially those prior to them; and the first was beyond the seconds and what gives was beyond what is given; for it was superior. Therefore, if there is something prior to actuality, it is beyond actuality, so that it is also beyond life. If then life is in Intellect, what gives gave life, but is finer and more valuable than

life. So Intellect possessed life and had no need of a manifold giver, and its life was a trace of that and not its life. While its life was looking towards that Good it was unlimited, but when it had looked there it was limited, though that has no limit. For immediately seeing something that is one, life is limited by it and has in itself limit, end, and form; and the form was in what was formed, but what forms was formless. But the limit was not from outside, as if surrounded by a magnitude, but it was the limit of all his multiple and infinite life, in so far as it would radiate from such a nature. And it was not the life of a particular thing, or it would be limited as belonging to an individual; but of course it was limited, so it was limited as the life of a multiple unity—and certainly each of the many things was limited—and it was limited as many because of the multiplicity of life, and on the other hand as one because of the limit. What then is the meaning of “it was limited as one?” Intellect, for life which is limited is Intellect. And what “as many?” Many intellects. Therefore, all are intellects, the whole is Intellect, and the individuals are intellects. But does the universal Intellect, which contains each individual intellect, contain each as the same? But then it would contain only one. If then there are many intellects, there must be difference. So again how did each have difference? In becoming wholly one it had difference; for what is the same in any intellect is not the universal. Therefore, the life is universal power, and the seeing from the Good is the productive power of all things, and the Intellect which came to be is manifest as all things themselves. But the Good is seated upon them, not in order for it to have a foundation but that it may provide a foundation for the form of the primary forms, though formless itself. And Intellect is to the soul a light for it in the way that that Good is light for Intellect; and when Intellect limits the soul, it makes it rational, giving it a trace of what it has. So Intellect is also a trace of that; but since Intellect is form and exists in extension and multiplicity, that is shapeless and formless; for in this way it makes forms. But if that was form, Intellect would have been a rational principle. But the first must not be multiple in any way, for its multiplicity would derive from another prior to it.

Commentary on VI.7[38].16-17

16.1-4 *χρῇ . . . ὅπως*. With the soul identified with the intelligible world, it receives the exhortation to transcend the intelligible light and beauty which envelops it on all sides. The use of μεταβαίνειν to describe the upward movement of the mystical ascent is rather unusual, the only other examples occurring at VI.7[38].33.27, 40.24; VI.9[9].11.44. More commonly he employs ἀναβαίνειν; for references and discussion cf. Atkinson 47.

As he so often does P. here speaks of the hindrance the soul experiences when immersed in intelligible beauty. This theme is most fully explicated in V.5[32].12 and VI.7[38].22. In the former passage he stresses that “Beauty is shown to be

secondary because this passionate love for it is secondary . . . But the more ancient, unperceived desire of the Good proclaims that the Good itself is more ancient and prior to beauty" (V.5[32].12.15-19). Cf. also VI.9[9].4.10 and comm. on V.5[32].8.10ff. where this problem is discussed at greater length.

The seriousness with which P. asserts that intelligible beauty must be transcended is revealed in the phrase ἀφέντα καὶ τοῦτο. In this mystical context ἀφιέναι performs the same function as ἀφαιρεῖν, the technical term widely used by P. to describe the procedure of subtraction in the negative theology, most notably in the phrase ἄφελε πάντα at V.3[49].17.38. The sources for and P.' use of ἀφαιρεῖν is extensively discussed in comm. on III.8[30].10.31-32, a text that closely parallels the present passage: εἰ δὲ ἀφελὼν τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνοις, θαῦμα ἔξεις. Here the abandonment of intelligible beauty occasions the wonder (θαυμάσαντα) at who generated it. Note also III.8[30].10.14-15: ἥ καὶ θαῦμα, πῶς τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ζωῆς ἐξ οὐ πλῆθους ἦν. In the same treatise the beauty of the sensible heaven plays an important role in the ascent to the One: ὥς δὴ ὁ ἀναβλέψας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄστρον φέγγος ἰδὼν τὸν ποιήσαντα ἐνθυμεῖται καὶ ζητεῖ, οὕτω χρὴ καὶ τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ὃς ἐθεάσατο καὶ ἐνεῖδε καὶ ἐθαύμασε τὸν κάκεινον ποιητὴν τίς ἄρα ὁ τοιοῦτον ὑποστήσας ζητεῖν ἢ ποῦ ἢ πῶς (III.8[30].11.33-38). Significant for the present stress on transcending Intellect, not the sensible heaven, is the fact that earlier in this treatise the intelligible universe is referred to as ἐκεῖ οὐρανός (VI.7[38].12.4-6, 17-19). Hence in that earlier context P. ζητεῖ πόθεν οὐρανὸς ἐκεῖ (19).

P. employs the poetic word αἵσσειν several times to describe the rapid movement towards the One: χρὴ τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα ῥῆξαι πρὸς ἓν, καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἔτι προσθεῖναι (V.5[32].4.8-9); ἴσως οὖν χρὴ αὐτὴν ἤδη γεννηῖσαι αἵξασαν πρὸς αὐτὸ πληρωθεῖσαν ὠδίνων (V.3[49].17.16-17). The use of the word in the context of the mystical ascent may have come to him from the *Chaldaean Oracles*: the wise man πρὸς "Ὀλυμπον ἀποσκεδάσας τὸδε σῶμα ἦξεν ἀειρόμενος ψυχῆς κούφαις πτερύγεσσιν (Fr. 217.5-6). But it should be noted that ἦξεν is Kroll's conjecture for the MSS ἦξεν ("has arrived"). For discussion of this Oracle cf. Lewy 32-34.

16.4-10 ἕκαστον μὲν . . . ἐντεῦθεν. This passage prefaces the transition from the soul's experience of the intelligible world to the elaborate discussion of Intellect's procession from the One with a brief description of Intellect's central metaphysical attributes: form, life, and totality. Thus, it serves the same purpose as III.8[30].8.17-30 where an extensive account of intelligible life and intellection precedes the important account, in lines 30-40, of Intellect's procession from the One, in terms of a circle unrolling itself. But whereas in the earlier treatise life is linked with contemplation, the conceptual focus of III.8[30] as a whole, here Form is prominent because of the analysis of the relation

between the Forms and sensible particulars in the first third of this treatise. The remark that each part of the intelligible world is ἴδιος οἶον τύπος is a signal that a discussion of procession and reversion is coming, for the inchoate life which proceeds from the One receives an impression from the One which makes it actualized life and Intellect, as in lines 34-35: ἀφ' ἧς οἶον ἐτυποῦτο πληρούμενος (see comm. on this passage for discussion of the Stoic theory of τύπωσις and P.' critique). P.' use of οἶον in both passages is not casual: he is aware that the term impression may have materialistic overtones or it might suggest that something external is making the impression, both of which are inappropriate to the nature of intelligible reality, as he argues in the following: if we say that "the intelligibles and Intellect are linked (συνεξεῦχθαι) . . . Then the acts of intelligence will be impressions (τύποι); but if this is what they are, they come to it from outside and are impacts. But then how will the impressions be made, and what shape are things like intelligibles? And intellection will be of what is external, just like sense-perception" (V.5[32].1.23-27). Hence, because the One does not act on Intellect as an external object, τύπος is synonymous with ἵχνος, as P. notes a bit later in this treatise: "everything which comes from the Good has a trace (ἵχνος) and an imprint (τύπος) which is his or derives from him" (VI.7[38].18.2-3)—a point made in the more extensive analysis of the ἀγαθοειδές-motif presented there. The present passage is in fact a *précis* of Ch. 18 which illuminates it at several points.

It will be useful first to consider a brief passage in Ch. 15 where the ἀγαθοειδές-motif is introduced: ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τὸ ἀγαθοειδές φησιν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχει. τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, ὃ δὲ ἀγαθὸς ἐστιν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν τὸ ζῆν ἔχων· θεωρεῖ δὲ ἀγαθοειδῆ ὄντα τὰ θεωρούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ἃ ἐκτήσατο, ὅτε ἐθεώρει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν (Ch. 15.9-13). This establishes that ἀγαθοειδές can be predicated of Intellect and the Forms because Intellect possesses the Good in a life that is determined by contemplation. In the present passage the claim that what the intelligibles have in common is being and life (5-8) follows from the argument, presented later, that τὸ κοινόν does not come from the Good: "For coming from the Good does not suffice for sameness: for what is common should be in them themselves . . . also, what is given in sameness might become different in the things which are going to receive it" (Ch. 18.9-12). Since, also, life and goodness come to Intellect from the Good εἶδος ἕκαστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθοειδές (Ch. 18.25). P.' final comment on the ἀγαθοειδές-motif refers to the immanence of the Good to the differentiated Forms: "For, as they are different, when the same thing is predicated of them there is nothing to prevent this being immanent in their substance, but all the same it is possible to take it separately in thought . . . otherwise each of them or each particular one of them would be called good equivocally (ὁμωνύμως)" (Ch. 18.31-37). The haphazard reciprocity between the present passage and Ch. 18 provides a revealing glimpse of how in his

rambling, oral lectures P. picks up points for greater elaboration even at the cost of continuity. Thus we can see that in the present passage his focus is not on how Intellect is good, because he is anxious to provide an explanation of how intelligible reality is generated. For further discussion of the ἀγαθοειδές-motif and its Platonic sources see comm. on III.8[30].11.15-23.

What is common to the differentiated multiplicity of the Forms is being and life. On τὸ ὄν as common cf. also VI.6[34].18.40-42. The ontological priority and degree of universality P. wants to attribute to being and life is difficult to determine with precision, but the following should be noted: εἰ δὴ τὸ ὄν πρῶτον δεῖ λαβεῖν πρῶτον ὄν, εἴτα νοῦν, εἴτα τὸ ζῶον—τοῦτο γὰρ ἦδη πάντα δοκεῖ περιέχειν—ὁ δὲ νοῦς δεύτερον—ἐνέργεια γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας—οὔτ' ἂν κατὰ τὸ ζῶον ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἴη—ἦδη γὰρ καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν καὶ δύο ἦν—οὔτε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν—πρὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἐν οὖσα καὶ πολλὰ ἦν (“If then one should take being first, since it exists first, then intellect, and then the living being (for it is already established that this contains all things)—but intellect comes second, for it is the active actuality of substance; then number would not be on the level of the living being—for even before it both one and two existed—nor on the level of intellect—for substance was before it, which was already one and many”: VI.6[34].8.17-22); τὸ ὄν τοῦ νοῦ προεπιννοεῖν ἀνάγκη (V.9[5].8.11). With respect to the ontological ranking of life, in the former it should be noted that the typical order is being-life-thought; see the conspectus of texts cited by Hadot (1960) 108-17. That τὸ ζῶον appears to be used analogously to ζωὴ convinces Hadot that “l'exégèse du *Timée* 39e rejoint finalement celle du *Sophiste* 248e” 119. This is a fine observation, for the point of *Sophist* 248e7-249a9 is to affirm the presence of νοῦς and ζωὴ in τὸ παντελῶς ὄν. Moreover, the statement that ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῶον ἕκαστον [sc. εἶδος] ζωῆς κοινῆς ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὑπαρχούσης (7) supports Hadot's contention that τὸ ζῶον of the *Timaeus* is very closely assimilated by P. to the ζωὴ of the *Sophist*. For an unconvincing attempt to contrast the two concepts cf. Bertier et al. 50.

The *Sophist* may have influenced P.' use of κοινόν in the present passage, though not so explicitly. For the universality of τὸ ὄν he certainly echoes *Soph.* 254dff., but it does not seem to me unlikely that the term κοινόν came to his mind from the discussion of the κοινωνία τῶν εἰδῶν at *Soph.* 251cd, the fact that Plato's intention is very different from P.' notwithstanding.

16.5-6 ἀγαθοειδές . . . πάντα ἔχει. Kirchhoff deletes πάντα in line 6 on the grounds that ἔχει and ὄν (5) require a singular subject. Bréhier accepts the change, but assimilates ἀγαθοειδές ὄν to κοινόν: “mais elles ont toutes un caractère commun qui les traverse, c'est la forme du Bien.” I cannot see ἀγαθοειδές as accusative, especially with ὄν. Cilento retains πάντα but gives it an implausible adverbial sense: “essendo ‘boniforme’, essa ha qualcosa di

comune che trascorre su tutte e le investe *da ogni lato*.” B-T delete πάντα: “indem es nun gutgestaltig ist, hat es ein Gemeinsames, das sich über sie alle erstreckt.” A potent counter-argument to excising πάντα is that it seems unlikely that anyone—except P. himself—would have put it there in the first place! Hence, I agree with H-S that πάντα (*pro ἑκάστων*) *subiectum ad ἔχει*¹ Although ἀγαθοειδὲς ὄν would agree with πάντα, I can accept the possibility that P. has simply switched from singular to plural without taking account of the grammatical consequences. What he wants to say, then, is that each entity in the intelligible world, being good-in-form, has something common which envelops all of them, i.e. the Good.

16.8-9 ἀλλὰ . . . εἴη. B-T delete καὶ: “Indes, insofern die Ideen gut sind, was wäre das, um dessentwillen sie gut sind.” However, I think we must again consider, who would be so rash as to insert that καὶ. The anacolouthon, which is common enough in P., should be retained.

Harder’s conjecture καθ’ ὃ ἐστίν for the MSS καθ’ ὅσον is quite unnecessary, in spite of Szlezák’s 145 n464 claim that κατὰ τί at VI.7[38].18.1, 51 provides clinching evidence to emend.

16.10-13 ἄρα . . . δύνασθαι. It is quite significant that this sentence poses a question, for in the ensuing lines P. presents a view of the potential Intellect that is somewhat different than the one expressed by the question. Here we find aspects of Intellect’s reversion to the One which are prominent in the earlier treatises, e.g. the reversion as synonymous with seeing: νόησις δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὁρῶσα καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιστραφεῖσα (V.4[7].2.4-5); τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὗτος (V.2[11].1.9-11); seeing the One as multiple, not as a unity: πολλὰ ὁρῶν ἤδη (V.4[7].2.10—not an exact parallel, because at that point actualized Intellect might be the subject of the seeing); οὐχ ἔν θεωρεῖ. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἔν θεωρῇ, οὐχ ὡς ἔν (III.8[30].8.31; cf. comm. *ad loc.* for further references). The correlate of this inability to discern the One’s unity is the fact that the potential Intellect breaks it up into parts: ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως οἷον σχιζομένη ἢ νόησις καθορᾷ (V.1[10].7.10-11); ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτῷ ἐκείθεν, οἷον μεριστῷ ἐξ ἀμερίστου (V.1[10].7.17-18). An important passage in the previous chapter integrates each of these themes into a fuller account: δύναμιν οὖν εἰς τὸ γεννᾶν εἶχε παρ’ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ πληροῦσθαι γεννημάτων διδόντος ἐκείνου ἃ μὴ εἶχεν αὐτός. ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τούτῳ· ἦν γὰρ ἐκομίζετο δύναμιν ἀδυνατῶν ἔχειν συνέθραυε καὶ πολλὰ ἐποίησε τὴν μίαν, ἵν’ οὕτω δύναιτο κατὰ μέρος φέρειν (“Intellect therefore had the power from him to generate and to be filled full of its own offspring, since the Good gave what he did not himself have. But from the Good himself who is one there were many for this Intellect: for it was unable to hold

the power which it received and broke it up and made the one power many, that it might be able so to bear it part by part": Ch. 15.18-22). In a note *ad loc.* Armstrong argues that in Ch. 16.10-24 P. "carefully criticizes and refines this account of the pluralizing contemplation of Intellect," though he does not specify the criticisms P. has in mind. I think Armstrong is correct, and it seems to me that one aspect of this account which is absent in the present chapter is the reference to, or perhaps the emphasis on, Intellect's power to generate its own contents. This fact weakens substantially the argument of Lloyd (1987) 166, 176-78, who relies heavily on Ch. 15.18-22, that Intellect generates existence and the Forms, with the causality of the One reduced to a secondary role. For further discussion of this problem cf. comm. on V.6[24].5.9-10.

Note that the reference to the inchoate Intellect as one (11) parallels ἀρχάμενος ὡς ἓν at III.8[30].8.32, the first instance of this view stated in the *Enneads*; cf. comm. *ad loc.* for discussion.

16.13-16 ἀλλ' οὐπω . . . πρὸς αὐτό. The first revision which P. makes of the view articulated in lines 10-13 concerns the function of vision in the potential Intellect. Interestingly, he does not indicate the change baldly, but gropes his way towards the new position: οὐπω νοῦς ἦν ἐκεῖνο βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔβλεπεν ἀνοήτως . . . οὐδὲ ἑώρα πάποτε, ἀλλ' ἔζη μὲν πρὸς αὐτό. He is not arguing that the inchoate Intellect does not look towards the One, rather he appears to articulate an earlier stage in the life of the processive Intellect, the ontological moment in which it can be defined as an incipient unity. This position is hinted at already in III.8[30].11.5: πρὶν γοῦν ἰδεῖν ἦν ἓν. It is, therefore, unified life which proceeds from the One and first turns back to it: "it lived towards the One." Cf. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο, δηλονότι ζωὴ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τούτῳ ἐξημμένη ἐκείνου καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσα ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ζῶσα ("But if there is that something beyond, it is clear that the life of this other is directed to that and dependent on that, and has its existence from that and lives towards that": V.3[49].16.35-37). Hadot puts it very well when he says that pre-noetic life is an "état d'indétermination de la pensée qui est une phase nécessaire de la genèse de l'Intelligence" (1960) 134 and, further, that "la Vie issue de l'Un, et de soi illimité, se convertit vers l'Un et se convertissant, devient l'Intelligence . . . La Vie représente donc un mouvement d'autodétermination, d'autoactualisation de l'être . . . de déploiement qui permet la conversion, le mouvement vers l'extérieur qui *déjà* est mouvement vers l'intérieur" 134-35, author's italics. Some of these points pertain also to the more extensive account of life in Ch. 17.13-24.

Following closely upon this "living" is the ἀόριστος ὄψις of V.4[7].2.6, the inchoate Intellect's faculty of vision which is more strikingly described here in the statement that it ἔβλεπεν ἀνοήτως. This tendency to empty pre-noetic seeing of its content, as it were, to articulate the faculty of vision purely potentially, is

also prominent in V.3[49].11: ὅψις οὐπω ἰδοῦσα (5), ἀτύπωτος ὅψις (12); cf. comm. *ad loc.* for discussion of these phrases in context as well as comm. on VI.7[38].35.30. (Slezák 165 unconvincingly identifies this “Nicht-Noesis” in the present passage and in V.3[49].11 with the νοῦς ἐρῶν of VI.7[38].35.23ff.; cf. comm. *ad loc.*) These characterizations of pre-noetic vision should not be interpreted as doctrinal innovations, for they simply express, a bit more precisely, what is already implicit in the ἀόριστος ὅψις of V.4[7].2.6.

16.16-19 ἡ δὴ κίνησις . . . πλήρης. When the reversion issues in actualization, the familiar κίνησις appears on the scene. In fact, κίνησις is synonymous with ζωή, as the reference to the processive phase of Intellect in the statement οὐκέτι κίνησις ἦν μόνον (18) indicates. Their presence in the intelligible world, along with sameness, difference, and rest, derives from the Platonic μέγιστα γένη in *Soph.* 254d-255a; cf. V.9[5].10.11-13, III.7[45].3.10-12. But of the five only κίνησις and ζωή are endowed with a pre-intellectual existence. The earliest account of the reversion in terms of movement is V.6[24].5.7-9: <τὸ> γεγόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ δ’ ἐκινήθη τε καὶ εἶδε. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι νοεῖν, κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου; but cf. also II.4[12].5.30 where the inchoate Intellect is defined as κίνησις πρώτη. The direct source for this close association of κίνησις and ζωή is, of course, Plato *Soph.* 248eff., but Hadot (1960) 135-36 adds correctly that “Elle correspond à une transposition platonicienne, c’est-à-dire à une élévation au plan métaphysique de la conception stoïcienne du mouvement alternatif constitutif de l’être, mouvement appelé par les stoïciens τονική κίνησις.”

If the Platonic κίνησις finds a place in P.’ actualized Intellect, Aristotle’s notion of κίνησις is applicable to the actualization of the inchoate Intellect. Note Aristotle’s remarks at *Physics* Γ 2.201b27-35: τοῦ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν αἴτιον ὅτι οὔτε εἰς δύναμιν τῶν ὄντων οὔτε εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἔστιν θεῖναι αὐτήν . . . ἡ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι τις δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ· αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἀτελὲς τὸ δυνατόν, οὗ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν. ἢ γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν ἀναγκαῖον θεῖναι ἢ εἰς δύναμιν ἢ εἰς ἐνέργεια ἀπλῆν, τούτων δ’ οὐδὲν φαίνεται ἐνδεχόμενον. The same polyvalence of meaning is abundantly evident in P.’ concept of intelligible κίνησις. Like the Aristotelian version, his is ascribed to the inchoate Intellect in so far as it is ἀόριστος and ἀτελής; but in its progress towards actualization, the inchoate Intellect is, in Aristotle’s terms, ἐνέργεια τις. Thus, we can see P. constructing his model of the actualization of Intellect on the basis of Aristotle’s claim that ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινητοῦ, ἢ κινητόν (202a7-8).

Actualization by πλήρωσις can be found as early as V.2[11].1.10 (ἐπληρώθη), but it is considerably more common in the later treatises. Particularly relevant is III.8[30].11: τῇ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ὅψει τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ

πληροῦν (7-8), πλήρωσιν δὲ ἀληθινὴν καὶ νόησιν ἔχει (43-44); and parallel to the linkage of νοῦς καὶ κόρος (41) is κίνησις διακορῆς καὶ πλήρης in the present passage. Note that P. expresses the distinction between potential and actual Intellect in terms of κίνησις μόνον and κίνησις διακορῆς καὶ πλήρης respectively, which closely parallel ὄψις and ὄρασις. Movement is to be predicated of both phases of Intellect's life, because, in the first phase, the indefinite, expanding life proceeding from the One must undergo the ontological change which results in actualized Intellect. And, of course, movement is appropriate to the second phase because intellection is a movement. Movement thus provides a conceptual focus for describing the ontological continuity between the two moments of Intellect's life, but it also suggests how the potential Intellect becomes actualized: it is filled by moving to or around the One (16-17). Curiously, P. remarks that κίνησις filled it, i.e. Intellect, when Intellect as such does not yet exist. Since κίνησις διακορῆς καὶ πλήρης is Intellect, he is trying to describe, albeit awkwardly, how the inchoate Intellect shares with the One in the generation of actual Intellect. Because κίνησις is synonymous with ἔφεσις we can see the same notion more clearly articulated at V.6[24].5.9-10: ἡ γὰρ ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ.

16.19-20 ἐξῆς . . . νοῦς ἤδη ἦν. P. indicates that Intellect is now (ἤδη) actual and complete with the common statement that "it has become all things"; cf. also V.4[7].2.39, III.8[30].8.41ff., 9.44ff. Simultaneous with its actualization is the emergence of Intellect's self knowledge, as in V.6[24].5.16-17: ἐν τῇ νοήσει αὐτοῦ [sc. τοῦ ἐνός] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ νοεῖ· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βλέπων αὐτὸν νοεῖ. However, in the present passage P. employs the phrase συναισθήσει αὐτοῦ to define this self-knowledge, which elicits Schwyzer's comment that this is Intellect's "erste dunkle Gefühl von sich selbst" (1960) 377. This remark unnecessarily introduces an imperfect state of knowledge prior to fully actual intellection. Other passages confirm that here P. does not intend to make a distinction between συναίσθησις and νόησις. The two terms are virtually equivalent in V.6[24].5.1-5; even more explicit is the following: "For in general thought (τὸ νοεῖν) seems to be an intimate consciousness (συναίσθησις) of the whole when many parts come together in the same thing; [this is so] when a thing knows itself (ἑαυτὸ νοῖ), which is knowing (νοεῖν) in the proper sense" (V.3[49].13.12-14). For discussion of the various shades of meaning of συναίσθησις see comm. on V.4[7].2.18. Another parallel occurs later in the present treatise where σύνεσις, a synonym of συναίσθησις, is linked with self-intellection: συνεῖναι οὖν δεῖ τῇ νοήσει τοῦτον καὶ σύνεσιν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν ἀεὶ, ὅτι τοῦτο τοῦτο, ὅτι τὰ δύο ἓν (Ch. 41.19-21).

16.20-22 πληρωθεις . . . κομιζόμενος. P. now turns his attention to explaining how the One functions as the primary cause in the generation of actualized Intellect. The possession of what Intellect sees refers not to the One, but rather to itself *qua* the Forms. To see these intelligible realities Intellect receives the light streaming from the One, a reference to the analogy of the Good and sun at *Rep.* 509b2-8 which P. follows quite closely in lines 22-31. Cf. also *Rep.* 540a8 where the Good τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, a phrase echoed by ὃ νῶ φῶς παρέχει (VI.7[38].23.1). The light by which Intellect sees the Forms is also said to give them to Intellect (παρὰ τοῦ δόντος ἐκείνα), which clearly indicates the primary causality exercised by the One in the generation of Intellect. On “giving” and “receiving” cf. comm. on Ch. 17.5-12 below.

P.’ presents his most extensive account of the light by which Intellect sees in the elaborate analogy between sense-perception and intellection in V.5[32].7, which serves as the preface to Intellect’s mystical apprehension of this light by itself. Because there the problem is the movement from intellection of the Forms, which here is said to be possible through the One’s light, to hyper-noetic vision of the Good, the One’s light is differentiated from the light reflected in the Forms: ὁρᾷ μὲν καὶ αὕτη δι’ ἄλλου φωτὸς τὰ πεφωτισμένα ἐκείνη τῇ πρώτῃ φύσει (V.5[32].7.16-18). For discussion cf. comm. on V.5[32].7.31-35. The same analogy is more briefly drawn at Ch. 21.13-17: “For just as with bodies, though light is mixed into them, all the same there is need of another light for the light, the colour, in them to appear, so with the beings there in the intelligible, though they possess much light, there is need of another greater light (φωτὸς κρείττονος ἄλλου) that they may be seen both by themselves and by another.” This passage also defines the One’s light as distinct from the intelligible light the soul sees in its ascent so that it can begin to focus on the ultimate goal of the ascent—the One itself. The close parallels between the present passage (as well as the following lines) and these mystical contexts indicates that the One’s light manifests its power both in the actualization of Intellect and in drawing Intellect or the soul beyond intelligible reality towards itself. The distinction between these two events is discussed further in comm. on Ch. 35.19ff.

16.22-31 διὰ τοῦτο . . . παρέχων. The sun-analogy from the *Republic* is introduced strategically to demonstrate that the One is the primary cause of the generation of Intellect in both its potential and actualized phases. This is important because lines 10-16 focus almost exclusively on what the inchoate Intellect contributes to the actualization of Intellect. Therefore, the purpose of the present passage is to illustrate the applicability of the following principle to the generation and sustenance of Intellect: “in that it is brought into being by something else and needed something else for its coming into being, it needs something else at every point” (V.5[32].9.3-4). (Cf. further comm. on III.8[30].11.16-23, where the ἀγαθοειδές-motif figures prominently.)

P. closely follows his source-text in the present passage: οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὅψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι (*Rep.* 508a5-6); οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἢ ὅψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ δὲ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα (508a11-12); ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὅψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἵτιος δ' ὦν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης; (508b9-10); τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γινωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ιδέαν φάθι εἶναι (508e1-3); καὶ τοῖς γινωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (509b6-9). That P. draws freely and often on these texts is well known, but in the present context it is instructive to see clearly how he employs the same terms as Plato, shifts their connotations, and incorporates them into his account of the ontological derivation of Intellect. For P. ὅψις is equivalent to the inchoate Intellect, while its actual activity extends to both ὁρασις/νόησις (adopting Igal's supplement <νοεῖν καὶ> in line 30) and ὁρᾶσθαι/νοεῖσθαι. His Platonic source enables him to claim the One as cause of both as well as of τὰ ὄντα and the light by which they are seen. In fact, at every point the One's causal efficacy is primary, to which point he returns again in Ch. 17.11ff.

By focusing primarily on passages like lines 10-16 above, in his argument that the inchoate Intellect, not the One, is the primary causal agent in the generation of actualized Intellect, Lloyd (1987) 166, 170-71 fails to take adequate account of the present passage, especially the claim that it is the One's light that makes intelligible seeing possible at all. The inchoate Intellect *qua* ὅψις cannot contribute light to the process of actualization, so it is totally dependent on the One. Lloyd diminishes the effect of P.' reading of the *Republic* passages by subordinating it to the Aristotelian theory of *De Anima* Γ 4-6: "Plato's analogy of light, which in Plotinus is often the ἐνέργεια between a cause and its product, helps him to assimilate the psychological model on account of the part played by the medium, particularly light and air in Aristotle's theory of perception" 170. But it is precisely P.' view that the Good is the cause of the inchoate Intellect *qua* ὅψις, which makes his position fundamentally different from Aristotle's. Hence, while Lloyd argues correctly that P.' distinction between the Good and Intellect "appeals to the famous description of the form of the Good as that which imparts the powers of knowing and of being known," his conclusion that "under this dominant influence Plotinus may have chosen to ignore, or just ignored, the details of his regular account of the genesis" 170-71 is tendentious: the Aristotelian psychological model is crucially important, but it does not alone, or even primarily, define P.' "regular account," particularly in the form Lloyd presents it. For further discussion cf. comm. on Ch. 17.6-8 below and on III.8[30].11.16-23 and V.3[49].11.6ff.

16.31-35 πληρούμενος . . . πληρούμενος. The sentence πληρούμενος . . . ἐώρα recapitulates the stages in the actualization of the potential Intellect first presented in lines 10-19. In the first part of the next sentence, there is dispute about how to take ἀρχή and ἐκεῖνό. MacKenna, B-T, H-S, and Atkinson 121 follow Bouillet's rendering of ἐκεῖνό as *ille status*: "the beginning is that state of not yet having been filled" (MacKenna); "Beginn für ihn war jener Zustand vor seiner Erfüllung" (B-T). On the other hand Bréhier, Harder, and Cilento take it as referring to the Good: "Urbeginn aber ist ihm Jenes, das vor seiner Erfüllung liegt" (Harder). The neuter alone does not preclude this possibility, since P. changes the gender of pronouns which refer to the Good indiscriminately; but if we construe it this way, the first part of the sentence states that the Good exists before Intellect is filled, which makes the second part (ἀρχή ἑτέρα . . . ἦν) redundant, evident in Harder's version: "und ein zweiter, gleichsam äußerer Beginn ist der, der ihm vollmachte."

The problem, then, is this: if ἐκεῖνο refers to the Good, what does P. intend by the ἑτέρα? Armstrong's translation, which neatly reflects the ambiguity of the Greek, provides one solution: "Its principle was that which it was before being filled, but another principle, in a way external to it, was the one that filled it." This would make the inchoate Intellect a kind of internal principle of its own actualization, the closest parallel to which is the considerably less extraordinary statement that Intellect μορφοῦται δὲ ἄλλον μὲν τρόπον παρὰ τοῦ ἐνός, ἄλλον δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ (V.1[10].5.17-18; cf. Atkinson's discussion *ad loc.*). Such an interpretation is not impossible, but the more attractive alternative is to construe ἀρχή differently in the two parts of the sentence with B-T: "Beginn für ihn war jener Zustand vor seiner Erfüllung; verschieden davon war das Prinzip, das ihm gleichsam von außen erfüllte." This is open to the objection that it neglects the force of the ἑτέρα, but perhaps the first ἀρχή does mean "beginning," along the lines of this passage: πῶς αὖ πολλά τοῦτο τὸ ἐν; ἢ ὅτι οὐχ ἔν θεωρεῖ. ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἐν θεωρῇ, οὐχ ὡς ἐν· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ γίνεται νοῦς. ἀλλὰ ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἐν οὐχ ὡς ἥρξατο ἔμεινεν (III.8[30].8.30-33; see comm. *ad loc.*). That in the beginning the inchoate Intellect is a unity and thus like the One nicely complements the present passage, which articulates a state of the inchoate Intellect which is prior to being filled. This interpretation seems preferable to that of Szlezák 105 who sees in the present passage "eine Rückkehr zur überlieferten dualistischen Metaphysik Platons und der Alten Akademie." But in making the Indefinite Dyad ontologically dependent on the One, P. is not compelled "von einem zweiten 'Ursprung' zu reden."

With the two instances of οἶον P. expresses the difficulty of describing the Good's distinctness from the potential Intellect in terms of the dualistic terms internal/external. (Cf. the strenuous effort he makes to eliminate the distinction in the mystical context of V.5[32].7-8.) Similarly, "in a way receiving an impression" or "being imprinted" (οἶον ἐτυποῦτο) must be read provisionally,

because of its materialistic connotations: cf. οἶον τύπος (5) above. In his analysis of sense-perception, he criticizes the role played by τύπωσις and τύποι in Stoic epistemology, because it presupposes the corporeality of the soul. For the Stoics φαντασία δέ ἐστι τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ, τουτέστιν ἀλλοίωσις (*DL* VII.50 = Long-Sedley 39A.8-9); τυποῦσθαι τε δύναται τὸ μέρος τὸ ἡγούμενον αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ παραδέχεσθαι τὰς τυπώσεις· ταῦτα γὰρ ἴδια ψυχῆς ἐστίν (*SVF* I.141.10-13). P. rejects the notion that any activity of the soul can be described as an ἀλλοίωσις and “memories are not stamps imprinted on the soul or mental pictures like impressions in wax” (μνήμας οὐ τύπους ἐναποσφραγιζομένους οὐδὲ τὰς φαντασίας ὡς ἐν κηρῷ τυπώσεις),” because for him “the soul remains the same in substrate and essence” (III.6[26].3.27-32). In his criticism of the comparison of τύπωσις to wax receiving impressions from a signet-ring (IV.7[2].6.37ff., IV.6[41].1.1ff.), a doctrine held by Aristotle in *De Mem.* 1.450a30-34, P. may be following Chrysippus (*DL* VII.50 = Long-Sedley 39A.9-11) in his modification of Cleanthes’ view, as Sextus *Adv. Math.* VII.228-31 explains (Long-Sedley II.238); see Rist (1969) 136.

Another objection to the materialistic theory of τύποι is that “if we received impressions (τύπους) of what we see, there will be no possibility of looking at the actual things we see, but we shall look at images and shadows of the objects of sight, so that the objects themselves will be different from the things we see” (IV.6[41].1.29-31). Oddly enough, this limitation in the concept of τύποι may have made it appealing to P. in order to express the inchoate Intellect’s faulty apprehension of the Good, which he also characterizes as οἶον φαντασίαν (V.6[24].5.15) and φάντασμά τι (V.3[49].11.7). For excellent discussions of P.’ extensive critique of Stoic epistemology cf. Blumenthal 10, 73-74, 84 and Graeser 25, 32-33.

If P. is so adamant about opposing the Stoic theory of τύπωσις in the case of sense-perception, why does he use it to explain Intellect’s incipient apprehension of the Good? First, that οἶον appears both in lines 5 and 34-35 suggests that P. wants this imprinting to be understood metaphorically. On this basis the process can account for apprehension of a higher reality by a lower entity, as for example in V.3[49].2.9-13: “as for the things which come to it [sc. the soul] from Intellect, it observes what one might call their imprints (ἐφορᾷ οἶον τοὺς τύπους) . . . and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognizing the new and recently arrived impressions [which come via sense-perception] and fitting them to those which have long been within it.” Here too the οἶον is the signpost for the incorporeality of the process. Second, the aspects of Stoic τύπωσις and φαντασία described by Long-Sedley I.239 would have obvious appeal for P., provided they are dematerialized: “impressions are self-revealing in the sense that they make their recipient *aware* of their occurrence—i.e. aware of

the objects they reveal. . . . like light, impressions are the illumination of, or means of our observing, actual things” authors’ italics. The tension between the Stoic view that impressions do contribute to our awareness of actual things and P.’ critique that they do not determines his own theory of the inchoate Intellect’s vision.

17.1-6 ἀλλὰ . . . οὖσι. P. returns to the problem, first announced at Ch. 15.13-14, how the potential Intellect receives what the One gives but does not possess: ἦλθε δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖ ἦν, ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὸς ἔσχεν; cf. also III.8[30].10.14-17 and comm. *ad loc.* where parallel passages are noted. The repeated references to the One as τὸ διδόν (lines 5, 9, 11, 13) is especially noteworthy in the context of the ensuing analysis of the γένεσις τῶν ὄντων. Cf. III.8[30].10.5-6: πηγὴν ἀρχὴν . . . δοῦσαν ποταμοῖς πᾶσιν αὐτήν. The One acts as primary cause at every stage of the genesis despite the fact that what is received is necessarily altered by the recipient (Lloyd [1987] 165), which has the ontological implication that “what is given is less than the giver” (5-6). But what is the referent of τὸ διδόμενον? Generally speaking, Intellect; but more specifically P. seems to have in mind τὰ ὄντα, as indicated by τοῖς οὖσι (6) and παρὰ τοῦ δόντος ἐκεῖνα (Ch. 16.21-22).

17.6-14 πρῶτον . . . ζώῃ. The distinction between giver and what is given is analyzed in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of ἐνέργεια and δύναμις. H-S and B-T refer to Aristotle *Met.* Θ 8.1049b5: πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστιν, but that text only confirms the point about ontological priority. But we must look elsewhere for sources for the more important claim that τὰ δ’ ὕστερα εἶναι δυνάμει τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν (7-8). Later in the same chapter Aristotle remarks that ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργεῖα ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίνεταί τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ὃν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος (1049b23-25); cf. also *Met.* α 1.993b24-25: ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων καθ’ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον, which point he illustrates with the example of fire and heat according to the double-ἐνέργεια theory. I suspect that his notion of final causality is also relevant: ἅπαν ἐπ’ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τέλος (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἔνεκα ἢ γένεσις), τέλος δ’ ἢ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἢ δύναμις λαμβάνεται (1050a7-10). However, though so far P. appears to follow the Aristotelian theory rather closely, it is important to remember that he is applying it to the generation of Intellect, which rules out, at least implicitly, Aristotle’s assertion that ἔστι δ’ οὐθὲν δυνάμει αἰετὶον (1050b7-8).

If P. broadly reproduces the Aristotelian account of the interplay between things that are actual and things that are potential, we must now ask what is the referent of τὸ ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι? The previous sentence would seem to indicate that

it is τὸ διδόν, i.e. the One. On this view P. would be following the argument of Aristotle *Physics* Γ 3, according to which the ἐνέργεια of cause and effect are the same in substrate but different in essence. The problem with this supposition is that lines 9-11 establish that τὸ διδόν is beyond ἐνέργεια, which is consistent with the transcendence of the One. So we are left with the difficulty of ascertaining what actuality the subsequents are potentially. Presumably, P. does not mean that the subsequents—the indefinite life and movement of the inchoate Intellect—are potentially the One, for Intellect, as the first actuality (cf. Ch. 18.12), represents a diminution of the One's reality and productive power. Other possibilities present themselves, though none are completely satisfactory.

First, a plausible case can be made for interjecting the double-ἐνέργεια theory and thus for identifying τὸ ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι with the ἐνέργεια *from* the One, which is distinct from the ἐνέργεια *of* the One; for P.' use of the theory cf. V.4[7].2.27ff. and comm. *ad loc.* That the theory is relevant to understanding lines 6-8 is hinted at in lines 13-14: ἦν ἡ ζωὴ ἵχνος τι ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἐκείνου ζωῇ. The implications of this point are brought to light in several passages in Ch. 18, which explicitly adduce the double-ἐνέργεια theory. The specific problem P. addresses is why intelligible realities are ἀγαθοειδῆ: εἰ δὴ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἦκον πᾶν ἵχνος καὶ τύπον ἔχει ἐκείνου ἢ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀπὸ πυρὸς ἵχνος πυρὸς καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ γλυκέος γλυκέος ἵχνος, ἥκει δὲ εἰς νοῦν καὶ ζωὴ ἀπ' ἐκείνου—ἐκ γὰρ τῆς παρ' ἐκείνου ἐνεργείας ὑπέστη—καὶ νοῦς δὲ δι' ἐκείνον κτλ. ("Certainly, if everything which comes from the Good has a trace and an imprint which is his or derives from him, as what comes from fire is a trace of fire and what comes from a sweet thing a trace of sweet, and if also life comes from that Good to Intellect—for it came to exist from the activity derived from him—and Intellect exists through him etc.": Ch. 18.2-7). The underlined text indicates that life is a product of the ἐνέργεια *from* the One, i.e. it is an activity which produces a potentiality. This point is developed further: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ πρώτη ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ ὁρισθὲν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ συνάμφω· καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅτι γενόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ' ὅτι κόσμος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δ' ὅτι συνάμφω ("For the first activity is good and what is defined following upon it is good, and the pair of them together: and the one is good because it is brought into being by the Good, and the other because it is an ordered world which comes from it, and the last because it is both of them together": Ch. 18.41-43). On this passage B-T remark that "Die ἐνέργεια πρώτη ist der ἀτύπωτος νοῦς; das ὁρισθὲν der erfüllte Geist"; so too Lloyd (1987) 177: "the external activity of the One, which is equivalent to the indefinite Pre-Intellect." B-T cite as a parallel Ch. 21.4-6: ἀγαθοειδῆ δὲ λέγω τῷ τὴν μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι ἐνέργειαν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνέργειαν, τὸν δὲ ἤδη ὁρισθεῖσαν ἐνέργειαν ("I mean 'in the form of good' in the sense that life is the activity of the Good, or rather an activity from the Good, and Intellect is the activity already bounded and defined").

Returning to lines 6-7: is the *ἐνέργεια πρώτη*, i.e. the *ἐνέργεια* from the One, equivalent to *τὸ ἐνεργεῖν εἶναι*? If so, P. is saying that *τὰ ὕστερα* are potentially this *ἐνέργεια πρώτη*. But if we accept the argument of B-T and Lloyd that the *ἐνέργεια πρώτη* is in fact the inchoate Intellect (*νοῦς ἐν δυνάμει*), as well as its attributes indefinite *ζωή* and *κίνησις*, and further that, apparently, *τὰ ὕστερα* refer also to these same pre-intellectual attributes, the sentence becomes meaningless: viz. aspects of the potential Intellect are potentially the potential Intellect. Lloyd observes that P. “enunciated his own law that a giver does not have to possess what it gives (17.3-4) and then enunciated the Aristotelian law [lines 6-7]. He did not put them in conflict but used an argument (lines 6-13) which aimed at showing that the Aristotelian law was inapplicable to the present case, but which was somewhat sophistical—or perhaps we should say dialectical and provisional” (1987) 173. Could P. be employing the Aristotelian law in a non-Aristotelian way? Assume that the *ἐνέργεια* from the One is not in fact identical to the inchoate or potential Intellect, but rather, in that the former produces the latter, it is another expression of the familiar description of the One as *δύναμις τῶν πάντων* (cf. III.8[30].10.1ff.). The external activity of the One is thus a great productive power, an actuality and not just an activity. On this hypothesis, the indefinite attributes of the inchoate Intellect are potentially *this* actuality, which remains necessarily distinct and derivative from the *ἐνέργεια* of the One, though strictly speaking the One is not an *ἐνέργεια*. The weakness of this hypothesis is that it interposes an actuality between the One and the potential Intellect for which there is little if any explicit support.

Another solution to the problem is that P. may simply be invoking the Aristotelian law in an unsatisfactorily general manner, i.e. that there is something actual (corrected later to something that is beyond actuality) prior to what is given and that the latter, which is a potentiality, will be actualized; cf. Ch. 25.31 where Intellect is an *ἐνέργεια ἐξ αὐτοῦ*. This may an example of P.’ provisional use of Aristotle; in any case, I cannot agree that it is sophistical.

17.11-14 εἰ . . . *ζωή*. Szlezák 106 n329 adroitly points out the Platonic echoes in *ὁ διδοὺς ἔδωκε ζωὴν . . . καλλίων καὶ τιμιώτερος ζωῆς; τὸ . . . τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδίδόν* (*Rep.* 508e2); *μειζόνως τιμητέον* (509a4); *ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει* (509a7).

A close parallel to this discussion of life as a trace of the One is V.3[49].16.38-42: *δεῖ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο ζωῆς εἶναι κρεῖσσον καὶ νοῦ· οὕτω γὰρ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὴν ζωὴν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ, μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντος, καθὼς τοῦτο ζῇ, καὶ τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐν τούτῳ, μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντος, ὅ τι δῆποτέ ἐστι τοῦτο* (“That, therefore, must be better than life and intellect; thus the other will turn towards it both the life which is in it, a kind of image of the life in that in so far as this lives, and the intellect in it, a kind

of representation of what is in that, whatever this may be"). The phrase *μίμημά τι τοῦ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὄντος*, καθὸ τοῦτο ζῆ is somewhat more emphatic in attributing some sort of life to the One than *ἦν ἡ ζωὴ ἵχνος τι ἐκείνου*, οὐκ ἐκείνου ζωὴ (13-14); cf. also *ζωὴ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ* (V.4[7].2.16-17) and comm. *ad loc.* And for another extended discussion of Intellect as containing the *ἵχνος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* cf. III.8[30].11.19.

17.14-21 πρὸς ἐκεῖνο . . . ἐκλαμπνᾶσης. In the first sentence, *πρὸς . . . ἔχοντος* (14-16), P. summarizes the more complex account of the reversion articulated at Ch. 16.13-19. This two-pronged, abbreviated schema is more common in the earlier treatises, as e.g. at V.4[7].2.6-7: *ἀόριστος μὲν αὐτὴ ὥσπερ ὄψις, ὀριζομένη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ*; cf. also II.4[12].5.33-37. However, P. has more to say here about what the inchoate Intellect sees: *βλέψασα ἐκεῖ* (cp. *ἐκεῖ κινεῖσθαι*: Ch. 16.17) and *πρὸς ἐν τι ἰδοῦσα*. The latter remark is only a slight variation, if that, on P.' normal view that the indefinite vision does not see the One accurately, as in *ὅταν τὸ ἐν θεωρῇ, οὐχ ὡς ἐν* (III.8[30].8.31). On the pre-noetic level of Intellect's existence we have a subject that is a unity (*ἐν ὃν αὐτὸς*: Ch. 16.11) and indefinite looking at an object that is some sort of unity, while the One is said to be *ἄμορφον* (18). (Cf. lines 23-25 below for the persistence of this unity in the actualized Intellect.) This remarkable situation reveals the great extent to which P. has modified Aristotle's psychological model, acutely noted by Szlezák 107: "Die Beibehaltung des ὄρασις-Modells täuscht darüber hinweg, dass der kreative Vorgang im Intelligiblen als Bestimmung des Unbestimmten durch das Unbestimmbare gedacht werden soll." And elsewhere P. leaves no doubt that seeing something definite, and thereby acquiring form, constitutes a diminution: *ἐπειδὴ ὁ νοῦς ἰδίον τι νοεῖ, ἡλάττωται, κἂν ὁμοῦ πάντα λάβῃ ὅσα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ· κἂν ἕκαστον, μίαν μορφήν νοητὴν ἔχει* (Ch. 33.7-9).

The actualization and definition of the inchoate Intellect is indicated by the appearance in the recipient of *ὅρος*. But P. is careful to point out that *ὅρος* οὐκ ἔξωθεν, a clarification of his remark at the end of the previous chapter that *ἐτέρα δὲ ἀρχὴ οἶονεῖ ἔξωθεν ἢ πληροῦσα ἦν* (Ch. 16.33-34). But, he goes on to argue, the manifestation of limit must not be understood in spatio-temporal terms, for there is no question of magnitude here. This point is necessary not only because the intelligible world, in all its modalities, is incorporeal, but also because life is infinite (and now multiple also), since it has been radiated from the infinite power of the One. The expression, in similar terms, of the continuity between the two principles is more emphatic in this passage: the One "is the greatest of all things, not in size but in power (*οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει*), so that its sizelessness also is a matter of power (*τὸ ἀμέγεθες δυνάμει*): since the things after it also are indivisible and undivided in their powers (*ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμέριστα καὶ ἀμερῇ*), not in their bulks (*τοῖς ὄγκοις*). And it must be

understood as infinite not because its size and number cannot be measured or counted but because its power cannot be comprehended. For when you think of him as Intellect or God, he is more" (VI.9[9].6.7-13). The superimposition of limit and form on this unbounded life is not absolute, for Intellect retains this limitless element within itself in the form of striving and love for its source. This point provides the theoretical foundations for the mystical ascent later in VI.7[38]: there the mystical return to the One requires that ἔρος be ἄπειρος (Ch. 32.28); cf. Szlezák 107.

Theiler speculates that the assertion "ὅρος nicht ἔξωθεν, vielleicht Polemik gegen den gnostischen "Όρος, wie er z. B. bei Hippolyt Elench. 6.31.5f. erscheint"; but it should be noted that the Gnostic articulation of the Pleroma by Limit is in many respects analogous to the differentiating role of limit in P.' intelligible world. Cf. especially *A Valentinian Exposition* "Limit is the separator of the All and the confirmation of the All" (*Nag Hammadi Library* XI.25); for this reference I am indebted to John Dillon. Also analogous to P. is the fact that for Valentinians the First Principle is beyond being and limit; for a thorough discussion see Krämer (1964) 239-41.

17.21-26 ζώή . . . νοῦς. P. begins to focus his attention on the internal structure of the intelligible world, establishing first that the universality and generic character of life precludes predicating it of, or limiting it to, particular things (τοῦδε) or individuals (ἀτόμου). This may be a veiled criticism of Aristotle's theory of substance. At any rate, his view of the hierarchical structure of the intelligible world, only barely visible here, is developed at length in, for example, VI.2[43].2 where he arranges γένη—εἶδη—ἄτομα in descending order: the rarely used term ἄτομον appears in lines 8, 13, 33; cf. also VI.2[43].22.12; VI.3[44].1.15, 9.37. The best discussion is Wurm 222-24.

P. also criticizes interpreting the limitation and definition of intelligible life in terms of magnitude in a similar fashion in Ch. 14: "if it [i.e. a nose] was simply and solely one thing (ἐν τι) it would be a lump (ὄγκος). And the unbounded (τὸ ἄπειρον) is in Intellect in this way, that it is one as one-many, not like one lump but like a rational forming principle multiple in itself" (Ch. 14.10-12). In the present context too Intellect is a one-many (the source-text is Plato *Parm.* 145a2): the cause of unity is ὅρος and of multiplicity, life (τὸ πολὺ τῆς ζωῆς). (Cf. VI.6[34].3.1ff. where τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πλήθος are used as synonyms.) Note that the unity of actualized Intellect is implicitly differentiated from the incipient unity of the inchoate Intellect, which is the equivalent of indefinite ζώή: ἐν ὃν αὐτός (Ch. 16.11). In more incisive discussions, P. derives intelligible multiplicity from otherness: ἅτε ὦν ἐξ ἑνὸς πολλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ θατέρου φύσιν συνοῦσαν ἔχων, εἰς πολλὰ γίνεται (VI.2[43].22.8-10). This passage can be seen as complementary to the present case in the sense that life is more universal than otherness, so that the effect of the latter is subsumed under the

former. However, the discussion of multiplicity takes a different turn in the ensuing lines where, significantly, διαφορά plays a role.

17.26-34 τί . . . τὰ πάντα. Though “each of the many things is defined” (ὥριστο ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν: 23-24) and Intellect is “defined as one” (ἐν ὁρίσθη: 25), Intellect is said to be many because of the νόες πολλοί. We should not, I think, conclude from the former points that the product of limit is only unity, rather limit and difference act in conjunction with the multiplicity of life to articulate the internal structure of the intelligible universe. On the other hand, the remark that “it is one because of limit” (διὰ τὸν ὅρον ἐν) may indicate that limit is ontologically prior, though chronologically posterior to, the unlimited life of the inchoate Intellect. This would make P.’ position similar to Proclus for whom limit certainly is prior: cf. *In Parm.* 1124.1; but note that Rist (1967) 31 considers the priority of limit “rather un-Plotinian.”

The problem of the relation between universal Intellect and particular intellects is also addressed at III.8[30].8.42ff. (cf. comm. *ad loc.*) at a similar point in the discussion—immediately following an account of procession and reversion. The distinction between universal Intellect and individual intellects is elaborated in VI.2[43].20.10-16: οὕτω δὴ ἄλλως μὲν νοῦν τὸν ξύμπαντα εἰπεῖν εἶναι, τὸν πρὸ τῶν καθέκαστον ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντων, ἄλλως δὲ νοῦς ἑκάστους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μέρει ἐκ πάντων πληρωθέντας, τὸν δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι νοῦν χορηγὸν μὲν τοῖς καθέκαστα, δύναμιν δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν ἐν τῷ καθόλου ἐκείνους, ἐκείνους τε αὖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν μέρει οὖσιν ἔχειν τὸν καθόλου, ὡς ἢ τις ἐπιστήμη τὴν ἐπιστήμην (“Thus we can certainly say that universal Intellect exists in one way—that is the one before those which are actually the particular intellects—and particular intellects in another, those which are partial and fulfilled from all things; but the Intellect over all of them directs the particular intellects, but is their potentiality and contains them in its universality; and they on the other hand in their partial selves contain the universal Intellect, as a particular body of knowledge contains knowledge”). The parallels between VI.2[43].20 and the present passage are quite close: τὸν δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι νοῦν χορηγὸν μὲν τοῖς καθέκαστα/ὁ πᾶς νοῦς ἕκαστον περιέχων (28); ἐκείνους τε αὖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν μέρει οὖσιν ἔχειν τὸν καθόλου is explanatory of the claim that πάντα οὖν νόες, καὶ ὁ μὲν πᾶς νοῦς, οἱ δὲ ἕκαστοι νοῖ (27); δύναμιν δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν ἐν τῷ καθόλου ἐκείνους/ἢ μὲν ζωὴ δύναμις πᾶσα . . . ὁ δὲ γενόμενος νοῦς αὐτὰ ἀνεφάνη τὰ πάντα (32-34). Cf. also VI.2[43].20.20-23: ἐν ἐκείνῳ μὲν πάντας ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὄντι δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντι τὰ πάντα ἅμα, δυνάμει δὲ ἕκαστον χωρὶς, τοὺς δ’ αὖ ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ὅ εἰσι, δυνάμει δὲ τὸ ὅλον.

In discussing the relation between universal Intellect and individual intellects P. endeavors to make two points. (i) Intellect’s δύναμις, in conjunction with the ὅρασις derived from the One, specifies the secondary causality it possesses in

generating its own contents. For the derivation of Intellect's δύναμις from the One cf. V.1[10].7.13-14: ὁρίζει τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ τῇ παρ' ἐκείνου δυνάμει. δύναμις πάντων is better construed as an objective genitive than as a possessive, *pace* Lloyd (1987) 166: "the power of all things" author's italics. (I cannot agree with Lloyd that this passage demonstrates that P. "is anxious to dissociate it [i.e. the generation of Existence] from the direct agency of the One.") Cp. Armstrong: "the power to become all things"; B-T: "Möglichkeit sämtlicher Dinge"; and Bréhier, who strays from the Greek: "une vision qui vient de l'Un et qui contient tous les êtres dans sa puissance." (For discussion of Intellect as δύναμις cf. III.8[30].8.42ff. and comm. *ad loc.*) Note that δυνάμει ("potentially") is more prominent in VI.2[43].20.20-23 (Wurm 233); in line 14 (δύναμιν δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι), however, I think a good case can be made for translating δύναμις as "productive power" rather than Armstrong's "potentiality." P. distinguishes the Aristotelian δυνάμει from δύναμις at II.5[25].1.21-34 and V.3[49].15.27-37; cf. Wurm's valuable discussion, 235. (ii) The existence of multiple intellects reveals the presence of διαφορά, here synonymous with ἑτερότης, whose counterpart among the Platonic μέγιστα γένη, ταυτότης, is echoed in ταυτόν (28, 32). In the former case P. establishes that ταυτότης cannot eliminate ἑτερότης from the intelligible world, otherwise there would be no multiplicity of intellects.

The present passage, especially when read in conjunction with VI.2[43].20, offers the possibility of interpreting the distinction between τὸ ἐνεργεῖν εἶναι and τὰ ὕστερα εἶναι δυνάμει in lines 6-8 above in terms of the relation between universal Intellect and individual intellects. If the almost twenty lines separating the two passages were removed, this would be a most attractive solution. However, in this case I do not think we can read the two together with any confidence.

17.34-36 ὁ δὲ ἐπικάθεται . . . αὐτό. All editors before H-S, and other scholars like Krämer (1964) 405, have considered Intellect to be the subject of ἐπικάθεται (as well as the verbs that follow), but I agree with H-S and Armstrong that the Good is in fact the subject. Now, this is the only instance of the verb in the *Enneads*, but the majority view derives some support from Ch. 15.29, where Intellect is situated (ἰδρυμένον) on the peak of the soul, and VI.9[9].6.26-27: because the One is most self-sufficient οὐ γάρ τι ζητεῖ, ἵνα ᾗ, οὐδ' ἵνα εὖ ᾗ, οὐδὲ ἵνα ἐκεῖ ἰδρυθῇ (for discussion of this and related passages cf. Atkinson 220-21). But reading Intellect as the subject creates problems for construing εἶδος εἰδῶν and ἀνείδειον αὐτό; and the fact that for Aristotle εἶδος εἰδῶν (*De An.* Γ 8.432a2) refers to νοῦς offers no assistance. Bréhier, Cilento, and Kirchhoff prefer ἰδῶν (the reading of Codd. wBC) to εἰδῶν (Codd. wUQ). But note the difficulties with this text in Bréhier: "L'Intelligence siège en eux, non pas pour y trouver un fondement, mais pour

être le fondement de la forme des êtres premiers grâce à la vision qu'elle a de ce qui est sans forme." This rendering has the effect of making εἶδος the subject of ἰδρύση, which is just as unlikely as taking ἰδρύση as a middle. Theiler retains εἰδὼν, but offers the unhappy observation that "diese Form ist paradoxerweise formlos." Beutler translates ἀλλ' . . . αὐτό: "sondern damit die Form der Formen Fundament gibt." For what, one must ask? I think we must assume that when P. shifts from a passive to an active transitive verb, an object is required. The only objection against taking the Good as the subject is that it has not been part of the discussion since line 21; but the contrast between Intellect as εἶδος and the Good as ἄμορφος καὶ ἀνείδεος in line 40 removes this difficulty.

If, therefore, the Good is the subject of this sentence, what is the implication of the phrase εἶδος εἰδὼν? Does it refer to the Good or, in some way, to Intellect? Szlezák 152 offers strong reasons for the former view: "wenn das Gute εἶδος εἰδὼν heisst (17.35), mithin als Höchstform von εἶδος gedacht werden soll, oder wenn das Geformtwerden erfolgt durch das Hinblicken 'auf ein Etwas' (πρὸς ἓν τι 17.16), so als hätte das Eine selbst Gestalt, die es zu einem Etwas machen würde. Aber Plotin scheut sich, einen Schritt weiter in diese Richtung zu tun, und beeilt sich zu versichern, dass die Form der Formen selbst nicht Form ist (17.36, 40f.) und dass die Form beim Vorgang des Geformtwerdens nur im Geformten auftreten müsse (17.17f.)." Szlezák goes on to argue that the reference to the Good as εἶδος εἰδὼν is equivalent to the One as νοητόν in V.4[7].2. This is not an unattractive interpretation, but I am not convinced that it is compelling in the present context, since the Good is defined as ἄμορφος in lines 18 and 40, i.e. both prior to and after the present passage, and as ἀνείδεον in the same sentence. Moreover, following immediately the discussion of universal Intellect and particular intellects, it is not unlikely that εἶδος refers to the former and εἰδὼν τῶν πρώτων to the latter. In a related passage, following an analysis of the priority of the one Intellect to the many intellects, P. distinguishes between a generic Form that is prior to the species-forms: "For as long as the division, of a genus for instance, arrives at another form, it is not yet infinite: for it is limited by the forms which have been generated: but the ultimate form (τὸ ἔσχατον εἶδος) which is not divided into forms (εἶδη) is more infinite" (VI.2.[43].22.15-17).

17.36-43 καὶ νοῦς . . . πρὸ αὐτοῦ. For the sake of completeness P. adds that the same terms and relationships can be employed to describe the ontological derivation of the soul from Intellect and Intellect from the Good. Cf. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκ νοῦ φῶς τι περὶ αὐτὸν γενομένη ἐξήρτηται τε αὐτοῦ (V.3[49].9.15-16); νοῦ δὲ γέννημα λόγος τις καὶ ὑπόστασις, τὸ διανοούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον καὶ νοῦ φῶς καὶ ἵχνος ἐξηρημένον ἐκείνου (V.1[10].7.42-44). For an excellent discussion of these and other words—e.g. εἰκόν, εἰδωλον, ἵνδαλμα, μίμημα—P. employs

to express the relation between Intellect and the soul and Intellect and the One see Atkinson 49-50.

The assertion that the Good cannot be εἶδος because this would make Intellect a λόγος indicates the limits of the comparison between the Good/Intellect and Intellect/soul relations, for according to P.' normal view of the latter the soul is the λόγος of Intellect: cf. V.1[10].3.8, 6.44-45 and Atkinson's valuable discussions *ad locc.* I agree with his trenchant arguments, against many scholars, that we should not call Intellect a λόγος of the Good. He disposes of the only troublesome passage—Intellect is a λόγος εἰς καὶ πολὺς at VI.4[22].11.16—with the insightful remark that “P. is probably saying no more by the phrase . . . than that the single Intellect contains the individual Forms (or νόες) within it” 54.

17.40 ἐκτάσει. ἔκτασις (“stretching out, extension”) and ἔκστασις (“movement outwards, standing outside of oneself”) are often confused in the MSS, but context usually indicates which word is appropriate. The best example of ἔκστασις attributed to Intellect is V.3[49].7.14: νῦν ἡσυχία οὐ νοῦ ἐστὶν ἔκστασις, i.e. a departure from its true nature. Cf. also VI.9[9].11.23 where ἔκστασις, and its equivalents ἀπλωσις and ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ, signify the soul's self-transcendent mystical union with the One. Clearly, neither of these connotations of ἔκστασις is appropriate here, despite the fact that a majority of the MSS read ἐκτάσει. Thus, Theiler's suspicion that ἐκτάσει is the correct reading, but printed only by H-S and Armstrong, should be accepted.

17.41 εἰδοποιεῖ. Only here does P. define the Good's activity with εἰδοποιεῖν; but it is synonymous with ὀρίζειν, as the following account of the soul's actualization by Intellect indicates: ἔλαττον ὃν εἶδωλον εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἀόριστον μὲν ὡσαύτως, ὀριζόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννήσαντος καὶ οἶον εἰδοποιούμενον (V.1[10].7.40-42). At III.4[15].1.8-10 the word describes the definition achieved by all indefinite entities in the reversion to their generator. Atkinson 181 notes that εἰδοποιεῖν is first used by Chrysippus in describing how qualities impart form and shape to matter: τὰς ποιότητος πνεύματα οὕσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις, οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης, εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν (SVF II.449 = Long-Sedley II.39 M.6-8). Once again, the οἶον indicates a dematerialization of the Stoic activity.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ENNEAD VI.7[38].35.19-36.27

Introductory Note

Having completed an elaborate account of the generation of the intelligible world in Chs. 15-17, P. explores the goodness of Intellect as derived from the Good (Ch. 18), but focuses immediately upon the desire of the soul and its pursuit of the Good as τὸ ἐφετόν (Ch. 19). Because Intellect is a secondary reality, the soul must ascend beyond it to the Good which is beyond reason. Hence the allurements of intelligible beauty must be overcome: the soul awakens to the splendour (ἀγλαΐα) shining upon Intellect and attracting it to the Good; its awakening is symbolized by the sprouting of wings, lifting it towards its goal (Ch. 21-22). In Chs. 24-29 P. steps back from this erotic mysticism in order to assay a hierarchy of goods which the soul may choose as objects of its desire. The ebb in the emotional intensity of the treatise in this section gives way to renewed attention to what is most desirable—the best part of ourselves, i.e. the inner beauty and life one discovers when the soul returns to Intellect (Ch. 30). Chs. 31-34 build towards the climax of Chs. 35-36, tracing the ascent of soul and Intellect to the Good by means of metaphysical ἔως and the negative theology. The details of this section are directly relevant to Chs. 35-36 and thus are discussed extensively in the commentary.

Translation of VI.7[38].35.19-36.27

35. Intellect then has one power for intellection, by which it sees its own contents, and one by which it sees what is beyond it by an intuitive awareness and reception, by which also at a prior moment it only saw, and later by seeing possessed Intellect and is one. And that first power is the contemplative vision of Intellect in its intelligent state, and the second is Intellect in love, when it is witless, “intoxicated on the nectar”: then in love it is simplified into bliss through its fullness; and it is better for it to be intoxicated in this way than to be eminently sober. But does Intellect in this state see things piecemeal, now some things and now others? No, for the rational account didactically makes them appear as events, but Intellect always has intellection and always non-intellection, rather seeing that Good in another way. For in seeing that it had offspring and it was directly conscious of their generation and their existence within it; and when it sees them it is said to intelligize, but it sees that Good by the power by which it was going to intelligize. But the soul sees by fusing and annihilating, so to

speak, the Intellect abiding within it, or rather the Intellect in it sees first and the vision also comes to it and the two become one. The Good, however, is extended over them and assimilated to their coinherence; while it runs over and unites the two, it is present to them and gives them a blessed perception and vision, raising them so high that they are not in place nor in anything else, where by nature one thing is in another: for it is not anywhere, rather the “intelligible place” is in it, but it is not in another. Therefore the soul does not move then, because that Good does not move. It is, then, not even soul, because that does not live, but is beyond life. Nor is it even Intellect, because that does not intelligize; for it must be made like. It does not even intelligize that Good, because that does not intelligize.

36. The rest is clear and something has also been said about this point. Nevertheless, now also we must address it briefly, beginning from that vision but advancing by means of rational arguments. The knowledge of or contact with the Good is the greatest thing, and Plato calls it “the greatest study,” meaning by study not the vision of the Good, but learning something about it beforehand. What teaches us, then, are analogies and negations and knowledge of what derives from it and specific degrees of the ascent, but what advances us towards it are purifications and virtues and adornments and securing footholds in the intelligible world and establishing ourselves in it and feasting on it. But whoever has become at once seer of himself and the other intelligible beings and the object of his own vision, and becoming substance and Intellect and the perfect living being, he no longer looks at it from outside. When he becomes this he is near, and the next thing is that Good, and it is already close gleaming over the entire intelligible world. Here, certainly, one puts aside all study, and having been guided to this Intellect and established in beauty, one intelligizes as far as this in which one is, but is swept out of it by the, so to speak, wave of Intellect itself and lifted high by a kind of swell and he sees suddenly not seeing how, but while the vision fills his eyes with light it does not make him see something else by it, rather the light itself is what is seen. For in that which is seen there is not an object of seeing and its light, nor Intellect and object of intellection, but a radiance which generates these afterwards and allows them to exist beside it; but it itself is the radiance which only generates Intellect and does not extinguish itself in generating, but the radiance itself abides and that Intellect comes to be because this exists. For if this Good was not of such a nature, Intellect would not have come into existence.

Commentary on VI.7[38].35.19-36.27

35.19-27 καὶ τὸν νοῦν . . . μέθης. In articulating two aspects of Intellect’s life this passage is of fundamental significance for P.’ mystical theory. Up to this point the soul’s journey resembles closely the trajectory of the mystical

ascent in VI.9[9]. Thus, in lines 1-2 of this chapter the soul, having already become Intellect, is said “even to despise intellection” (τοῦ νοεῖν καταφρονεῖν). Catching a glimpse of the One, the soul “at once lets everything go” (πάντα ἤδη ἀφήσιν: 7). The soul’s dissatisfaction with Intellect is also stressed at Ch. 22.10-14 and Ch. 34 *passim*. However, unlike the early discussion of the mystical ascent in VI.9[9], in the present context P. does not proceed from the soul’s transcendence of the intelligible world to speak of its mystical vision of the One. Instead, he distinguishes a higher mode of intellectual activity with which the ascending soul is identified as it experiences the mystical union.

He designates this aspect with the phrases νοῦς ἐρῶν and νοῦς ἄφρων. Now ἔρως is normally for P. the desiring activity of the soul which defines its aspiration for the Good: ἔρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς ἀγαθοῦ ὀριγνωμένης (III.5[50].4.22-23). Here the νοῦς ἐρῶν functions as a conceptual focus for articulating more precisely the sensorium of hyper-noetic reality. At the same time the soul’s erotic, mystical experiences of the Good are to be predicated of this intoxicated and mindless νοῦς ἐρῶν. A survey of these experiences, recounted earlier in the treatise, will provide a complete picture of the sort of ontological and psychological transformation as well as the modes of hyper-noetic cognition entailed by mystical eros: “The soul, receiving into itself an outflow from thence, is moved and dances wildly and is all stung with longing and becomes love (ἔρως γίνεται)” (Ch. 22.7-10); “as long as there is anything higher than that which is present to it, it naturally goes on upwards, lifted by the giver of its love (αἰρομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος τὸν ἔρωτα)” (Ch. 22.17-19; for the One as giver of life and light, cf. Chs. 16.21 and 17.5ff. and comm. *ad locc.*); “It saw, as if in utter amazement (οἶον πληγεῖσα), and since it held something of it in itself, it had an intimate awareness (συνήσθητο) of it and came into a state of longing (διατεθείσα ἐγένετο ἐν πόθῳ)” (Ch.31.8-9); “the soul also loves that Good, moved by it to love from the beginning (ψυχὴ ἐρᾷ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ἐρᾶν κινηθείσα)” (Ch. 31.17-18); “Truly, when you cannot grasp the form or shape of what is longed for, it would be most longed for and most lovable (ποθεινότατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον), and love for it would be immeasurable (ἔρως ἂν ἄμετρος εἴη). For love is not limited here, because neither is the beloved, but the love of this would be unbounded (ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως); so his beauty is of another kind and beauty above beauty (κάλλος ὑπὲρ κάλλος). . . . Therefore the productive power of all is the flower of beauty, a beauty which makes beauty (δύναμις οὖν παντὸς καλοῦ ἄνθος ἐστί, κάλλος καλλοποιόν” (Ch. 32.24-32); cp. εἰδοποεῖ at Ch. 17.41.

The highly personal language of erotic mysticism is muted in Chs. 35-36, but the free oscillation between Intellect and soul as the subject of mystical experience, especially in Ch. 35.36ff., strongly implies that the νοῦς ἐρῶν is the

equivalent of the erotically charged soul. The hyper-noetic state designated by παραδοχή is predicated of both or of the soul alone: “one must become Intellect and entrust one’s soul to and set it firmly under Intellect, that it may be awake to receive what that sees (ἴν’ ἃ ὁρᾷ ἐκείνος ἐγρηγορυῖα δέχοιτο)” (VI.9[9].3.24-25); “having received the true light (δεξάμενος φῶς ἀλθηνὸν) and illumined his whole soul through drawing nearer” (VI.9[9].4.20-21); the One “in its presence is not present except to those who are able and prepared to receive it” (VI.9[9].4.25-26). The repeated use of δέχεσθαι, and here παραδοχή, to define the mystical state indicates the importance of the *Phaedrus* myth: at 247d3 the soul receives its proper nourishment, the vision of being; at 251b1-2 the soul as lover receives the outflow of beauty from its beloved (paraphrased at Ch. 22.7-10). For P. receptiveness signifies the cessation of Intellect’s normal contemplative activity, the θέα νοῦ ἔμφορος; cf. τὸ δὲ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν αἰεὶ in line 29. Synonymous with this state, in which both Intellect and the soul apprehend the One mystically, is the higher mode of cognition defined by ἐπιβολή, attributed to Intellect at III.8[30].9.20; cf. προσβολή in III.8[30].10.33 and V.5[32].7.8; at V.8[31].10.32-33 προσβολή is linked with intellectual intoxication. This hyper-noetic activity, therefore, is to be predicated of the νοῦς ἐρῶν, which is also referred to by several other phrases: καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ . . . καὶ τοῦ νοῦ πρώτῳ (VI.9[9].3.26-27); μὴ πάντα νοῦν (III.8[30].9.32); τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῷ (V.5[32].8.22-23); οὐ νοήσεις (V.3[49].13.33). Note the preponderance of instrumental datives in these instances as well as in the use of ἐπιβολή and προσβολή noted above.

Besides receptiveness, intuitive awareness, and non-thinking, the νοῦς ἐρῶν is said to be intoxicated, with the phrase μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος borrowed inappositely from *Symposium* 203b5 where the drunken Poros falls asleep in the garden. Another quotation from the *Symposium* myth, βεβαρημένος (*Symp.* 203b7) at III.8[30].8.34 (cf. comm. *ad loc.*), fits the Platonic context far better. It is quite instructive to examine what P. does with the myth in his detailed exegesis of it in III.5[50]. Noting that “that which is filled with nectar” (πληρούμενον τοῦ νέκταρος) is a λόγος “which has fallen from a higher origin to a lesser one [i.e. the soul]” (Ch. 9.5-6), he remarks: “but Intellect possesses itself in satiety and is not drunk with the possession (νοῦς δὲ ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ἐν κόρῳ καὶ οὐ μεθύει ἔχων). For it does not possess anything from outside” (Ch. 9.18-19). Now the higher Intellect is in a state of satiety in the present passage (ἐν κόρῳ: 26), but the denial of drunkenness in III.5[50].9 contrasts sharply. The explanation of this apparent contradiction depends on the difference in focus: here Intellect’s mystical relation to the One, there the derivation of the soul from the intelligible world. The connotations of intoxication in the two contexts are quite different: in the former the super-consciousness of Intellect’s source, in the latter the soul’s forgetfulness of Intellect, its source. Note also that κόπος occurs at III.8[30].11.39-41 in an

account of the generation of Intellect; there κόρος is the equivalent of πλήρωσις and νόησις.

As with intoxication and satiety, so too with σεμνότης, the precise implication of the term must be determined in context. In line 27 Intellect's normal, sober (σεμνοτέρῳ εἶναι), and self-contemplative activity is contrasted pejoratively with its higher, erotic mode. However, in Ch. 39.28-34, interpreting *Sophist* 248d6-249a2, P. remarks that the One σεμνὸν ἐστήξεται because he thinks that σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ ὄντως σεμνὸν . . . εἶναι τὸ ὑπερβεβηκὸς τὸ νοεῖν. In this case σεμνότης accompanies the transcendence of thought, whereas in the present passage the opposite is true; cf. also V.3[49].13.3 where the One transcends τοῦ σεμνοτάτου νοῦ. Another example of P.' inconsistent use of terminology; but this is understandable in the case of strongly positive epithets which can be employed to describe either the One or Intellect, depending on the context. The contrast between intellectual sobriety and intoxication is yet another echo of the *Phaedrus* myth, as Theiler points out, citing 244d4: κάλλιον μανία σωφροσύνης.

Henry (1938) 229 cites several passages in which Proclus refers to the phrase μεθυσθεῖς τοῦ νέκταρος and identifies it with a higher aspect of Intellect: ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ ὑπερούσιος ἐνάς (*In Parm.* 1047.23-24); τὴν [γνώσιν] ὥς μὴ νοῦς (*In Parm.* 1080.8-9); τῷ πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῶ (*In Plat. Theol.* I.67.3). For discussion of Proclus' theory of the ἄνθος τοῦ νοῦ, cf. Rist (1964b) and Trouillard (1982) 103-04.

35.22 καθ' ἣν καὶ πρότερον ἑώρα μόνον. This statement, which refers to the ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ of the νοῦς ἐρῶν, is interpreted by Trouillard, O'Daly, Hadot and others to mean that Intellect's pre-noetic and hyper-noetic phases are nearly equivalent or even identical. The phrase ἑώρα μόνον is one of many expressions for the activity of the inchoate Intellect, and hence is synonymous with the following: ἀόριστος ὄψις (V.4[7].2.6); οὕτω νοῦς ἦν ἐκεῖνο βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔβλεπεν ἀνοήτως (Ch. 16.13-14); προνοοῦσα οὕτω νοῦ γεγονότος καὶ τοῦ θιγγάνοντος οὐ νοοῦντος (V.3[49].10.43-44); ὄψις οὕτω ἰδοῦσα (V.3[49].11.5). Citing lines 19-27, Hadot (1986) 243 argues that the "Intellect that does not yet think corresponds to the first phase, the Intellect that is 'out of its mind', as Plotinus says, the Intellect that is coming into being and is still in immediate contact with the Good from which it emanates": thus, "thought is born from a sort of loving ecstasy in this type of drunkenness, which is produced by nonintellectual contact with the Good from which it emanates." Trouillard (1955b) 108ff. characterizes the initial state of Intellect in the procession as "extase germinale" and "extase prénoétique." In the comm. on V.3[49].11.15-16 (see also comm. on III.8[30].8.32, 9.32, 11.5; Ch. 16.11) I quote and respond extensively to the arguments of Trouillard, Hadot, and O'Daly that the pre-noetic and hyper-noetic states are analogous or

identical, particularly the attempt to assimilate pre-noetic and hyper-noetic vision and contact. Here I wish to focus more on the “loving ecstasy in this type of drunkenness” which these scholars see as defining Intellect both at the “beginning” and at the “end” of its life.

Armstrong (1967) 262-63, who appears to subscribe to this interpretation, states the point well when he observes that Intellect’s “power of love seems to be identical with that unbounded life as which it first came forth from the One.” In this formulation our initial task is to determine the implications of the word “power,” for in the present passage it is the same δύναμις which connects ἐπιβολή καὶ παραδοχή with ἑώρα μόνον, Intellect’s hyper-noetic and pre-noetic modes of apprehension, respectively. δύναμις is also the lynchpin for linking together these two states in the only other passage which appears to support the interpretation under discussion: the soul is able to touch the One through likeness “and by the power in oneself akin to that which comes from the One: when someone is as he was when he came from him, he is already able to see as it is the nature of that God to be seen” (τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεὶ τῷ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ· ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἤδη δύναται ἰδεῖν ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνος θεατὸς εἶναι: VI.9[9].4.27-30). O’Daly (1974) 166 correctly adduces ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ as parallel to the phrase ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἓν at III.8[30].8.32, but his conclusion is unjustified: “The ‘one-ness’ of the subsequent is accounted for by its contact with the One, its being as yet hardly differentiated from the power in the One.” I agree that in its initial phase the efflux from the One is barely differentiated from it, but it is misleading to describe the δύναμις “which comes *from* the One” as “the power *in* the One.” The One *qua* δύναμις τῶν πάντων is not the One itself; cf. comm. on III.8[30].10.1ff. This point is crucial, because in the mystical union the soul or Intellect is in fact within the One, or at least is said to see the One super-consciously. Moreover, if we infer that the initial oneness of the inchoate Intellect depends on its pre-noetic contact with the One, it must be kept in mind that pre-noetic, as opposed to hyper-noetic, contact is mentioned only once, at V.3[49].10.43-44; cf. comm. on V.3[49].11.15-16. In the present passage, VI.9[9].4.27-30, and III.8[30].8.32, there is no hint of pre-noetic contact. In the first two passages, again, it is the rather general references to the power from the One which suggest the similarity or identity of the two modes of cognition, but the analogy is made too loosely for it to serve as the support for such a speculative reading of the relation of the One and Intellect. Even with the distinction between two types of intellectual δύναμις, it must still be admitted that each aspect of Intellect’s life is in a sense nothing more than this δύναμις in a distinct state; see further comm. on lines 30-33. What must be scrutinized are not the simple, and rare, assertions that “it is as it was,” but rather the much more prolific and precise descriptions of those states.

Now in the present passage the hyper-noetic δύναμις is equivalent to the νοῦς ἐρῶν, so the first question to be addressed is whether the inchoate Intellect is ever described as erotic. The answer is, quite simply, never. As I argue in the comm. on V.3[49].11.15-16, a careful examination of the characterizations of pre-noetic and hyper-noetic seeing reveals how different P. considers them to be. We are led ineluctably to the same conclusion in the case of the various modalities of desire. P.' preferred term from the vocabulary of desire for defining the potential Intellect is ἔφεις: cf. V.6[24].5.8-10 and V.3[49].11.11-12. In the latter we have πρὸς τοῦτου ἔφεις μόνον, which is clearly the equivalent of ἑώρα μόνον in the present passage; in the former, ἔφεις precedes and generates intellection: ἔφεις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ. Note also that in that chapter the Good is referred to as ἐφετόν. What, then, is the distinction between ἔφεις and ἔρω; Certainly, neither ἔρω nor ἐρῶν are used to define the desire of the inchoate Intellect, though the verb figures in a very general account of the generation of the soul at Ch. 31.11-18, albeit in a strongly mystical context. On the other hand, though ἔρω-*language* is occasionally used to describe the internal relations of the self-contemplating Intellect—e.g. at III.8[30].7.26—in the great majority of instances it serves to define the soul's close proximity to the One or the universal love for the Good or beauty. In the latter, more general contexts, ἔρω often appears in conjunction with ἐφίεσθαι and, more rarely, it can be synonymous with ἔφεις (for examples of both usages, cf. V.5[32].12.10-17, VI.5[23].10.4, and III.5[50].7.19-23); but this occurs in mystical contexts or in general statements of the soul's universal desire to return to the Good.

In a particularly interesting passage P. remarks that ἡ ἔφεις . . . ἐγέννησε τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔρωτα τοῦτον ὄντα (III.5[50].9.46-48). Read with ἔφεις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε (V.6[24].5.9), it is possible to conclude that the bare, indefinite ἔφεις of the inchoate Intellect is chronologically prior to the various types of desire which are predicated of the actualized Intellect. Though it is extremely difficult to make precise distinctions about P.' use of terminology, especially with terms like ἔφεις and ἔρω, the following pattern of linguistic usage seems to hold in most cases: (i) for the inchoate Intellect: ἔφεις (μόνον); (ii) for the internal activity of the actualized Intellect or for general statements of the desire to return to the One: both ἔφεις and ἔρω, as well as other terms like πόθος and ὄρεξις; (iii) in accounts of the ultimate, mystical ascent to the One: primarily ἔρω, but note ἔφεις πρὸς ἀφῆν at VI.9[9].11.24. (ἔρω and ἔφεις are also identified with the Good itself at VI.8[39].15.1-7; cf. comm. on VI.8[39].16.13-15). The crucial points are, of course, that ἔρω is not relevant to (i) and that, with rare exceptions, ἔφεις is absent from (iii). A more concrete way to envision the difference between pre-noetic and hyper-noetic desire is to recall that the latter engenders an ἐρωτικὸν πάθημα (VI.9[9].4.19). This justifies the remarkable statement that οὐ γὰρ

ὥρισταί ἐνταῦθα ὁ ἔρως, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ ἐρώμενον, ἀλλ' ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως (Ch. 32.26-28). In neither passage, it seems to me, would it make sense to replace ἔρως with ἔφεις. Unlike the νοῦς ἐρῶν, the inchoate Intellect does not experience the intense longing for the Good or the pain which results from this longing. Moreover, it is precisely the purpose of the inchoate Intellect to be limited: cf. V.4[7].2.6-7 and especially Ch. 17.15-24. I conclude, therefore, that the ἔφεις προνοοῦσα, far from being identical with the νοῦς ἐρῶν, is not really even similar to it—except that both states are modalities of desire and both are minimally differentiated.

35.26 ἀπλωθεὶς εἰς εὐπάθειαν. On ἀπλωθεὶς I agree with the renderings of H-S¹ (*simplex factus*), Armstrong (“simplified”), Bréhier (“se simplifiant”), Beutler (“einfach geworden”), and MacKenna (“it is made simplex”) in contrast to H-S² and Theiler who adopt Ficino’s *se ipsam diffundens*. Theiler cites III.5[50].9.1-3 as a parallel for his rendering “sich entfalten.” Poros, since it is a λόγος in the intelligible world “and is more diffused and, as it were, spread out (καὶ μᾶλλον κεχυμένος καὶ οἶον ἀπλωθεὶς), would be concerned with soul and in soul.” This passage is not at all relevant, since it describes a movement from intelligible unity to psychic multiplicity, the inverse of the present situation in which Intellect transcends its own multiplicity. Thus, ἀπλωθεὶς is synonymous with ἄπλωσις at VI.9[9].11.23.

Though the Stoics employ εὐπάθεια extensively and define many examples (SVF III.431-432), P.’ use of the term is probably more indebted to Plato *Rep.* 615a3: in the Myth of Er the substantive defines the celestial experiences of the good souls; or *Phaedrus* 247d4: in the myth εὐπαθεῖν defines the experiences of souls who behold true being. P. uses the term in mystical contexts at Ch. 34.30, 38 and VI.9[9].9.38 (here a quotation of the *Phaedrus* passage).

35.27-30 παρὰ μέρος . . . βλέπειν. P. maintains the distinction between the two powers of Intellect, noting that both exist eternally; cf. ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων (III.8[30].11.23-24). On the basis of these two statements it seems reasonable to conclude that the initial state of Intellect, when it exists as indefinite movement, vision, and desire, is also eternal. This too would be explained by the necessity of providing a rational account (λόγος) in sequential order of the generation and mystical return of timeless realities. P. often cautions against reading these accounts temporally: οἱ λόγοι καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ἀγεννήτων ποιοῦσι, καὶ τὰ ὁμοῦ ὄντα καὶ αὐτοὶ διαιροῦσι (“rational discussions, also, make generations of things ungenerated, and themselves, too, separate things which are together”: III.5[50].9.27-28); cf. also IV.8[6].4.40-42.

The definition of Intellect's higher, erotic mode of cognition as ἄλλως ἐκεῖνον βλέπειν closely parallels the reference to the soul's mystical seeing at VI.9[9].11.22: ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν.

35.30-33 καὶ γὰρ ὁρῶν . . . νοεῖν. Here P. inserts a brief statement of the genesis of Intellect and its actualization which is very close to Ch. 16.19-22; see comm. *ad loc.* Cp. Intellect's δύναμις τοῦ γεννᾶν at Ch. 40.13-14. The inference that the inchoate Intellect is also eternal, noted above on the previous sentence, receives support from the claim that actualized intellection is a manifestation of the same δύναμις by which Intellect originally is ὄψις, i.e. potential seeing or the faculty of vision. This passage is overlooked by those scholars (discussed above on line 22) who wish to assimilate pre-noetic and hyper-noetic vision. Reading both passages together demonstrates that there are three types of seeing, each of which is a distinct activity derived from the original δύναμις.

35.33-45 ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ . . . οὐδὲ νοεῖ. This is one of the most important accounts of mystical union in the *Enneads*, but much of the preparation for it is presented in Chs. 18-22, 31-34. It is significant that, though he has distinguished a higher phase of Intellect, P. immediately reverts to the soul as the putative subject of the experience, resuming the focus of the first 19 lines of the chapter as well as the earlier chapters noted. He makes several points which are fundamental for his mystical theory: (i) the soul negates the intelligible reality it has become (33-34), the necessary precondition for (ii) when the unity of seer and seen is achieved (35-36, 37-38); (iii) in the state of mystical union, the soul assumes the negative predicates of the One: not existing in something else (39-41), not moving (42), transcending life and intellection (42-45), and being made like the One (44). I propose to discuss each aspect of P.'s mystical theory in turn, adducing the many parallels to the present passage, and turning finally to a theoretical assessment of his mysticism.

In terms of the distinction introduced in lines 19-27, the remarkable assertion that the soul annuls Intellect means that it is now identical with the νοῦς ἐρῶν, having transcended the νοῦς ἔμφορῶν. This ontological transformation is announced already in the opening lines of the present chapter (see introductory remarks to comm. on lines 19-27), but the soul's negation of intelligible reality raises the difficult problem of determining its ontological status both before and after this mystical annihilation. On the former, Atkinson 104-05 argues that the numerous references to the soul "becoming Intellect" do not mean identity or "strict union." His view is expressed with respect to V.1[10].5.3: οἷον ἐν γενομένη ζῆν ἀεί. Here the οἷον is otiose, for elsewhere the qualification is dropped: νοῦς γινόμενος (Ch. 35.4: *contra* Atkinson who refers the qualification οἷον νοωθεῖσα back to this phrase); νοῦν νῶ θεωρητέον

(VI.6[34].8.8); θεὸν γενόμενον (VI.9[9].9.58). Atkinson 105 asserts that even without the qualifying οἶον “we have no right to interpret statements of unity as statements of identity.” The justification for this generalization is apparent in his useful discussion of another text, which, at first glance, seems relevant to the present context: οὐσα οὖν ἀπὸ νοῦ νοερά ἐστι, καὶ ἐν λογισμοῖς ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς (V.1[10].3.12-13). In his comm. *ad loc.* Atkinson articulates well the Plotinian distinction between the soul’s intellect and Intellect as hypostasis, which is central to that discussion of soul’s derivation and difference from Intellect. However, the individuality and ontological inferiority of the soul’s intellect in that passage and elsewhere (cf. the references assembled by Atkinson) is to be distinguished from the elevated state of the mystically ascended soul here. Thus, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ νοῦν in line 34 is not equivalent to ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς: the latter is ambiguous without ἐν λογισμοῖς, which indicates clearly that the phrase “its intellect” means discursive reasoning. The soul is capable of existing on many levels and exercising the activity characteristic of a particular level of being, but essentially it is intellectual: ἐσμὲν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός . . . καὶ μένομεν τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ παντὶ νοητῷ ἄνω (III.4[15].3.22-24). The complexities of the tension between the discursive and intelligible powers of the soul need not detain us here, for when the soul ascends to Intellect and beyond, its lower powers are no longer active because its essential intellectual nature is then wholly activated. In mystical contexts P. in fact stresses identity. In the celebrated account of his personal mystical experience P. claims that “awakening to myself . . . I have felt assurance that then most of all I belonged to the better part; I have actually lived the best life and come to identity with the divine (τῷ θεῷ εἰς ταὐτὸν γεγενημένος)” (IV.8[6].1.1-5).

The fact that the soul negates the Intellect within also indicates that it must have been identified with the intelligible world. If P. actually intended the individuality of the soul to be maintained, he would be arguing for the existence of an individualized substance beyond the universal and perfect being of Intellect, an impossible position in my estimation. Hence, I agree with O’Daly (1973) 84-85 that in the mystical ascent the soul first is identified with Intellect and then exists in a hyper-ontic and hyper-noetic state, which makes it identical with the νοῦς ἐρῶν, the non-intellectual or primary part of Intellect; cf. also Hadot (1986) 244. The question why P. continues to employ the terms ψυχή and νοῦς is addressed satisfactorily only by O’Daly. First, on the distinction between the two powers in Intellect, he argues that P. “does not want to situate the self which experiences *unio* outside of *nous*, of the ontic realm, because of the contradictions involved” 88. Second, O’Daly 90 sees P.’s discussions of mystical theory and experience operating implicitly with the “category of the self,” which, nevertheless, could be expressed only with the traditional concepts of ψυχή and νοῦς inherited from Plato. Linguistic necessity plays a role also, for as Henry points out (1960) 448 (noted by O’Daly), Greek has no word for “person” or

“self”: hence, “the term ψυχή appears to be chosen rather than νοῦς for the faculty in question, if only because its connotations are wide, compensating for the clearly delimited function of νοῦς” O’Daly 89. This is his explanation of why, after the introduction of the νοῦς ἐρῶν in lines 19-27, the soul returns as the subject of mystical experience in lines 33ff. On his view lines 34-36—μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ νοῦς αὐτῆς ὁρᾷ πρῶτος, ἔρχεται δὲ ἡ θεὰ καὶ εἰς αὐτήν καὶ τὰ δύο ἐν γίνεται—demonstrate that “the notion of a non-intellectual Intellect is quickly found unsatisfactory . . . for *nous* cannot describe the whole vision, which is, in the ultimate reckoning, more than intellectual. Thus soul is identified with *self* as the subject of vision” 88, author’s italics. Moreover, lines 42-45 convince him that not only “Plotinus’ attempt to posit a νοῦς ἐρῶν fails” but also “ultimately soul, too, is discarded, and the problem remains unsolved” 89. O’Daly’s first assertion—that the postulation of a higher phase of Intellect is rejected by P. himself—is not supported by the present passage and it is controverted, it seems to me, by the abundant references both to the non-intellectual part of Intellect and the various types of mystical awareness attributed to it in III.8[30].9, V.5[32].7-8, V.3[49].14, and VI.9[9].3 (the relevant texts are cited in comm. on lines 19-27). Therefore, that he switches to the soul as the mystical subject in the present passage indicates that P. employs soul and the higher part of Intellect as alternative designations of the same subject, not that the latter is rejected out of hand. What other explanation accounts for the fact that the soul’s mystical apprehension of light at Ch. 36.19ff. (see comm. *ad loc.*) is almost identical to Intellect’s experience in V.5[32].7-8?

O’Daly’s second point—that the problem remains unsolved because even the soul is rejected as the mystical subject—depends on an overly fastidious concern for precise terminology. His “self” is open to the same objections, for it performs the same functions as the soul. If the soul is equivalent to the self as “that spontaneous, self-determining faculty which accounts for the conscious identity of the human subject at its several possible levels of existence” (1974) 160, it makes sense for P. to speak of a soul or self in a hyper-noetic state. But more important than defining with precision the putative subject of mystical union are the mystical states or experiences themselves. The instances of unification in the present passage—τὰ δύο ἐν: 35-36 and ἐνῶσαν τὰ δύο: 37-38—refer not to union with the One, but rather, I think, to the soul’s union with Intellect’s erotic, higher mode of activity. However, union with the One is implied in lines 39-45. Consideration of other more explicit passages will enable us to determine the ultimate condition of the subject of the mystical union.

It is necessary to stress first that the soul must transcend Intellect so that it can see the One itself: “he who wishes to contemplate what is beyond the intelligible will contemplate it when he has let all the intelligible go; he will learn that it is by means of the intelligible, but what it is like by letting the intelligible go” (V.5[32].6.19-21); “set firm in it I have come to that supreme actuality, setting

myself above all else in the realm of Intellect” (IV.8[6].1.5-7). Many passages point to the sort of experience the soul has in union with the One. First, there are many references to the soul’s touching or having contact with the One. P. uses as synonyms the terms συνάπτω, ἐφάπασθαι, ἀφή, ἐπαφή, θιγείν at VI.9[9].4.27, 7.4, 8.19-29, 9.19, 11.24-25; Ch. 36.4 (see comm. *ad loc.* where the texts are quoted), 39.19-20, 40.2; V.3[49].17.34. These passages are ably discussed by Rist (1967) 222, Trouillard (1955b) 102-03, Atkinson 238-39, and Arnou (1967) 236-37. However, I disagree with Rist’s view that contact-language implies a higher degree of unity than vision, though I think he is correct to argue “that even touching will not describe the proper situation at the moment of unity” 223. Second, less commonly P. speaks of “blending” or “mixing,” especially where he compares mystical union to the union of lover and beloved: τοῦτο οὖν εἴ τις ἴδοι, ποίους ἂν ἴσχοι ἔρωτας, ποίους δὲ πόθους, βουλόμενος αὐτῷ συγκερασθῆναι (I.6[1].7.12-13); οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐρώμενοι συγκρίναι θέλοντες (Ch. 34.15-16); cf. Rist (1967) 222-23. However, despite the pervasive use of erotic imagery in accounts of the mystical ascent (especially in the passages from VI.9[9] and in Chs. 31-34 quoted in comm. on lines 19-27), P. does not choose to represent union itself in erotic terms.

Finally, there is the large group of passages which define the mystical union in terms of seeing or being the One. The mystical vision prominent in the following passages depends upon, but transcends, in my view, the θέα mentioned here in lines 35-38:

(a) καθ’ ἑαυτὴν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅταν ἰδεῖν ἐθέλῃ, μόνον ὁρῶσα τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐν οὖσα τῷ ἐν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐκ οἶεταί πω ἔχειν ὃ ζητεῖ, ὅτι τοῦ νοουμένου μὴ ἕτερόν ἐστιν (“But when the soul wants to see by itself, seeing only by being with it and being one by being one with it, it does not think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought”: VI.9[9].3.10-13).

(b) τοῦτο αὐτῇ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος· ἀρχὴ μὲν, ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν, τέλος δέ, ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ. καὶ ἐκεῖ γενομένη γίγνεται αὐτὴ καὶ ὅπερ ἦν (“this is its beginning and end; its beginning because it comes from thence, and its end, because its good is there. And when it comes to be there it becomes itself and what it was”: VI.9[9].9.20-22).

(c) ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ, καὶ ἐν μόνῳ στήναι τούτῳ, καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθαι μόνον (“we must put away all other things and take our stand only in this, and become this alone”: VI.9[9].9.50-52).

(d) ἑαυτὸν μὲν οὖν ἰδὼν τότε, ὅτε ὁρᾷ, τοιοῦτον ὄψεται, μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ συνέσται καὶ τοιοῦτον αἰσθήσεται ἀπλοῦν γενόμενον (“When therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see himself like this, or rather he will be in union with himself as like this and will be aware of himself as like this since he has become single and simple”: VI.9[9].10.9-11).

(e) τότε μὲν οὖν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὐδὲ διακρίνει ὁ ὁρῶν οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο, ἀλλ' οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς οὐδ' αὐτοῦ συντελεῖ ἐκεῖ, κακείνου γενόμενος ἐν ἐστίν ὥσπερ κέντρῳ κέντρον συνάψας ("So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish and does not imagine two, but it is as if he had become someone else and he is not himself and does not count as his own there, but has come to belong to that and so is one, having joined, as it were, centre to centre": VI.9[9].10.14-17).

(f) ἐπεὶ τοίνυν δύο οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἦν αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδὼν πρὸς τὸ ἑωραμένον, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἑωραμένον, ἀλλ' ἠνωμένον . . . ἦν δὲ ἐν καὶ αὐτὸς διαφορὰν ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδεμίαν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχων οὔτε κατὰ ἄλλα . . . οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις νόησις οὐδ' ὅλως αὐτός, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀρπασθεὶς ἡ ἐνθουσιάσας ἡσυχῇ ἐν ἐρήμῳ καὶ καταστάσει γεγένηται ἀτρεμεῖ, τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ οὐδαμῇ ἀποκλίνων οὐδὲ περὶ αὐτὸν στρεφόμενος, ἐστὼς πάντῃ καὶ οἷον στάσις γενόμενος ("Since, then, there were not two, but the seer himself was one with the seen (for it was not really seen, but united to him) . . . He was one himself, with no distinction in himself either in relation to himself or to other things . . . but there was not even any reason or thought, and he himself was not there, if we must even say this; but he was as if carried away or possessed by a god, in a quiet solitude and a state of calm, not turning away anywhere in his being and not busy about himself, altogether at rest, and having become a kind of rest": VI.9[9].11.4-16).

(g) εἰδήσει ὡς ἀρχῇ ἀρχὴν ὁρᾷ καὶ συγγίνεται τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ("he will know that he sees principle by principle and that like is united with like": VI.9[9].11.31-32).

(h) τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ μόνῃ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐκείνῳ· γίνεται γὰρ καὶ αὐτός τις οὐκ οὐσία, ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ταύτῃ, ἥ προσομιλεῖ. εἴ τις οὖν τοῦτο αὐτὸν γενόμενον ἴδοι, ἔχει ὁμοίωμα ἐκείνου αὐτόν, καὶ εἰ ἂν αὐτοῦ μεταβαίνοι ὡς εἰκὼν πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον, τέλος ἂν ἔχοι τῆς πορείας ("but when it is in itself alone and not in being, it is in that: for one becomes, not substance, but 'beyond substance' by this converse. If then one sees that oneself has become this, one has oneself as a likeness of that, and if one goes on from oneself, as image to original, one has reached 'the end of the journey'": VI.9[9].11.40-45).

(i) καίτοι οὐδὲ βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὦν καὶ οὐ δύο (V.5[31].8.21-22).

(j) εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἐλθοῦσα . . . ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξαίφνης φανέντα μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔτι δύο, ἀλλ' ἐν ἅμφῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι (when it "has come to likeness . . . and it sees it in itself suddenly appearing—for there is nothing between, nor are there still two but both are one: nor could you still make a distinction while it is present": Ch. 34.11-14).

These passages make it much easier to determine the sort of ontological transformation experienced by the soul in the present account, especially in lines

39-45. Here the soul, like the One itself, is the container and is not contained in anything else; for the stringent demand that the One is not ἐν τόπῳ or ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ, cf. V.5[32].9.18-33. So elevated is the soul that it contains the intelligible world (41). It is also like the One in that it transcends κίνησις and νόησις; for the attribution of these transcendental predicates to the One, cf. VI.9[9].3.42-45 and 2.45-47 respectively. Text (f) is especially relevant to the latter point, for there P. maintains that unification entails a state of absolute rest, indeed that the soul itself becomes στάσις. Note that the One's συναίσθησις exists ἐν στάσει αἰδίῳ at V.4[7].2.18; see comm. *ad loc.* for similar phrases applied to the One.

The assertion ὁμοιοῦσθαι δεῖ (44) echoes texts (d), (g), (h), and (j). The mystical ascent is possible because we are like the One and because we already possess something of it: cf. III.8[30].9.22-23 and comm. *ad loc.* The use of likeness, image/archetype, and contact-language convinces Arnou (1967) 248 and Rist (1967) 221 that P. is not talking about the identity of One and the soul, but rather the relation of two distinct spiritual substances. Thus, union with the One means that “we are brought to resemble him as closely as possible” Armstrong (1967) 262; similarly, Arnou who emphasizes the force of καθ’ ὅσον δύναται, which appears often in VI.4-5[22-23], but in contexts which do not address the issue of union with the One; Mamo 209 makes the same objection. There P. invokes the Platonic dictum ὁμοίως θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (*Tht.* 176b1-2), but his mystical theory cannot be explicated fully by relying on Plato’s more tenuous statements. The union of “like with like” must be understood in accordance with the more explicit assertions of the absence of duality and otherness as well as of seeing and becoming the One.

Texts (a), (e), (f), and (j) establish that in the unified state there is no otherness and that the soul is not different from what it apprehends. For the moment I postpone discussion of the problem of mystical vision, but it is clear that the removal of otherness from the soul and its experience makes it difficult to distinguish it from the One. VI.9[9].8.32-35 supports this inference: “when therefore there is no otherness, the things which are not other are present to each other. That One therefore, since it has no otherness is always present, and we are present to it when we have no otherness.” (Cf. Rist [1967] 221 who does not interpret the absence of otherness as pointing to some sort of identity.) The removal of otherness is equivalent to the transcendence of intellection, which activity requires otherness to function, and the elimination of duality. (a), (e), (f), (i), and (j) all stress the unity which has been attained. The difficulty is to determine whether this unity is absolute or relative, i.e. that the unified soul is still distinct from the One. Rist (1967) 227 defends the second alternative, arguing that in the statements “the soul is one with the One” or “both are one” the words “with” and “both” articulate an at least minimal difference. Similarly, on (e) he makes the point that “Were the soul and the One equivalent, there would be no need to speak of a centre of centres” 225. Attention to the syntax of P.’

statements about the state of unification is certainly necessary, especially since he is groping to express an ineffable experience. However, we must be equally rigorous in reading these statements: δεῖ . . . τοῦτο γενέσθαι μόνον (c); τοιοῦτον αἰσθήσεται ἀπλοῦν γενόμενον (d); οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς οὐδ' αὐτοῦ συντελεῖ ἐκεῖ, κάκείνου γενόμενος ἔν ἐστιν (e); εἴ τις οὖν τοῦτο αὐτὸν γενόμενον ἴδοι (h). The use of γίνεσθαι in these texts, especially (c) and (e), suggests an ontological transformation that goes considerably beyond Rist's assessment of (e) and other statements, like ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ (VI.9[9].11.24): "The finite self, then, is lost" 224. Since "he himself was not there" (οὐδ' ὅλως αὐτός; text f) and "nor is it soul" (οὐδὲ ψυχὴ; line 42), in order to make a coherent statement P. must say the soul "becomes this alone," it must *be* something or *be* in a certain state. It seems to me that in these statements P. is using process-language, but that he envisions an ultimate state where the soul is completely merged with the One. In short, he implies an identity-statement with the copula in his use of γίνεσθαι. To justify this unorthodox interpretation requires discussion of mystical vision and mystical eros.

Rist (1967) 222, 224 in particular argues that vision signifies a lesser degree of union than the coincidence of centers, because the former makes sense only if there is a distinction between subject and object. Elsewhere he argues more explicitly that "ὄρασις may be a suitable word to describe what the προκόπτον can 'see' of the One *before* he has attained to union, but in the moment of ecstasy it is not a question of seeing but of being the One" (1964a) 83-84, author's italics; similarly, Henry (1962) 49. His point would apply to texts (a), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (j), i.e. passages which contain some of P.'s strongest statements about unification. But since we are dealing here with ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν (VI.9[9].11.22-23), the view of Trouillard (1974) 12 that "ce langage est métaphorique, puisqu'il n'y a dans ce retour à l'Un ni sujet ni objet ni vision" is closer to the truth. This is the proper perspective to bring to ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξαίφνης φανέντα (j) and the related accounts of the One's light obliterating the distinction between subject and object in Ch. 36.19ff. and V.5[32].7-8. The claim in the latter—that one sees best by not seeing—renders the denial of vision in the state of mystical union in texts (f) and (i) consistent with the presence of mystical vision in the others. However, I differ from Trouillard in maintaining that, though the vocabulary of vision is metaphorical, there is a sort of vision in the state of unification. That the soul ἀρχῇ ἀρχὴν ὁρᾷ (g) is evidence that vision persists even when the soul is inside the One. This claim can be justified by reference to the fact that the One itself is described as identical with its self-vision: "if he is supremely because he, so speak, holds to himself and so to speak looks to himself (οἷον πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει), and this so called being of his is his looking to himself (τὸ οἷον εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρὸς βλέπειν)" (VI.8[39].16.18-21). For an extensive analysis of this difficult passage see

comm. *ad loc.* Briefly, its importance for the present discussion lies in the fact that it justifies the conclusion that vision is not an inappropriate activity for the soul that is fully unified with the One. It is possible for the soul to see when it no longer exists as a distinct entity, because its vision has merged with the self-vision of the One. Therefore, rather than pointing to the continuing existence of the soul as distinct from the One, the former's mystical vision is actually the latter's self-vision viewed from a different perspective. We must now consider how the alternative perspectives on eros in the soul and in the One supports the hypothesis that the mystical union is a state of identity.

As we have seen, mystical ἔρως conveys the soul towards the Good as its object of desire; but since desire requires relatively distinct subjects and objects, P. does not employ eros-language to define the unitive state itself. Nevertheless, the goal of ἔρως is clearly unification: ἐρῶ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ ἐνωθῆναι θέλουσα (VI.9[9].9.33-34); ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐρώμενον, ᾧ ἔστι καὶ συνεῖναι μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντως ἔχοντα . . . ὅστις δὲ εἶδεν, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ζῶν ἄλλην ἴσχει τότε (VI.9[9].9.44-47). Thus it is ἔρως which enables the soul to share in the inner life of the One, a notion that is not contradicted by the claim of the present passage that the soul is beyond life because the One is. On one occasion P. refers to the One's ἡ οἶον ζωὴ (VI.8[39].7.51), a statement that should not be interpreted literally, but one which makes considerable sense in a context where the One is described as an ἐνέργεια; see comm. on VI.8[39].16.15-17. More importantly, the ἔρως by which the soul is unified with the One, the νοῦς ἐρῶν, ultimately discovers its source in the One as ἔρως. O'Daly's claim that "the concept of νοῦς ἐρῶν is in no sense a solution to the problem of the identity of the visionary" (1974) 160 suggests that νοῦς and ψυχὴ are inadequate designations of the mystical subject; but ἔρως as an absolutized activity is suitable to characterize the inner life of the One with which the soul's ἔρως merges. Note again this significant description of mystical ἔρως and its object: "Truly, when you cannot grasp the form or shape of what is longed for, it would be most longed for and most lovable (ποθεινότατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον), and love for it would be immeasurable (ἔρως ἂν ἄμετρος εἴη). For love is not limited here, because neither is the beloved, but the love of this would be unbounded (ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως)" (Ch. 32.24-28). The lack of limitation both in this love and its object suggests that we are dealing here with the reality of the One itself, a suspicion that is confirmed by this description of the Good in VI.8[39].15.1, 5-6: καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως . . . τὸ οἶον ἐφίεμενον τῷ ἐφετῷ ἐν. Moreover, the Good οἶον ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπήσας . . . αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἡγάπησε (VI.8[39].16.13-14; see comm. *ad loc.* for discussion of both texts).

Among Plotinian scholars only Rist (1964a) has seen the implications of these passages for understanding the mystical union: "in the mystic union, at the time

the soul is restored to unity with the One, it must itself be the object of the One's love, since the One loves itself, and the elevated soul *is* the One's self . . . In the mystic union, then, the One loves the soul, since the soul is no longer soul" 82, author's italics; the soul "is nothing but ἔρως; it is nothing but the One" 97; there is "a total submergence of the Self in the ἔρως of the One" 103. Rist (1967) 224ff., which I will discuss in a moment, seems to be a systematic retrenchment, but his earlier view is fundamentally correct in my view. However, I dispute his claim that "ὄρασις is transcended though ἔρως is not" (1964a) 84; so too Sorabji 159, Wallis (1972) 89, and Arnou (1967) 246; *contra*, O'Daly (1973) 86.

O'Daly is also correct in his assertion that in the unitive state the soul as "the self" is "transcendent and absolute," in its own way analogous to the absolute self of the One, (1973) 91, though he argues against the disappearance of the soul. I find it difficult to conceive not only of two hyper-ontic, absolute selves (O'Daly's position), but even more so to understand the view of the great majority of Plotinian scholars according to whom the soul continues to exist as a distinct entity when it is in union with the One. The orthodox interpretation of P.' mystical theory rests on two foundations: (i) mystical union is a temporary phenomenon, (ii) a state of absolute identity with the One violates central aspects of Plotinian metaphysics, rendering it unacceptably *Oriental*. Both points are important and must be addressed carefully.

Scholars have properly emphasized the suddenness with which the One becomes present to the soul (cf. e.g. V.5[32].7.35, Ch. 34.13) as well as the fact that mystical experiences cannot be induced. Thus, Hadot (1986) 245 argues that "mystical experience is presented as an exceptional phenomenon and as transitory. Although the union of the Intellect with the Good is eternal (VI.7[38].35.29-30), the unitive experiences of the soul are exceptional." Of those scholars who have discussed this problem, Wallis (1972) 89 and Sorabji 160 emphasize the transiency of mystical union. There are many references to the soul slipping away from union with the One: VI.9[9].3.6ff. (καταβαίνει πολλάκις), 54; 4.4ff. (ἀπόστασις); 9.35ff., 59-60; 11.38; IV.8[6].1.8-9 (καταβὰς . . . καταβαίνω). We must also reckon with Porphyry's statement that P. attained union with the One on four occasions (V. *Pl.* 23.16-17). This might support the claim that mystical experience is transitory, but it is shaky evidence for the conclusion that it is exceptional. Porphyry's testimony is relevant only to the six years he was with P. in Rome, at a period late in P.' life; cf. Goulet 207. There is no support for assuming that P. only began to experience the state of ecstatic union in the company of Porphyry, especially in light of his remark at IV.8[6].1.1: πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἐμᾶντον, which corresponds precisely to καταβαίνει πολλάκις at VI.9[9].3.7.

However, even if P. experienced mystical union hundreds of times, this would not entail the conclusion either that union might be permanent, much less

that it is a state of absolute identity. On the first point, Rist thinks that “the lower or irrational parts of the soul even survive the death of the body [supported by I.1[53].12, IV.7[2].14, and VI.4[22].16]. No part of the soul can pass into non-existence, for the soul is, though the lowest of them, yet one of the things which must be immortal. . . . the soul has a lower self which exists for ever; the One is purely itself” (1967) 230. Though P. never explicitly says that the lower self ceases to exist when unification is achieved, neither does he in specifically mystical contexts give us strong reasons to suppose that it does not. In this respect P. is as ambiguous as Plato, who apparently maintains in the *Myth of Er* that the lower parts of the soul exist postumously, but also refers to the final liberation and perfection of the philosophic soul in *Phaedrus* 249a-c. For both P. and Plato much depends on context and on the experience of individual souls. Hence, one must distinguish between the psychology of the embodied soul and the mystical experience of the rare unified soul.

Certainty is not possible on the question whether the mystical union is permanent, but I incline to the view that there is an ineluctably centripetal movement towards unification in Plotinian metaphysics. As text (b) indicates, the goal of the mystical ascent is the Good “because its good is there. And when it comes to be there it becomes itself and what it was.” Porphyry confirms that P.’ own goal was this permanent return to the first principle: “To Plotinus ‘the goal ever near was shown’: for his end and goal was to be united to, to approach the God who is over all things (τέλος γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν τὸ ἐνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ)” (V. *Pl.* 23.14-16). Another passage is even more explicit: “How is it, then, that one does not remain there? It is because one has not yet totally come out of this world. But there will be a time when the vision will be continuous, since there will no longer be any hindrance by the body” (VI.9[9].10.1-3). This does not specify the nature of the union, but it is difficult to see what purpose would be served in such a state of continuous mystical vision of the One by the eternal existence of the lower parts of the soul posited by Rist and others. P. himself supplies the requisite psychological principle to explain the activity of soul on different levels of existence and to distinguish the experiences of individual souls: “all souls are all things, but each [is differentiated] according to that which is active in it: that is, by being united in actuality, one being in a state of knowledge, one in a state of desire, and in that different souls look at different things and are and become what they look at; and the fullness and completion for souls is not the same for all” (IV.3[27].8.13-17). Thus, when mystical vision is continuous for a specific soul, its identity with the One should not be understood with respect to other souls which are still enmeshed in corporeality and thus still require the continuous activity of the lower parts of the soul.

Even if, in fact, the goal at least of the mystical ascent is a permanent state of unification, the claim that union involves identity, as I have argued, and not a

mere likeness, as the great majority of scholars see it, requires further justification. Resistance to this interpretation is rooted in various assumptions about mystical experience itself as well as in justifiable concerns about its implications for Plotinian metaphysics. The view that "the vision of the One is no part of his philosophy, but is a mischievous accretion" (Inge 98) finds little support among contemporary Plotinian scholars, though Lloyd maintains that there is something distasteful about this central feature of Neoplatonic thought: "about the mystical union with the One there can be no question; it is not only ineffable, it is the negation of thought; more than that it is the negation of consciousness—Neoplatonists were quite clear about this. And this seems to belong to some Indian mysticism but to have no place in what counts as philosophy in Europe" (1967) 324; cf. also Dodds (1965) 88. Lloyd's tacit acceptance of Bréhier's Oriental thesis (cf. Bréhier [1928] 107-33) is at odds with many scholars who have argued strongly and successfully against it; cf. Armstrong (1936); Rist (1967) 213-17, 228-30; Wallis (1972) 89; Staal 235-49 is a valuable survey of scholarly opinion on the question. These scholars pursue a two-fold agenda: (i) challenging arguments for any historical Oriental influence; (ii) discrediting the thesis that P.' mysticism is monistic and concluding that therefore it must be theistic. I accept the first point without argument, but the second requires more careful analysis.

What concerns Armstrong, Rist, Arnou, Sorabji and others about the monistic interpretation—which, it should be noted, has been favored by very few—is that it involves the disappearance of the soul's individuality, an outcome necessitated by the claim that all realities except the One are illusions. The second point, addressed by Armstrong (1977), would indicate Oriental contamination: "No Neoplatonist ever maintains that the material universe is a mere illusion, still less that the soul or self and whatever higher spiritual realities are recognized are only inadequate ways of thinking about the One. And even in the culmination of the return, when the self and all things are in perfect union with their Source, nothing at any level is done away with or disappears" 180. Certainly, for P. the universe is not an illusion and when an individual soul attains union with the One the entire hierarchy of being continues to exist. However, it seems to me quite coherent for P. to maintain that the unified soul ceases to exist as a distinct, individual self. If this is P.' view, it does not require that we define Intellect or the soul prior to attaining union as illusions, for the soul becomes more real as it approaches union with the One. Armstrong (1967) 263 makes the unnecessary inference that identity with the One entails the theory of illusion. Moreover, the concern is palpable that attainment of identity involves loss of existence, i.e. the loss of consciousness suggested by Lloyd. This too is a false inference—texts (a) through (j) render this judgment nugatory—because when the soul merges with the One it becomes the infinite consciousness of the One and shares its rich

inner life. What P. seems to imply, therefore, is not so much an annihilation of the individual self as its unlimited expansion into identity with the One as Self.

Having said this, I think it is quite unnecessary to launch a treacherous expedition into the realm of comparative mysticism, as Rist does. His strategy is to demonstrate that if P. points to a state of mystical identity he must necessarily accept the utterances and doctrines of certain Oriental mystics. Since the Orientalist R.C. Zaehner labels Islamic mystics as “monists,” for whom the soul is annihilated in the mystical union and the statement “I am God” is attributed to some of them, Rist concludes that the “Plotinian equivalent would be ‘I am the One’.” Yet nowhere do we find such an assertion” (1967) 227. This supports his conclusion that the mystical union involves the likeness of the One and soul: “while the soul as a spiritual substance can be enveloped by the One, enraptured, surrendered, wholly characterized so as to become infinite and not finite, it is neither obliterated nor revealed as the One itself, nor as the *only* spiritual substance” 227, author’s italics. There are difficulties with the theory of union as identity, but they are not rendered insuperable, let alone clarified, by arguing that it entails the statement “I am the One.” Relying on one Orientalist’s questionable definition of what is prototypically “monist” to define P.’ mysticism by contrast is to beg the question.

It is instructive to consider Ch. 38 in the present treatise, which casts doubt on Rist’s assumption that “I am the One” is a necessary condition for the mystical union to involve a state of identity. P. begins with the assertion that neither “ἔστιν” nor “ἀγαθός ἐστι” are predicable of the Good, because such predications are made ὡς κατ’ ἄλλον ἄλλο (1-3). However, “we say ‘the Good’ about him, not speaking him himself nor predicating of him that good belongs to him, but saying it is himself” (4-6). Thus, “the good” is acceptable if we remove the “is” (9). Next he considers this question: “Why then will he not say ‘I am the Good’? Again he will predicate the ‘is’ of himself” (12-13). Clearly, what P. wants to exclude is not only predications about the Good but any use of the copula. Therefore, if the unified soul uttered the statement “I am the Good,” this would be proof that it had *not* merged with the Good. In short, if “I am the Good” is not appropriate to the Good itself, it is not surprising that P. does not attribute it to the unified soul, especially since, strictly speaking, it no longer exists as such.

Thus, on the view proposed here, the soul’s identity with the One does not mean that it becomes the only spiritual substance, for the simple reason that we can no longer speak of a soul; cf. texts (c), (f), and (h). I share Mamo’s puzzlement with Rist’s proposed solution: “If we are willing to say that the soul becomes infinite how can its former identity still remain while enveloped by the infinity of the One? Are there two, or any number of, infinite substances? Wouldn’t that which distinguishes them be a limit?” 211. If the identity-thesis is incorrect, these questions must be confronted directly if we are to understand the

interpretation of Rist, Armstrong and others that P. is a theistic and not a monistic mystic.

There are good reasons for avoiding the terms theistic and monistic altogether, at least in so far as they are used to characterize generally P.' thought. Besides opening the door to facile comparisons between thinkers in different traditions, these rubrics often mean very different things to different critics, and sometimes even to the same scholar. For example, Rist argues that P.' mysticism is theistic, but in Rist (1965) 338 he is prepared to describe P. as a "metaphysical monist." Perhaps metaphysical monism is compatible with a theistic spirituality, but if so the terms have lost a great deal of their putative explanatory value. The "theistic" label is certainly applicable to many of P.' statements about the One. Rist (1962c) 172-73 supplies a compendium of passages where the One is referred to as ὁ θεός or as θεός, and VI.8[39] is replete with fully theistic descriptions of the One's will and personality. But Armstrong, Rist and others employ "theistic mysticism" as an irreducible category which eliminates by fiat possible interpretations of ambiguous texts. I suspect that the impetus to apply this rubric categorically derives from Christianizing assumptions, e.g. the claim that there must always be a fundamental distinction between the One and the soul. This is certainly how Christian philosophers and mystics interpret Plotinian metaphysics and there are Plotinian texts which imply such a distinction, but the statement that "we must become this alone" (text c) is not coherent on this view. Such assertions, in fact, are ignored by those who maintain the theist position, as are the remarkable accounts of the One's inner life in VI.8[39]. A notable exception is Rist (1964a), which in certain aspects appears to support the identity-thesis; however, Rist (1967) offers a very different perspective, as we have seen.

The only scholars who accept some version of the identity-thesis are Beierwaltes (1985) 146 and Mamo. The latter points out the considerable difficulties of the theistic interpretation and adroitly identifies the tendentious character of Rist's and Arnou's criticisms of the monistic interpretation. However, Mamo too feels compelled to employ the categorical term "monist," though he is less dogmatic than those who rely on "theistic." Moreover, his analysis does not solve the problem of what happens to the individual soul when it achieves union. In the following he seems to imply that the self exists eternally in different modalities: "At the moment of 'union' there is no consciousness of any form, not even the otherness that normally distinguishes the One from the *Nous*. *Qua* self the spiritual reality has become identical with the One. *Qua* a certain formal personality principle it is eternally emanating from the One and is, therefore, distinct" 204. This interpretation, which depends a great deal on Trouillard and has much to commend it, at least is more faithful to the texts than the theistic view; but Mamo also fails to consider the evidence of VI.8[39].16. Nor does he adequately address the problem of the possible permanence of mystical union. In the end no theoretical statement of P.' doctrine of mystical

union can be expected to win assent from scholars who are wrestling with extremely difficult texts. I have only attempted to present an explanation which is plausible and which does not violate P.' metaphysical principles.

35.43-45 οὐδὲ ψυχὴ . . . οὐδὲ νοεῖ. The meaning of the final two sentences of the chapter is clear, but the apparent redundancy of ὅτι οὐδὲ νοεῖ (44-45) has invited emendations. Preller altered the MSS νοεῖ to νοεῖται, adopted by Bréhier and MacKenna. But it makes no sense for P. to add that the soul is not an object of intellection: the point of lines 39ff. is to establish that the mystical subject is no longer the soul. Theiler deletes the clause (it is “unbegreiflich”) on the grounds that it is a variant of ὅτι μηδὲ νοεῖ (44). But standing alone, νοεῖ δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνο (44) follows ὁμοιοῦσθαι γὰρ δεῖ no better than the received text; nor does it provide a better transition to the beginning of the next chapter as he argues. H-S and Armstrong retain the MSS reading and translate: *anima ne illud quidem cogitat se ne cogitare quidem*; “It does not even think that it does not think.” This rendering of ὅτι οὐδὲ νοεῖ (44-45) is open to the objection that, unlike the ὅτι-clauses in lines 42-44, the soul suddenly is the subject. A new point is added with this version, but I prefer to maintain the One as subject of the final ὅτι-clause with Cilento: “l'anima non pensa il Bene, poiché neppure il Bene pensa.” P. is not averse to driving home his point at the expense of a minor redundancy.

36.1-6 τὰ μὲν . . . πρότερον. As the bulk of this chapter—until line 15—is devoted to clarifying the role of rational and moral preparation for the vision of the Good, the metaphysical and erotic intensity of the previous chapters subsides until the climax of lines 15-25. For the moment, then, all is clear (τὰ ἅλλα δῆλα), but P. does not intend to end the discussion with this comment, which is a formulaic device for summing up and beginning anew; cf. III.8[30].7.15, III.2[47].1.3. On the other hand, he assumes that the clarity he claims for the previous exposition of mystical union is shared by others who have had the experience: ὅστις εἶδεν, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω (VI.9[9].9.46-47 and I.6[1].7.2); cf. also VI.9[9].4.16ff. for an extensive statement of the existential qualifications required to grasp the hyper-noetic vision of the Good.

On lines 3-4 Theiler argues that “ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γνῶσις hier geradezu gnostische Formulierung. Der Ausdruck, weil zu intellektuell, durch ἐπαφή korrigiert.” The εἴτε-εἴτε construction makes this inference rather dubious. The distinction between discursive knowledge and hyper-noetic awareness is expressed by means of λογισμοί vs. γνῶσις and ἐπαφή. Hence, the latter terms should be taken as complementary (so too Arnou [1967] 235 n1), despite the fact that γνῶσις is usually just a variant of νόησις, as at III.8[30].9.19, VI.9[9].3.3, and even though in line 7 “contact” is distinctly hyper-noetic; cf. VI.9[9].9.19: ἐπαφή οὐδὲν νοερὸν ἔχει. In the present instance we should understand

γνώσις as synonymous with σύνεσις, on which see comm. on III.8[30].10.34. On ἐπαφή see comm. on Ch. 35.33-45.

The splitting of the quotation of *Rep.* 505a2—referring to mystical awareness of the Good as μέγιστον μάθημα—is probably intentional. The Platonic referent is ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα which is rather inappropriate for P., as Theiler correctly notes. But μάθημα neatly introduces the ensuing discussion of the intellectual and moral preparation necessary to approach the Good, a lengthier example of the λόγος διδάσκων alluded to at Ch. 35.28-29.

36.6-10 διδάσκουσι . . . ἐστιάσεις. The distinct but complementary intellectual and moral aspects of the ascent are indicated by the μέν-δέ construction: διδάσκουσι μὲν . . . πορεύουσι δέ. Armstrong captures the sense of this passage, pointing out the “sharp distinction between ‘learning about’ the One and advancing towards it by a moral purification and noetic experience” (1974) 182-83. As scholars have pointed out, this repertoire of terms reflects traditional Platonic and Middle Platonic usage. ἀναλογίαι refer to the concepts and images, which, in the handbook account of Albinus, comprise the *via analogiae*, the νόησις ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν (*Did.* 165.18). Albinus’ example is the sun simile in *Rep.* VI, which of course P. employs often: cf. Ch. 16.22ff. and comm. *ad loc.* Another Plotinian example is the analogy of center and circle and One and Intellect or soul respectively; in VI.9[9].8, one of the most important discussions of this geometric analogy, we even find the term ἀναλογία at line 12, though P. is careful to point out the limits of the analogy between the soul and a geometric circle. (For use of geometric figures in an account of procession cf. III.8[30].8.36-38 and comm. *ad loc.*) In the same treatise (VI.9[9] 5.41-46) ἀναλογία is used to explain the relation between the point or unit and intelligible substance which is ontologically prior. Especially in the case of the geometric analogies, the limitations of the *via analogiae* are evident; so it is appropriate that P. assigns this method a paideutic role.

The second word, ἀφαίρεσις, the mathematical term for abstraction or subtraction (see comm. on III.8[30].10.31ff. for a full discussion), is the technical term for negation. For P. and other Platonists, this defines the *via negationis*. In his discussion of the νόησις ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν (*Did.* 165.15), Albinus illustrates the negative theology from the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. Since P. in the present passage links ἀφαίρεσις with διδάσκουσι, it may be that he has in mind the rational removal of attributes from our conceptions of the Good and not the full force of the negative theology. However, in his remarks on this passage Hadot argues that the soul’s “concrete movement of discarding (and also of detaching itself from any affective attachments), which is essential to the mystical life, must not be confused with negative theology, which is, in fact, only a rational method of knowing, as Plotinus stresses (VI.7[38].36.6). The negations tell us something about the

Good, but the purifications actually lead us to it. . . . We must not confuse these rational methods with the activity of discarding all forms, of renouncing everything, of detaching oneself from everything, which actually leads us to the One” (1986) 247. I prefer a less hard and fast distinction between rational negation and existential or spiritual purification: both seem to me to be integral parts of the negative theology. Put another way, the practice of negation has profound existential implications, as the closing words of V.3[49].17 would seem to indicate: πῶς ἂν οὖν τοῦτο γένοιτο; ἄφελε πάντα. Cf. also εἰ δὲ ἀφελὼν τὸ εἶναι λαμβάνοις, θαῦμα ἔξεις (III.8[30].10.31-32). This sort of talk explains why Armstrong (1977) 184 is correct to say that “doing negative theology is painful” and that it is “a fairly agonizing business.” Strictly speaking, in the present passage negation may be understood as a rational procedure, but “cutting away everything,” the most apt phrase to define P.’ practice of the negative theology, is both intellectual and existential. The indefatigable practice of this procedure is necessary because “It is only when divine thought breaks down that the Divine Intellect and ourselves in it can find what we want. Pure thought at its highest is an everlastingly unsuccessful attempt to think the unthinkable” Armstrong (1975b) 81; the entire essay warrants careful consideration for its eloquent statement of the value of negative theology.

The final term in the first series, ἀναβασμοί, is a quotation from *Symp.* 211c3. The ascent by degrees up the ladder of beauty in Diotima’s speech is the example of the *via eminentiae* cited by Albinus *Did.* 165.24ff. In his articulation of the hierarchy of goods earlier in the present treatise, P. clarifies how the steps in the ascent are to be seen in relation to the goal: ἄρ’ οὖν τῷ μὲν ἐσχάτῳ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ αἰεὶ ἡ ἀνάβασις τὸ ὑπὲρ ἕκαστον διδοῦσα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ ὑπ’ αὐτό, εἰ ἡ ἀνάβασις οὐκ ἐξίσταται τοῦ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ μείζον αἰεὶ προχωροῖ; τότε δὲ στήσεται ἐπ’ ἐσχάτῳ, μεθ’ ὃ οὐδέν ἐστιν εἰς τὸ ἄνω λαβεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κυρίως ἔσται (“Is it then so that the good for the last and lowest among beings is what lies before it, and there is a continuous ascent which gives that above a thing to be good for what is below it, on the assumption that the ascent never gets beyond relative proportion, but goes on for ever to greater good? But it will come to a stop at the ultimate, at that after which one cannot grasp anything higher, and this is the First and the really good and the Good in the strictest sense”: Ch. 25.18-24). This scheme is Platonic, but I detect a greater urgency, which is typical of P.’ mystical theology, to have done with lesser goods and arrive at the ἐσχάτον. In the present passage, however, P.’ purpose is to call attention to the ἀναβασμοί as objects of study. The extensive use of the three “ways” in Middle Platonism is discussed exhaustively in Festugière (1954) 92-140 and Krämer (1964) 105-19.

In P. κάθαρσις usually accompanies virtue, as here, and involves asceticism, i.e. the detachment of the soul from the body: see I.2[19].3.8ff., 4-5. At

III.6[26].5.13-23, however, equal stress is placed on both moral and intellectual purification; at IV.7[2].10.40 κάθαρσις leads to γνῶσις τῶν ἀρίστων. In the present context P. may imply a hierarchy of spiritual states: first, moral purification which engenders ἀρεταί and κοσμήσεις and, second, a higher state of knowledge, attained when the soul is established in the intelligible world. Some support for the former derives from the fact that the only other instance of κόσμησις seems to point to moral preparation: ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ κόσμησις δῆλη πού τοις παρασκευαζομένοις (Ch. 34.11-12).

To describe the soul's arrival in the intelligible world P. employs the Platonic words ἐπιβάσεις and ἐστίασις. The former is a quotation of *Rep.* 511b6, from the account of the highest section of the Divided Line, according to which hypotheses comprise οἶον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς in the dialectical ascent to the unhypothetical first principle. For the latter H-S cite *Rep.* 612a3 as a possible source, but in that passage the "feastings" are the earthly enjoyments of the soul, which is likened to the sea-god Glaucus encrusted with shells and seaweed. A much more plausible source is the *Phaedrus* myth. At Ch. 30.28 the soul's intoxication is the metaphorical equivalent of τὸ ἐπὶ δαῖτα καὶ ἐστίασιν· while in the present phrase the Homeric ἐστίασις replaces θοῖνη in the *Phaedrus* at 247a8, the feasting in that context pertains to the ascent to the ὑπουράνιον region, which fits the present passage well. (On the primacy of Platonic over Homeric influence cf. Lamberton 98 n52). Moreover, a bit later in the myth the soul is described as τὰλλα ὡσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως θεασαμένη καὶ ἐστιαθεῖσα (247e2-3), which parallels closely the intelligible feast in line 10.

ἰδρῦεῖν is used extensively of Intellect: ἰδρυμένος πᾶς ἄνω [sc. ὁ νοῦς] (IV.3[27].12.31); αὐτὸ μὲν [sc. τὸ ὄν] ἰδρῦσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ (VI.4[22].3.4); cf. also VI.8[39].11.25 and comm. on Ch. 17.35 in the present treatise. It also appears in accounts of the soul's mystical ascent: ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν ἐμαντὸν ἰδρύσας (IV.8[6].1.6-7).

36.10 ἐστιάσεις. ὅστις <δὲ γε>. Several emendations have been proposed to ease the rough transition created by the MSS ὅστις γένηται. Kirchhoff conjectures ὥς τις for ὅστις, which is adopted by Bréhier and B-T; Heintz prefers ἕως τις. B-T and Bréhier replace the stop after ἐστιάσεις with a comma, Theiler arguing that there is a lack of connection between the two sentences if we accept ὅστις with a stop. He also objects to the subjunctive without ἄν, though this is hardly exceptionable, given the Platonic precedents at *Laws* 727b4 and 848a4 cited by H-S. Removing the stop after ἐστιάσεις is ill advised, because it makes much harsher the transition from a protreptic catalogue of mental and emotional states to the personal experience of the soul. The new sentence initiates the actual ascent of the soul, resuming the account at the end of the previous chapter. Therefore, I retain the MSS ὅστις following a stop *pace* H-S, Cilento, and Armstrong. Note that H-S² adds <δὲ γε> after ὅστις, which is

not very attractive with respect to euphony; but their reasoning is cogent: the new sentence is awkward without a connective, and the γε at least could have disappeared by haplography.

36.10-15 ὅστις . . . ἐπιστίλβον. The transition from learning to experience is a clearly marked event in mystical contexts: μέχρι γὰρ τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τῆς πορείας ἡ δίδαξις, ἡ δὲ θέα αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἤδη τοῦ ἰδεῖν βεβουλημένου (VI.9[9].4.15-16). In its identification of the soul with Intellect and the presence of the Good above both, this sentence recalls Ch. 35.33-39 of which it is really a continuation. Here the identification is strongly affirmed in the statement that the soul is both θεατῆς and θέαμα, a claim that is made more often when the soul attains union with the Good: ἑαυτὸν μὲν οὖν ἰδὼν τότε, ὅτε ὁρᾷ, τοιοῦτον ὄψεται (VI.9[9].10.9-10); ἐπεὶ τοίνυν δύο οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἦν αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδὼν πρὸς τὸ ἑωραμένον (VI.9[9].11.4-5). The soul's identification with Intellect is expressed generally with τοῦτο γενόμενος, but on this occasion P. specifies more precisely that it becomes the intelligible triad of being, Intellect, and life—here in the form of the ζῶον παντελές of *Tim.* 31b1. In his discussion of this and related passages, Hadot (1960) 119 notes that P. never explicates his definition of being as life and Intellect or intellection, but assumes they are self-evident because traditional.

In the present mystical context, the introduction of the triad drives home the point that the ontological expansion of the soul's substance entails the internalization of universal being and life. Indeed, radical interiority (μηκέτι ἔξωθεν αὐτὸ βλέπει) is a key signpost of mystical experience: δραμὼν δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶσω ἔχει πᾶν (V.8[31].11.10-11; on εἰς τὸ εἶσω see comm. on VI.8[39].16.12). Trouillard's characterization is particularly fine: "at the level of pure intelligence, the noetic subject integrates the opposing terms (experience vs. abstractions) by means of a concrete norm of synthesis, which is the equivalent of a self-determining act within the plenitude of spirit" (1961a) 137. This "norm of synthesis" is also evident in the phrase τῇ ἀμφοτέρων συστάσει at Ch. 35.37. Trouillard's further remark, that "the noetic subject must be grounded in a mystical subject" 138, contributes perhaps to our understanding of why both the soul and Intellect are present at the theophany.

The Good is immediately present, shining upon the intelligible world. This concluding part of the sentence is very close to V.5[32].8.12-13: εἶδε μὲν τὰ πρῶτα καλλίω γενόμενον ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐπιστίλβοντα, ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντος αὐτοῦ. Cf. also the instance of ἀποστίλβειν at V.8[31].10.25. The close proximity of the Good (τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐκεῖνο καὶ πλησίον αὐτὸ ἦδη), together with the identification of soul and Intellect, illustrates the so-called blurring of the hypostases which is such a striking feature of P.' spirituality. The fluidity in his conceptions of metaphysical realities is especially prominent in the next sentence.

36.15-21 ἐνθα δὴ . . . τὸ ὄραμα ἦν. The text of this important passage has been disputed in three places, though none of the proposed emendations seriously alters the sense. In lines 15-16 H-S and Armstrong read καὶ μέχρι του—"up to a point" in Armstrong's translation. Except for Heintz's οὐδ', the other editors prefer τούτου (Cod. J), which is translated "to this point" (B-T, MacKenna) or construed with ἐν καλῷ (Bréhier, Cilento). Armstrong's earlier view, (1953), was that τούτου refers to Intellect, a not unattractive reading. There is little difference between the alternatives του and τούτου, but I prefer the definite pronoun, as the point of the opening section of the sentence is to note that the soul has arrived specifically in the intelligible world.

Theiler proposes more radical surgery. Arguing that του is a mistake for τοι, he reads καίτοι μέχρι τούτου—"war doch bis zu diesem Punkt geleitet" (Beutler). I see no need for the concessive καίτοι. Theiler claims also that μέχρι τούτου in line 17 is a correction for the disputed *locus* in lines 15-16. In the former, therefore, he deletes the phrase and replaces the MSS μὲν with ἕως, on the assumption that "solange" is required instead of the paler "as far as." However, though inexact, μέχρι is coherent enough; in any case, the μὲν should be preserved to maintain the contrast between the soul's presence within Intellect and its being carried above Intellect. Finally, Harder's αὐτοῦ is superior to the MSS αὐτῷ in line 17.

Intellectual study and moral preparation have done their work and thus are to be abandoned, but these are what have brought (παιδαγωγηθεῖς) the soul to the intelligible. On this use of παιδαγωγεῖν cp. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀναβήσεται, καὶ πόθεν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ, καὶ τίς λόγος τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα παιδαγωγήσεται; (V.9[5].2.10-12; the answer is intelligible beauty); εἰ οὖν μήπω ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν ἔξω, ἢ δι' ἔνδειαν τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦντος λόγου καὶ πίστιν περὶ αὐτοῦ παρεχομένου, δι' ἐκεῖνα μὲν αὐτὸν ἐν αἰτίᾳ τιθέσθω (VI.9[9].4.30-33). All three instances demonstrate that reason and study are indispensable and efficacious; cf. further Ferwerda 171-72.

As H-S and Theiler note, lines 16-19 are verbally close to *Symp.* 210e2ff.: ὅς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά παιδαγωγηθῇ, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς . . . τὰ καλά . . . ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν. As in P.' abundant use of the sun simile from the *Republic*, so here the Platonic hierarchy of being and the sudden visionary experience provide the foundation for the mystical ascent. Of course the goal of the Platonic ascent is the ἐπιστήμη καλοῦ (*Symp.* 210d7), whereas for P. it is ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἴτε γνῶσις εἴτε ἐπαφή (3-4).

The theophany occurs in two stages: (i) the soul is lifted up on the swelling wave of Intellect; (ii) instantaneously, it is enveloped in the light of the Good. So far as I can determine, this image of the rising wave is unprecedented in ancient philosophical literature and P. does not use it elsewhere. οἶδεῖν does occur at *Phaedrus* 251b5, but to describe the swelling of the stump of the erotic soul's

wings. It would seem that P. has forged this extraordinary image out of his own imagination to dramatize the power of the νοῦς ἐρῶν (Ch. 35.24); cf. Rist (1967) 267 n43. As in the *Phaedrus* it is eros which raises the soul. At Ch. 31.29 the mystically erotic soul ἐκεῖ φέρεται δεινὴ ἀνευρεῖν οὐδὲρ ἐρᾷ οὐσα. But it is also true that the Good lifts the soul, attracting it irresistibly towards itself: αἴρεται φύσει ἄνω αἰρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος τὸν ἔρωτα. καὶ νοῦ μὲν ὑπεραίρει (Ch. 22.18-19); cf. also ἡρθη ἐκεῖ at V.9[5].1.18 and Ch. 35.39-40.

There has been a tendency among some Plotinian scholars to ignore such statements or to downplay their significance. Dodds (1960b), for example, argues that union with the Good or the “recovery of the true self,” as he puts it, does not depend on “any specific act of divine grace, but simply on the soul’s choice” 4; “the unitive experience is in Plotinus’ system a natural event, not a supernatural grace as in Christian mysticism” 7. Certainly, we cannot speak of a specific or distinct act by the Good which draws the soul towards the mystical union, but at the same time it is quite misleading to conclude that the soul returns to the Good under its own power or even that noetic experience is a natural process. Ontologically, both levels of experience are transcendental, i.e., in the basic sense of the term, supernatural. And, though the “action of the One is impersonal, indifferent and universal” it is also true that “the illumination and the passionate desire are *given*” Armstrong (1957) 128, author’s emphasis. It would certainly be incorrect to identify central aspects of the Christian notion of grace in P.’ doctrine of the One, but it is crucial to recognize the tremendous attractive force exerted by the Good simply in its being what it is—the source and goal of all aspiration. For a more extensive and nuanced exposition of this view, see Trouillard (1955b) 122-32.

The second portion of this visionary episode—ἐξαίφνης . . . ἦν—parallels V.5[32].7.31-35 quite closely; see comm. *ad loc.* for detailed analysis.

36.21-27 οὐ γὰρ . . . ἐκεῖνο. The implication of the claim that “the light itself is the vision” is the obliteration of the distinction between subject and object. When seen mystically, the Good ceases to be an object, and it certainly is not an intelligible reality. Even light is inadequate to convey the reality of the Good and the mystical experience of the soul. The disappearance of all categories of thought and perspective echoes V.5[32].7.35: “ἐνδον ἄρα ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἐνδον αὖ.”

Here P. abruptly breaks off his account of mystical vision and relates the reversion to the problem of procession. All these things the Good is not—light, Intellect and object of intellection—are only apprehensible as differentiated realities “afterwards,” i.e. posterior to the Good’s generation of them. Here too, as in Ch. 16.19ff., the generation of Intellect is presented in terms of the diffusion of light, though αὐτὸς αὐτῇ μόνον γεννῶσα νοῦν more strongly

defines the Good as light. Surprising as this sounds, at VI.8[39].16.13 the inner reality of the Good is defined as αὐγὴν καθάραν, quoting *Phaedrus* 250c4. Though brief, this account of procession defines the Good in familiar terms: self-abiding (μείνασα) and undiminished (οὔτι σβέσασα αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ γεννᾶσαι). The same points are made at III.8[30].10.5-7, where the Good is compared to an overflowing spring: νόησον γὰρ πηγὴν ἀρχὴν ἄλλην οὐκ ἔχουσιν, δοῦσαν δὲ ποταμοῖς πᾶσιν αὐτήν, οὐκ ἀναλωθεῖσαν τοῖς ποταμοῖς, ἀλλὰ μένουσαν αὐτήν ἡσυχῶς. The change in focus at the end of this chapter prepares the way for the extensive critique in Chs. 37-42 of the Aristotelian view that the first principle is a self-thinking Intellect.

36.23 ἀφείσα. Theiler emends the MSS ἀφείσα to ἀφείδσα, on the grounds that a present participle is required to agree with γεννῶσα (22); but such tidying up is unnecessary. He also argues that παρ' αὐτῷ must refer to Intellect and not to the Good: "diese Dinge bei dem Schauenden sein läßt" (Beutler); similarly, MacKenna's "allowed them to occupy the quester's mind" and Bréhier's "leur permet d'exister à un rang inférieur." While these renderings yield good sense, Theiler's concern that a reference to the Good would compromise its transcendence is unwarranted.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ENNEAD VI.8[39].16

Introductory Note

In this treatise P. speaks in the most positive and revealing terms of the inner life of the One. Beginning with human freedom and its limitations in embodied souls (Chs. 2-3), he ascends to Intellect which possesses the greatest freedom because it participates in and can return to the Good (Chs. 4-6). The theory of the will and of freedom presupposed in his discussion is based on the Platonic and Aristotelian notion of freedom as freedom to be one's self, in contrast to the freedom of undetermined choice. In Ch. 7 he begins to consider the freedom of the Good by considering an objection to his own position—τις τολμηρὸς λόγος ἐτέρωθεν. According to this anonymous view "since the nature of the Good happens to be as it is, and does not have the mastery of what it is, and is what it is not from itself, it would not have freedom, and its doing or not doing what it is necessitated to do or not to do is not in its power" (Ch. 7.12-15). The source of this τολμηρὸς λόγος has been identified as certain Gnostics by Bréhier (*Notice* to VI.8) and by Armstrong (1982b) as Christians who espoused moderate or extreme indeterminacy-voluntarist language about the divine will. Both theses are plausible; in any case, P. takes this view quite seriously and seeks to refute it because it misrepresents fundamentally his thinking about the Good. If the Good were compelled by its nature to will both what it is and what it generates, not only would its freedom be limited, but it would be subject to duality. Thus, in order to save the Good from chance P. ascribes positive activities to it like ἐνέργεια, ζωή, and οὐσία (Ch. 7.46ff.). On the other hand, all predicates applied to the Good are strictly speaking inapplicable, but some are appropriate if carefully qualified (Ch. 8). For example, the phrase "it happened to be" is rejected on the grounds that the Good is what it wills, though at the same time it is beyond all willing (Ch. 9-10). The ensuing discussion in Chs. 11-15 of how we can speak of the Good and the sorts of activities which are identical with it receive attention in the commentary on Ch. 16.

Translation of VI.8[39].16

Since we claim, and it appears to be the case, that this Good is everywhere and again is nowhere, we must consider this point and think about what we must posit about the things we seek as we examine it from this point of view. For if he is nowhere, he has not happened to be anywhere, and if he is everywhere, he is as much as he is everywhere; so that the "everywhere" and the "in every way"

are himself, and he is not in that “everywhere,” rather he is this himself and gives being to other things to be present in the “everywhere.” But he, who has the highest rank, or rather does not have it, but is himself the highest, has all things subject to himself; he does not happen to them, but they to him, or rather other things are around him; he does not look towards them, but they towards him. He penetrates, as it were, into his own interior as if in love with himself, the “pure radiance,” being himself this which he loves; this is to say that he brings himself into existence, since he is an abiding actuality and the highest object of love in a way like Intellect. But Intellect is an actualization; so that he is an actualization. But not the actualization of another; so he is the actualization of himself. Therefore he is not as he happened to be, but he is as he acts. Moreover, if he exists in the highest degree, because he in a way holds fast to himself and in a way looks towards himself, and his being, as it were, is his self-looking, he so to speak creates himself, and he is not as he chanced to be but as he wills, and this will is not random nor as it happened; for the will directed to the best is not random. But that such an inclination to himself, which is his, as it were, actuality and abiding in himself, makes his being what it is, is evident if one supposes the opposite; because if he inclined to what is outside himself, he would destroy his being what he is; so his being what he is is his self-directed actuality, and these are one and himself. Therefore, he has brought himself into existence, while his actuality is brought forth with himself. If, then, his actuality did not come to be, but was always and is like waking without another awakener, an eternal awakening and super-intellection, he is thus as he awakened. And his waking is beyond substance and Intellect and intelligent life: but these are himself. So he is an actuality above Intellect and intellection and life; but these derive from him and not from another. Therefore, his being derives by and from himself. So he is not as he happened to be, but he is himself as he willed.

Commentary on VI.8[39].16

1-8 ἐπεὶ δὲ . . . παρακεῖσθαι. The omnipresence doctrine is introduced as a problem in its own right and as the starting-point for the bold speculation on the inner life of the Good which begins in line 12. P. has various ways of stating the doctrine. The Good may be designated as τὸ πανταχοῦ (III.8[30].9.25; cf. comm. *ad loc.*) or as here with both the positive and negative predicates πανταχοῦ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ. Cf. also οὐκ ὦν οὐδαμοῦ οὐδαμοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν (V.5[32].8.24). Both predicates are necessary to explain how the Good is the universal cause but also transcendently other than its products: πῶς οὖν ἐξ ἑνὸς πληθός; ὅτι πανταχοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅπου οὐ. πάντα οὖν πληροῖ· πολλὰ οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα ἤδη. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ μόνον πανταχοῦ, αὐτὸ ἂν ἦν τὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ, τὰ πάντα γίνεται μὲν δι’ αὐτόν, ὅτι πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖνος, ἕτερα δὲ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτὸς

οὐδαμοῦ. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς μόνον πανταχοῦ καὶ αὖ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ; ὅτι δεῖ πρὸ πάντων ἔν εἶναι (III.9[13].4.1-7). The relentless logic of this passage makes it clear precisely what is being asserted in the oft-quoted opening statement of V.2[11].1: τὸ ἐν πάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἓν.

In the double-predication the terms are complementary, indeed they entail each other. Note how the negative predicate supports the positive assertion of omnipresence: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔν τινι ἐκεῖ ἐστίν, οὗ ἐστίν· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ποῦ, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου μή. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐνθαδί, δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλος αὐτὸν κατέχει τόπος . . . εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ οὐ ποῦ ὦν, πανταχοῦ ἔσται ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ (V.5[32].9.18-20, 22-23). This not only excludes corporeal spatiality from the Good's reality, but more importantly the metaphysical space of the intelligible world. In the present passage he makes this point absolutely: the Good is not even "in the everywhere"—οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὦν τῷ πανταχοῦ (6-7). This is because P. wishes to assert the absolute identity of the Good and omnipresence: τὸ πανταχοῦ καὶ τὸ πάντα αὐτός . . . αὐτὸς ὦν τοῦτο (lines 6-7). The intensive pronoun has the precise logical function, here and throughout the chapter, of establishing the identity of the Good and its various quasi-predicates without the use of the copula. The present participle sneaks in occasionally owing to grammatical necessity, but the avoidance of the copula is the result of conscious choice, as the extensive critique at VI.7[38].38.1-14 of using "ἔστι" in statements about the Good clearly demonstrates. This logical rigour naturally excludes πανταχοῦ and οὐδαμοῦ from being understood as accidental attributes: εἰ γὰρ μηδαμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκε (4); cf. also οὐκ ὡς συμβέβηκεν ἐστίν (17-18). Moreover, P. categorically denies τὸ "συνέβη" as applicable to the Good, for it pertains only to multiple realities (Ch. 8.21-24, Ch. 11.33-37). His purpose is to remove all contingency and limitation both from our conceptions of the Good and from its reality (Henry [1931] 322). This, of course, is the foundation of P.' mystical theology, but it is interesting that the omnipresence of the Good, the lynchpin of positive theology, continues to be important after the practice of negation: "Nor would one who sees it still be rash enough to say 'as it happened to be': nor is he able to utter a word about it: if he did he would be struck dumb in his rashness, and would not in his swift flight be able to say 'where' about it; it appears everywhere to him as if before the eyes of his soul and, wherever he fixes his gaze, he is looking at him" (Ch. 19.6-11). This passage articulates well the sort of existential attitude P. himself brings to the account of the plethora of quasi-attributes and activities which are ascribed to the Good later in this chapter.

The source of P.' diverse meditations on the omnipresence of the Good is Plato's *Parmenides*: οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἓν, μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν (138b5); ἐν ταύτῳ ἅμα πολλαχοῦ (131b7); ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἢ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων (144b1-2); cf. Dodds (1928) 132-33, Charrue 88-90. For parallels to the double-predication

πανταχοῦ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ, cp. Philo *De Conf. Linguar.* 136 τοῦ θεοῦ . . . ᾧ πανταχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῳ; Porphyry *Sent.* 31.16.13, 38.34.12-13. Hadot has an illuminating discussion of the use of this and other contradictory formulas in P., Porphyry, and Victorinus. Extending as far back as Philo and Albinus, there is a tradition of combining the positive and negative theologies and, particularly in the later Platonists, the first principle is said to be beyond the opposition between affirmation and negation: cf. Hadot (1968) I.283-85, 418-20.

Ontological derivation from the Good is mentioned briefly in lines 7-8 in terms of this strong statement of the omnipresence doctrine: δοὺς εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν τῷ πανταχοῦ παρακεῖσθαι. Unlike the Good other realities exist in something else, but, more dramatically than usual, P. says ἐν τῷ πανταχοῦ, i.e. in the Good. This orientation begins to prepare us for the spectacular glimpse into the inner life of the Good from which inferior realities derive. Armstrong's remarks on the more explicit development of this theme in Christian Neoplatonists like the Ps.-Dionysius and Eriugena also applies, it seems to me, to the present context: "in this tradition there is nothing (not even 'nothing') ultimately external to God, nothing other than himself for his presences or theophanies to be present in, and it is only on, so to speak, his own infinity considered passively as a potentiality for creation that he can exercise what we seem compelled to call his infinite diversity of activities" (1977) 179.

8-12 ὁ δ' ὑπερτάτην . . . πρὸς αὐτόν. The stress placed on the complete independence and absolute transcendence of the Good is noteworthy, coming as it does just before the ascription of so many activities and attributes to the Good in lines 12ff. This is the only instance of ὑπέρτατος applied to the Good; interestingly, the only other use of the word defines the soul's ontological priority to the body (IV.2[4].2.52). Note again that P. identifies the attribute with the reality of the Good: οὐκ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὦν ὑπέρτατος αὐτός; cf. also τὸ ἐν πρώτῃ ἔδρᾳ ὄν (Ch. 7.7). Any distinction between subject and predicate would indicate duality, which is inappropriate to the absolute unity of the Good. The use of this word is consistent with the abundant use throughout the treatise of ὑπερ- compounds with respect to the Good: ὑπερνόησις (line 32 below); τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει (Ch. 10.33-34); ὑπεράνω κείμενον μόνον τοῦτο (Ch. 21.30-31); πρῶτως αὐτὸς καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός (Ch. 14.42). Note also the many superlatives attributed to the Good: οἶον αἰτιώτατον καὶ ἀληθέστερον αἰτία (Ch. 18.38-39); τελειότατον (V.1[10].6.40, V.4[7].1.24); δυνατώτατον (V.4[7].1.25); ἀπλούστατον (II.9[33].1.8); ἀκρότατος (V.1[10].1.24-25).

The implications of the statement that all things are subservient to the Good are to be found elsewhere in the treatise, particularly in the early chapters, where P. develops the distinctions between mastery and slavery, freedom and compulsion,

self-determination and dependence. P. wishes to establish two related points: (i) the Good is subservient to nothing and (ii) everything is subject to the Good. In a sense this is just an alternative vocabulary for expressing the ontological independence and transcendental causality of the first principle, as in Ch. 19.14-19 where he asserts that τὸ ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας means “not only that he generates substance but that he is not a slave to substance or to himself (οὐ δουλεύει οὐδὲ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ)”; moreover, “he has no need of being.” This insures the self-identity and self-determination of the first principle: ἐνέργεια δὴ οὐ δουλεύσασα οὐσίᾳ καθαρῶς ἐστὶν ἐλευθέρα, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸς παρ’ αὐτοῦ αὐτός (“Now certainly an activity not enslaved to substance is purely and simply free, and in this way he himself is himself from himself”: Ch. 20.17-19). The freedom and independence of the Good derives from its self-will which is discussed below on lines 21-23.

If, then, the Good is free from every compulsion and necessity, what does it mean for all things to be subservient to the Good? P. clarifies what he means here by δοῦλα early in the treatise: “Now, where there is no compulsion (μὴ ἡνάγκασται) to follow another, how can one speak of slavery (τὸ δουλεύειν)? How could something borne towards the Good be under compulsion (ἡναγκασμένον) since its desire for the Good will be voluntary (ἐκουσίου) if it knows that it is good and goes to it as good?” “And if it [sc. Intellect] is active according to the Good, it is much more in its own power and free (πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον): since one seeks freedom and being in one’s own power for the sake of the Good” (Ch. 4.11-15, 34-36). On this view slavery (δουλεία) is the condition of one who does not pursue the good (Ch. 4.20-24) and beings are most free when they are so perfectly conformed to the Good as to be incapable of choosing the bad (Armstrong [1982b] 404). In the present passage, therefore, δοῦλα indicates only the ontological dependence of all things on the Good, not that their state of being or will is under the compulsion of the Good.

That things look towards the Good is stressed throughout the downward and upward movements of metaphysical realities, from the pre-noetic vision of the inchoate Intellect to the hyper-noetic vision of the ascended soul. And, of course, the Good does not look at anything besides itself (see line 20 and comm. *ad loc.*); nor does it exercise any of its activities on the realities derived from it. P. maintains this view throughout the *Enneads*: κάκεινο μὲν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐφίεται, ὥστε περὶ ἡμᾶς εἶναι, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνου, ὥστε ἡμεῖς περὶ ἐκείνο (VI.9[9].8.35-36); δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ’ αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος οὐδὲ βουλευθέντος οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος ὑποστῆναι αὐτό (V.1[10].6.25-27); ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις θέλησις αὐτοῦ οὐ δεδεκασμένου οὐδὲ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ἐπισπομένου, ἀλλ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐλομένου, ὅτι μὴδὲ ἦν ἄλλο, ἵνα πρὸς ἐκείνο ἐλχθῇ (“For the nature of the Good is in reality the will of himself, a self not corrupted nor following his own

nature, but choosing himself, because there was nothing else at all that he might be drawn to”: Ch.13.38-40). On one occasion this consistent view that the Good, either as the source or the goal of all realities and activities, directs no attention outside itself yields what must be called a supreme nonchalance: “He would not have cared if it had not come into being” (V.5[32].12.44).

12-13 οἶον. Here begins the astonishing exploration of the inner life of the Good. In order to assess it properly we must understand how P. intends us to read it. The language he employs throughout is carefully qualified by the abundant use of οἶον, of which there are ten instances in this chapter alone. Earlier in the treatise he insists that the attributes predicated of the Good are inadequate to convey its reality: ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα ἐπάγειν δεῖ τοῦ ζητουμένου, πάλιν αὖ λεγέσθω, ὥς τὰ μὲν οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται, ὅτι οὐ ποιητέον οὐδ’ ὥς εἰς ἐπίνοιαν δύο, τὰ δὲ νῦν τῆς πειθοῦς χάριν καὶ τι παρανοητέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. . . . δεῖ δὲ συγχωρεῖν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, εἴ τις περὶ ἐκείνου λέγων ἐξανάγκης ἐνδείξεως ἕνεκα αὐτοῖς χρῆται, ἃ ἀκριβεῖα οὐκ ἐῷμεν λέγεσθαι· λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ “οἶον” ἐφ’ ἐκάστου (“But if one must bring in these names of what we are looking for, let it be said again that it was not correct to use them, because one must not make it two even for the sake of forming an idea of it; but now we must depart a little from correct thinking in our discourse for the sake of persuasion. . . . But one must go along with the words, if one in speaking of that Good uses of necessity to indicate it expressions which we do not strictly speaking allow to be used: but one should understand ‘as if’ with each of them”: Ch. 13. 1-5, 47-50). This caveat is applicable to every positive statement about the Good, for example the ascription of οἶον συναίσθησις to it at V.4[7].2.18 (cf. comm. *ad loc.*). We must, then, be careful not to fracture the absolute unity of the Good, but, at the same time, these names are not to be emptied of their profoundly suggestive connotations. Through persuasion (πειθῶ) and specific indications (ἐνδείξις) they can allay the fear experienced by the ascended soul that it is proceeding into formlessness, that in union with the Good it possesses nothing; cf. (VI.9[9].3.4-6).

In the present treatise and especially in this chapter the qualifications must be applied more rigorously because of the sheer abundance of positive predications, which in most cases are strictly applicable only to the intelligible world. (I use “predication” provisionally; P. himself would object to the term on the grounds that it implies the duality of subject and predicate.) On the transference of his noetic vocabulary to the reality of the Good he adds these remarks: “But we see self-determination not as the Good’s incidental attribute but itself by itself, by taking away the opposing factors from the self-determinations in other things (ἡμεῖς δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτεξουσίων ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἑαυτό): we might say this about it by transferring (μεταφέροντες) what is less from

lesser things because of incapacity to find what we ought to say which is applicable to it, or even really about it" (Ch. 8.1-7). What P. means by "the opposing factors" (τὰ ἐναντία) is clarified to some extent in the concluding section of Ch. 7. In lines 45-54 he stresses that no duality is imputed to the Good by the attribution of such terms as ὑπόστασις, ἐνέργεια, οὐσία, τὸ εἶναι, ζωή. But to what does he refer with the phrase "in other things?" We would assume that he is thinking of Intellect, but at Ch. 7.47-49 he states: "for one is not one thing and the other another if this is not even so with Intellect," though he adds that Intellect's activity is "more according to its activity" than the other way around. There is some doubt, then, that τὰ ἐναντία can refer to noetic predicates. P. does not refer to being and life as incidental attributes (συμβεβηκός: Ch. 8.1), and these central aspects of Intellect are never designated, so far as I am aware, as contraries or opposites. At VI.6[34].18.39-44, for example, he seems to deny that there are opposites in the intelligible world (cf. Bertier et al. 81-82). This position is consistent with statements made elsewhere, as in I.8[51].6: "non-substance is contrary to substance and that which is the nature and principle of evil to the nature of good" (32-33); "by contraries (ἐναντία) we mean things that are furthest removed from each other" (41-42); "so things which are altogether separate, and have nothing in common, and are as far apart as they can be, are contrary in their very nature: for their contrariety does not depend on quality or any category of being, but on their furthest possible separation from each other, and on their being made of opposites (ἀντιθέτων) and on their contrary action" (54-59). Contrariety, therefore, seems to require χωρισμός as well as the lack of intermediates, as in the case of health and sickness, the example cited in VI.3[44].20. P. concludes discussion of this example with the question: "Is it, then, that things which have some likeness . . . either greater or lesser, are not contraries, but those are contraries which have nothing the same in their specific form? And one must add: in the genus of quality. For them also the contraries which have no intermediates [will be contrary], those which have nothing tending to likeness" (VI.3[44].20.28-33).

If τὰ ἐναντία are excluded from the intelligible world, what are the "opposing factors in the self-determinations of other things" referred to in Ch. 8.1-3? One possibility is that he is using the term in a less technical sense, i.e. to designate predicates which are attributed to a subject. This less precise and, on his own terms, less accurate use of the term may be what he has in mind in one sentence from the discussion in I.8[51].6 cited above: "For the other contraries belong to the same species or the same genus and have something in common as a result of this belonging" (36-38). In this sense ἐναντία might be predicable of Intellect, though I am not convinced P. is very clear on the matter. In any case, what is important about the use of οἷον in the following lines is that it enables P. to say a great deal about the Good's multifarious life without compromising its

unity and transcendence. οἶον *F* is what results from the ἀφαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων. Moreover, as Armstrong suggests, “though every term is negated, its use implies also the negation of its contrary” (1982b) 403.

12-13 ὁ δ' εἰς τὸ εἶσω οἶον φέρεται αὐτοῦ. P.' first assertion about the Good is unique in the *Enneads*. Now movement or turning inward frequently marks the ascent of the soul to Intellect or to the Good. The omnipresence of the Good means ultimately that it is within all things and hence that direct contact with it can be realized only by turning within, as the opening lines of Ch. 18 suggest: “And you when you seek, seek nothing outside him, but seek within all things which come after him: but leave him himself alone. For he himself is the outside, the encompassment and measure of all things. Or within in depth (εἶσω ἐν βάθει)” (Ch. 18.1-4). Also parallel is the contention that “the soul must let go of all things and turn altogether to what is within (ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἶσω πάντη)” (VI.9[9].7.17-18); αὐτὸν δοῦναι εἰς τὸ εἶσω (V.8[31].11.17); cf. Beierwaltes (1985) 129. Similarly, in the mystical theophany at V.5[32].7-8, Intellect begins to see the light of the One by “veiling itself from other things and drawing itself inward (συναγαγὼν εἰς τὸ εἶσω)” (V.5[32].7.32; see comm. *ad loc.*). The mystically ascended soul and Intellect are seeking the absolute interiority which is the Good itself. There is light, too, within the Good, as is evident from αὐγὴν καθαρὰν, a quotation of *Phaedrus* 250c4. We must conclude, therefore, that turning or moving inward and seeing light pertain both to the ascended soul and to the Good, and that these events in the case of the former are approximations of the Good's absolute reality. The Good's movement into itself represents an absolutizing of the mystical moment in the lives of Intellect and the soul, when they contact or merge with the Good. Interpreted in this manner, the present passage supports my contention that the controversial ἐπιστροφή at V.1[10].7.5 may in fact refer to the One and not Intellect. (For the problem of the One's self-vision in line 6 of that early text see comm. on line 20 below.) ἐπιστραφῆναι πρὸς τὸ εἶσω, the injunction laid upon the soul at VI.9[9].7.17-18, is synonymous with εἰς τὸ εἶσω οἶον φέρεται αὐτοῦ.

13-14 οἶον ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπήσας . . . ἡγάπησε. The transference and absolutizing of hyper-noetic activities in the Good is strikingly exemplified here in the case of love: the Good loves itself and it is what it loves. In the present passage P. employs ἀγαπᾶν as well as ἀγαπητότατον in line 15. I prefer to translate the verb with “to love” instead of Armstrong's “to be well pleased with”: the latter is too tame for the absolute love with which the Good is identical. In short, ἔρω is equivalent to ἀγαπή: cf. Rist (1964a) 98-99, Beierwaltes (1965) 311 n37. This is also true in accounts of the mystical ascent of the soul. At VI.7[38].31.5-18 the soul's erotic rapture in the presence of the Good is expressed by both ἔρω and ἀγαπή; and ἀγαπᾶν is synonymous with

the soul's ἐπιστροφή to the Good at V.3[49].8.30-31: ἐπέστρεψε [sc. ἐπιλαμφθέν] πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ . . . ἀγαπᾶν ἐποίησε τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀγλαίαν. Similarly, Intellect is defined as ἀγαπητότατον (VI.7[38].30.30) and its desire as ἀγαπή (VI.7[38].31.5), and the νοῦς ἐρῶν (VI.7[38].35.24) refers to its self-transcending activity.

We encounter an even more emphatic definition of the Good as love in the previous chapter: καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως, ἅτε οὐκ ἄλλως καλὸς ἢ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι, εἰ μὴ τὸ συνὸν καὶ τὸ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸν εἶη. εἰ δὲ τὸ συνὸν τῷ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ τὸ οἷον ἐφίεμενον τῷ ἐφετῷ ἐν, τὸ δὲ ἐφετὸν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οἷον ὑποκείμενον, πάλιν αὖ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ταὐτὸν ἢ ἔφεσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία ("And he, that same self, is lovable and love and love of himself, in that he is beautiful only from himself and in himself. For surely his keeping company with himself could not be in any other way than if what keeps company and what it keeps company with were the one and the same. But if what keeps company is one with what it keeps company with and what is, in a way, desiring is one with the object of desire, and the object of desire is on the side of existence and a kind of substrate, again it has become apparent to us that the desire and the substance are the same": Ch. 15.1-8). The repeated insistence on unity should not lull us into underestimating the significance of this passage for P.' theory of the One and its relation to Intellect, though it has been largely ignored by Plotinian scholars (Rist and Armstrong are notable exceptions). We can trace the path by which P. came to this formulation by beginning with his firm conviction, inherited from Plato, that the Good is the supreme object of desire—τὸ ἐφετόν, τὸ ἀγαπητότατον (15); for ἐφετόν cf. also I.6[1].7.3; V.6[24].5.1; VI.7[38].22.6, 32, 24.5, 25.8; Ch. 7.4. P. is also indebted to Aristotle's notion of the Unmoved Mover who κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον (*Met.* A 7.1072b3). The eros which conveys the soul to the Good derives of course from the Platonic conception, but here P. utterly transforms Platonic eros by defining the absolute as itself eros.

This has enormous implications for his presentation of the Good as both ἀρχή and τέλος. On the first, as Rist has pointed out, the "soul's power to love is given, along with its existence, by the One itself. And in the act of loving that power is actualized by the direct inspiration of the One. In a very real sense our eros is caused by God's nature" (1970) 168. This reading is fully justified when we juxtapose the present passage with the claim made at VI.7[38].31.17-18 that the soul loves the Good since it is moved by it to love from the beginning. Fundamentally, therefore, the Good's undiminished giving, its power to generate, is a direct manifestation of its eros (cf. Rist [1964a] 83). This may seem to contradict the Plotinian principle that the first principle gives what it does not have, but if we remember that the Good maintains its absolute unity, its eros can be understood as an ecstatic perfection, not a desire requiring completion by

another reality: ταῦτόν ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία. The Good's erotic nature, therefore, grounds its self-diffusion, i.e. its omnipresence, but this is only a complex way to describe its self-identity: πανταχοῦ ἔσται ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ (V.5[32].9.23); cf. Beierwaltes (1985) 52.

On the second point too Rist's comments on the Good as eros are most illuminating: "it must love not only 'itself in itself', but 'itself as present with its effects'. Furthermore, in the mystic union, at the time the soul is restored to unity with the One, it must itself be the object of the One's love, since the One loves itself, and the elevated soul is the One's self . . . In the mystic union, then, the One loves the soul, since the soul is no longer soul" (1964a) 82. Later in his discussion Rist argues correctly that in its unified state the soul "is nothing but eros; it is nothing but the One" 97; there is "a total submergence of the Self in the eros of the One" 103. However, Rist goes on to argue that the soul "still remains numerically distinct" 104; cf. his more insistent defence of this position in Rist (1967) 224, 227-28, 230. This conclusion is puzzling, coming as it does at the end of perhaps the most insightful discussion of the eros of the Good and of the mystically ascended soul.

As I argue in the comm. on VI.7[38].35.33ff., there are strong reasons for supposing that in the mystical union the soul ceases to exist as an individually distinct entity. The passages under discussion here, it seems to me, provide even stronger support for this view. When the soul attains union with the Good, the eros that lifted it so high merges but does not disappear as the ontological limits of the soul disappear; rather, the desire for the *summun bonum* merges with the inner life of the Good which is absolute eros. In short, the soul loses itself but gains the absolute reality of the Good. The ultimate state, on this reading, is not non-existence, but an absolute existence which is fully erotic, as well as visionary and actual as the following lines demonstrate.

Further support for this thesis can be gleaned from a careful examination of the language employed to characterize the Good's eros in Ch. 15. Even more revealing than the common ground between the soul's and the Good's eros is the fact that P. uses συνεῖναι and being ἐν several times in this passage: τὸ συνεῖναι ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι, εἰ μὴ τὸ συνὸν καὶ τὸ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν εἴη (3-4). In one place he utilizes the verb, but notes that all notions of duality must be negated: ἐν ὃν συνὸν αὐτῷ οὐ δεῖται νοήσεως ἑαυτοῦ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ συνεῖναι δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἵνα τηρῆς τὸ ἐν, ἀλλὰ καὶ το νοεῖν καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ νόησιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (VI.9[9].6.49-52). συνεῖναι is used several times to define the soul's union with the Good: μόνον ὁρώσα τῷ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐν οὐσα τῷ ἐν εἶναι αὐτῷ (VI.9[9].3.11-12); ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐρώμενον, ᾧ ἔστι καὶ συνεῖναι μεταλαβόντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντως ἔχοντα (VI.9[9].9.44-45); αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ συνέσται καὶ τοιοῦτον αἰσθήσεται ἀπλοῦν γεγόμενον (VI.9[9].10.10-11); τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς τὸ συνεῖναι τῷ συγγενεῖ (I.2[19].4.14); οὐτοί [sc. οἱ

ἐρῶσι] εἰσιν οἱ συνεῖναι δυνάμενοι (VI.7[38].31.16-17). It is useful in this context to adduce the parallels between, on the one hand, states of mystical cognition in the soul defined by συνιέναι (see further III.8[30].10.34 and comm. *ad loc.*), σύνεσις (VI.9[9].4.2, VI.7[38].33.27), and ἐπιβολή (see III.8[30].9.22 and comm. *ad loc.*) and, on the other hand, the Good's οἶον συναίσθησις (V.4[7].2.18) and its ἀπλῇ τις ἐπιβολή αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν (VI.7[38].39.1-2). In these cases—and more will be cited in the comm. on the following lines—we continually discover striking similarities between the hypernoetic state and the ineffable relation of the Good to itself; this is also pointed out by Beierwaltes (1985) 144, though he argues against the annihilation of the individual, 143. Moreover, the fact that in Ch. 15.1-8 the “subject” and “object” poles of the Good are said to be “one” lends support to my contention that when the soul is “one with the Good” it has achieved a state of absolute identity (cf. comm. on VI.7[38].35.33ff.). If this way of speaking does not violate the Good's absolute unity, why should the very same statement, as applied to the mystical union, preclude the possibility that P. envisions the identification of the soul and the Good, as most scholars have argued? We must accept either that this interpretation is based on a plausible reading of the relevant texts or conclude that in VI.8[39] P. does in fact fracture the Good's unity. The second strategy, which is pursued by a few, creates more difficulties than it solves (see comm. on lines 14-15); specifically, it flies in the face of repeated asseverations that the various activities attributed to the Good in this treatise comprise an undifferentiated unity.

14-15 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑποστήσας αὐτόν. This is the first of three instances in this chapter alone where P. asserts that the Good causes itself: οἶον ποιοῖ ἄν αὐτόν (21), αὐτὸς ὑπέστησεν αὐτόν (29). Krämer (1964) 401 argues that this is “die erste eingehende Analyse der absoluten Substanz als *causa sui*.” However, Whittaker (1975) 204ff. offers an extensive repertoire of Neopythagorean, Hermetic, and Gnostic texts which clearly speak of divine self-generation. What is important about P.' account of self-causation is that, unlike those theories, his pertains to a transcendental first principle which is absolute unity.

Elsewhere in the present treatise P. explains how the self-causation of the Good is to be understood. He argues against the objections that either the Good brings itself into existence from a previous state of non-existence or potential existence or that it pre-exists its self-generation: “‘Well then’, someone might say, ‘does he not happen to be already before he comes into being (οὐ συμβαίνει πρὶν ἢ γενέσθαι γεγονέναι)? For if he makes himself (ποιεῖ ἑαυτόν), as regards himself he does not yet exist, but on the other hand as regards the making he exists already before himself, as he himself is what is made’. To this we must reply that he is not at all to be classed as made, but as maker (ὅλως οὐ τακτέον κατὰ τὸν ποιούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν

ποιούντα); we must posit that his making is absolute (ἀπόλυτον τὴν ποιήσιν αὐτοῦ), and not in order that something else should be brought to perfection by his making, since his activity is not directed to the perfection of something else, but is altogether this God: for there are not two, but one" (Ch. 20.1-9). (This argument is based on the claim that the Good is a perfect actuality, on which see comm. on lines 15-18.) He adds the further points that the Good can not be generated by something else (Ch. 20.19-20) nor is its self-causation subject to the temporal considerations of "before" and "after": "Now if there was a time from which he began to be, 'he has made' would be used in the strict and proper sense: but now, if he was what he is before eternity existed, this 'he has made' must be understood to mean that making and self are concurrent (τὸ σύνδρομον εἶναι τὸ πεποιηκέναι καὶ αὐτό): for the being is one with the making and what we may call the eternal generation (ἐν γὰρ τῇ ποιήσει καὶ οἷον γεννήσει αἰδίῳ τὸ εἶναι)" (Ch. 20.23-27). Also to be noted is that self-causation is synonymous with self-will (see discussion of this topic in comm. on lines 22-23): "but if its willing comes from itself, it is necessary that it also gets its being from itself, so that our discourse has discovered that he has made himself" (Ch. 13.53-55; cf. also Ch. 15.8-10).

Although P. clearly insists on the identity and unity of cause and caused, Bales argues that self-causation entails distinctions within the Good and hence that P. predicates "of the One that which is properly predicated only of what is lower than the One" 48; "the notion of self-causation is the self-contradictory heart of the paradoxical unification of the Being and Non-Being of the One itself" 47. Ignoring completely the carefully qualified language P. relies on throughout, Bales observes that the present chapter comprises an "ontological characterization" of the Good, according to which what he calls "the meontological character of the One is explicitly denied: the Good must lie 'within Being'" 43-44. In addition to P.' arguments for the identity of the putative subjective and objective aspects of the Good, this interpretation is based on the erroneous assumptions that (i) the absolute transcendence of the Good defines it as non-being; (ii) the Good's quasi-attributes in this chapter are explicable only by predicating noetic being of it; and (iii) Intellect generates itself absolutely. The third assumption especially is to be resisted, for P. never says that Intellect by itself brings itself into existence: it is generated through the double movement of procession and return, which explains how the potential Intellect becomes actualized Intellect. As the texts in Ch. 20 cited above demonstrate, the Good never exists potentially; hence it is not subject to κίνησις. Finally, P. distinguishes the Good and Intellect vis-à-vis causality: "each and every part of Intellect is rational principle and cause, but that One is cause of the cause (ἄριστον ἐκεῖνο τοῦ αἰτίου)" (Ch. 18.37-38).

While I disagree with Bales' interpretation, it should be noted that his concern that self-causation presupposes duality in the One is shared to some extent by

Proclus. In order to preserve the One's absolute unity and transcendence Proclus explicitly excludes self-causation and self-generation from the One. Thus, for him the One is the ἀναϊτίως αἴτιον (*In Plat. Theol.* II.9.106) or προαίτιον (*In Parm.* 1210.11). Proclus' view that the One transcends self-generation is intimately linked to his doctrine of the αὐθυπόστατα, which applies to the divine beings posterior to the One; on this theory cf. Whittaker (1975) 217ff.; Beierwaltes (1965) 350 and n58; Dodds (1963) 224.

15-18 εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα . . . ὥς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός. The Good is said to be an ἐνέργεια or ἐνέργημα as well as οἶον νοῦς (on this phrase see comm. on line 32); the former point is repeated in lines 25, 28, 30-31, and 35. P. quite often claims that the Good is ἐπέκεινα ἐνεργείας: I.7[54].1.17-20, V.3[49].12.22ff., V.6[24].6.3-4 (see comm. *ad loc.*), VI.7[38].17.10 (see comm. *ad loc.*). These negations are usually made in contexts where the generation of Intellect is the primary focus. Yet sometimes, when he wishes to explain the derivation of the intelligible world from the Good in terms of the double-ἐνέργεια theory, P. is willing to define the Good as the primary or internal ἐνέργεια: see especially V.4[7].2.27-30 and comm. *ad loc.*, VI.7[38].18.6, 41, 56.

The assertion that the Good is a self-directed ἐνέργεια is consistent with less adventurous accounts of the first principle, because (i) this is an ἐνέργεια μένουσα and (ii) because the Good is not an actualization of a previously existing potentiality nor of anything self. The first statement is a variant expression of the common assertion that the Good remains in itself, especially while it generates Intellect; on the Good's μένειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ see especially V.4[7].2.13 and comm. *ad loc.* The second point is made in the present context with the argument that Intellect is an actualization of something else, whereas the Good is not because it is identical with its actuality. For Intellect as an ἐνέργεια of the Good see VI.7[38].25.31 and I.8[51].2.21-22; for further discussion of this idea see comm. on VI.7[38].17.6-8.

In the present treatise, therefore, the Good is the πρώτη ἐνέργεια ἄνευ οὐσίας (Ch. 20.9). The contrast with intellectual ἐνέργεια is asserted in Ch. 20.13-15: εἰ οὖν τελειότερον ἢ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας, τελειότατον δὲ τὸ πρῶτον, πρῶτον ἂν ἐνέργεια εἴη. The Good's ἐνέργεια is a necessity if its self-mastery (αὐτοῦ κύριος) is to be maintained (cf. Ch. 12.22-25), though even self-mastery is inappropriate, in that this notion involves ruling and subservient parts (Rist [1967] 79). Also rejected for introducing the duality of nature and activity is the notion that the Good is active (ἐνεργεῖν) "according to its nature" (ὥς πέφυκεν), a point P. insists on in the same passage where he argues for the identity of the Good's οἶον ἐνέργεια with its οἶον ὑπόστασις, οἶον ζῶη, οἶον οὐσία, and self-production (Ch. 7.46-54).

P. rarely uses the non-Aristotelian ἐνέργημα, which is common among Hellenistic philosophers, particularly the Stoics, who are fond of creating terms with -μα to define activities (Hadot [1968] I.362). Cf. *SVF* II.134.16ff.; II.295.4: ἐνέργημα τι τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι.

19 πρὸς αὐτὸν οἶον στηρίζει. It is somewhat surprising to encounter the verb στηρίζειν in the present context, since it is used primarily in cosmological theory. At VI.5[23].9.45 it is applied to Intellect which serves as the βάσις for intelligible realities and “fixes them” (τοῦ στηρίζοντος αὐτά). Earlier usage of the term in cosmological speculation may have suggested to P. appropriate connotations. Anaxagoras, for example, describes the pre-cosmic condition as one of rest: στηρίζειν αὐτὸ αὐτό φησιν τὸ ἄπειρον . . . τὸ γὰρ αὐτῷ στηριζόμενον καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄν ἀκίνητον εἶναι ἀνάγκη (Aristotle *Physics* Γ 5.205b2-3, 6-7 = *DK* A 50). An analogous association of being fixed and at rest occurs in Empedocles: οὕτως Ἀρμονίης πυκινῷ κρυφῷ ἐστήρικται / σφαῖρος κυκλοτερὴς μονή περιηγεί γαίων (*DK* B 27.3-4). Whether μονή in Empedocles (cf. Wright 188) means “rest” (from μένω) or “alone” (from μόνος), the latter connotation is echoed by μονή in line 25, suggesting that P. may in fact have had this Fr. in mind when writing the present passage. In any case στηρίζειν is used of the fixed stars; cf. Aratus *Phaen.* 230, 274. In Proclus and the *Chaldaean Oracles* we find the term utilized in contexts which combine noetic and astronomical theory: cf. Proclus *In Remp.* II.220.14-15 and Lewy 10, 124 n221 (d).

19-21 οἶον πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει . . . αὐτὸν βλέπειν. Perhaps the most unexpected and controversial activity attributed to the Good in this entire treatise is self-vision, which is identical with its “being”: τὸ οἶον εἶναι τοῦτο αὐτῷ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπειν. On the noetic level, of course, seeing is synonymous with intellection, which leads P. on countless occasions to stress that the Good transcends intellection and any sort of vision; cf., for example, VI.7[38].39.13-14: ἐλέγομεν δέ, ὅτι οὐ νόησις τούτου, οὐδ' εἰ ἄλλον αὐτὸν ἐθέλοι ἰδεῖν. However, no amount of discussion of the many denials of vision in the Good contributes to understanding what P. intends by defining the Good as self-vision. Except for the quite difficult phrase πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐώρα at V.1[10].7.6 (cf. comm. *ad loc.*), this is the only instance of such a claim. We must, I think, consider the many discussions of the soul's hyper-noetic vision when it achieves contact with the Good.

The relevant texts are discussed at length in comm. on VI.7[38].35.19ff. and 33ff., so here only a summary of the evidence is necessary. The soul's union with the Good is described as “another kind of seeing” (ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν: VI.9[9].11.22-23). In the unitive state “the seer himself was one with the seen (for it was not really seen, but united to him)” (ἐν ἣν αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδὼν πρὸς

τὸ ἑωραμένον, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἑωραμένον, ἀλλ' ἠνωμένον: VI.9[9].11.5-6); the soul ἀρχῇ ἀρχὴν ὁρᾷ (VI.9[9].11.31-32). P. can continue to ascribe vision to the soul when it achieves union with the Good and even, on my interpretation, when the soul ceases to exist, because its vision has merged with the Good's self-vision. Rist too follows the strategy of comparing the soul's mystical experience and the Good's inner reality, but rejects it in the present case on the grounds that "in the moment of ecstasy it is not a question of seeing but of being the One." He concludes, therefore, that the "term ὄρασις is appropriate to the soul in ecstasy only with strict reservations, and is a misleading description of the One itself. The One does not see itself, is not the object of its own vision; rather it is itself, cause of itself and of all things. ὄρασις is transcended though ἔρως is not" (1964a) 83-84; cf. also Schwyzler (1960) 76. However, if the Good's self-vision does not entail the duality of subject and object, surely one can at least consider the possibility that the soul's mystical seeing does not apprehend the Good as an object; on this point see further comm. on V.5[32].7.31-36. The merging of the soul's hyper-noetic vision with the Good's self-vision also makes much more plausible my claim that the soul ceases to exist in the unitive state: the persistence of seeing does not preclude, but rather confirms, that union has occurred.

Finally, I would argue that the Good's vision is perhaps less problematic if we see it as a fully synonymous variant of the other activities ascribed to it in this chapter, particularly ἔρως and ὑπερνόησις as well as light. Seeing and ἔρως are closely linked in P.' mind. In his exegesis of the *Symposium* myth he derives ἔρως from ὄρασις, a spurious etymology, which, in conjunction with the visual component of erotic attraction, may partially explain the presence of both here: "So from the power which is intensely active about the object of vision and from a kind of outflow from that object, Love came to be as an eye filled with its vision, like a seeing that has an image with it; and, I suppose, his name most likely came to him from this, because he derives his real existence from seeing" (III.5[50].3.11-16). Cp. Aristotle *Eth. Nic.* I 5.1167a4: τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὀψεως ἡδονή.

21-24 οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν . . . οὐκ ἔστιν εἰκῆ. The problem of the will of the One is only touched on briefly in this chapter, but it is the central theme of the treatise as a whole. Since this has been well analyzed by Henry (1931), Armstrong (1982b), and Fraisse 109-23, my account can be brief. The early chapters of the treatise point to the view that freedom means the freedom to be oneself, which for the soul is only attained on the noetic level. Thus, βουλήσις is synonymous with νόησις (Ch. 6.36-41). Willing the Good means "being in our power" (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν: Ch. 6.41-42). As in the cases of love, vision, and selfhood, the notion of will is transposed from its operation in the intelligible world and absolutized in the Good, where it is identical with the Good's self:

πάν ἄρα βούλησις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἔνι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον· οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως ἄρα. πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βούλησις αὐτός (Ch. 21.14-16). As Armstrong points out, the free will of the Good absolutely excludes “any possibility of choice between alternatives . . . in willing both himself and his products (it seems self-evident to Plotinus that the Good in ‘willing’ himself ‘wills’ his self-diffusion...)” (1982b) 404; cf. Dihle 115. This important point is fully supported from the following: “So then he is also as he willed and of the kind he willed, and what follows upon his will, what this kind of will generated—but it generated nothing further in himself, for he was this already” (Ch. 21.16-19).

Extending this line of argument a bit further, it would seem that the Good’s θέλησις is especially close in purpose and meaning to its ἔρωσ; taken together they lend greater coherence to P.’ theory of procession and of the mystical return. On the first, it is possible to see that the Good—as perfect θέλησις and ἔρωσ which are fully actual—generates the inchoate Intellect which is typically defined as potential or indefinite ἔφεσις, ἐπιθυμία, κίνησις, and ὄψις. With respect to the metaphysics of light, we might liken these potential aspects of the inchoate Intellect to the colors differentiated when visible light passes through a prism. In the mystical return, on the other hand, after these potential aspects have achieved their actualized state in the intelligible world, they first approximate and finally achieve, in their hyper-noetic and mystical modalities, their exemplars as they always exist in the Good; but there they are identical with one another in the state of absolute unity.

P.’ exploration of the Good’s freedom of will is based on the Aristotelian analysis, as Henry and Armstrong have pointed out; but certain later developments should be noted. βούλησις and θέλησις are implicated in divine thought in the Gnostics and the *Corpus Hermeticum* (Dihle 212, Krämer [1964] 402); in Patristic writers like Origen and Victorinus, God’s will and being coincide (Dihle 219, 228). Scholarly opinion on the importance and originality of P.’ analysis of the will in the present treatise varies enormously. For Armstrong it is “the profoundest discussion of the metaphysic of will and freedom in ancient Western philosophical literature” (1982b) 397, whereas Madden 62 and Benz 289ff. argue that P. never evolved a developed theory of the will. Benz has been ably criticized both by Hadot (1968) I.16ff. and Krämer (1964) 402 for his assumption that a theory of the divine will is coherent only in voluntarist terms (see also Armstrong’s article). In my view, P.’ is not a fully developed theory in the voluntarist sense, i.e. he does not posit freedom as the unrestricted choice between alternatives (Armstrong 397). But since freedom to be oneself is actualized first on the noetic level and ultimately through participation in the Good, we must conclude that his theory is of great importance. Especially when the soul’s will and eros merge with the self-will and self-love of the Good, it is apparent that his model of divine freedom comprises a profound alternative to

that entertained by most Christian philosophers, for whom the divine will is an operation of divine thought and being and for whom the human and divine wills always remain distinct.

For the extensive use of βούλησις (on the noetic level) by Proclus and Damascius see Hadot (1968) I.307-08.

24-27 **ὅτι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη νεῦσις . . . ὕπερ ἐστί.** The Good's inclination towards itself (τοιαύτη νεῦσις αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν) is to be taken with the statement that it moves into its own interior (13). Inclining outside itself would make it cease being what it is (26-27). This self-inclination of the Good is perfectly consistent with an early account of the Good's generation of Intellect: δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος οὐδὲ βουληθέντος οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος ὑποστῆναι αὐτό (V.1[10].6.25-27). In his comm. *ad loc.* Atkinson notes that νεῦσις is used by the Gnostics in their theory of creation by the soul, which is specifically attacked by P. at II.9[33].4.6ff. However, he does not indicate that it is used by Middle Platonists, Plotinus (e.g. at I.1[53].12.27, I.8[51].4.19, I.6[1].5.49), and later Neoplatonists in their accounts of the descent of the soul (cf. Lewy 294 n136), though the Platonic theories differ significantly from the Gnostic accounts. Clearly, the connotation of the term is very different in the present context, where it is probably synonymous with συννεύσις, the mathematical term for "convergence" (cf. Atkinson 239). For self-convergence in unity cf. ἔτι τὸ πολὺ ζητοῖ ἂν ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐθέλοι ἂν συννεύειν καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ (V.6[24].5.1-2); see comm. *ad loc.* The uncompounded verb is used in a mystical context characterized by the geometric analogy of radii converging towards the center: ἐσμὲν νεύσαντες πρὸς αὐτό (VI.9[9].9.11-12).

25 **μονή.** The rarely used μονή has essentially the same meaning and intent as the phrase μένειν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ which is often ascribed to the Good. In the present chapter, which attributes so many activities to the Good, it confirms P.' view that the first principle is permanently in the same state. In the later Neoplatonists the term is combined with πρόοδος and ἐπιστροφή to form one of their many noetic triads; on the origins of the doctrine see Dodds (1963) 220-22, and for its role in later Neoplatonic metaphysics Gersh 45-57.

27-33 **τὸ ἄρα εἶναι . . . ὥς ἐργηγόρσεν.** This passage both draws upon and criticizes Aristotle's famous account of the Unmoved Mover in *Met.* A 7: ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐνέργεια τούτου καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐργήγορσις κτλ. (1072b16-17); ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἢ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἢ καθ' αὐτήν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος (1072b27-28). P. is aware that he is borrowing Aristotle's divine ἐνέργεια, but he places emphasis on unity rather than on the fact that the highest reality is the ζωὴ ἀρίστη: τοῦτο δὲ ἐν καὶ αὐτός (28-29). Similarly, while

Aristotle makes an analogy between the pleasure of ἐγρήγορσις and other mental states and that of divine thought, P. transposes to the Good the psychological state of being awake by absolutizing it. The striking statement that the Good ἔστιν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγρηγόρσεν provides another perspective on the notion of self-causation: the Good is itself absolute consciousness which awakens itself—a remarkable oxymoron, given the fact that the Good is never “asleep.”

With ἐγρήγορσις occurs ὑπερνόησις, which, together with lines 33-34, comprises an explicit criticism of Aristotle’s νοῦς-theology. Parallel to this pair of terms—one designating a state of consciousness, the other a state of transcendent knowledge—are συναίσθησις and κατανόησις at V.4[7].2.17-18. Henry (1960) 59 also juxtaposes the two passages, arguing correctly that the occurrence of analogous terms in an early and late treatise indicates P. always maintained that the Good possesses consciousness. In his remarks on Schwyzer (1960) 387 he observes: “je le vois plus prudent pour attribuer à l’Un des termes désignant la ‘conscience’ que des termes désignant la ‘connaissance’.” It is in fact perplexing why P. persists in employing noetic terminology, albeit literally hyper-noetic, to describe the Good. We must also reckon with the phrase οἶον νοῦς at lines 15-16.

Armstrong observed long ago that Intellect “has always a tendency to become a duplicate of the ‘positive’ conception of the One” (1940) 115; “this makes it inevitably an οὐσία, however much it may transcend the beings which we know” 3. His later discussions, particularly (1982b), make it unlikely that he still subscribes to this view, which has been criticized by Szlezák 156. In his illuminating discussion of this problem of the “Intellect in the One,” Szlezák 158-59 argues that the positive conception of the One is developed by tracing its manifestations back into the ground of being, the impetus being the ἀγαθοειδές-motif from the *Republic* and its implications. There is much truth to this argument—particularly the notion of the Good as supreme cause—but it is not the whole story. Conspicuously absent from Plato’s thought is an explanation of the generation of Intellect which would satisfy P. Because of his principle that everything is somehow inside the Good, he is impelled to find a direct source for each derivative reality or activity in the Good.

Several passages from Ch. 18 reveal this tendency which we see operating throughout Ch. 16. What is generated from the Good is compared to radii proceeding from the center of a circle: οὕτω τοι καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄν χρή λαμβάνειν, γενόμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ οἶον ἐκχυθὲν καὶ ἐξεληχθὲν καὶ ἐξηρημένον, ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ νοεῖας φύσεως μαρτυρεῖν τὸν οἶον ἐν ἐνὶ νοῦν οὐ νοῦν ὄντα· ἐν γάρ (“it is like this that we must apprehend that Intellect and being, coming to be from that Good and as if poured out and spread out and hanging out from it are evidence of something like Intellect in the One which is not Intellect: for it is one”: Ch. 18.18-22); οἶον γὰρ τὸ ἐν νῶ, πολλαχῇ μείζον ἢ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκείνῳ (“For something like what is in

Intellect, in many ways greater, is in that One”: Ch. 18.32-33); μειζόνως ἄρα οἶον αἰτιώτατον καὶ ἀληθέστερον αἰτία, ὁμοῦ πάσας ἔχον τὰς μελλούσας ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἔσεσθαι νοερὰς αἰτίας καὶ γεννητικὸν τοῦ οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχε, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἡθέλησεν αὐτός (“He is then in a greater degree something like the most causative and truest of causes, possessing all together the intellectual causes which are going to be from him and generative of what is not as it chanced but as he himself willed”: Ch. 18.38-41). Krämer (1964) offers an excellent assessment of this theme: “Plotin greift dabei—mit allem Vorbehalt auf die Kategorik der Noologie und Bewußtseinsphilosophie zurück, nicht nur, weil das Denken die höchste fassbare Seinsweise darstellt, sondern vor allem, weil der Ursprung selbst primär als Ermöglichung, Medium, Potenz und Substrat des Denkens, kurz: als Denk-*Prinzip* und Denk-*Element* bestimmt ist, und weil darum das Denken immer schon auf ein Denkhaftes im Ursprung selber zurückweist” 395-96, author’s emphasis. Of course intellection is not the only activity which must derive from the Good, but also all the other activities of intelligible life—eros, vision, and will.

This theme of the “Intellect in the One” has two prongs; as in the case of self-love, the Good as love manifests its reality as both causative source and mystical goal. The passages cited from Ch. 18 indicate that the Good contains the intellectual causes which proceed from it, a process that depends on its self-will. In fact, everything is in a way a manifestation (ἐκφανσις) of the Good: ἔστι δέον οὐχ ὡς ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐνέργεια πρώτη τοῦτο ἐαυτὴν ἐκφάνασα, ὅπερ ἔδει (“it is not what ought to be as a substrate, but as the first active actuality revealing itself as what it ought to be”: Ch. 18.51-52). (In the later Neoplatonists ἐκφανσις becomes a technical term for defining the One’s and Intellect’s self-manifestation: for Proclus see Beierwaltes [1965] 373; for Damascius see Trouillard [1972] 354-56 and Hadot [1968] I.307-08.) With respect to the mystical return, just as the eros which lifts the soul towards the Good ultimately merges with the latter’s eros, so the hyper-noetic phase of Intellect’s life corresponds to the “Intellect in the One which is not Intellect.” This hyper-noetic aspect is defined variously as the νοῦς ἐρῶν (VI.7[38].35.24), “that part of it which is not Intellect” (V.5[32].8.22-23), “the pure or primary part of Intellect” (VI.9[9].3.26-27), and the ἔνδον νοῦς (V.3[49].14.14-15). In his mystical theory, therefore, P. does not envision the One positively by reduplicating the Intellect on a higher level, as the views discussed above might lead us to conclude, but negates Intellect in favor of the activities—like eros and vision—which can be absolutized on the higher level of the One.

This theme of the “Intellect in the One” must have influenced Porphyry, who claims that the One contains everything “non-intellectively and hyper-essentially” (ἀνεννοήτως τε καὶ ὑπερουσίως): *Sent.* 10. Cp. also *Sent.* 25: περὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ κατὰ μὲν νόησιν πολλὰ λέγεται, θεωρεῖται δὲ ἀνοησίᾳ κρείττονι νοήσεως. Proclus, on the other hand, specifically criticizes the view

that the One contains the causes of lower realities, on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the One's absolute unity: cf. *In Parm.* 1108.8.

33-39 ἡ δὲ ἐγρήγορσις . . . αὐτὸς ἐστίν. Having concluded the remarkable speculative journey inside the One, P. here reasserts its absolute transcendence, a clear indication that the many attributes and activities ascribed to the first principle in this chapter do not compromise its unity. Nor is the negative theology, which aims at preserving the absolute transcendence of the One, invalidated. One of the lessons to be learned from the present chapter is that negation can become a mental crutch if it leads to an intellectual rigidity that sets limits on what the One can be; hence P.' emphasis throughout the treatise on the One's will, as here: ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτὸς ἐστίν. In a sense the infinity and even the unity of the One are compromised if we maintain that there is something the One is not. Armstrong argues poignantly that one important denial implicit in negative theology "is that it is adequate to call the One 'transcendent'. His relationship to all which comes after him is absolutely indescribable, whether in terms of immanence-transcendence, identity-otherness, or any others." As "the Good," he continues, "he is more, not less, than anything we can describe or define" (1975b) 82. Similarly, Findlay (1967): "It is of the essence of a necessary absolute that there is nothing for which it is not, in the last resort, responsible, nothing which is not, in the last resort itself" 193; "pulsating richness rather than emptiness is, then, a suitable characterization of the absolute" 198. Therefore, negation and the concomitant assertions of the One's radical transcendence are directed at our intellectual activities, both discursive and noetic, not at the superabundant reality of the One. In itself the One is not nothingness, nor is the mystical experience of its rich inner life empty. In order to express the inner life of the One, which is the same life the soul achieves when it transcends the structure of reality P. informally practices a method analogous to what the later Neoplatonists defined more explicitly as the *negatio negationis*: our negations, since they too are mental constructs, must be negated and transcended. On this topic see Beierwaltes (1965) 360ff. and Armstrong (1982b).

CHAPTER NINE

ENNEAD V.3[49]11.1-18

Introductory Note

This late treatise is particularly concerned with self-knowledge in the soul and Intellect (Chs. 1-10) and how the One transcends multiplicity and all types of thinking (Chs. 12-17). The soul's reasoning is intermediate between sense-perception and intellection (Chs. 2-3) and a trace of the latter (Ch. 6). However, the goal is to transcend discursive reasoning and become the self-identical actuality of the intelligible universe (Chs. 4-5), which is perfect self-knowledge (Ch. 7). Because in the early chapters of the treatise Intellect is presented as the goal of the soul's ascent, P. emphasizes its unity and actuality: "Intellect and the intelligible object are one, and this is Being and the primary Being, and also the primary Intellect which possesses the real beings, or rather it is the same as the real beings" (Ch. 5.26-28). Intellect's self-contemplation is likened to light seeing itself: "in the intelligible world seeing is not through something else, but through itself, because it is not directed externally. So Intellect sees one light with another, not through another. Light then sees another light, so light sees itself" (Ch. 8.20-23; cf. V.5[32].7-8 and comm. *ad loc.*) And because this intelligible light generates the soul as an image and the soul's life is a trace of Intellect's, the soul can return to its source, its true self, by seeking what it is like (Chs. 8-9). The generative power of intelligible light is elaborated in terms of the sun-analogy from the *Republic* (Ch. 9.10ff.), which often is used to explain the One's generation of Intellect. The focus of the discussion shifts noticeably in the next chapter, where the contrast is now between the One and Intellect instead of between the soul and Intellect; cp. the similar transition in III.8[30].8. Because Intellect must be a multiplicity in order to contemplate itself, it derives from a principle beyond it which is a unity without parts and without intellection (Ch. 10): "there must be more than one in order that seeing may exist, and the seeing and the seen must coincide, and what is seen by itself must be a universal multiplicity" (Ch. 10.14-16). What follows in Ch. 11 is the latest and one of the most significant accounts of the generation of Intellect through its reversion to the One.

Translation of V.3[49].11.1-18

Therefore this multiple Intellect, when it wishes to intelligize that which is beyond, wishes to intelligize that itself as one, but wishing to apprehend it in its

simplicity it emerges continually grasping something else multiplied in itself; so that it strived for it not as Intellect, but as vision not yet seeing, and emerged possessing what the vision itself multiplied; so that it vaguely desired something else, having in itself a figment of it. Yet the vision certainly has an impression of what is seen, otherwise it would not have accepted it to come to be in itself. But this impression became multiple from one, and in this way Intellect knew it and saw it, and then it became vision which sees. This is now Intellect when it possesses it, and it possesses it as Intellect; but prior to this it is only desire and vision without impression. Therefore, Intellect had a direct apprehension of the One, but by grasping became Intellect, always in need of the One and becoming Intellect and substance and intellection when it intelligized; for prior to this it was not intellection since it did not possess its object of intellection, nor Intellect since it did not yet intelligize. But that which is prior to these is their first principle, not as immanent in them. For what is immanent is not that from which something derives, but the things from which it is constituted; and that from which each individual derives is not an individual, but other than all of them.

Commentary on V.3[49].11.1-18

1-4 διὸ καὶ . . . πληθυνόμενον. The unusual reference to what the inchoate Intellect sees as τὸ ἐπέκεινα is to be accounted for by the sustained focus in Chs. 10-17 on the radical transcendence of the One and the exhortation to move beyond Intellect until the ascent attains its goal. This also explains why the chapter begins with Intellect defined as πολύς: that Intellect must be multiple is established in the previous chapter on the basis of the claim that Intellect comprises the duality of seer and seen (Ch.10.8ff.); cf. the beginning of V.6[24].5: ἔτι τὸ πολὺ ζητοῖ. In the following lines, however, P. penetrates to the initial stage of the inchoate Intellect when it is a unity: ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἓν (III.8[30].8.32), ἐν ᾧ αὐτός (VI.7[38].16.11). Similarly, the discussion of the internal structure of Intellect in the previous chapter occasions the use of νοεῖν, prior to which is the moment when Intellect is not actualized: οὐχ ὡς νοῦς (4); but νόησις can be the equivalent of pre-intellectual ὁρασις, as in VI.7[38].16.10-11 (quoted in the next paragraph).

Analysis of the reversion begins at ἐν μὲν οὖν κτλ. (2ff.), at which point P. argues that the potential Intellect looks at the One but comes out possessing multiplicity: ὅταν τὸ ἐν θεωρῇ, οὐχ ὡς ἓν (III.8[30].8.31); πρὸς ἓν τι ἰδοῦσα (VI.7[38].17.16); ὅτε ἑώρα πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐνόει ὡς πολλὰ τὸ ἐν ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἐν ᾧ αὐτὸς ἐνόει αὐτὸν πολλὰ (VI.7[38].16.10-12). The focus on the activities of the inchoate Intellect is marked by the disappearance of noetic vocabulary, beginning with ἐπιβάλλειν, until lines 11ff. when Intellect becomes actualized. It is most interesting that P. selects ἐπιβάλλειν here (and ἐπέβαλε in line 13) to begin to describe the nature of pre-noetic cognition, for

ἐπιβολή/προσβολή and their verbal forms usually designate hyper-noetic awareness of the One: see comm. on III.8[30].9.20 and 10.33. The significant differences between these two modes of cognition will be examined in the discussion of lines 15-16, but note that the phrase καὶ ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων (III.8[30].11.23-24), which echoes the present ἐπιβάλλειν θέλων . . . ἀεὶ λαμβάνων, covers both in a general fashion.

There are three textual disputes in this opening sentence. (i) I see no need to delete ὁ² (1) with Kirchhoff; ὅτι πολὺς ἐστὶ (26), adduced by Theiler, is hardly a clinching parallel. (ii) In line 2 the MSS have the meaningless εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο, for which several corrections have been proposed. The ever-resourceful Kirchhoff proposed νοεῖ with a period after νοεῖν, which has been adopted by Bréhier, Cilento, and MacKenna. But this creates difficulties with ἀλλ' ἐπιβάλλειν, as Theiler notes, which leads him to emend εἰ to οὐ with νοεῖ understood: "freilich nicht als das Jenseitige selber." This is certainly better than retaining the received text, but with H-S and Armstrong I prefer Dodds's excellent correction ἐν (1961) 708, to which the parallels cited above lend considerable support. (iii) Editors have preferred ἐπιβάλλειν to the better attested MS reading ἐπιθάλλειν ("to flower upon the One in its simplicity": Armstrong's rendering of this text which he does not accept), though Armstrong reports in his note *ad loc.* that Schwyzler now wishes to read the latter and remarks: "His reasons seem to me strong but not certainly convincing, and the change might have considerable implications for our understanding of Plotinus' thought about the relationship of the One and Intellect." However, *LSJ* cite only one possible instance of ἐπιθάλλειν (Nonnus). Moreover, I have not found examples of the common poetic word θάλλειν in P., though it is used once in the *Chaldaean Oracles* at Fr. 215.2, but still, in the classical sense, as an epithet of earth. If we take θάλλειν with its basic meaning of "growing, flourishing, or thriving," it would seem that ἐπιθάλλειν ὡς ἀπλῶ would be virtually equivalent to ἔζη πρὸς αὐτό (VI.7[38].16.15). Perhaps Armstrong sees significant implications because, as his rendering seems to suggest, it reminds him of the Chaldaean and later Neoplatonic notion of the ἄνθος νοῦ. At any rate, a rare and highly poetic word like ἐπιθάλλειν seems improbable to me in a chapter which contains P.' usual language for describing the reversion of the inchoate Intellect.

4-12 ὥστε ὥρμησε . . . ἀτύπωτος ὄψις. In this passage P. intricately weaves together many of the activities and terms attributed to the inchoate Intellect, though the vocabulary of desire and vision predominates. What is not yet Intellect (οὐχ ὡς νοῦς) ὥρμησε and ἐπεθύμησεν because in this phase it is ἔφεσις μόνον (12). But in the actualized Intellect too knowledge is πόθος τις (Ch.10.49). Striving and desiring define Intellect's nature from the very beginning of its existence and thus are synonymous with indefinite κίνησις:

τοῦτό ἐστι νοεῖν, κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου· ἡ γὰρ ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ (V.6[24].5.8-10); ἡ δὲ κίνησις αὕτη πληρωθεῖσα τῷ ἐκεῖ κινεῖσθαι . . . καὶ οὐκέτι κίνησις ἦν μόνον (VI.7[38].16.16-18). The alternative vocabulary of vision is here even more pervasive: ὄψις οὕπω ἰδοῦσα and ἀτύπωτος ὄψις (12) parallel the following: ἀόριστος ὄψις (V.4[7].2.6); ἔφεσις γὰρ ὄψεως ὄρασις (V.6[24].5.10); ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὄψις τις καὶ ὄψις ὁρῶσα, δύναμις ἔσται εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθοῦσα (III.8[30].11.1-2); οὕπω νοῦς ἦν ἐκεῖνο βλέπων (VI.7[38].16.13); πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπουσα ἀόριστος ἦν (VI.7[38].17.14-15). Since indefinite ὄψις, κίνησις, and ἔφεσις are fully synonymous, Lloyd (1987) 163 is correct that ἀορίστως modifies ἐπεθύμησεν, not ἔχουσα as most translators take it: once it possesses what it desires, Intellect is no longer unlimited. Moreover, each of these terms should be understood as specifications of pre-intellectual life: φατέον ὡς οὐδὲ ἐώρα πώποτε, ἀλλ' ἔζη μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸ (VI.7[38].16.14-15). I agree, therefore, with Hadot that in P. there is "une certaine tendance à rapprocher la vision inconsciente avec la vie et la vision achevée avec la pensée. Mais ces notations n'ont rien de systématique" (1968) I.235.

An essential part of the psychological model P. employs to describe the actualization of pre-intellectual vision is the reference to what is seen as φάντασμά τι and τύπον τοῦ ὁράματος. τύπος is discussed in comm. on VI.7[38].16.5 and 34-35; but note that in the former instance τύπος is a quasi-attribute of actualized Intellect: ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν εἶδος, ἕκαστον καὶ ἴδιος οἶον τύπος. It would seem, then, that in the present passage the absence of the οἶον indicates the insubstantial, phantasmal character of this impression. The phrase φάντασμά τι is analogous to the claim that in the reversion Intellect οἶον φαντασίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λαμβάνον (V.6[24].5.15). One of the sources for this theory is Aristotle: τὰ μὲν οὖν εἶδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ . . . ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ἦ, κινεῖται (*De An.* Γ 7.431b2-5); P., of course, adapts the Aristotelian theory to suit the demands of his reversion-theory in which the One is not Form. He can attribute φαντασία to the inchoate Intellect, because for Aristotle too φαντασία is νόησις τις (*De An.* Γ 10.433a10). Contributing to the positive connotations of φαντασία is its association in P.' mind with participation in the Good: contrasting the self-satisfaction of the Good (τὸ ἀρέσκεσθαι αὐτῷ) with the inherent lack of it in generated things, he claims that ἃ μετουσίᾳ ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φαντασίᾳ ἀρέσκεται αὐτοῖς ("they are satisfied with themselves by their participation in or imagination of the Good": VI.8[39].13.46-47). On the other hand, that φαντάσματα are deceptive, that they do not truly represent an object to the mind, plays an important role in this context, and on this point P. follows Plato (*Soph.* 266b) and perhaps the Stoics: φαντάσμα μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ δόκησις διανοίας οἷα γίνεται κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους (Long-Sedley II.39 A.7-8 = *SVF*

II.55; note, however, that Chrysippus goes on to distinguish between the deceptiveness of φαντάσματα and the accuracy of φαντασία. And, as in the Platonic text, so too for P., φαντάσμα is often a synonym of εἶδωλον: cf. III.6[26].7.13.

Since the One is not even mentioned until line 9, we might inquire what sort of causality the One exercises in the actualization of the inchoate Intellect. Specifically, how are we to interpret the many references to Intellect “holding” or “apprehending” or “receiving” something in itself which it makes multiple? The agency of Intellect is emphasized in these passages: ἄλλο ἀεὶ λαμβάνων ἐν αὐτῷ πληθυνόμενον (3-4); ἐξῆλθε δὲ ἔχουσα ὅπερ αὐτὴ ἐπλήθυνεν (5); ἐξῆλθε δὲ ἄλλο λαβοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ αὐτὸ πολὺ ποιήσασα (7-8); ἔχει τύπον τοῦ ὁράματος· ἢ οὐ παρεδέξατο ἐν αὐτῇ γενέσθαι (8-9); ὡς νοῦς ἔχει (11); λαβὼν ἐγένετο νοῦς (13). Lloyd (1987) 165-66 correctly notes the emphasis placed here on the creative activity of the inchoate Intellect, but this must be balanced against the causality of the One stressed later in this treatise: ἄρα, ὅτι αὐτὰ σφάζει ἐν ἑκάστων αὐτῶν ποιήσασα εἶναι; ἢ καὶ ὅτι ὑπέστησεν αὐτά. πῶς δὴ; ἢ τῷ πρότερον ἔχειν αὐτά (Ch. 15.28-30); πῶς οὖν ποιεῖ ἢ μὴ ἔχει; οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔτυχε· μηδ’ ἐνθυμηθεὶς ὃ ποιήσει, ποιήσει ὁμῶς (Ch. 15.35-37); the One is “τὸ ποιήσαν ταῦτα” (Ch. 17.4). I agree with Szlezák’s judicious remark on this problem: “die Ursache der Existenz des Nus getrennt gedacht ist von der Ursache seiner Beschaffenheit. Der Begriff der ἀρχή verlangt jedoch, beides zusammenzudenken, und so lautet die Frage auch nach der Erklärung durch die Prägung des ungeprägten Sehens immer wieder nach dem Wie der Hervorbringung durch das Eine” 109. This double-causality is clearly articulated in VI.7[38].17.3-13 where the Good is repeatedly referred to as τὸ διδόν, against the background of the ἀγαθοειδέες-motif (cf. comm. *ad loc.*), and the inchoate Intellect as what receives.

At this point it will be useful to consider the question whether P.’ doctrine of the inchoate Intellect reveals any significant development, particularly in light of Baladi’s stimulating interpretation. Unlike the great majority of Plotinian scholars, he argues that as we read through the accounts of procession and reversion, from the earliest discussion in V.4[7].2 through the latest in the present treatise, we observe “la disparition de termes tels que ‘dyade indéfinie’, altérité ou matière intelligible et la présence de termes variés, tous empruntés au langage de la psychologie.” The psychological vocabulary of vision, striving, and movement is, in his view, “un nouveau langage, mieux adapté que le langage classique—dyade, altérité, matière intelligible—à une philosophie qui s’inspire d’une expérience personnelle. Le langage psychologique se trouve doublé, orienté et enrichi par celui de l’expérience mystique” (1971) 91. Baladi is correct that terms like ἔφεσις first appear in V.6[24].5 and III.8[30].11, but it is highly questionable to conclude that the Dyad, intelligible matter and otherness disappear from P.’ analysis of the intelligible world. It is important to note that

neither plays a major role in accounts of procession and reversion, but we find ἐτερότης closely linked not only with intelligible matter but also with κίνησις πρώτη in the early treatise II.4[12].5.28-30. Moreover, intelligible matter is the equivalent of ὅψις ἐν δυνάμει at III.8[30].11.4. ἐτερότης is widely used in later treatises to articulate the internal structure of the intelligible world, especially in III.7[45] and VI.2-3[43-44] (cf. Sleeman *s.v.*).

On the other hand, I agree that P.' analysis of pre-intellectual vision becomes more precise. This is evident when one compares V.4[7].2 with the present passage as Baladi does: "en plus d'une vision indéfinie et d'une vision en puissance, il est question d'une vision sans object, ὅψις οὐπω ἰδοῦσα, d'une vision sans netteté, ἀτύπωτος ὅψις, d'une vague esquisse de l'object de la vision, τύπος τοῦ ὁράματος, mais encore d'un désir de l'inconnu, πόθος, d'un simple désir, ἔφεσις μόνον, d'un désir générateur de la vision, ἔφεσις ὄψεως" 91. VI.7[38].16-17 can be adduced to support this specific argument that P. distinguishes the inchoate Intellect's non-seeing more explicitly, but this need not obscure the more important point that even in V.4[7].2 and V.1[10].7 the psychological model of actualization by the object of vision determines P.' reversion theory. In III.8[30].11.1-5 we still find the earlier equations ὅψις = δύναμις and ὄρασις = ἐνέργεια. Missing also from Baladi's assessment is any reference to life which becomes increasingly prominent in the later treatises. Thus, in placing greater emphasis on life, desire, and striving, within the context of the psychological model which is there from the beginning, it is evident that P. seeks to explore with greater penetration how the inchoate Intellect derives from the One as well as how the One acts on this efflux in the reversion. Szlezák's statement of this development is quite valuable: "die Einführung der mit einander eng verbundenen Begriffe Streben, Verlangen und Leben in den Zusammenhang der Entstehung des Nus für Plotin eine exegetische Notwendigkeit war: wenn die Idee des Guten als Prinzip begriffen werden soll und eine inhaltliche Bestimmung, die ihr mit dem 'Guthaften' gemeinsam wäre, durch ihre Transzendenz ausgeschlossen ist, so bleibt allein das Verlangen (gleichsam als Urform des Lebens) das Verbindende" 109.

One aspect of this view that is developed by Lloyd (1987) 163, 170 warrants comment. He argues that desire most often characterizes the inchoate Intellect's desire of the Good, but in the present text P. speaks of the One. The One and the Good, of course, are virtually interchangeable names for the first principle, but there can be desire for the One as well, because the One is the object of the inchoate Intellect's vision and intellectual desire is part of the psychological model P. inherits from Aristotle.

9-10 οὐτος . . . οὕτως. That the referent of οὐτος is ὁ τύπος from line 8 is accepted by Bréhier (who translates imprecisely: "mais cet objet, d'un, est devenu multiple"), MacKenna, H-S, B-T, Lloyd, and Armstrong. Lloyd seems

to think there is a dispute here, noting only that H-S and Armstrong see this. He argues that this must be the case because pre-Intellect's "multiplication would lack here any explanation, while the multiplication of the impression by Pre-Intellect/Intellect is what the previous sentences have been about" (1987) 165. Strictly speaking this is true, but indefinite vision's possession of its object implies that Intellect too becomes multiple.

Whereas MacKenna, H-S¹ and Cilento retain the MSS reading οὗτος ὡς in line 10, with Bréhier, B-T, Armstrong, and H-S² I prefer Kirchhoff's οὕτως. However, with either reading the MSS γνούς is preferable to Harder's γνοῦσα, for the subject of εἶδεν is νοῦς not ὄψις.

12-15 οὗτος . . . ἐνόησε. The MSS have the corrupt ἐνδιάμενος or ἐνδιαθέμενος in lines 13-14. The less well attested ἐνδιαθέμενος is preferred by most editors. Beutler translates "Geist, welcher sich ständig konstituiert" in accord with Theiler's "Geist: sich im Innern konstituierend." For Cilento ἐνδιαθέμενος recalls the Stoic ἐνδιάθετος: "Il νοῦς è l'immanente parola dell'Uno: una parola che si differenzia e fonda poi la distinzione." But this explanation runs up against the claim in line 17 that the One as first principle οὐχ ὡς ἐνυπάρχουσα, though his translation is unexceptionable: "Spirito che si distingue una volta per tutte." The other renderings of ἐνδιαθέμενος: "always self-constitutive" (MacKenna); "elle garde alors pour toujours sa disposition" (Bréhier). Although ἐνδιαθέμενος is certainly not impossible, I agree with Armstrong that Igal's ἐνδεόμενος is the best conjecture: Intellect is always in need of the One.

In lines 13-15 the actualization of Intellect is indicated by the emergence of οὐσία and νόησις; cf. V.4[7].2.23ff., V.1[10].7.13-21, VI.7[38].17.5. Yet it is surprising how rarely οὐσία is specifically mentioned in the many accounts of the generation of Intellect. Lloyd (1987) 171-77 sheds much light on the neglected problem of how οὐσία is generated, adducing first an important passage in VI.7[38].40, which, as he notes, has not been adequately discussed; but cf. Schroeder (1986) 192 and Theiler *ad loc.* In this important passage P. examines the generation of οὐσία by distinguishing two types of νόησις: δεῖ τοίνυν γινώσκειν ἐπιστήσαντα, ὡς νόησις πᾶσα ἔκ τινός ἐστι καὶ τινός. καὶ ἡ μὲν συνοῦσα τῷ ἔξ οὗ ἐστὶν ὑποκείμενον μὲν ἔχει τὸ οὐ ἐστὶ νόησις, οἶον δὲ ἐπικείμενον αὐτῇ γίνεται ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ οὐσα καὶ πληροῦσα τὸ δυνάμει ἐκείνο οὐδὲν αὐτῇ γεννώσα· [10] ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐστὶν, οὐ ἐστὶ, μόνον, οἶον τελείωσις. ἡ δὲ οὐσα νόησις μετ' οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστήσασα τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγέννησέ τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐσα. ἀλλ' οὐσα δύναμις τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐγέννα, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ἐστὶν [15] οὐσία, καὶ σύνεστι καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ ἔστιν οὐχ ἕτερον ἢ νόησις καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὕτη καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἑαυτὴν νοεῖ ἢ φύσις, οὐχ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἢ λόγῳ, τὸ νοούμενον καὶ τὸ

νοοῦν, πλῆθος ὄν, ὡς δέδεικται πολλαχῇ. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη πρώτη ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν γεννήσασα εἰς οὐσίαν, καὶ ἰνδαλμα ὄν ἄλλου οὕτως ἐστι μεγάλου τινός, ὥστε ἐγένετο οὐσία. [20] εἰ δ' ἦν ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐκείνου ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπόστασις ἦν (Armstrong's translation, with Lloyd's variant renderings inserted: "One must, then, know and understand that all thinking comes from something and is of something. And one kind of thinking, which keeps close to that from which it comes, has as its ground [subject] that of which it is the thought and itself becomes a kind of superstructure [addition], being its ground's [subject's] actuality and fulfilling that ground's potentiality [completes what the subject was potentially] without generating anything itself: for it is only a kind of completion of that of which it is [for it belongs to the subject only as its perfection]. But the thinking which accompanies substance and has brought substance into existence could not be in that from which it came to be: for it would not have generated anything if it was in that. But since it was a power of generation by itself, it generated, and its active actuality is substance, and also in substance it is there with it, and the thought and this substance are not different things, and, again, in that the nature thinks itself, they are not different except in definition, what is thought and what thinks, that is a plurality, as has often been demonstrated. And this is the first active actuality, which has generated an existent which came to be substance, and, being the image of another, is the image of one so great that substance came to be. But if it was intrinsic to that and did not derive from it, it would be nothing else but intrinsic to that and would not be an existent on its own": VI.7[38].40.5-22). In his exegesis of this difficult passage Lloyd 172 distinguishes (i) thinking as it is attached to or is from the Good and (ii) thinking as it is attached to being or responsible for its existence. Comparing (i) to Aristotle's theory of perception, he argues that "Thinking (1) belongs to Pre-Intellect (2), but as an addition to (2) because it is the perfection of (2)'s potentiality without having generated anything; what generated thinking was the One as seen by (2) [from lines 43-54 and elsewhere]." Now he admits that "saying that thinking belongs to Pre-Intellect is of course inaccurate: but we are having to describe a dynamic situation in static terms." Then he remarks that (i) and (ii) "do not make a division which corresponds to the usual two stages of the genesis. They are two levels or aspects of thought within the second, or reversion stage." On the face of it this interpretation is plausible, but we are faced with the difficulty of explaining how both these aspects of νόησις can be defined as ἐνέργεια: (i) at line 8, (ii) at lines 14, 18-19, 22-23. It is rather unlikely that (i) can refer to the vision of the inchoate Intellect, the ὄψις οὕπω ἰδοῦσα of the present passage. Lloyd thinks (i) follows from Aristotle's "physical model which makes the *energeia* of the agent identical at least 'in subject' with that of the patient" 174. This too is reasonable, but does P. refer elsewhere to this νόησις ἢ συνοῦσα τῷ ἐξ οὗ ἐστίν? In that (i) πληροῦσα τὸ δυνάμει ἐκεῖνο it almost

sounds like the first principle (cf. VI.7[38].16.16ff.) or perhaps the higher phase of Intellect, the νοῦς ἐρῶν of VI.7[38].35.24.

Another possibility is the initial seeing subsequent to the inchoate Intellect's vision, i.e. its capacity to see, which P. appears to have in mind in the following passages: ὧν οὖν ἐστι δύνάμις, ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως οἷον σχιζομένη ἢ νόησις καθορᾷ . . . παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχει ἤδη οἷον συναίσθησιν τῆς δυνάμεως (V.1[10].7.10-13). Here the initial νόησις precedes the generation of οὐσία and τὸ νοεῖν in lines 15-18, which arise through the agency of both the One and Intellect. Second, in V.6[24].5 the νόησις generated by ἔφεσις (9) "intelligizes the Good" (αὐτὸ νοῆι: 12). This is followed by self-intellection: πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βλέπων αὐτὸν νοεῖ. ἐνεργοῦντα γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτὸν νοεῖ (17-18). Self-intellection pertains to (ii) in VI.7[38].40.16 as well: αὐτὴν νοεῖ ἢ φύσις. An analogous distinction between knowing the One and self-knowledge is made in V.3[49].7: καὶ γὰρ ὅσα ἔχει παρ' ἐκείνου γινώσεται, καὶ ἃ ἔδωκε, καὶ ἃ δύναται ἐκεῖνος. ταῦτα δὲ μαθὼν καὶ γνοῦς καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτὸν γινώσεται (3-6); εἰ δὲ ἀδυνατήσῃ ἰδεῖν σαφῶς ἐκεῖνον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἰδεῖν ἴσως αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον, ταύτῃ μάλιστα λείποιτ' ἂν αὐτῷ ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ εἰδέναι, εἰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ὁρώμενον (9-12). If the "sight itself" in this passage, which seems to precede self-vision, is parallel to (i) in VI.7[38].40, then, on the basis of the latter, we must conclude that there are two actualized types of νόησις: the first is posterior to the φάντασμα τι here in line 7, but prior to νόησις in line 14. Certainly this is difficult, but these passages may bridge the gap between the normal accounts of procession and reversion in V.3[49].11 and VI.7[38].16-17 and the more theoretical derivation of νόησις and οὐσία from the One in VI.7[38].40. Strengthening this hypothesis is Lloyd's final point about the latter text: "Instead of the more obvious identification of seeing and thinking with the actualization of the faculties of the seer and thinker we have them identified with the actualization of the capacities or dispositions of the objects" 174.

In VI.7[38].40 the second νόησις is said to generate οὐσία: οὐσα δύνάμις τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐφ' αὐτῆς ἐγέννα, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ἐστὶν οὐσία, καὶ σύνεστι καὶ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ (13-15). (In his note on line 6 Theiler curiously remarks that it is the "höhere Art des Denkens, die das Sein konstituiert.") This point is made less explicitly in the passages from V.1[10].7 and V.6[24].5 quoted above, but in both cases the One's causality is also emphasized. So too in Ch. 7.4-5: ἃ ἔδωκε, καὶ ἃ δύναται ἐκεῖνος. On this point Lloyd attacks "modern accounts of Plotinus" for maintaining that "the object of Pre-Intellect's thinking is usually represented as being the One;" for him this "presents a contradiction. For if it follows that the One, not Intellect, activates thought it follows that the One, not Intellect, generates existence; for this activation consists in so delimiting it that it becomes *eo ipso* Existence" 174-75. I do not see the contradiction, unless, with Lloyd, we interpret VI.7[38].40 as emphasizing that

it is Intellect which solely or primarily generates οὐσία. He acknowledges that Intellect's "power to do so was a gift of the One" 174, but his application of Aristotle's psychological model to P.' reversion-theory requires that the object which is the agent be primarily the One-as-seen. In my view, the causal order is the reverse of this.

Contributing to Lloyd's argument, 174 and 177, for Intellect as generator of οὐσία is his claim that οὐσία is the internal ἐνέργεια of Intellect. This is certainly the case in VI.7[38].40.13-15 and in other passages, e.g. VI.7[38].15.17ff. But the following should induce some uncertainty: (a) "If then Intellect was thought of as preceding being (τοῦ ὄντος), we should have to say that Intellect by coming to active actuality in its thinking perfected and produced the real beings (ἔδει τὸν νοῦν λέγειν ἐνεργήσαντα καὶ νοήσαντα ἀποτελέσαι καὶ γεννῆσαι τὸ ὄντα); but since we must think of being as preceding Intellect (τὸ ὄν τοῦ νοῦ προεπιννοεῖν ἀνάγκη), we must assume that the real beings have their place in the thinking subject, and that the active actuality of thinking is in the real beings, as the active actuality of fire is in fire already existing, in order that they may have Intellect in its unity in them as their active actuality. But being is active actuality: so both have one active actuality, or rather both are one thing" (V.9[5].8.8-16); (b) "If then one should take being first, since it exists first, then intellect, and then the living being . . . but Intellect comes second, for it is the active actuality of substance" (VI.6[34].8.17-20); (c) "But immediately after Intellect comes being, and number is in this, and with its help it produces the real beings when moving according to number" (VI.6[34].15.24-26); (d) "the One still more remains unchanged before the real beings; but while it remains unchanged, it is not another which makes (οὐκ ἄλλο ποιεῖ), if the real beings are modelled on the One, but the One itself is sufficient to generate reality (ἀρκεῖ αὐτὸ γεννῆσαι τὰ ὄντα). . . . it gives beings substantial existence (τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῖς ὑπεστήσατο), so that being is a trace of the One" (V.5[32].5.4-14). (a) makes τὸ ὄν prior to τὸ ὄντα and Intellect, with Intellect as the generator of τὸ ὄντα. The second part of this account is analogous to the second type of νόησις in VI.7[38].40 which generates οὐσία. If we wish to make the two passages consistent with each other, it would be necessary to conclude that being in the earlier passage is equivalent to the intellection in the later passage, the aspect which does not generate; but P. does not provide sufficient grounds for such a linkage. (b) confirms the priority of being asserted in V.9[5].8, but (c) alters the order (cf. Hadot [1960] 117-18; he cites the many passages which present being, life, and thought in various orders, but does not address the problem of the priority of being). (d) stresses the primary and direct causality of the One in the generation of τὸ ὄντα; cf. comm. on VI.7[38].17.5ff. for further discussion of this point.

That three of these passages offer a very different explanation of the generation of τὸ ὄν and τὸ ὄντα than does VI.7[38].40 convinces me that P.

has not worked out crucially important issues in his theory of ontological derivation. In a brief passage it is possible to see P.' shifting perspective at work: "the whole is universal Intellect and Being, Intellect making Being exist in thinking it, and Being giving Intellect thinking and existence by being thought. But the cause of thinking is something else, which is also cause of being; they both therefore have a cause other than themselves" (V.1[10].4.26-30). We should resist, therefore, the urge to make his views more systematic than the diverse evidence will allow.

To the question, raised by Lloyd, whether τὸ ὄν or οὐσία is an internal or external ἐνέργεια of Intellect, P., as we have seen, has various responses. If it is necessary to choose, Lloyd's preference for the former has much to commend it. But too much weight should not be placed on such perspectival criteria, especially when P. discusses being and its derivation in the context of the One/Intellect relation as opposed to the analysis of the internal structure of Intellect. In many respects the latter is provisional and is only fully intelligible vis-à-vis Intellect's participation in the One.

15-16 πρὸ γὰρ τούτου . . . νοήσας. This reference to Intellect's pre-intellectual phase, before it "grasps" (λαμβάνω: 13; the same word appears in lines 3 and 7, and ἔχειν in line 4-5, 8) something of the One, is most important. The repetition in the phrases οὐ νόησις, οὐδὲ νοῦς, and οὐπω νοήσας as well as οὐχ ὡς νοῦς (4) comprises one of the most emphatic statements in the *Enneads* of the view that in its first stage Intellect is a non-Intellect; cf. ἀλλ' οὐπω νοῦς ἦν ἐκεῖνο βλέπων, ἀλλ' ἔβλεπεν ἀνοήτως (VI.7[38].16.13-14). More controversial is the closely related passage in the previous chapter, which is inserted into a discussion of intellectual duality: without the duality of subject and object οὐκ ἔσται νόησις αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ θίξις καὶ οἶον ἐπαφή μόνον ἄρρητος καὶ ἀνόητος· προνοοῦσα οὐπω νοῦ γεγονότος καὶ τοῦ θιγγάνοντος οὐ νοοῦντος ("there will not be a thought of it, but only a touching and a sort of contact without speech or thought, pre-thinking because Intellect has not yet come into being and that which touches does not think": Ch. 10.42-44). This text has been the focus of a brilliant, speculative interpretation, first proposed by Trouillard and followed by others, of the original nature of Intellect which warrants serious consideration.

There are difficulties in understanding Trouillard's interpretation, for it is not only subtle and richly imaginative, but aspects of it are dispersed throughout several studies. We might begin with his comment on προνοοῦσα in the passage just quoted: "Πρό veut dire 'antérieurement' et évoque la régression vers un déjà-là . . . Le supérieur est aussi l'antérieur. Ce vers quoi on tend est ce dont on est parti" (1961b) 432. He goes on to argue in the same study that "au toucher prénoétique (θίξις καὶ οἶον ἐπαφή . . . προνοοῦσα) de V.3.10.42 répond la tension vers le contact qui est donnée dans l'extase (ἔφεσις πρὸς ἀφήν:

VI.9.11.24)” 434. Closely following Trouillard, O’Daly adduces further evidence from VI.9[9]: “This state, ‘prior’ to the establishment of νοῦς, is described in language which Plotinus uses of the experience of mystical vision. At VI.9.4.27 it is said of those who enjoy that vision that they οἶον ἐφάνασθαι καὶ θιγεῖν ὁμοιότητι the One. Chapter 9.56 of the same treatise: ἐφαπτόμεθα θεοῦ . . . For ἄρρητος we may compare chapter 4.10, where the Platonic text οὐδὲ ῥητὸν οὐδὲ γραπτὸν [*Ep.* VII. 341c^{ff.}] is applied to the One’s presence in mystical vision. Finally, ἀνόητος is paralleled in V.5.8.22f., where vision of the One is achieved by the self τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῶ” (1974) 164-65. Trouillard (1955b) 109 further assimilates these apparently parallel passages by reference to other texts: ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν, ἔκστασις καὶ ἁπλωσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ (VI.9[9].11.22-23); ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἐκείνον βλέπειν (VI.7[38].35.30); see comm. *ad loc.*

Now it is the term ἔκστασις that serves as the terminological focus for Trouillard’s notion of the “extase germinale” which he sees as the foundation of the inchoate Intellect. He unpacks this in several places: “Il sera difficile de ne pas conclure que l’extase est, en germe, la source implicite de la pensée elle-même” (1955b) 109 n1; “Grâce à l’efficacité interne du Bien, l’esprit peut renoncer à son ordre tout entier et accéder à un degré supérieur d’union. Mais s’il est vrai qu’il accède à l’extase parfaite parce qu’il se renonce, il est encore plus vrai qu’il se renonce parce que déjà l’extase germinale est en lui” 108; “Il y a au fond de tout mouvement intellectuel une aspiration à l’union mystique et à une mue radicale. L’esprit veut coïncider le plus possible avec l’acte qui le pose, et même avec l’initiative interne de cet acte” 109 (this comment vis-à-vis VI.9[9].11.31: ὡς ἀρχῇ ἀρχὴν ὀρᾷ); “Ainsi l’origine de la pensée est dans un présence plus intense et plus spirituelle que la pensée” 105 (a comment vis-à-vis V.5[32].7.31: οὐκ ὀρῶν ὀρᾷ); “La contemplation est le premier fruit de l’extase et en vérifie à chaque instant la valeur noétique” 104; “il conviendrait de faire entrer en ligne de compte les indications données sur l’extase (VI.7.34-36 — VI.9.11), puisque celle-ci est l’actualisation du contact radical de l’esprit avec l’Un. Elle doit révéler son germe. L’extase se précède en effet et se prépare elle-même dans l’esprit, par cette indivision toujours sous-jacente à la pensée et dont procède la pensée (VI.7.35.29-30 — III.8.8.32-35 — V.3.10.42-44)” (1955a) 46. Elsewhere he also adduces III.8[30].8.32-35 (ἀλλὰ ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἐν οὐχ ὡς ἥρξατο ἔμεινεν κτλ.; cf. comm. *ad loc.*): “La pensée part toujours d’une coïncidence supra-intellectuelle . . . Introduisant la relation, elle refoule dans l’inconscient la simplicité préessentielle” (1961b) 435. Finally: “C’est donc un premier contact dynamogénique, qui tend toujours à se reprendre et à s’intensifier. Nous retrouvons l’implication de la procession et de la conversion, et il apparaît une fois de plus que les deux mouvements s’engrenent sans s’annuler” (1955b) 106.

Citing Trouillard as his source, O'Daly presents his own version of this all-encompassing interpretation: "Mystical vision can, therefore, imply the self's procession from the One, as well as being a realization of the self's radical 'coincidence' with the One. More precisely, the 'return' of the self to this 'coincidence'—the so-called mystical ascent—is *identical* with its incipient procession. 'Procession' and 'conversion' (or return) are temporal metaphors for the moment in which the self's originative vision of its principle—a vision that is permanent—is made conscious to itself as pre-intellectual, in an instant of unmediated contact" (1974) 164, emphasis added. To the formidable list of passages describing the potential Intellect O'Daly 165 adds ἄλλ' οὐπω νοῦς ἦν ἐκεῖνο βλέπων, ἄλλ' ἔβλεπεν ἀνοήτως (VI.7[38].16.13-14) which is analogous to ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ ἰδεῖν, ἔκστασις κτλ. (VI.9[9].11.22-23) and ἄλλα ἄλλως ἐκεῖνον βλέπειν (VI.7[38].35.30). He also argues (following the less emphatic remarks of Trouillard [1955a] 46 and [1955b] 105-06) that we find an "equivalence of language" 168 between ἐπιβάλλειν θέλων ὡς ἀπλῶ (2-3) and ὁ νοῦς ἐπέβαλε ἐκείνῳ (12-13) in the present treatise and in the following: the ἐπιβολῇ ἀθρόα (III.8[30].9.21) by which Intellect mystically apprehends the One; the statements that the νοῦς ἐρῶν sees τὰ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ (VI.7[38].35.21; cf. comm. *ad loc.* for further discussion of how this passage fits into the interpretation of Trouillard and O'Daly) and that one sees the Good προσβαλεῖς . . . ἀθρόως ὁ προσβάλλων (V.5[32].10.7). These mystical states, in turn, are attributed by O'Daly 167 to the νοῦς καθαρὸς (VI.9[9].3.26, V.3[49].14.14) and ὁ ἔνδον νοῦς (V.3[49].14.14-15). One of the primary passages that O'Daly 166 uses to link together the texts concerning the potential Intellect and Intellect in the mystical vision is ὥστε ἐναρμόσαι καὶ οἷον ἐφάψασθαι καὶ θιγεῖν ὁμοιότητι καὶ τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· ὅταν οὕτως ἔχη, ὡς εἶχεν, ὅτε ἦλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἥδη δύναται ἰδεῖν ὡς πέφυκεν ἐκεῖνος θεατὸς εἶναι ("so as to be in accord with it and as if grasp it and touch it in their likeness and by the power in oneself akin to that which comes from the One: when someone is as he was when he came from him, he is already able to see as it is the nature of that God to be seen": VI.9[9].4.26-30). Adducing III.8[30].8.31 (ἀρξάμενος ὡς ἐν κτλ.), O'Daly asserts that "the phase in which the subsequent 'began as one' is surely that 'in which one was when one proceeded from it (the One)' of VI.9.4.28. The 'one-ness' of the subsequent is accounted for by its contact with the One, its being as yet hardly differentiated from the power of the One" 166.

Before turning, at last, to an analysis of this complex interpretation, we must take note of one final passage, cited by Hadot in support it: "The intellect must return, so to speak, backwards, and give itself up, in a way, to what lies beyond it (for it faces both directions); and there, if it wishes to see that first principle, it must not be altogether intellect (μὴ πάντα νοῦν εἶναι)" (III.8[30].9.29-32). Hadot observes that "On reading this text, we cannot fail to think of the formula

that H. Bergson used, more or less summing up his own philosophy: 'Intelligence, reabsorbing itself in its principle, will relive its own formation in reverse'. In this way, thought is born from a sort of loving ecstasy in this type of drunkenness [a reference to VI.7[38].35.24ff.], which is produced by nonintellectual contact with the Good from which it emanates" (1986) 243. Others who subscribe to this interpretation, though less explicitly, include Theiler (*ad* V.3[49].10.42ff. and [1966] 157 n132), Atkinson 149, Szlezák 108, 165, and Beierwaltes (1985) 44-45.

It has been necessary to present this interpretation in considerable detail because of its brilliance and boldness, the fact that it has a bearing on so many important passages and thus on our understanding of the theory of the generation and return of Intellect, and because it has never been systematically challenged. Only two scholars, as far as I know, even raise the issue, and their remarks, though moving in the direction I think correct, are rather brief; cf. Schroeder (1986) 192 and Lloyd (1987) 182. Synthesizing the detailed arguments of Trouillard, O'Daly, and Hadot yields the thesis that the initial state of the inchoate Intellect is identical with or very similar to the erotic Intellect that attains the mystical union with the One. In short, pre-Intellect is the equivalent of what I would prefer to call the hyper-Intellect. Against this view I wish to argue that P. attributes three, not two, modes of life to what he wishes to call Intellect: (i) the potential or inchoate Intellect, (ii) the actualized, self-intelligizing Intellect, and (iii) the hyper-noetic or hyper-ontic Intellect. Thus, (i) and (iii) should, in my view, be carefully distinguished, not merged together.

Beginning with the present passage, which predicates a pre-intellectual *θίξις* καὶ οἶον ἐπαφή μόνον ἄρρητος καὶ ἀνόητος (Ch. 10.42-43) of the inchoate Intellect, it is certainly true that "touching" and "contact" are often ascribed to the soul's mystical apprehension of the One. It is also true that various expressions of *ἐπιβολή* are found both in descriptions of the potential and hyper-noetic phases of Intellect. But it is quite significant that Chs. 10-11 of the present treatise is the only text which employs these terms to characterize the inchoate Intellect. In both contexts P. has recourse to this tactile vocabulary because he is looking for terms which possess no intellectual connotations. In the case of the processive efflux from the One, touching, contact, and attaining suggest that the efflux is in a way still part of the outflowing, productive power of the One. But what is clearly lacking from the present account of the procession—and from all the other passages cited by Trouillard and O'Daly—is any suggestion that the inchoate Intellect is in a state of ecstasy or possessed by an overpowering erotic passion or that it is flooded by the light of the One. Thus, these distinct groups of passages can be assimilated and made to define the same ontological state only by ignoring the ontological contexts in which they appear.

It is thus necessary to distinguish pre-intellectual from hyper-noetic vision as well. The descriptions of non-intellective vision in VI.7[38].16-17 and

V.3[49].10-11 establish unequivocally that the vision P. ascribes to the inchoate Intellect is the barest minimum which, in fact, cannot apprehend the One in itself, because it is a capacity, or potentiality, for actual seeing. Hence the ascription of φαντασία to this indefinite vision. How different is the mystical vision: “When therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see himself as like this, or rather he will be in union with himself as like this and will be aware of himself as like this since he has become single and simple” (VI.9[9].10.9-11); “he sees principle by principle that like is united with like” (VI.9[9].11.31-32; adduced by Trouillard above). Here the soul’s vision is so transformed from what it was on the intelligible level that its vision merges totally with the One’s reality. It achieves the maximum degree of self-awareness, a unified self-consciousness which is quite inappropriate to the original, indefinite vision. Similarly, Trouillard’s and O’Daly’s reference to the “non-Intellect” of V.5[32].8.23 (see comm. *ad loc.*) fails to account for the fact—described at length in V.5[32].7-8 as well as in VI.7[38].32-36—that when the hyper-ontic Intellect sees the One, it is flooded with light, it becomes motionless and attains rest (cf. VI.9[9].11.13ff.), it sees itself become beautiful, and it is unified with the One. None of these states or activities pertains to the inchoate Intellect, with the exception of the reference to its incipient unity at III.8[30].8.32 and 11.5; see comm. *ad locc.* The immobility of the unitive state contrasts sharply with the definition of the potential Intellect as κίνησις and ἔφεσις. If, with Trouillard and O’Daly, we conflate stages (i) and (iii) of Intellect’s life, the result is the virtual identification of ἔφεσις μόνον with the νοῦς ἐπὶ. However, indefinite desire, which again is not ecstatic, should be sharply distinguished from the hyper-ontic mystical eros: the former precedes, but does not transcend, the actualized Forms and being; the latter does and by so doing attains the One in its unity. The incipient unity of the potential Intellect, on the other hand, can see neither itself nor the One as a unity; moreover, in none of the few references to this incipient unity is any sort of consciousness predicated of it, least of all the ecstatic self-transcendence characteristic of the mystical union.

The statement at VI.9[9].4.26-30, that for the soul to attain mystical vision of the One it must return to the ontological moment “when someone is as he was when he came from him,” can be explained on the basis of this same distinction between potential and hyper-ontic Intellect. In this passage P. means that the soul must transcend intellection and being and see the One non-intellectively, but not pre-intellectively. Hence I interpret the phrase “as he was” to refer to the intimate *ontological proximity* to the One, but not to the minimal *consciousness* attributed consistently to the inchoate Intellect. Both pre-intellective and hyper-noetic vision are barely differentiated from the reality of the One in terms of proximity, but they are radically different from each other in the degree of awareness each possesses. In this sense, therefore, the former is undifferentiated *qua* unconsciousness, the latter is undifferentiated *qua* super-consciousness. On this

view, Intellect does indeed “relive its own formation in reverse,” but it does so erotically, hyper-ontically, and hyper-noetically, the culmination of which is its transcendent awareness of itself as merged with the inner life of the One described in VI.8[39].16, from which the original efflux proceeds as a pale shadow or trace.

16-18 τὸ δὲ πρὸ . . . ἀπάντων. Typically, with the actualization of Intellect, P. reasserts the transcendence of the One, though here he makes the point more precisely that the One οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει. Does this statement place a limitation on the One’s presence or causality? I think not, for particularly in the present account of reversion, he stresses the phantasmal character of Intellect’s seeing. Note that when he speaks about what Intellect derives from the One, via life, the emphasis is slightly different: “Is then the Good immanent in their substance? Now, each of them is good as a whole; its good does not depend on just one constituent. Well then, are they good as parts? But the Good is partless. . . . For the first activity is good and what is defined following upon it is good, and the pair of them together: and the one is good because it is brought into being by the Good, and the other because it is an ordered world which comes from it” (VI.7[38].18.37-43).

The concluding twelve lines of Ch. 11 repeat points made elsewhere: (i) the One is not one of all things; (ii) even the name “Good” is an inadequate designation; (iii) intellection pluralizes Intellect. For discussion of (i) see comm. on III.8[30].9.41, on (ii) comm. on III.8[30].9.16; for (iii) see discussion of πληθυνεῖν in lines 1-5 above.

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II.4[12].2.4	126	III.6[26].4.33	108
II.4[12].3.2	126	III.6[26].5.13-23	196
II.4[12].3.14-15	126	III.6[26].6.15	75
II.4[12].4.14-17	119	III.6[26].7.1	125
II.4[12].4.14-20	77	III.6[26].7.13	225
II.4[12].4.17	126		
II.4[12].5.10	115	III.7[45].3.10-12	157
II.4[12].5.13	126	III.7[45].3.19-20	85
II.4[12].5.15-16	119	III.7[45].11.15ff.	82
II.4[12].5.15-18	32	III.7[45].11.22-27	83
II.4[12].5.28-29	118		
II.4[12].5.29ff.	61	III.8[30].4.16-19	25
II.4[12].5.30	157	III.8[30].7.15	193
II.4[12].5.31ff.	59	III.8[30].7.26	178
II.4[12].5.31-33	15	III.8[30].8-11	66
II.4[12].5.31-35	118, 120	III.8[30].8.17-30	152
II.4[12].5.33-37	166	III.8[30].8.30-33	161
II.4[12].5.36	117	III.8[30].8.31	155, 166, 222, 233
II.4[12].16.1-3	118	III.8[30].8.31-36	47, 64
		III.8[30].8.32	16, 156, 177, 222
II.5[25].1.21-34	169	III.8[30].8.33	56
II.5[25].3.40	108	III.8[30].8.34	175
		III.8[30].8.36ff.	141
II.9[33].1.8	104	III.8[30].8.36-38	45, 194
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II.9[33].3.7-12	83	III.8[30].9.5ff.	31
II.9[33].3.7-14	106	III.8[30].9.19	193
II.9[33].3.8-12	110	III.8[30].9.20	175
II.9[33].4.1-10	90	III.8[30].9.21	136, 233
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II.9[33].8.22ff.	28	III.8[30].9.25	202
II.9[33].9.35-37	83	III.8[30].9.29-32	233
		III.8[30].9.32	146, 175
III.1[3].4.5	108	III.8[30].9.44ff.	158
		III.8[30].10.1ff.	30f., 49, 165
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III.2[47].17.64-75	97	III.8[30].10.5-7	200
		III.8[30].10.14-15	152
III.3[48].7.10-13	108	III.8[30].10.14-17	163
		III.8[30].10.31-32	152, 195
III.4[15].1.8-10	171	III.8[30].10.33	136, 175
III.4[15].2.14	125	III.8[30].11.1-2	11, 62, 224
III.4[15].3.22-24	181	III.8[30].11.1-5	40, 226
		III.8[30].11.5	16, 47, 156
III.5[50].3.11-16	215	III.8[30].11.7-8	158
III.5[50].4.22-23	174	III.8[30].11.8	144
III.5[50].7-9	81	III.8[30].11.16	35
III.5[50].7.19-23	178	III.8[30].11.16-23	14, 159f.
III.5[50].9.1-3	179	III.8[30].11.19	166
III.5[50].9.5-6, 18-19	81, 175	III.8[30].11.23	59f.
III.5[50].9.24-29	131	III.8[30].11.23-24	179, 223

III.8[30].11.24-25	145	V.1[10].1.24-25	204
III.8[30].11.26	57	V.1[10].2.1-5	127
III.8[30].11.26-27	137	V.1[10].2.25-26	32
III.8[30].11.33-38	152	V.1[10].3.3	115
III.8[30].11.37	59	V.1[10].3.8	171
III.8[30].11.39-41	175	V.1[10].3.12-13	181
III.8[30].11.41, 43-44	158	V.1[10].3.16-17	127
		V.1[10].4.7	75
III.9[13].1.15-18	19	V.1[10].4.9-10	130
III.9[13].4.1-7	203	V.1[10].4.21-22	25
III.9[13].9.2	27	V.1[10].4.26-30	231
		V.1[10].4.34-37	61
IV.2[4].2.52	204	V.1[10].4.35-36	25
		V.1[10].4.35-39	78
IV.3[27].5.10	83	V.1[10].4.38-39	61
IV.3[27].8.13-17	189	V.1[10].4.40-41	120
IV.3[27].8.22-24	17	V.1[10].5.1	56
IV.3[27].10.31ff.	28	V.1[10].5.1-4	127
IV.3[27].11.14-17	135	V.1[10].5.3	180
IV.3[27].12.31	196	V.1[10].5.4	105
IV.3[27].15.4-7	81	V.1[10].5.6	90
IV.3[27].17.13-14	135	V.1[10].5.6-8	59
IV.3[27].18.13-20	98	V.1[10].5.6-9	15
IV.3[27].23.21-33	63	V.1[10].5.8ff.	90
		V.1[10].5.14-15	119
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		V.1[10].6.1-2	54
IV.5[29].2.8ff.	134	V.1[10].6.7	56
IV.5[29].7.17ff.	28	V.1[10].6.12-15	127
IV.5[29].7.24ff.	134	V.1[10].6.15-19	37
		V.1[10].6.17-18	41, 51
IV.6[41].1.1ff.	163	V.1[10].6.17-19	38
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IV.6[41].8.8	128	V.1[10].6.25-27	205, 217
		V.1[10].6.27-34	35
IV.7[2].6.37ff.	162	V.1[10].6.28-30	135
IV.7[2].8.5	43	V.1[10].6.40	204
IV.7[2].8 ⁵ .28	108	V.1[10].6.44-45	171
IV.7[2].9.23-25	32	V.1[10].6.46-47	28
IV.7[2].10.18-19	127	V.1[10].6.51-53	37
IV.7[2].10.32-37	127f.	V.1[10].6.52-53	109
IV.7[2].10.40	197	V.1[10].6.53	36, 110
IV.7[2].13.5	121	V.1[10].7.1	27
IV.7[2].14	189	V.1[10].7.1-4	63
		V.1[10].7.5	208
IV.8[6].1.1	162, 188	V.1[10].7.6	214
IV.8[6].1.1-5	181	V.1[10].7.9-11	107
IV.8[6].1.5-7	183	V.1[10].7.10ff.	76
IV.8[6].1.6-7	196	V.1[10].7.10-11	58, 155
IV.8[6].1.8-9	188	V.1[10].7.10-13	229
IV.8[6].4.40-42	179	V.1[10].7.11-13	23
IV.8[6].6.1-3	106	V.1[10].7.12	57
IV.8[6].7.17-18	99	V.1[10].7.13	15
		V.1[10].7.13-14	14, 31, 59, 169

V.1[10].7.13-17	118	V.3[49].11.11-12	178
V.1[10].7.13-21	227	V.3[49].11.12	59f. 124, 157
V.1[10].7.15-17	14, 59, 144	V.3[49].11.14	56
V.1[10].7.16	117	V.3[49].12	105
V.1[10].7.17-18	155	V.3[49].12.1-10	56
V.1[10].7.21-26	31	V.3[49].12.22ff.	213
V.1[10].7.35-36	130	V.3[49].12.35-36	20
V.1[10].7.40-42	171	V.3[49].12.39-44	135
V.1[10].7.42-44	170	V.3[49].12.40	35
V.1[10].8.16	136	V.3[49].12.44-45	29
V.1[10].8.17-18	32	V.3[49].12.49	120
V.1[10].11.10-13	85	V.3[49].13.1-6	93, 121
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V.1[10].12.14-20	97	V.3[49].13.3	176
		V.3[49].13.6-7	25
V.2[11].1.1	203	V.3[49].13.6-8	93
V.2[11].1.1-3	21, 52	V.3[49].13.12-14	158
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V.2[11].1.8	107	V.3[49].13.17	120
V.2[11].1.9-11	41, 117, 155	V.3[49].13.19-21	88
V.2[11].1.10	157	V.3[49].13.30-31	122
V.2[11].1.14-16	107	V.3[49].13.32-33	94
V.2[11].1.16ff.	28	V.3[49].13.33	175
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V.2[11].2.13	42, 96	V.3[49].14.5-8	93, 121
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		V.3[49].14.14-15	100, 219, 233
V.3[49].2.9-13	162	V.3[49].15.10	124
V.3[49].4.9-13	128	V.3[49].15.11	61
V.3[49].5.7-8	88	V.3[49].15.11-15	111
V.3[49].5.7-21	47	V.3[49].15.20-21	22
V.3[49].5.21-48	91	V.3[49].15.27	96
V.3[49].6.7-8	88	V.3[49].15.27-29	59
V.3[49].7.3-4	51	V.3[49].15.27-32	22
V.3[49].7.3-6, 9-12	229	V.3[49].15.27-37	169
V.3[49].7.14	171	V.3[49].15.28-30	225
V.3[49].7.18-20	64	V.3[49].15.29-32	105
V.3[49].7.19-22	28	V.3[49].15.33-35	105
V.3[49].7.21-25	67	V.3[49].15.35-37	225
V.3[49].8.30-31	209	V.3[49].15.37-39	78
V.3[49].8.36-38	135	V.3[49].15.37-40	104
V.3[49].9.15-16	170	V.3[49].16.14-16	104
V.3[49].10.16-18	21-23, 26	V.3[49].16.19	122
V.3[49].10.42-43	234	V.3[49].16.35-37	156
V.3[49].10.42-44	231	V.3[49].16.38-42	165
V.3[49].10.43-44	176f.	V.3[49].16.41	28
V.3[49].10.49	125, 223	V.3[49].17.4	225
V.3[49].10.52	83	V.3[49].17.9	96
V.3[49].11.2	125	V.3[49].17.16-17	152
V.3[49].11.4-8	49	V.3[49].17.24-25	102f.
V.3[49].11.5	117, 157, 178	V.3[49].17.28-29	137
V.3[49].11.6	125	V.3[49].17.34	183
V.3[49].11.7	63, 162	V.3[49].17.34-37	146
V.3[49].11.10-12	117	V.3[49].17.37-38	195
V.3[49].11.10-14	11, 40	V.3[49].17.38	113, 135, 152

V.4[7].1.2-3	111	V.5[32].7.31-32	41
V.4[7].1.5	104	V.5[32].7.31-35	199
V.4[7].1.24	204	V.5[32].7.32	208
V.4[7].1.31-34	11, 28	V.5[32].7.35	188, 199
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V.4[7].2.4-7	92	V.5[32].8.24	202
V.4[7].2.5-7	59	V.5[32].9.1-7	124
V.4[7].2.6	54, 156, 176, 224	V.5[32].9.3-4	159
V.4[7].2.6-7	51, 113, 166	V.5[32].9.5-7	42, 96
V.4[7].2.6-8	54	V.5[32].9.9-10	96
V.4[7].2.7	59	V.5[32].9.11-12	96
V.4[7].2.7-8	54, 119	V.5[32].9.16	96
V.4[7].2.10	155	V.5[32].9.18-20	203
V.4[7].2.13	139, 213	V.5[32].9.18-33	185
V.4[7].2.15-19	53, 57	V.5[32].9.22-23	203
V.4[7].2.16-17	166	V.5[32].9.23	210
V.4[7].2.17-18	218	V.5[32].9.33	42, 96
V.4[7].2.18	41, 49, 57, 95, 99, 139, 159, 185, 206	V.5[32].10.7	233
V.4[7].2.21	38, 107	V.5[32].12.10-17	178
V.4[7].2.21-22	139	V.5[32].12.15-19	152
V.4[7].2.23ff.	227	V.5[32].12.32-36	143
V.4[7].2.25-26	35	V.5[32].12.41-47	120
V.4[7].2.26	139	V.5[32].12.44	206
V.4[7].2.27ff.	66, 164	V.5[32].13.11	113
V.4[7].2.27-30	213	V.5[32].13.35	107
V.4[7].2.27-34	67	V.6[24].1.22-23	118
V.4[7].2.33-34	38, 107, 139	V.6[24].2.7-9	20
V.4[7].2.34-36	109	V.6[24].2.7-12	11
V.4[7].2.35-36	39	V.6[24].2.9	12
V.4[7].2.43	75	V.6[24].4.2	120
V.4[7].2.43-44	90	V.6[24].4.5	63
V.5[32].1.23-24	92	V.6[24].4.14-16	135
V.5[32].1.23-27	153	V.6[24].4.21	120
V.5[32].1.24-25	92	V.6[24].5.1	209, 222
V.5[32].2.13	93	V.6[24].5.1-2	217
V.5[32].2.13-15	91	V.6[24].5.1-5	158
V.5[32].2.17-21	91	V.6[24].5.2-5	24
V.5[32].4.1-5	111	V.6[24].5.2-7	92
V.5[32].4.1-7	90	V.6[24].5.3	120
V.5[32].4.8-9	152	V.6[24].5.5-6	53
V.5[32].5.2-4	90	V.6[24].5.7-9	157
V.5[32].5.4-14	230	V.6[24].5.8-10	125, 178, 224
V.5[32].5.19-28	98	V.6[24].5.9	124, 178, 229
V.5[32].5.22	28	V.6[24].5.9ff.	76, 231
V.5[32].6	15	V.6[24].5.9-10	14, 51, 60, 158
V.5[32].6.4-5	113	V.6[24].5.10	224
V.5[32].6.19-21	182	V.6[24].5.13	35, 125
V.5[32].7.6-9	116	V.6[24].5.15	124, 162, 224
V.5[32].7.8	95, 175	V.6[24].5.16-17	14, 158
V.5[32].7.16-18	159	V.6[24].5.17	76, 229
V.5[32].7.31	232	V.6[24].6.3-4	213

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		VI.4[22].11.16	171
V.8[31].3.35	102	VI.4[22].11.20	36
V.8[31].4.4-6	135	VI.4[22].12.9-10, 14-18	98
V.8[31].4.21-24	88	VI.4[22].14.3-5	22
V.8[31].7.32-35	128	VI.4[22].16	189
V.8[31].9	142		
V.8[31].9.22-27	89	VI.5[23].4.20	96
V.8[31].9.42	107	VI.5[23].5.3-23	85
V.8[31].10.10	115	VI.5[23].8.7-8	10
V.8[31].10.13	108	VI.5[23].9.45	214
V.8[31].10.25	197	VI.5[23].10.4	178
V.8[31].10.32-33	175	VI.5[23].12.16-25	128
V.8[31].11.10-11	197		
V.8[31].11.17	208	VI.6[34].3	16
V.8[31].11.23	24f., 116	VI.6[34].3.1ff.	167
V.8[31].12.3-7	130	VI.6[34].3.24	54
V.8[31].13.1-11	130	VI.6[34].8.8	181
		VI.6[34].8.12	194
V.9[5].1.18	199	VI.6[34].8.17-20	230
V.9[5].2.10-12	198	VI.6[34].8.17-22	154
V.9[5].5.30-31	33	VI.6[34].9.11-13	78
V.9[5].6.3-4	22	VI.6[34].9.22-27, 29-33	79
V.9[5].8.2-4	88	VI.6[34].9.27-31	90
V.9[5].8.8-16	230	VI.6[34].9.29-37	17
V.9[5].8.11	154	VI.6[34].9.38-39	108
V.9[5].8.21-9.2	47	VI.6[34].9.40	109
V.9[5].9.14-16	47	VI.6[34].10.1-4	79
V.9[5].10.10-12	75	VI.6[34].14.27	107
V.9[5].10.11-13	157	VI.6[34].15.24-26	230
		VI.6[34].15.29-30	79
VI.1[42].9.9	107	VI.6[34].15.34	108
		VI.6[34].17.21-29	84
VI.2[43].2.8, 13, 33	167	VI.6[34].18.39-44	207
VI.2[43].6.7	108	VI.6[34].18.40-42	154
VI.2[43].6.15-20	78		
VI.2[43].8.18-24	26	VI.7[38].12.4-6, 17-19	152
VI.2[43].10-11	111	VI.7[38].12.22-23	75
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VI.2[43].21.7-9	107	VI.7[38].14.10-12	167
VI.2[43].22.8-10	167	VI.7[38].14.11-12	90
VI.2[43].22.12	167	VI.7[38].15-17	124
VI.2[43].22.15-17	170	VI.7[38].15.9	122
VI.2[43].24-27	89	VI.7[38].15.9-10, 13-14	123
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VI.3[44].1.15	167	VI.7[38].15.15-16	40, 60
VI.3[44].9.37	167	VI.7[38].15.17ff.	230
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VI.4[22].2.46	10	VI.7[38].15.23	122
VI.4[22].3.4	196	VI.7[38].15.29	169
VI.4[22].7.35-39	142	VI.7[38].16.5	122

VI.7[38].16.5-10	35	VI.7[38].21.8	122
VI.7[38].16.6-7	124	VI.7[38].21.13-17	159
VI.7[38].16.7-8	75	VI.7[38].21.16-17	122
VI.7[38].16.10	40	VI.7[38].22.6	209
VI.7[38].16.10-12	222	VI.7[38].22.6-14	143
VI.7[38].16.10-13	123	VI.7[38].22.7-10	174f.
VI.7[38].16.10-14	77	VI.7[38].22.10-14, 17-19	174
VI.7[38].16.10-16	47	VI.7[38].22.18-19	199
VI.7[38].16.11	222	VI.7[38].22.32-33	122
VI.7[38].16.13	224	VI.7[38].23.1	134, 159
VI.7[38].16.13-14	176, 231, 233	VI.7[38].23.3-4	116
VI.7[38].16.14-15	224	VI.7[38].23.21	108
VI.7[38].16.15	223	VI.7[38].24.5	209
VI.7[38].16.16	41	VI.7[38].25.18-24	195
VI.7[38].16.16-18	224	VI.7[38].25.31	165, 213
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VI.7[38].16.19-20	24, 49, 57, 125	VI.7[38].30.28	196
VI.7[38].16.20	22	VI.7[38].30.30	209
VI.7[38].16.21	124, 174	VI.7[38].31.1-3	142
VI.7[38].16.21-31	135	VI.7[38].31.5	209
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